TRUSTAFRICA

Survey of African Regional Organizations - Civil Society Organizations, Research Institutes and Think Tanks

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

This report emanates from a survey of African Regional Organizations (AROs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Research Institutes and Think Tanks initiated by TrustAfrica in 2007. The aim of the survey was to help identify opportunities and strategies for donor agencies, and in particular private foundations, to consider in helping to strengthen the effectiveness and sustainability of African regional organizations. It is the first time an audit of this kind has been conducted.

The survey focused on organizations with a continental or sub-continental mandate in five broad thematic areas: peace and security; human rights; environment; governance; and population. TrustAfrica's rationale for selecting these themes, and not others, is that these five fields together constitute sustainable foundations for African development, in the sense that there can be no durable development without a freer, safer and sustainable environment. Two main types of organizations were surveyed: TBOs or IGOs, which in the past constituted the main continental and regional actors; and CSOs and networks, which now occupy center stage in advocating continentally on the themes of the survey. An additional category identified in the survey covers cross-cutting organizations that work across themes.

The survey was conducted in two phases. The first phase, spanning February to April 2007, involved gathering data, including information on their track records and details of donor support for their work. The second phase entailed putting together the report—a draft of which was submitted at the end of May, peer reviewed, revised on the basis of feedback and completed in October 2007. In light of this assessment, and using the findings as an entry point, a conference was convened in April 2008 in Dakar to discuss wider issues of sustainability around existing and future support for AROs and CSOs. Participants at the conference included senior CSO, think tank and research institute leaders, representatives of donor agencies (private foundations as well as bilateral and multilateral funders), and a cross-section of experts.

In addition to publishing the survey, and further to the conference, TrustAfrica plans to take a number of initiatives – including the creation, updating, and maintenance of a dynamic online database of continentally-focused African organizations – as part of a long-term strategy to promote the sharing of knowledge and strengthen collaboration among AROs.

The report is divided into two parts. The first is a narrative section that includes a thematic overview, discussion of the donor landscape as it relates to continentally-focused organizations in Africa, and an analysis of gaps and opportunities identified in the course of the survey. It ends with key findings and strategic recommendations. The second part features profiles of more than 100 organizations.

Why This Work Is Important

The growing currency of regional approaches as a complementary strategy to state-led development in Africa makes this report timely and relevant.

On the one hand, the institutional landscape has evolved significantly in the past few years, with the result that the Pan-African intergovernmental system is becoming more and more relevant as a forum for policymaking. Alongside the advent of the African Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001 (and AU organs such as the Peace and Security Council, African Court on Human and People's Rights and Pan-African Parliament), the regional economic communities (RECs) are forging ahead with various economic, political and peace-building arrangements.

This surge of activity is spurred by a conviction that regional approaches are critical in addressing a host of concerns that know no borders—such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, demographic imbalances, environmental degradation and armed conflicts. At their level best, regional organizations can serve as vehicles for setting and securing compliance with standards and norms for sustainable

On the other hand, African civil society has grown exponentially since the days of the *African Charter on Popular Participation in Development and Transformation* (1990) and *African Charter on Human and People's Rights* (1981) – which respectively reflected a growing awareness among states of popular participation, and emphasized the importance of economic and social rights alongside political rights. The advent of these norms also provided civil society with opportunities to engage continentally to push for compliance with continental norms and standards, opportunities that coalesced around a new Pan-Africanism triggered by the demise of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the birth of the AU.

The *Constitutive Act of the African Union* (2001) articulated the new commitment by African states to "build an integrated Africa, a prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena". This commitment to a people-led union, marked by the establishment of institutions such as the Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) of the AU, came in recognition of the remarkable upsurge in the numbers as well as the diversity of civil society organizations (CSOs) engaging regionally, alongside the intergovernmental system.

Juxtaposed with an invigorated intergovernmental policy sphere, the emergence of these continental civil society formations advocating for continental policy, political and social change has attracted new interest and increasing support from Africa's development partners.

And yet the emerging regional institutional landscape remains fragile, with sustainability posing an overarching challenge. The legitimacy of civil society remains contingent on its ability to put its house in order, while some governments remain suspicious of CSO agency and agendas. Even as it asserts African ownership, the African intergovernmental system is unable to sustain the ambition of its own operations. This has in part been due to the reality that while many donor agencies have provided institutional and program support to regional TBOs and CSOs in the last two decades, this funding has tended to be piecemeal and sporadic.

All this speaks to the need for a more coherent and coordinated approach to supporting continentally-focused African organizations. By providing a detailed review and analysis of the field as currently constituted, and lessons learned as to what has worked and what has not, this report speaks to the need to build the capacity and sustainability of regional institutions in Africa so they can bridge the gap between declarations of intent and implementation on the ground.

In light of all this, the timing is right for private foundations to rethink their support to organizations working on these themes. Sustained and well-coordinated efforts to strengthen regional approaches to addressing challenges related to these and other themes are likely to lead to a significantly stronger field over the next 10 to 15 years.

Key Recommendations and Proposals
The report makes a number of recommendations, targeted primarily at private foundations but also of relevance to continentally-focused organizations. In light of the cross-cutting nature of the gaps and challenges identified, and given the differences in

remit from one foundation to another, the recommendations are deliberately strategic, offering concrete proposals without being too prescriptive.

Recommendations
The recommendations that follow are primarily targeted at private foundations, the primary audience of the survey. Nevertheless, and in the process, they also include recommendations for CSOs, think tanks and research institutes. In light of the cross-cutting nature of the gaps and challenges identified, and given the differences in remit from one foundation to another, the recommendations are deliberately strategic, offering concrete proposals without being too prescriptive.

➤ **Build Sustainable Capacity:** The question of capacity is fundamental to the future effectiveness of regional institutions and initiatives. In light of the proliferation of actors, the scale and scope of need is sizeable. Capacity encompasses institutional as well as human capacity and skills development, and relates to recruitment and staff retention, career and succession planning, internal training, administrative, financial and reporting systems, monitoring and evaluation, and technology, among other aspects.

In response to this challenge, and to ensure the sustainability of the field, _private foundations_ should place special emphasis on supporting institutional capacity as a core component of funding decisions, particularly as related to NGOs and CSOs. Where the need exists, such support should be predicated on addressing systemic organizational and human capacity constraints, with a view to setting the organizations in question on a sustainable path.

Foundations should develop clear benchmarks for institutional sustainability and use their networks of contacts to leverage the best available technical expertise to support their investments. Such support should be medium to long-term in duration. It may be necessary for foundations to ring-fence specific funding dedicated to strengthening institutional capacity. Such a dedicated fund could, for example, focus on a long-term effort to build the capacity of civil society to influence regional norms, standards, and initiatives, or help build civil society capacity to monitor and evaluate impact on outcome.

AROs and CSOs should recognize the centrality of institutional sustainability to the success of their missions, and should each develop a phased multi-year institutional strengthening strategy that is in sync with their respective work programs, highlighting the contingencies between program delivery milestones and incremental increases in institutional capacity. Proposals submitted to donors for core support should routinely include such multi-year strategies.

➤ **Ensure Stable and Predictable Funding:** Both at the level of NEPAD and the AU, and among small to medium-sized CSOs, there are gaps between program goals and objectives and the availability of resources to deliver. While this can be due to overly ambitious organizations setting unattainable goals, it is often due to a lack of funding and relates to the question of sustainability.

Private foundations should ensure that available resources are sufficiently stable and predictable to enable CSOs in particular to deliver their mission—bearing in mind the need for sufficient administrative support to ensure program delivery. Resource scarcity impedes long-term strategic decisions and is contrary to the spirit and commitment to long-term targets such as the MDGs. To deal with this funding gap, organizations need to identify long-term financial resources to ensure the

sustainability of their program activities as well as to rethink and challenge their nonprofit status. Private foundations could contribute in exploring this terrain.

Core resources should be provided to enable stable and sustained programming according to agreed objectives. Funding for projects should add value to core support, or risk distorting incentives by providing piecemeal support that does not advance the CSOs' core missions. Delays in disbursing funds, a problem highlighted by a number of organizations, seriously hamper program implementation and should be minimized. In addressing the widespread requirement for increased volume, foundations should also ensure the recipients have the capacity to absorb new money.

Recipients of funding need to develop innovative mechanisms and approaches not only to mobilize funds but also to maximize impact from available resources. In order to make a compelling case for increased funding—whether in asking for a larger proportion of core versus project funding or in seeking core funding where none existed previously—CSOs need to develop more empirically sound and demand-driven approaches to setting program goals. These approaches need to bear in mind the existing landscape, avoid duplication, and embrace partnership with others on the basis of a clear and symbiotic division of labor.

AROs should rationalize their programs, simplify complex procedures and arrangements, limit their core focus to what they are best placed to deliver, and establish effective partnerships with other AROs based on a clear division of labor. On that basis, they should find ways to secure sustained, predictable, timely, and long-term support from member states. Such support would indicate a serious commitment to the mission and ensure the AROs are better insulated against external agendas. AROs should take steps to ensure that support offered by or canvassed from external donors is streamlined with, and helps deliver the objectives of, the core program of work.

Where these do not currently exist, AROs should proactively develop mechanisms for agreeing on priorities, pooling funds and streamlining reporting. Project support should only be solicited where it adds value to the organizations' core mission.

➢ ***Strengthen Ownership, Coherence, and Coordination:*** As highlighted in the survey, programming is often supply-led and donor-driven. Furthermore, recipient relationships with a multiplicity of funders each providing support on the basis of its own priority issues and agendas introduce a high transaction cost that erodes the organizations' ability to establish context-responsive goals and deliver on them. This lack of donor coherence emerged as a key finding of the survey. While bilateral and multilateral donors are particularly culpable in this regard in their support to AROs, private foundations—with a range of charitable missions—often work in isolation.

Private foundations should invest in strengthening recipient ownership to encourage programming that is relevant to the challenges on the ground. To foster ownership, allow the space for these organizations to set their priorities and improve cost efficiency, foundations should develop more coordinated funding approaches. This might be achieved by 'subcontracting' funding to entities, such at TrustAfrica, that work exclusively on regional approaches in and on Africa. Foundations of this nature with detailed knowledge and a wide appreciation of the terrain are best placed to coordinate the management of pooled funds dedicated to strengthening the field.

To foster greater coherence, and taking into account the differences in charitable purpose from one private foundation to another, it should be possible to arrive at a

consensus on the key challenges facing AROs and CSOs, and on that basis pool funds to address these challenges. Where a challenge does not fall within the remit of a particular foundation, that foundation should not be compelled to invest in the area at hand. However, the objective of coherence should not be undermined by earmarking. Private foundations would do well to consider the principles contained in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness[1], endorsed by more than 100 countries.

Foundations should develop systematic ways to share information on continentally-focused organizations requesting funds, either through regional entities endowed for the purpose or via other arrangements. On this basis, coordinated approaches could be developed to ensure sustained support for leading actors as well as potential winners. Flexibility is key, enabling foundations to respond to the dynamic and rapidly changing regional landscape. Where possible, coordination among private foundations should also seek to establish common reporting formats to reduce transaction costs on recipients.

Donor coherence also demands that _AROs and CSOs_ be more consistent in designing programs and projects that reflect their mission, vision, and objectives amid fast-changing priorities in the region and the urgency for donors to address emerging issues.

To strengthen ownership and effectiveness, continentally-focused organizations should build synergies with each other. While CSOs may address different themes using a variety of strategies, they are united by common purpose and share the overarching objective of contributing to Africa's development. There is a critical need for CSOs to partner with each other more systematically, as well as with AROs and community-based organizations (CBOs), which ensure that the perspectives of marginalized groups are taken into account in regional initiatives. Such partnerships should be developed on the basis of distinct comparative advantage, a clear division of labor, and transparent and effective governance.

➢ **_Back Systemic Advocacy for Social Change:_** As highlighted in the report, advocacy conducted by CSOs has tended to be _ad hoc_ and lack long-term perspective. Furthermore, the sheer size of the continent and scope of the challenges at hand require that advocacy be well-designed, undertaken in coalitions and designed to bring about tangible policy changes not simply at the continental level but also at sub-regional, national, and sub-national levels. International NGOs working at regional level in Africa have internalized these lessons and ensure substantial and sustained support for their campaigns, to great effect.

In providing funds to CSOs undertaking advocacy to influence continental norms and standards, _private foundations_ should bear in mind the process orientation and long-run nature of advocacy. In doing so, foundations should be prepared to commit to supporting campaigns in the medium- to long-term, so as to have the best possible chance of brokering social change.

On their side, _CSOs_ should ensure that advocacy campaigns go beyond securing signatories or ratifications to continental treaties, charters, or related standards. It is imperative that advocacy strategies be developed that run the gamut, from influencing policy to ensuring the domestication, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of policy within countries. On issues such as population, linkages should also be made with global partners and campaigns.

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[1] OECD 2005, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, accessible at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf

➢ **Enable Better Dissemination and Networking:** The majority of continentally-focused organizations, including cross-cutting research and higher education institutions, are in the knowledge business, generating a high volume of published materials. However, and almost without exception, their dissemination is weak, depending largely on outdated and expensive methods. They rely on one-way transmittal of information to undefined audiences, and fail to ensure ongoing and high-quality feedback. They also fail to effectively harness ICTs, which enable more targeted dissemination as well as feedback and continuous engagement with stakeholders. All this leads to less than optimal program formulation and implementation, and an ivory-tower mentality.

In light of the fact that advocacy is fast becoming a tool of choice in regional processes, *CSOs, research institutes and think tanks* should urgently review their information and dissemination strategies with a view to developing more sophisticated, better-targeted approaches. A fundamental shift is needed from one-dimensional, wide-spectrum information dissemination to a more interactive model drawing on emerging approaches to sharing knowledge and communicating policy. Such strategies should be rooted in an understanding of communication as a means of strengthening program delivery, as opposed to a downstream public relations function. Advocacy will also benefit from this approach.

As part of its upcoming think-tank initiative, the Hewlett Foundation is considering investing resources in communicating the results of policy. Other *private foundations* could learn from this initiative, and contribute to a major rethinking of the information-communication-knowledge continuum and the role of knowledge networks in enhancing the impact of continentally-focused organizations. Prospective approaches such as e-learning, along the lines of the African Virtual University, could also be retailed by donors currently successfully supporting networking in other regions.

➢ **Invest in Research:** The lack of policy-oriented research is a missing link in the field. While a number of policy research institutes (PRIs) and institutions of higher learning consider research a core competence, this research is not necessarily linked to continental and sub-regional policy agendas. Conversely, the high cost of producing research has affected the ability of organizations working on regional issues to generate the evidence base. The link between research-focused and advocacy-focused regional organizations is also weak. The result is that CSOs working to influence policy are either forced to dig deep to commission research, or end up embarking on advocacy without the necessary evidence to convince policymakers.

Although research is expensive, private foundations can help make a significant difference to the rigor and effectiveness of future advocacy efforts by investing strategically in policy-relevant research led by independent think tanks and CSOs. This might range from studies like the African Governance Report (AGR), produced by the Economic Commission for Africa in collaboration with national policy research institutes, to research on Union Government being conducted by a coalition of CSOs. Strengthening the role of universities in policy-relevant research, and ensuring they are networked (along with PRIs) to advocacy coalitions, should also be supported.

An initiative supported by private foundations to strengthen the research base for CSO advocacy could begin with an audit of existing research focusing on issues such as access, policy relevance, and product impact. Such an audit would help to identify gaps and help inform future research agendas.

> **Brokering expanded and better coordinated support**
> As the report argues, a major opportunity presents itself for donors to 'grow' the field by establishing a working division of labor to ensure that effective AROs or those with potential receive adequate support. There is also a chance that donors can transcend traditional boundaries (foundation-bilateral-multilateral-private sector) and establish innovative joint arrangements. How donors can provide more consistent, long-term support along the lines of proposals emanating from this report remains a key question.
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> An important part of the answer could lie in the emergence of African philanthropy, a small but growing field. A number of organizations possess the knowledge and capacity to serve as intermediaries who can broker expanded and more coordinated support by private foundations to AROs. Such intermediaries could add value in a number of ways, including: by convening key actors in the AROs field on a periodic basis to share experience and strengthen collaboration; by monitoring and tracking developments and changes in the field; by generating knowledge to help enhance synergy among foundations and between them and their grantees; by fostering the development of knowledge-based networks of AROs to further facilitate experience-sharing and collective action; and by mobilizing additional resources that can be provide in the form of strategic grants to support priority areas.
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> Key among potential intermediaries is TrustAfrica itself. Established in June 2006 and based in Dakar, Senegal, it is the first foundation of its kind, consciously promoting regional approaches in peace and security, regional integration, citizenship and identity, and trade and private sector investment. The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), set up in 1973, is widely recognized as a key non-governmental centre of social knowledge production on the continent. The Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF)—established in 1991 and based in Harare, Zimbabwe—provides management and institutional support to a number of regional and sub-regional organizations, including research institutes. The Southern Africa Trust, based in Midrand, South Africa, is a leading proponent of integrated regional approaches to addressing common development problems, and grants to organizations as well as processes, primarily but not exclusively in the SADC sub-region.

II. INTRODUCTION

Background

The institutional landscape in Africa has evolved significantly over the past four decades. The founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1965 gave rise to the subsequent establishment of several other treaty-based inter-governmental organizations (TBOs/IGOs), notably the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) working at the sub-regional level. Initially the emphasis was on cooperation between states, and institutional mechanisms in place were overwhelmingly intergovernmental. Nevertheless, this state-led project recognized the need for African countries to overcome the constraints of their individual sizes and relative resource endowments, to aggregate their strengths and capacities, and to forge pan-African solidarity as a common strategy for development.

Over the last three decades, and for a number of reasons, civil society has begun to emerge as force for change in Africa. As the continent's economies went into decline in the late 1970s and countries were forced to disinvest from social development in order to pay their debts, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs), mainly of the international variety, sought to fill the gap left by the state. During

this period, a remarkable phenomenon started to unfold: African civic organizations, which had long rallied uncritically around the national project, started to assert the importance of citizen participation in development.

This aspiration was taken up at continental level, resulting in the Arusha Declaration, formally known as the *African Charter on Popular Participation in Development and Transformation*, in 1990. It marked the first time African states officially recognized the important role civil society could play in advancing African development. Another landmark was the *African Charter on Human and People's Rights* (1981), which emphasized the importance of economic and social rights alongside political rights. If the advent of these norms marked a growing awareness among states of popular participation, it also provided civil society with opportunities to engage continentally to push for compliance with these standards.

These opportunities coalesced around a new Pan-Africanism triggered by the demise of the OAU and the birth of the African Union (AU). The *Constitutive Act of the African Union* (2001) articulated the new commitment by African states to "build an integrated Africa, a prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena". This commitment to a people-led union, marked by the establishment of institutions such as the Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) of the AU, came in recognition of the remarkable upsurge in the numbers as well as the diversity of CSOs engaging regionally, alongside the intergovernmental system.

With the advent of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) alongside the AU (and AU organs like the Peace and Security Council and the African Court on Human and People's Rights), regional approaches to development are gaining currency as a complementary strategy to state-led development. The RECs are forging ahead with various economic, political and peace-building arrangements. The growing numbers of CSOs advocating for policy, political and social change at the regional level speaks to this recognition, which has attracted new interest and increasing support from Africa's development partners.

This surge of activity is spurred by a conviction that regional approaches are critical in addressing a host of concerns that know no borders—such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, demographic imbalances, environmental degradation and armed conflicts. At their level best, regional organizations can serve as vehicles for setting and securing compliance with standards and norms for sustainable development. They can help disseminate best practices across nations and promote efforts to harmonize national policies for sustainable development. In an increasingly globalized development context, effective regional organizations are also critical to Africa's collective ability to leverage trade, aid and ideas for sustainable development.

And yet the emerging regional institutional landscape remains fragile, with sustainability posing an overarching challenge. The legitimacy of civil society remains contingent on its ability to put its house in order, while some governments remain suspicious of CSO agency and agendas. Even as it asserts African ownership, the African intergovernmental system is unable to sustain its own operations, leaving it open to external influence. This and other shortfalls were well articulated by a recent audit of the AU, which included a series of proposals aimed at addressing the concerns raised. While many donor agencies have provided institutional and program support to regional TBOs and CSOs in the last two decades, this funding has tended to be piecemeal and sporadic.

All this speaks to the need for a more coherent and coordinated approach to supporting African regional organizations (AROs) and continentally-focused CSOs. AROs refer to TBOs or continental/ regional IGOs, whereas CSOs is taken to refer to non-governmental policy research and advocacy organizations. By drawing on lessons learned as to what has worked and what has not, it may be possible to build the capacity and sustainability of regional institutions in Africa so they can bridge the gap between declarations of intent and implementation on the ground.

Goal

With these developments in mind, TrustAfrica initiated a survey of AROs and CSOs to help identify opportunities and strategies for donor agencies, and in particular private foundations, to consider in helping to strengthen the effectiveness and sustainability of African regional organizations. The survey focuses on organizations with a continental or sub-continental mandate in five broad thematic areas: peace and security; human rights; environment; governance; and population. TrustAfrica's rationale for selecting these themes, and not others, is that these five fields together constitute sustainable foundations for African development, in the sense that there can be no durable development without a freer, safer and sustainable environment.

Typology

Two main types of organizations are surveyed: TBOs or IGOs, which in the past constituted the main continental and regional actors; and CSOs and networks, which now occupy center stage in advocating continentally on the themes of the survey. A distinction is made between continental AROs such as the AU, and sub-continental or sub-regional AROs, known as RECs, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or the East African Community (EAC). A similar distinction is made between sub-regional and continental CSOs, which work in a variety of areas—including research and higher learning, policy development and advocacy, awareness raising, service delivery, training and community building. An additional category identified in the survey covers cross-cutting organizations that work across themes.

In view of the proliferation of organizations working in and across the thematic areas, the approach adopted has been selective as opposed to exhaustive. This report therefore focuses on a subset of two types of organizations: those that are well established and have registered significant impact to date, and those with significant potential to make a difference.

Methodology

The survey was conducted in two phases. The first phase, spanning 1 February to 30 April 2007, involved gathering data on AROs and CSOs, including information on their track records and details of donor support for their work. Given the vast nature of the terrain, this data was gathered via desk research—involving review of documentation and scanning of websites—as well as telephone interviews and opportunistic face-to-face discussions with key actors.

The second phase entailed putting together the report—a draft of which was submitted to TrustAfrica at the end of May, reviewed by a group of experts and finalized in September 2007. In addition to publishing the survey in printed form, TrustAfrica plans to create, update, and maintain a dynamic online database of AROs and CSOs. Another important outcome of the AROs survey will be an initiative, led by TrustAfrica as part of its mandate, to promote the sharing of knowledge among organizations as a means of strengthening collaboration. In light of this assessment, and using the findings as an entry point, a conference was convened in April 2008 in Dakar to discuss wider issues of sustainability around existing and future support for AROs and CSOs. Participants at the conference included senior CSO, think tank and research institute leaders,

representatives of donor agencies (private foundations as well as bilateral and multilateral funders), and a cross-section of experts.

Road Map
The rest of this report proceeds as follows: Section II adds critical context to the survey by providing an overview of pertinent issues and milestones as related to the five themes identified above. Section III looks at the donor landscape as it relates to AROs and CSOs, while Section IV features an analysis of gaps and opportunities identified in the course of the survey. Section V highlights key findings and lists a number of strategic recommendations aimed primarily at private foundations.

Profiles of 108 organizations are featured in Section VI. Arranged by theme, these profiles are presented in a common format that includes information on their vision, mission and objectives, track record and challenges, as well as opportunities for donor engagement. Finally, alphabetical and thematic indices, as well as a comprehensive list of abbreviations featured in the report, and the donor matrix are included as appendices.

III. THEMATIC OVERVIEW

Context
An overview of the five themes underpinning this survey calls for a brief review of the institutional and policy landscape. As highlighted in the introduction to this report, regional approaches are gaining in currency in Africa as an important dimension of the quest for sustainable development. This trend is evident in efforts by AROs to reconfigure the continental institutional landscape and forge new collaboration arrangements.

At the pinnacle of the emerging continental architecture is the Constitutive Act establishing the African Union—which provides for a host of new institutions that include the African Court on Human and People's Rights, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). The demise of the OAU and emergence of the AU marks the end of non-interference and non-aggression, and the beginning of an era marked by collective responsibility for regional peace and security. The AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) and its sub-organs represent this new commitment.

Regional economic communities (RECs) accept this continental architecture as providing a common framework around which they can coordinate and synergize their efforts. Nevertheless, progress varies. While some RECs have forged ahead in establishing arrangements such as free-trade zones and fast-track energy sharing initiatives, the institutional landscape is characterized by overlapping arrangements and competing agendas.

These developments have not occurred in a vacuum. The increasing globalization of development has posed new challenges as well as opportunities for Africa, cementing the importance of regional approaches and unity of purpose at a time when other regional blocs are moving towards economic, political and cultural union. AROs have begun to use their convening power more strategically to incubate common African positions on key development issues. Positions developed by African trade ministers are emblematic of Africa's increasing assertiveness and confidence in its own development path.

The recognition of the centrality of citizen participation to the success of development efforts has led to the exponential growth of non-state actors and the emergence of

transnational civil society in Africa. Civil society is increasingly seen by AROs and individual governments as an important partner in these global engagements, and multiple spaces have opened up for CSO participation. Yet while civil society has rallied around this new regionalism, institutional arrangements remain a work in progress. CSOs themselves fall short in a number of critical areas, including capacity, governance and overall ability to register impact.

CSOs working on the five themes surveyed here are at best fragmented. By and large, they tend to be reactive rather than proactive. This is in part because agendas related to peace and security, governance, environment and population arise out of inter-governmental processes, while the implementation of policies emanating from these processes has tended to be led by treaty-based organizations. This top-down tendency is also reflected in the funding of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) implementing these agendas, which comes chiefly from bilateral and multilateral donors.

Consequently, the responsibility to help build the capacity of CSOs and think tanks has fallen largely on the shoulders of private foundations. While these foundations have been pivotal in ensuring sustained and effective non-governmental engagement in some areas—notably human rights—the overall lack of strategic, coordinated, predictable and coherent support has helped contribute to the slow growth in the field. Non-state actor engagement around issues of governance, for example, is largely residual and invited by IGOs—although this is beginning to change as the implications of a statist governance agenda become clear across civil society.

While human rights remains ascendant, other themes are becoming less relevant. Population, for example, is losing currency, at least as it was originally conceptualized and exported to the developing world as a concern by U.S. foundations and think tanks after World War II. Long-standing organizations are no longer attracting the support of their benefactors—in part because the contraction of available funding after the 2001 stock market collapse reduced money supply, but also because the population agenda was radically redefined at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo, Egypt, in 1994.

In light of all this, the timing is right for private foundations to rethink their support to AROs and CSOs working on these themes. Sustained and well-coordinated efforts to strengthen regional approaches to addressing challenges related to these and other themes are likely to lead to a significantly stronger field over the next 10 to 15 years.

With this critical context in mind, an overview of each of the five themes in this survey follows. The objective of this overview is to identify the key issues within each theme, to situate the current focus in historical perspective and to highlight important future trends in relation to these themes and the organizations that focus on them.

Governance
The origins of Africa's policy engagement with governance can be traced back to norms that predated the AU and NEPAD. Key among these was the 1990 *Arusha Declaration on Popular Participation*, which stressed the centrality of citizen participation and emphasized democracy as a prerequisite for African development. The Declaration reflected a series of external factors that impacted Africa – among them the end of the Cold War and the impact of a decade of structural adjustment programs. Another seminal governance-related moment was the emergence in 1991 of the Conference on Security, Stability and Development Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), which argued that progress for Africa must necessarily involve the four calabashes of security, stability, development and cooperation. Proponents of these views, which also featured in the 1981 African

Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment (AAF-SAP), argued that pluralism, democracy and people-led development were values inherent to the African personality.

External conceptions of governance have therefore been persistently resisted. CSOs rallying around the emerging AU agenda have continued to assert the primacy of the African personality, including indigenous views of governance, while rejecting external views. This was evident in the widespread CSO criticism of NEPAD as an externally imposed agenda. To this extent, governance remains a value-laden concept, and there are differing views as to what it should mean for Africa.

Inevitably, few CSOs espousing such views have benefited from donor support. Instead, the emphasis remains on supporting less ideological, more technocratic CSOs focused on such aspects of governance as electoral democracy. Bilateral donor agencies, along with IGOs such as the European Union and Commonwealth Secretariat, and northern NGOs such as the Carter Center remain market leaders in this field.

Although electoral democracy remains a core concern, it has been subsumed as part of a broader, increasingly hegemonic governance agenda rooted in the emerging aid relationship between Africa and its development partners. Treaty-based frameworks such as NEPAD have been pivotal in advancing the prevailing governance paradigm, which constitutes something of a consensus position between Africanist and external views. While asserting African ownership and leadership of its development, the consensus recognizes interdependence as a fundamental principle.

Thus, NEPAD represents a two-way compact—between Africa's leadership and its people, and between Africa and the outside world. The quest for good governance cuts across both of these dimensions. On the African side, and in addition to the incremental consolidation of electoral democracy, there is recognition that strong institutions of political, economic and corporate governance are needed if the continent is to achieve growth and development.

In terms of relations with the developed world, Africa's ownership of its own development is accepted as a fundamental principle—at least on paper. As enshrined in the G8 Action Plan, Africa and its partners must be mutually accountable in a new aid relationship that assigns responsibilities to both sides. Linked to this is the recognition that policy coherence is needed on both sides of the relationship.

Think tanks focused on Africa have begun to engage with aspects of the new aid relationship. Nevertheless, aid as a driver of development remains more of a concern among northern CSOs, while African CSOs and emphasize issues of economic justice—such as campaigning for a fair global trading regime and advocating for African developmental states with strong industrial policy. Emblematic of such actors is Third World Network–Africa (see profile on p.329), which seeks to mobilize African CSOs around trade and investment, mining and development, and gender and economic policy, and to promote alternatives to prevailing policies. Such CSOs are less doctrinaire than selective; they may, for example, choose to criticize NEPAD as neo-liberal while valorizing the APRM (see below) as an important process for strengthening governance within and above the African state.

An African vision of good governance
The continuing tensions between NEPAD and the AU, under whose leadership it has been officially subsumed, are reflected in the AU-led Declaration on Governance, Democracy and Elections, a bold attempt to develop a shared set of principles on the conduct of government within countries. Adopted by the AU's Addis Ababa summit on 30 January 2007, the Declaration omits a crucial phrase, present in an earlier draft,

proposing that African leaders be limited to two elected terms. Nevertheless, it provides a sound basis for citizens to hold their governments more accountable and demonstrates that governance as a theme has become well entrenched in the continent's development discourse. The Declaration is consistent with protocols on governance, peace and security in the RECs. SADC and ECOWAS, for example, have both denounced unconstitutional changes of government, while SADC's electoral principles, norms and standards are used throughout Southern Africa (see profile).

The UN Development Program (UNDP) defines governance as "… the legitimate exercise of political, economic and administrative authority through decision-making mechanisms and processes, institutions and management of development which reflects the requirements of participation, transparency, responsibility, efficiency and the primacy of the law"[2].

This technocratic definition encapsulates ongoing efforts, particularly among AROs, to define an African vision of good governance. Such a vision spans effective leadership, transparency and accountability, rule of law, a clear separation of powers, more effective parliamentary, judicial and administrative processes, a vibrant and empowered civil society, peace, stability and security, respect for human and people's rights, a free and responsible media, and constitutional guarantees including property rights[3].

Key challenges to African governance include weak political systems and flawed multiparty democracy, insufficient capacity in civil services, weak judicial and legislative institutions, a lack of citizen voice and participation in decision-making, the failure to harness traditional institutions in modern governance, and corruption. The consensus on African governance covers most of these aspirations. However, there remains a concern that the anti-corruption agenda—driven largely by the World Bank, IMF and northern governments—does not sufficiently take into account the fact that there is a giver as well as a taker. As such, northern NGOs such as Transparency International lead the charge to address corruption in Africa, even though it appears as a key indicator in African codes and standards developed to measure governance (see below).

Critically, HIV/AIDS has gained recognition as an overarching governance challenge that, unless halted in its tracks, will derail Africa's development and bring about a new era of crisis. The recognition of the wider socioeconomic implications of the pandemic, including a World Bank prediction that by 2020 Africa's per capita GDP could drop as much as 7 percent, has spurred campaigns for the right to health as well as research on governance scenarios for Africa's future.

Women's empowerment is also a continuing governance challenge across the board. More African women live in absolute and relative poverty today than a decade ago. The toll of HIV/AIDS on women and girls is disproportionately high, while women's access to the justice system is limited by legal illiteracy, lack of resources and gender insensitivity as well as bias among law enforcement agencies. In a number of countries, women are denied property rights. The incidence of violence against women, including rape and domestic violence, remains staggering[4].

The African Peer Review Mechanism
These concerns are reflected in the indicators underpinning the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which seeks to operationalize the continental aspiration of good

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[2] Statement by Mr. T. Gordon-Somers, special adviser, UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, IAD International Symposium, Dakar, 7–9 November 1966, "Good governance and development".
[3] Report of the 1st African Governance Forum, Addis Ababa, 11–12 July 1997.
[4] Consensus Statement, 4th African Development Forum, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 11–15 October 2004, http://www.uneca.org/adf.

governance. As agreed in Durban, South Africa, in 2002, its purpose is to "… foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building".

Countries submit to the APRM by signing the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, considered by many to be a ground-breaking document. One the one hand it reaffirms and renews the commitment of Africa's leaders to a host of previous norms and standards—including the *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* (1981) and the *Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government* (2000). On the other, it lays out an ambitious and far-reaching governance agenda on four critical fronts: Democracy and Good Political Governance; Economic and Corporate Governance; Socioeconomic Development; and the APRM itself.

On the basis of the peer review processes in Ghana, Rwanda, South Africa and Kenya to date, the APRM is emerging as a significant opportunity to strengthen governance across Africa using a continental mechanism to apply pressure on individual countries. That 26 countries have agreed to submit to the process opens up tremendous possibilities for increased debate and citizen participation in national and continental policy-making, and again demonstrates the potential of regional approaches. Aside from challenges of financing, ensuring inclusiveness and implementing the Programs of Action, the APRM's non-adversarial nature as a voluntary process for mutual learning means there is no enforcement of agreed codes, standards and norms.

Nevertheless, CSOs are starting to push for a seat at the table and opportunities to take ownership of the governance agenda. An important CSO initiative is the African Governance Monitoring Project (AfriMAP), which seeks to address conceptual and practical gaps in the APRM process, in part by monitoring government compliance and ensuring space for citizen involvement. While it started out as a reactive process to the APRM, AfriMAP has evolved into a far more substantive program that commissions research and facilitates advocacy on key dimensions of the African governance agenda, including justice and rule of law and democracy and political participation.

The APRM has spawned a series of efforts to develop and refine indicators for good governance, within and outside Africa, revealing the extent to which governance has become a technocratic agenda. A number of AROs have substantially reconfigured their programs to support the peer review process—notably the African Development Bank (AfDB) and Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), two of the APRM's three Strategic Partners, whose role includes sending experts as part of country review teams. However, CSOs are increasingly coming to terms with the fact that they too will have to address the technocratic aspects of the governance agenda, if only to generate research to inform issued-based campaigns.

In the next decade or so, governance will evolve, both in the way it is conceptualized and in the extent to which different actors can influence the agenda. Conceptually, it will be seen more in terms of a contract between African governments and citizens. Moreover, the link with development will be strengthened and there will be less emphasis on self-conditionality aimed at the outside world. The APRM and ongoing processes will continue to create space for citizen pressure on governments. This will lead to greater emphasis on compliance with agreed actions.

Peace and Security

Nearly half of the 50 UN peacekeeping missions conducted since the end of the Cold War have taken place in Africa, with many still under way—including one in the DRC, the largest so far. Yet security has taken on a wider definition since in recent years, evolving from the traditional state-centric and ideologically driven approach to a new emphasis on human security. Security is also increasingly seen as a *sine qua non* for regional integration and development, posing new challenges to African AROs and CSOs and requiring them to think laterally and do business differently.

Human security and development

The AU's *Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact* (2004) defines human security as the security of the individual with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life. Furthermore, human security encompasses "the creation of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities and choices for his/her full development"[5].

This definition clearly situates human security in the broader context of development. Poverty constitutes an overarching challenge with between 40 and 60 percent of Africa's 800 million inhabitants living below the US$1 a day poverty line. HIV/AIDS—accounting for 20 million deaths over last 20 years and 2.3 million in 2003 alone—is a bigger killer than conflicts in Africa. Some 25 million adults are living with AIDS and 11 million children have been orphaned. Added to this are other factors that render Africa's security challenges even more complex—among them the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the growing number of youth.

The emerging nexus of security and development has also placed greater emphasis on protecting women and children in situations of armed conflict. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, passed on 31 October 2002, recognized the impact of conflict on women and highlighted the pivotal role women could play in addressing these conflicts. Previously, the issue of women and armed conflict had constituted a key plan of the advocacy strategy implemented by African organizations in the run-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, China, in 1995.

Both the *Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women* (2003) and the *Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa* (2004) speak to the need to ensure the full and effective participation of women in peace processes, and to ban the abuse in conflict situations of girl children as wives or sex slaves. Similarly, the *African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child* (1990) stresses the need to protect the rights of women and children in situations of armed conflict. However, these issues are considered residual in an environment where AROs are driven by military-led peacekeeping considerations.

Progress and challenges

The AU and the RECs are mandated to take the lead in moving this new security agenda forward, with CSOs assigned a supporting role. An elaborate institutional architecture is spelled out in the 2004 *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (PSC), including provisions for a Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and African Standby Force (ASF).

Despite the constraints, progress in rolling out this architecture has been substantial, extending as far as the development of a post-conflict reconstruction framework. Similar

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[5] African Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, African Union 2005, downloadable from http://www.africa-union.org.

arrangements are also in place in the RECs, with ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD (see profiles) emphasizing human security as the bedrock to economic development effort, and prioritizing both. Significantly, and through their respective conflict mechanisms, both the AU and RECs can intervene preemptively to protect civilians in armed conflict. Nevertheless, AROs and CSOs still face a number of constraints that affect their ability to effectively implement the commonly agreed agenda.

One challenge that cuts across the regional landscape and specifically affects AROs is the absence of sufficient of political will to cede national sovereignty in favor of continental decision-making. This is less of an issue at the AU level, where many commitments are non-binding and consensus tends to paper over cracks. However, in the RECs, closer to the ground and more directly relevant to their member states, the exercise of sovereign agendas can lead to sub-regional paralysis. This is evident in IGAD and SADC, for example, where the involvement of member states as parties to conflicts in Somalia and DRC, respectively, has undermined regional efforts. Furthermore, and in practical terms, few member states are willing or able to shoulder the financial burden.

A second challenge is the AU's ability to coordinate the streamlining and implementation of continental peace and security arrangements. In light of the AU Commission's weak capacity amid a cascade of competing demands (as highlighted in the profile on p.69), coordination will continue to remain a significant challenge. Indeed, there is a widespread perception that security arrangements in some of the RECs are so far advanced that expecting the AU to coordinate is simply not realistic. ECOWAS is often held up as a market leader in this regard.

A third, and related, challenge is the absence of an overarching strategic framework to connect the various elements of the peace and security architecture. The division of labor among the different organs remains unclear. How the AU's Panel of the Wise complements or interacts with the ECOWAS Council of Elders and similar structures in other RECs, and how the various early warning systems link with each other, are among the many manifestations of this lack of coherence. A consequence is that while the human security agenda constitutes the dominant discourse of the day, peace-building efforts in practice largely address the symptoms, as opposed to root causes, of conflict in Africa. As such, much remains to be done to breathe life into the consensus of the intertwined nature of security and development.

In this environment, a fourth challenge is that while CSOs are visionary in terms of their appreciation and advocacy of human security concepts and issues, capacity is fragile and engagement is piecemeal. There is a clear lack of systematic CSO involvement in the AU and RECs, at a time when some authoritarian African governments are reneging on respect for rights and shunting aside concerns for human security.

A few leading CSOs specializing in research, convening, capacity building and technical assistance (see profiles on ISS, SaferAfrica and CCR) have adopted the AU architecture to guide their programming. However, most CSOs working in the field have not seen fit to do the same, instead often pursuing particular objectives with scant ability to deliver and poor awareness of the surrounding institutional landscape. That said, the establishment by ECOWAS of the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) in 2003 and the work of the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) demonstrate what is possible at sub-regional level. In other sub-regions, the recognition of civil society's role has not yet been translated into concrete mechanisms.

Opportunities and constraints
In theory, the new AU organs intended to systematize the involvement of CSOs constitute positive developments, but in practice they remain works in progress. The AU's ECOSOCC, which draws its inspiration from the Arusha Declaration, is under pressure to resolve bureaucratic, complex and opaque procedures for membership; eventually it will allow for substantive CSO engagement around peace and security, including at the technical level. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP), set up in 2004, includes a provision for debating the AU peace and security budget, and its president sits in the closed AU summits. The PAP can bring matters to the PSC, an important window for civil society given that the PAP will have full legislative, oversight powers in 5 years, when its members are elected. ECOSOCC, however, will remain advisory.

The Protocol establishing the PSC also allows CSOs to bring matters to its attention, while the Panel of the Wise can solicit CSO input in providing advice to the PSC. Similarly, the AU's Peace and Security Directorate collaborates with civil society on an *ad hoc* basis, although its partners are few and there remains no real strategy for working systematically with wider African civil society. The AU's 6th sixth region, the African Diaspora, is another potential channel of influence.

Ultimately, the advent of the AU and continued development of the RECs has opened up significant space for CSOs to take ownership of the continental agenda. However, unless and until mechanisms are put in place to ensure coherent and consistent funding aimed at advancing a people-centered peace and security agenda, AROs will continue to dominate the field. Yet they will face mounting pressure to stop proliferating continental standards and instead focus on achieving impact on the basis of existing ones. Inevitably, as they get better at raising funds and developing strategic programs, some non-state actors will move away from engagement with AROs and focus on parallel and alternative actions in the peace and security domain. There will be a much stronger and more concerted focus by non-state actors on human security.

Human Rights
Depending on how they are defined, human rights cut across many of the other focal themes of this survey and beyond. For instance, a previous survey[6] identified rule of law, administration of justice, law enforcement and penal reform, along with democratization, as human rights sub-themes—issues that appear in this survey under the governance umbrella. Similarly, rights related to land and the environment as well as rights of pastoralists and indigenous groups can fall as easily under environment as under human rights.

Again, issues related to refugees and forced migration and human rights in conflict situations form part of the human security agenda discussed above under the theme of peace and security. Thus it is wise to be flexible about thematic categorizations and to recognize the clear linkages between and across each theme.

The *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*, adopted in 1981 at a time when many states did not have citizens rights high on their agenda, nevertheless remains highly relevant today, and is often cited by AROs and CSOs concerned with human rights. It stands out for good reason—providing, among other things, for freedom of information and expression, the right to decent work, "the right to enjoy the best attainable state of mental and physical health", the right to education, the right to economic, social and cultural development, and the right to peace and security.

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[6] Building Bridges for Human Rights: Inter-African Initiatives in the Field of Human Rights. Interights: Compiled by M. Garling & C. Odinkalu, 2001.

Its central recognition of so-called 'second generation' economic and social (ECOSOC) rights was one of several innovations that distinguished the African Charter as highly progressive. ECOSOC rights are fully integrated into international as well as regional human rights law. National constitutions in a number of African countries contain binding and enforceable guarantees of these rights. However, they remain highly controversial—largely because the content of many of these rights is perceived to lack clarity, and because there is little in the way of international jurisprudence on the basis of these rights.

As such, while human rights lawyers continue to debate the justifiability of ECOSOC rights, most CSOs remains primarily concerned with advocacy around 'first generation' civil and political rights. Nevertheless, there is a growing belief among Africans concerned with human rights issues that, in light of the continent's development challenges, civil and political rights are pointless unless underpinned by ECOSOC rights.

Progressive institutions
The African Charter also provides for a series of bodies and mechanisms to ensure the protection of the rights it asserts. At the center is the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR), set up in Banjul, the Gambia, in 1987 to consider and rule on human rights violations in AU member states and to recommend corrective action against offending state parties. In May 1999, during its 25th session, the ACHPR resolved to allow CSOs access to its sessions, nominally for opening and closing sessions only, but also to closed sessions at the discretion of the chair, on issues of interest to them.

Additionally, the chair could give observers the floor to respond to questions from member states; observers could be requested by the chair to make a statement to the Commission on issues of concern; and observers could proactively request to have an issue of concern included in the meeting agenda. The 1999 resolution also included a requirement for each accredited CSO to present an activity report to the Commission every two years, establish close relations of cooperation with the ACHPR and engage with it on an ongoing basis. At the end of 2006, to differing degrees, some 342 organizations had observer status with the ACHPR, constituting a pioneering and active grouping of CSOs—and perhaps the strongest one in Africa to date.

Considering that the ACHPR was set up under the OAU, at a time when non-state actors had little or no access to continental decision-making forums, the decision and modalities developed were ground-breaking—so much so that every subsequent advance in jurisprudence related to human rights in Africa can at least in part be attributed to the observer mechanism.

Today, the ACHPR has been absorbed into the AU system, with a few innovations. Due to a weakness in the Protocol establishing the Commission, petitioners had to exhaust local remedies in-country before taking their cases to the continental body. Now, a provision in the Constitutive Act for an African Court of Justice—now merged with an African Human Rights Court as mandated by the African Charter—intends to provide the African human rights protection system with hitherto-absent teeth.

To a greater or lesser extent, the RECs have also enshrined human rights at the sub-regional level, creating a cascading architecture of judicial institutions, including the ECOWAS Community Court, the EAC Court and the SADC Court. As with the peace and security, the division of labor among these courts remains unclear.

A wider community of CSOs has embraced the enabling environment and has sought to actualize the spirit of the African Charter by advancing rights-based approaches to a host of diverse issues. Emblematic of this new approach is the Coalition for an Effective

African Court (see profile on p.132), whose mission is to strengthen the human rights protection system in Africa and provide redress for victims of rights violations. The Coalition has combined technical expertise and strategic legislative advocacy to good effect.

Other good practices include the '15% Now!' Campaign run by APHRA (see profile on p.120) and the Solidarity for African Women's Rights (SOAWR) campaign, which successfully sped the ratification of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa by combining adversarial tactics with constructive partnership, both with members states and the AU itself.

The implementation challenge
A major challenge to the African human rights community at large, and to AROs and CSOs in particular, lies in the fact that rights enshrined in the African Charter are rarely actualized in a systematic way—leaving the landscape littered with a proliferation of norms and standards that are often honored more in the breach. In light of the long-run nature of efforts to change the continental and sub-regional policy agenda, the link between the continental and national is patently weak, calling into question the relevance and effectiveness of the growing array of human rights organizations working in the domain.

A case in point is the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, adopted by OAU in July 1990. By July 2005, 39 countries had signed the Charter and 38 had ratified it. But only 3 countries—Egypt, Mauritius, and Rwanda—had submitted reports due to the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the body set up to ensure the Charter's implementation. CSOs working on child rights represent an important subset of human rights actors on the continent, yet ensuring domestication of continental norms has so far escaped even the hardiest of advocates.

As with other themes, lack of capacity and financial resources makes campaigns that require long-term commitments difficult if not impossible. The same applies to implementation of the pledge by African governments to earmark 15 percent of national budgets for health-related concerns, codified in the 2001 Abuja Declaration on AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Infectious Diseases.

Another challenge is to effectively harness important new or recent functions residing in the African human rights system. One such function, established by the ACHPR in 2004—two years after the AU's adoption of a Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression—is that of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. The role of the Special Rapporteur includes monitoring violations of the right to freedom of expression on the continent, recommending measures to address the violations, and assisting AU member countries in reviewing their national media laws and policies for compliance with the principles spelled out the ACHPR's Declaration.

The advent of both the Declaration of Principles and the Special Rapporteur owe much to the pioneering work of sub-regional media support organizations in Africa (e.g., see profiles of MISA, PIWA, and MFWA). This work was instrumental, for instance, in the adoption of the May 1991 Windhoek Declaration on promoting a free and pluralistic media, and the more recent African Charter on Broadcasting, adopted exactly 10 years later. In the coming years, the challenge for legislative advocates working on freedom-of-expression issues will be to move beyond the narrow focus on media rights to make linkages with the broader human rights struggles in different parts of the continent—a task that can be helped by a regional approach.

Another function with a strong rights basis is the AU Special Representative for the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, a position created in 2004 and funded by the Canadian government as part of its Canada Fund for Africa, which is designed to improve the AU's conflict prevention capacity. The role of the Special Representative is to advocate on behalf of war-affected populations across Africa, speak out against attacks on civilians, and urge that violators of international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law be held accountable for their actions.

That such important human rights functions in the AU system as well as in the RECs are made possible only through the RECs—or in the case of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, supported by an international NGO—speaks to the extent to which many continental initiatives are externally driven. An enduring challenge will therefore be to find ways to sustain such functions and their support structures, while ensuring their independence.

In the coming decade or so, there will be a growing recognition by African citizens they have the right to health and the right to work. Governments will increasingly acknowledge that they have a responsibility to meet these demands and explicitly set out to address them in policies and programs. At the same time, the emphasis among civil society will continue to be on actualizing political rights. The regional judicial architecture will be considerably stronger in 10 years' time that it is today—with judgments handed down by the African Court establishing strong jurisprudence on the basis of which targeted legislative advocacy can take place. The African human rights field is certain to be much stronger than it currently is.

Environment
Cross-cutting factors such as population growth, urbanization, endemic poverty, and inappropriate development practice constitute some of the major factors affecting and influencing the state of Africa's environment. At the same time, there is a growing recognition at regional and sub-regional levels that a degraded environment is a threat to those who depend on land and the natural environment for their livelihood.

This has led Africa's leaders, governments, institutions, and communities to make a number of regional and global commitments. As far back as 1980, African leaders adopted the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), a wide-ranging policy framework that included commitments to incorporate environmental issues into development planning. Since then, many governments have mainstreamed the environment in national Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs). With the advent of NEPAD, there is a clear commitment across Africa to the belief that safeguarding the environment constitutes a strategic and critical development imperative.

This commitment has been reinforced by the establishment of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) whose primary objective is to deepen cooperation on environmental policy making to realize sustainable development. AMCEN has provided impetus to the Africa Environment Outlook (AEO) project, a research-based publication that has helped highlight the continent's successes as well as outstanding challenges on the environment.

AEO has been instrumental in the development of NEPAD's Action Plan for the Environment Initiative, or Environment Action Plan (EAP), which asserts the centrality of the link between safeguarding Africa's environment and advancing its development. The EAP is a strategic framework that seeks to enhance Africa's economic prospects through sustainable management of environmental resources. A number of sub-regional centers

of excellence[7] have played a key role in developing the NEPAD framework, and are set to shape implementation of the NEPAD EAP.

In addition to the NEPAD initiative, African countries have signed more than 30 conventions and protocols addressing different aspects of environmental management. The existence of these norms and standards has had reinforced a broad consensus on the necessity and significance of environmental management in fighting poverty and advancing Africa's development. This has created room for greater coordination in the areas of energy, mineral resources, food, agriculture, animal resources, agriculture, forestry, water, and environmental protection. There also exists a clear division of labor between the AU and the RECs with regard to implementing identified priorities, including combating land degradation, drought, and desertification.

NEPAD EAP
Priorities for RECs

Arab Maghreb Union: Conservation and sustainable use of natural resources in the Maghreb countries; watershed management; rehabilitation and development of oases ecosystems and implementation of a long-term ecological monitoring network.

ECCAS region: Raising awareness on bushfires in the ECCAS region; water harvesting in arid and semi-arid zones; raising awareness on combating desertification targeting schools.

IGAD region: Environmental education and awareness raising; capacity building on integrated water management; enhancing capacity for community-based management of natural resources; rehabilitation and management of degraded rangelands; promotion of sustainable agricultural practices.

SADC region: Capacity-building for integrated rangeland management; protection and strategic use of groundwater resources.

ECOWAS region: Integrated management of the Lake Chad basin, Senegal River basin, Gambia River basin and Fouta Djallon highlands.

On paper, Africa is clearly committed to pursuing development on the basis of ecologically rational, economically sound, and socially acceptable policies. Yet despite the existence of a multiplicity of policy and institutional frameworks at various levels, environmental conservation remains a huge challenge. As the situation deteriorates in some areas, levels of compliance to regionally and internationally agreed norms and standards continue to be less than satisfactory.

Some key issues for Africa within the environment theme are discussed briefly below.

Land Degradation, Drought, and Desertification
The heavy reliance by Africa's population on land for agricultural livelihood and sustenance means that land is a critical natural resource. Agriculture is the continent's economic mainstay accounting for 20–30 percent of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa and representing up to 55 percent of Africa's total exports[8]. Africa is the continent most threatened by the spread of desertification, with 39 percent of Africa's land mass affected.

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[7] These include the Centre for Environment and development for the Arab region and Europe (CEDARE), Network for Environment and Sustainable Development in Africa (NESDA), and Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC), all of which have contributed substantively to the 2nd edition of AEO, titled *'Our Environment, Our Wealth'*.
[8] World Bank, 2000.

In response, Africa is now a key player in implementing the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)—ratified by all 53 African countries and now at various stages of implementation. The Convention addresses desertification from the perspective of sustainable development, emphasizing the involvement of local communities and CSOs. Priority actions in combating land degradation, drought, and desertification are identified and spelled out in detail in the NEPAD EAP[9] (see RECs box above).

Land degradation is a key factor of rural poverty. As soil fertility declines so does agricultural productivity, which must in turn be compensated for by costly fertilizers. Hence land degradation undermines livelihoods for small farmers, who are often caught in a downward spiral of declining agricultural activity, less subsistence, and flight from the villages—a major cause for the growing urban slums. This is exacerbated by the historical problem of community access to land.

As the profiles demonstrate, a number of organizations have sought to address land-related livelihood concerns. The African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF), for instance, has introduced new agricultural technologies to enhance food security by developing insect-resistant seedlings for subsistence and cash crops and supports farmers' access to markets and intellectual property protection. KickStart, an Africanized international NGO, has promoted small-scale enterprises in agriculture, irrigation, and marketing for sustainable growth.

Biodiversity and Livelihood Security
Africa currently has six of the world's 25 biodiversity hotspots[10], making it one of the most extensive ecosystems in the world. However, the hotspots are underutilized, poorly protected, and currently being lost at a high rate, with serious implications for the livelihoods of African communities dependent on natural resources. For these and other reasons, the conservation and protection of biodiversity is urgent.

Many African countries are party to agreements and protocols on the protection, conservation, and sustainable use of biodiversity. These include the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature.

Africa's biodiversity, a potential source of food and medicine, represents significant potential to accelerate economic growth and poverty reduction. However, a key concern is that it has not been harnessed to realize its true economic value. On the contrary, it has been expropriated primarily by northern entities conferring limited benefit to African farmers[11].

Effective conservation of biodiversity is closely linked to the preservation of Africa's wealth of indigenous knowledge. Traditional farming is an important pillar in safeguarding biodiversity given its emphasis on the intercropping of different crop varieties[12]. In reality, however, the protection of indigenous knowledge is generally weak, and local communities are poorly linked to research institutions involved in prospecting biodiversity. This has increased their vulnerability and led to a rapid loss of indigenous knowledge.

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[9] NEPAD, October 2003, Action Plan of the Environment Initiative of the New Partnership for Africa's Development.
[10] This includes the Guinean hot spot, which leads in mammalian species.
[11] According to a statement from African Civil Society organisations at the World Social Forum 2007, and for instance, Canada's main export, wheat, is derived from a Kenyan variety called 'Kenyan Farmer'; the U.S. and Canada grow barley bred from Ethiopian Varieties; and the Zera Zera sorghum grown in Texas originated in Ethiopia and the Sudan.
[12] In sub-Saharan Africa, more than 90% of the food is grown by small-holder farmers based on the use of customary farming practices such as multiple cropping, seed saving and on-farm crop selection (FAO, World Food Summit 2001).

Biotechnology, Biosafety, and Food Security

Despite concerns that biotechnology led to loss of biodiversity and soil degradation, and despite the danger of over-dependence on outside expertise and products at the expense of local capacity that is implied by biotechnology, NEPAD sees greater investment in science and technology—especially through the expansion of research and scientific innovation—as key to the conservation and use of Africa's rich biodiversity[13].

Africa's chief priority is to achieve food security without undermining the environment or compromising biodiversity. The uncertainty created by genetically modified crops heightens the need for biosafety regulations. The main concerns raised by GM crops relate to their potential impact on human health, poverty and hunger, livelihoods and food security, trade, and environment[14]. As a protocol to the UN CBD, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety calls for effective laws and regulations to safeguard human health and the environment from these emerging technologies.

The AU has spearheaded the development of a model law on biosafety and regulation of GMOs aimed at addressing a number of gaps in the Cartagena Protocol[15]. However, for many African countries, participation in the Protocol has been a challenge, due to a lack of capacity for biosafety activity at the national level. Despite these constraints, several countries in Africa have developed national biosafety networks.

The pressing need to support the livelihoods of small farmers is reflected in the work of several think tanks focused on biotechnology. These include the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF), which provides high-quality, insect-resistant cowpea varieties expected to benefit farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in West Africa; the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS), which made a significant policy contribution by focusing on laws that regulate access to genetic resources and promote fair and equitable sharing of benefits and implementing the CBD provisions; and the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA), an advocacy, innovation, and capacity-building organization that promotes the use of new and appropriate agro-technologies in fisheries, aquaculture, and livestock development (see profiles for more details).

Nevertheless, African CSOs remain divided as to whether they should embrace or reject biotechnology. Some have voiced concern over various initiatives proposed to boost agricultural production that have significant implications on biodiversity. One controversial initiative is the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), established by the Gates and Rockefeller Foundations and chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. CSOs are concerned that AGRA will undermine Africa's biodiversity by promoting an agricultural model dependent on agro-chemicals, monoculture of hybrid seeds, and introduction of GMOs[16]. Similar concerns have been expressed over a G8-led initiative to popularize biotechnology in African agriculture.

Further, CSOs warn that public-private partnership agreements between western companies involved in research of new agricultural technologies and national agricultural research centers in Africa pose a threat to biodiversity conservation because of their emphasis on monoculture. On the other hand, some argue that biotechnology consists of

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[13] The NEPAD framework on science and technology commits African countries to establish regional centres of excellence in science for conservation and sustainable use of Africa's biodiversity.

[14] UNEP (2006), Africa Environment Outlook 2: Our Environment, Our Wealth.

[15] In response to this constraint, the Conference of the Parties of the CBD, working with the Global Environment Facility (GEF) under the pilot biosafety Enabling Activity Project, has made $56 million available to build capacity for the Protocol's implementation worldwide. According to UNEP, however, none of the GEF funds are earmarked for Africa, and are more accessible to Asia and Latin America. This is developing project is highly demanding, leading to a 66-month lag before project implementation begins.

[16] See Statement from African Civil Society organisations at the World Social Forum, 2007.

a very broad spectrum of tools and approaches of which genetic engineering is only one of a number of biotechnology methods widely used and accepted in science as a whole. A minority believe that Africa has no choice but to embrace biotechnology, although ethical and safety concerns are cited.

Genetic resources
The push to recognize Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) on genetic resources is one such threat. Nearly 1,000 patents have been taken out on rice, wheat, soybean, and sorghum—predominantly by the world's largest agrochemical corporations. As a result, food security is moving away from the control of poor farmers as multinationals wield influence over the world's food chain. To stem this threat, the NEPAD Framework on Science and Technology has proposed developing an African databank on indigenous knowledge and technologies, promoting the integration of indigenous knowledge and practices in education curricula, and establishing an African network of regional gene banks, among other measures.

African priorities therefore include enhancing collaboration at the sub-regional and regional levels in enacting laws and policies regulating research on biotechnology to safeguard human and environmental health; encouraging robust debate to determine prioritization of GMOs and other agricultural technologies; building capacity on the scientific, legal, and policy aspects of risk management of GMOs; and strengthening national regulatory and monitoring frameworks on biosafety guidelines.

Africa's Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action offers diverse means of dealing with the issues of biodiversity and biosafety among others. So far, NEPAD has established the African Biosciences Initiative, a network of leading centers with hubs and nodes throughout the continent[17]. These hubs possess the necessary physical infrastructure to develop and implement regional and continental biosciences projects.

Energy
Energy is critical to poverty reduction and economic transformation in Africa. Yet a sizeable part of Africa's population lacks access to reliable, affordable, and socially acceptable sources of energy[18], and an estimated 80 percent lack access to electricity. Consequently, high reliance on wood fuel in many parts of Africa is destroying forests and natural vegetation, in the process interfering with water-catchment areas that feed rivers and streams. Renewable sources of energy are therefore critical to environmental conservation, especially in marginal and dry-land areas.

Under the NEPAD framework, African countries have committed themselves to developing affordable energy systems and reversing the environmental degradation caused by reliance on wood fuel. At the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002, the international community pledged to support and work with Africa to increase the use of renewable energy and other efficient and cleaner sources of energy in order to stem environmental degradation.[19] Under this framework, an increasing share of Africa's energy will be sourced from renewables, such as biofuel and biodiesel.

Several institutes are undertaking serious research in the area. Among them is AFREPREN, which has contributed to formulation of NEPAD's energy strategy and worked with the African Development Bank to identify priorities on renewables in Eastern

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[17] Biosciences East and Central Africa (BECA) at ILRI in Kenya; Southern Africa Network for Biosciences (Sanibel) at the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR, Pretoria, SA); West African Biosciences Network (WABNet) at Institut Senegalaise de Recherche Agricole in Dakar, Senegal; and Northern Africa Biosciences Network at National research Centre (NRC) of Cairo, Egypt. John Mugabe and Aggrey Ambali, Africa's Science and Technology: Consolidated Plan of Action (South Africa, NEPAD Office, 2006).
[18] NEPAD, Africa's Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action, 2007.
[19] WSSD, Plan of Implementation, Chapter 8 paragraph j.

Africa. Through its network, AFREPREN has contributed to the formulation of energy policy in the region. It has developed an excellent database on energy in Africa accessible online. Other organizations in this field include SolarAid, ZERO, FEMA, and AfriWEA, among others.

Climate Change
Africa's contribution to greenhouse gas emissions is low compared to those of China and the industrialized world, but the continent remains susceptible to the impacts of climate change due to factors of poverty, drought, inequitable land distribution, and over-reliance on rain-fed agriculture.

The major concern is that while Africa is the continent most vulnerable to the negative impact of climate change, it is the one least able to adapt. Indeed, the biggest challenge in relation to climate change is the short timeframe within which adaptation must take place to overcome its anticipated impacts—which are expected generate irreversible economic and socio-political problems with adverse impact on food security and other areas. It is estimated that climate change will reduce crop yields in Africa by an estimated 10 percent.[20]

Despite the urgency, few initiatives and organizations have been active in the area[21]. Nevertheless, several AROs, including the Sahara and Sahel Observatory (OSS), CILSS, and UMA, are addressing climate-change issues. The following profiled organizations are active in integrating climate-change issues in their wider programs: ACTS, ARCE, AYICC, CEDARE, CARPE, ELCI, IELRC, ZERO, and the Fossil Foundation. Meanwhile, CNA deals explicitly with the issue.

Water
Africa is endowed with significant sources of fresh water and is home to more than fifty significant international river basins. Yet over 300 million Africans lack access to safe drinking water. Population growth and the demands of growing economies means that demand for water in Africa will continue to rise. Africa also faces the challenge of ensuring environmental sustainability in the use of its water resources, which necessitates containing the over-exploitation of ground water and developing adequate environmental safeguards against pollution and contamination of existing fresh water sources.

Management of fresh water resources is also a major threat to peaceful coexistence between communities and among states—as evidenced by the Nile treaties, which have denied the upper riparians' rights to use the river's waters without Egypt's prior approval. In addressing the potential of conflict in the use of trans-boundary water sources, a number of ARO initiatives have emerged. The creation of the African Ministers' Council on Water in 2002 attests to the growing importance of managing water resources, as do such initiatives as the Nile Basin Initiative, Nile Basin Discourse, Lake Victoria Commission, Regional Water Initiative for Middle East and North Africa, Waternet, CEDARE, and the West African Water Initiative.

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[20] Murray L. and Orindi V., Adapting to Climate Change in East Africa: A Strategic Approach (IIED).
[21] Although several adaptation-relevant initiatives and programs are ongoing and more are proposed for the near future with the aim to contribute to the building adaptation capacity in Africa such as incorporating climate change in integrated water resources management in Tanzania; regional coping with drought and climate change; adaptation to climate and coastal change in West, Eastern, and Southern Africa; and community-based adaptation programs in several African countries. Elasha Osman Balgis, et al., A Background Paper on Impacts Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in Africa. Accra, Ghana, 21–23 September 2006.

Agro-Forestry

Forests and woodlands, occupying an estimated 21.8 percent of Africa's total land area[22], constitute a vital resource for Africa's environmental and economic sustenance and are also critical in combating desertification; conserving wetlands and coastal and freshwater resources; and limiting the impact of climate change. Forests and natural vegetation are intricately linked to human health in view of the high dependence on traditional medicine in many parts of the continent. Conserving endangered and economically useful medicinal plants widely available in tropical forests and woodlands therefore becomes a priority. Nevertheless, the absence of a clear legal and policy regime on the use and exploitation of forests has resulted in the unsustainable harvesting of forests leading to overall decline.

Institutions working in this area include: ANAFE, which strengthens the content and delivery of tertiary education in agro-forestry; AFORNET, which provides a platform to African forest scientists to facilitate the identification of key national, sub-regional, and regional forestry research problems; CARPE, which seeks to mitigate the impact of climate change by helping preserve the region's vast carbon sinks; and CAODN, a network spanning Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda, which builds awareness in public environment and the consequences of deforestation.

Gender and Environment

The importance of gender mainstreaming in environmental and poverty eradication policies has been recognized in a wide range of global agreements and forums[23], and several African governments have sought to mainstream gender in policies and strategies. Yet most environmental policies in Africa fail to acknowledge the fact that women play a substantially greater role in relation to environmental conservation and stewardship. Some research organizations have taken up this challenge by advocating not only for the empowerment of women but also for the institution of gender-sensitive policies in African countries. For instance, CODESRIA, a research-focused think tank, has worked with others to enhance the role of women in Africa's policy discourse.

With few exceptions, environmental organizations profiled in this survey fail to mention of gender in their mission, vision, or program objectives. Similarly, organizations working on peace and security miss the link between conflict, environmental destruction, and gender. At the same time, there are few women's organizations that deal specifically with environmental issues at a sub-regional and continental level. UNEP itself has only recently (in October 2006) developed a Gender Plan of Action aimed at mainstreaming gender in its work. There is room for much more to be done on gender and environment issues.

Energy, climate change, and water issues will dominate debates about the environment and resource allocation in the next two decades. Renewable sources of energy will become even more critical to environmental conservation, especially in marginal and dry-land areas, and as a means of mitigating the drastic effects of climate change. Extractive resources such as oil could well aggravate the continent's environmental problems, unless managed well and harnessed toward wealth creation and development. While this constitutes a critically important area for CSO advocacy and lobbying, it is also an area in which strong networks and social movements can bring about policy and social

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[22] FAO, 2003.
[23] These include Chapter 24 of Agenda 21 (UNCED, 1992); the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (WSSD, 2002); the Beijing Platform of Action, 1995; the World Conference on Human Rights, 1999; the International Conference on Population and Development, 1994; the World Summit for Social Development, 1995; he Millennium Declaration, 2000; and the requirements and agreements set out in the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women.

change. As such, enhanced focus by private foundations on continental policy and advocacy networks could be decisive in ensuring a sustainable African ecosystem.

Population
This theme has been at the forefront of the international agenda for many years, as manifested by the series of World Conferences on Population held in the last three decades of the 20th century—starting with Bucharest in 1974 and ending with the landmark International Conference on Population for Development (ICPD), held in Cairo, Egypt, in 1994.

At the ICPD, 179 countries signed up to a far-reaching Program of Action, to be implemented over a 20-year period (1994–2014). ICPD was significant because it moved the debate away from its previous focus on numbers, toward an emphasis on population in the broader context of reproductive rights—a shift that did much to advance the notion of gender as an overarching development challenge, and set the stage for the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995.

In December 2000, 189 countries signed on to the Millennium Development Goals, 8 targets that today represent a global consensus on what needs to be done to reduce poverty in the world's poorest countries. The Millennium Declaration itself is widely viewed as the pinnacle of the final decade of international conferences. Put together, the ICPD Program of Action, the Millennium Declaration, and the MDGs have informed Africa's agenda in the population field.

Demographic concerns and HIV/AIDS
Despite the acknowledgement of the Millennium Declaration, the African Common Position on the Progress of Implementation of the MDGs concedes that the majority of African countries are unlikely to meet most of the targets by 2015, because so many African countries are among the world's poorest. The latest available statistics suggest that if current birth rates remain unchecked, Africa's population, which has grown from 215 million to roughly 924 million since 1950, could rise to 2 billion by 2050, overtaking a projected 1.63 billion for India and 1.44 billion for China.

A number of demographic characteristics make Africa's situation particularly inimical to development. One is the fact that 42 percent of Africans are under 15, and 3 percent over 65, meaning Africa has a high dependency rate. With young women and girls making up 52 percent, the so-called youth bulge will mean that even if fertility declines, population will still continue to rise. HIV/AIDS is currently Africa's greatest challenge to sustainable development, with UNICEF and UNAIDS reporting that in 2004, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 63 percent of infections among youth aged 15–24. HIV/AIDS and lower birth rates in Southern Africa mean its projected population growth rate is among the slowest regions, second only to North Africa. By 2050, West and East Africa will register the highest population growth, followed by Central Africa[24].

Despite being unable to deliver on the Cairo Consensus due to a lack of capacity to implement most of the Program of Action, and according to the Africa progress report prepared for ICPD+10 in 2004, population issues are being addressed to a better extent within the context of poverty, environment, and decentralized planning; actions are being taken on specific issues of population, including reproductive health; while specific population policies have been adopted in some 69 percent of the countries.

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[24] Additionally, the number of Africans living in urban areas is projected to rise from 36 percent to 53 percent of the population by 2030. This increase will impose considerable strain on the continent's cities, but also create opportunities to provide services to a larger proportion of the population, as marginalized communities move from remote and hard-to-reach locations.

Taking ownership

While Africa's population strategies are aligned to global norms and standards, the AU has sought to take ownership of the population problem. In 1996, its predecessor, the OAU, set up the African Population Commission (APC) as the main continental body dealing with population and development and reproductive health issues. In 2005 the APC was rationalized and mainstreamed into the AU Commission, which now serves as its secretariat. The AU recently published the State of the African Population Report 2006, the second in a series of biennial reports charting progress and recommending policy actions.

The 2006 Report served as the main background document for the 6th Ordinary Session of the APC, which took place in South Africa from 16–17 July 2007. The meeting expressed concern that halfway through the target period Africa was not on track to meet the MDGs. In particular, the target of reducing maternal and infant mortality was unlikely to be met due to the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS. Another concern was that the population and development debate was restricted to issues of population size and growth rate, at the expense of aspects of the age structure and the implications of population dynamics for poverty reduction and development.

Among other things, the Gauteng Declaration issued at the end of the meeting called for: increased investment and repositioning of family planning; increased investment in health programs directed at women, children, and youth; free primary education and increased investment in technical education; speeded-up responses to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis; and strengthened institutional capacity for coordination, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of national population policies.

The Declaration also called for the active involvement of civil society in advocacy and service delivery around population issues. Currently, CSOs do not assume a prominent role in advocating for population issues in Africa to be addressed. The majority of CSOs view population within the broader context of reproductive rights, along the lines of the Cairo Consensus. While HIV/AIDS attracts significant CSO engagement, the broader debates on the relationship between population growth and economic development in Africa have largely been passed over.

A growing number of African countries have integrated population issues into the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of various sustainable development policies and programs. However, concerns over migration, human resource capacity, fertility, life expectancy, and availability of reproductive health commodities could affect the modest progress achieved.

Migration

An estimated one-third of the world's 150 million migrants are said to be Africans, including a growing number of female migrants. Within Africa, some 16 million people are reported to be living in a country other than their birth—forced by political instability, environmental degradation, and poverty. Among issues arising from this movement of people is the concern that Africa's best brains are leaving the continent. The large number of professionals leaving Africa on a consistent basis could erode capacity at a time when Africa needs to enhance labor productivity to move up the value chain of technological innovation as a means of leapfrogging its constraints.

In light of its implications for Africa's human resource capacity, the dearth of organizations of any type highlighting the migration issue constitutes a major cause for concern—particularly given policy interventions by the EU and other Western donors from a security perspective. Research has also shown that remittances are not always

effective as a replacement for aid, since their primary purpose was to support the day-to-day subsistence and reproduction of family members.

There are few organizations in Africa prioritizing the migration issue, notwithstanding the role of international organizations such as International Organization on Migration (IOM).

Reproductive Health
Population can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, adequate labor and consumer markets are good for economic growth. On the other, however, unchecked population growth in the absence of enough land and public services can wreak havoc. Africa's birth rate of 38 per 1,000 remains the highest in the world, and is set to rise, even with the deaths caused by the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious diseases. At the same time, HIV/AIDS is causing significant declines in life expectancy to as low as 34–40 years. Africa's average of 52 years is itself is low when compared to 80 years for citizens of developed countries.

For a number of reasons, and outside Northern and Southern Africa, the uptake and use of contraceptives remains relatively low. At the same time, there are problems of availability of so-called reproductive health commodities, making family planning all the more difficult. The evidence shows that where information and contraceptives are made available, there is a moderate-to-rapid decline in the birth rate as well as economic improvement, better health for women and their families, and higher educational attainment and status. In countries where the birth rate has not fallen, there has been explosive growth in urban slums, failed education strategies, and in some cases continuing oppression of women.

A number of continental organizations work in population-related areas. On HIV/AIDS, key players include the Population Council, Partners in Population and Development (PPD), African Council of AIDS Service Organizations (AfriCASO), and the African Networks for Health Research & Development (AFRO-NET). Along with the Partner in Population Development and the Regional Center for Training in Family Planning and Reproductive Health (RCT), the Population Council also works on reproductive health issues. Organizations such as the African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF) and programs such as the Health Systems Research for Reproductive Health and Health Care Reforms in the Eastern and Southern African Region also focus on the wider challenge of strengthening Africa's health systems.

Though there are many organizations conducting research related to reproductive health and HIV/AIDS, this tends not to include work on the challenges of HIV/AIDS in areas prone to conflict. This is an aspect of the research agenda that needs to be strengthened. Since the absolute numbers infected are much greater among the poor, and since reaching them with information and services is more difficult, resources should be deployed to ensure that the poor are provided with life-saving information, treatment of STDs, and access to condoms.

More emphasis needs to be placed on prioritizing prevention interventions due to scarcity of resources available in confronting the HIV pandemic in Africa. Since many organizations are involved in the awareness campaigns about the primary mode of transmission, there is need to focus on behavior change. Those involved in prevention should attempt to refocus their attention on youth, with the aim of making them advocates for and designers of intensified prevention efforts. Youth represent untapped terrain for support and investment, as those between the ages of 14 and 24, account for 20 percent of Africa's population.

Population does not exist in a vacuum. As such, another challenge that must be addressed in the coming years is the parlous state of health systems of most African countries due to persistent poverty, population growth, and diverse endemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria. The recognition that well-organized and sustained health systems are necessary to achieve results on the ground needs to be matched by concrete action in a number of areas. These include putting together the right chain of processes (i.e., financing, regulatory framework for private sector-public collaboration, governance, insurance, logistics, provider payment and incentive mechanism, information, well-trained personnel, basic infrastructure, and supplies) to ensure equitable access to effective service delivery.

The Nexus:

In reality, it is becoming increasingly difficult to treat environment, population and other themes as stand-alone, separate issues. The scientific debate around the connection between the environment and security goes back several decades. The core of this debate focuses on conflicts and the use of natural resources and land. As a result, these initially solely scientific debates evolved into a series of instruments for crisis prevention applying nature protection and resource management. In the classic debates centered on the relevance of the connection between the environment and security, the main focus of attention was on conflict and cooperation in the areas of energy and water management. Today, however, nature protection, sustainable use, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits have moved into the foreground as can also be seen in the UN Convention on Biodiversity.

The concern for the possibility of wars fought over access to natural resources was evoked for the first time at the beginning of the 1970s as an effect of the first oil crisis. The 1972 report of the Club of Rome on the limits to growth[25] mentioned such fears and the first UN Environmental Summit in Stockholm in the same year also addressed resource-based conflicts. It was Boutros Boutros Ghali, then Egyptian Foreign Minister and later UN General Secretary, who predicted the next war in the Middle East would not be fought over oil but rather over water.

At the same time, the Malthusian assumption that overpopulation and hunger would lead to crisis and insurgency in the near future was gaining ground. The example presented was the famine in the Sahel region with its ramifications in terms of the downfall and ultimate failure of states in the Horn of Africa, as well as the growing domestic conflicts within states regarding land use and land rights in West Africa.

Until the end of the 1980s, the debate developed further along these lines describing the explosive connection between poverty and environmental degradation as a risk to stability and security. Shortly thereafter, the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992 addressed both environment AND development[26].

Population and Environment issues typically fall under broader labels such as 'population, health and environment' or 'population and development' or simply "poverty alleviation." At the community level, population interventions cannot be separated from broader health needs, and natural resource management strategies are linked and indeed are often synonymous with economic development and livelihoods efforts.

Generally, the Population and Environment nexus is particularly complicated because the fields themselves are so complex. On the population side, funders' mandates have

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[25] D. Meadows *et al* (1972). The Limits to Growth: A Report to the Club of Rome, accessible at http://www.clubofrome.org/
[26] Linking Environment and Security (2004): Conflict Prevention and Peacemaking in East and Horn of Africa

expanded considerably over the past decade. While demographers maintain that population officially encompasses the three processes of fertility, mortality, and migration, donors have historically directed the majority of their funding toward lowering fertility rates, particularly in the parts of the world with the most rapid rates of population growth. However, the 1994 ICPD shed light on the importance for both social development and women's empowerment of stabilizing world population growth, and donors have responded accordingly.

The environmental arena is equally expansive. The field has evolved from a focus on single issues such as water pollution and species extinctions to a more holistic approach that emphasizes the importance of maintaining ecological processes and global ecosystem integrity. The environmental community's early emphasis on direct protection through parks, reserves, and protected areas was supplanted during the 1990s by a social-development push, illustrated by the proliferation of integrated conservation and development projects. Habitat fragmentation, human domination of natural systems, and an ambitious trend toward larger landscape-scale interventions have led the environmental community straight into the same social-development challenges as the population field. It is at this nexus that the young field of population-environment is emerging[27].

IV. DONOR SUPPORT TO AROs and CSOs

Introduction
This section begins with a snapshot of the global context as a means of better understanding the role and impact of private foundations in supporting African regional organizations.

During the Cold War, the emphasis in private philanthropy was on international affairs and peace and security. Subsequently the emphasis has shifted dramatically toward developmental concerns. These have included a greater focus on international development, health and family planning, education, human rights, and civil liberties. Accompanying this shift has been a decline in spending for international affairs and peace and security programs[28].

The last decade or so saw an explosion in overseas funding by U.S. foundations. This reflected a doubling of the number of philanthropic foundations in the U.S. between 1995 and 2005, and the incremental increase in their international funding—which doubled between 1998 and 2001, rising from US$1.8 billion to US$3.3 billion. Twelve major foundations[29] now allocate some 50 percent of their funding for global public goods such as health, education, and the environment[30].

Ramifications of 9/11
The attacks on September 11, 2001, interrupted this trend and registered a profound effect on grant-making. The financial crisis that followed led to a drop in the value of foundation endowments, and this in turn brought about a significant reduction in the size of grant-making budgets, which lasted until 2004. This undoubtedly had an impact on funding of CSOs.

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[27] Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2003): Environmental Change & Security Project Report. Issue No. 9
[28] International Grantmaking: Patterns and Priorities. L. Renz & J. Samson-Atienza, the Foundation Center, 1997.
[29] Ford, Hewlett, Packard, Rockefeller, Gates, Mellon, Kellogg, Mott Foundations, Open Society Institute, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Carnegie Corporation of New York, MacArthur.
[30] Foundation Center, "International Grantmaking III, an Update on U.S. Foundation Trends," 2004.

Despite this downturn, international grant-making rebounded from the decline of the previous 3 years, rising by 11 percent in 2004 and 8 percent in 2005. This was primarily due to the exponential increase in funding for global health by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which has donated US$5.8 billion through its Grand Challenges in Global Health Initiative alone. Also, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation pumped nearly US$ 1 billion into its Andes-Amazon initiative to conserve biodiversity. Another factor in the increase was the substantial foundation support in response to the humanitarian disasters in South Asia and the Sudan[31].

While the attacks led to restrictions on philanthropy, they also brought home to foundations the importance of balancing the governmental preoccupation with terrorism and security with the need to create a climate for tolerance and peace. This is manifested by a clear division of labor in which bilateral and multilateral donors focus on security concerns, such as the rebuilding of 'failed' states, while private foundations rally their resources to support developmental concerns. Private foundations are strong believers in the international system, and work closely with European nations and development agencies (who critically provide a bridge between the foundations and Africa), major international organizations (including the UN system), as well as development-serving regional organizations and initiatives such as NEPAD (see donor matrix on p.336).

Sectoral Priorities
Health, education, and the environment constitute the three biggest sectoral priorities of U.S. private foundations today[32], with health accounting for 31 percent of total international support from foundations, and education and the environment each accounting for 8 percent. The high outlay on health reflects the growing interest among private foundations in global public goods and the impact of HIV/AIDS, in line with the shift in priorities highlighted above. At the same time, and within the health sector, it raises concerns that support may be diminishing to issues that have major relevance for Africa's development. One of these is reproductive health (see Thematic Overview).

In addition to the fight against HIV and AIDS, other concerns now attracting significant support include protection of civil liberties and human rights, promotion of free expression through open media, amplifying Southern voices, campaigns to ban landmines and conflict diamonds, efforts to increase corporate accountability and rein in capital in the context of globalization, and market-based approaches to social and environmental justice[33].

CSO-led initiatives to advance the interests of poor countries in the global economy and compel the World Bank, IMF, and other international economic institutions to be more accountable are also attracting increased interest. One such initiative is the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN), supported by the MacArthur, Kellogg, and Rockefeller Foundations. Third World Network–Africa (TWN–Africa), a leading ARO focused on social and economic justice (see profile on p. 329), which also receives support from the Ford Foundation, was a prime mover in SAPRIN.

The Southern and Eastern African Trade and Investment Negotiations Initiative (SEATINI), which supports African negotiations in the WTO Uruguay Round and related processes, has also won support from U.S. foundations, notably the Rockefeller Foundation and Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

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[31] International Grantmaking Update: A Snapshot of U.S. Foundation Trends. L. Renz & J. Atienza, the Foundation Center, October 2006.
[32] Foundation Center, "International Grantmaking III, an Update on U.S. Foundation Trends," 2004.
[33] Globalization and Grantmakers: Demystifying the Issues, Actors and Funding Opportunities. August 2003, Revised Edition. C. Deere for the Funders Network on Trade and Globalization.

Spurred by the growth of NGOs in emerging democracies, improvement in telecommunications, growth of local philanthropy and technical assistance capacity[34], and other factors, a number of foundations have sought to expand their presence in the global South. For instance, the Open Society has established affiliated funds in more than 24 countries in recent years. In Africa, successive Open Society initiatives have been set up for West, Southern, and Eastern Africa, along with related initiatives such as AfriMAP[35]. As a result, continentally-focused CSO-led work on human rights, governance, and other themes has been energized and is expanding.

Funding patterns
Significantly, although the proportion of U.S. foundation grants to overseas recipients dropped to US$822 million in 2004, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for one-fifth of the amount, more than any other region[36]. Global programs of international NGOs such as the UK-based International HIV/AIDS Alliance also rank high on the list.

This is an indication that the sector in Africa may not yet be robust enough to attract sufficient direct support, as well as a pointer to the extent to which CSOs affiliate themselves to global thematic campaigns and concerns, and are partially dependent on funds from international NGOs. It also demonstrates the influence that programming on global issues, such as HIV/AIDS, has on the work of AROs in Africa.

When foundations choose non-American recipients, this aid becomes very geographically concentrated. In 2003 and 2004, for example, 90 percent of the Kellogg Foundation's grant-making went to either Africa or Latin America. The Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Mellon Foundation focused on sub-Saharan Africa. Other foundations—such as Hewlett, Ford, and MacArthur—tend to concentrate on global issues.

As a rule, U.S. foundations prefer to put most of their funding in relatively industrialized and emerging economies, as opposed to the poorest countries[37]. In the African context, South Africa therefore accounts for the largest share of Africa-destined funding, followed by Nigeria and Kenya[38]. This goes some way toward explaining the concentration of CSOs headquartered in these capitals, and the relative dearth of continental organizations in many other African nations.

Key Findings
With the above context in mind, this section highlights key findings from the survey as related to donor funding of AROs and CSOs.

General Findings
Overall, and across the spectrum of donors, the survey found a growing recognition of the importance of regional approaches. However, where such recognition exists, it is mainly top-down. Bilateral and multilateral donors, for example, are keen to help bolster the capacity of AROs to manage continental frameworks and initiatives. This is particularly evident in two of the themes of this survey—peace and security, and

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[34] Ibid.
[35] http://www.afrimap.org.
[36] International Grantmaking Update: A Snapshot of U.S. Foundation Trends. L. Renz & J. Atienza, the Foundation Center, October 2006.
[37] "US Funding of the Millennium Development Goals: an Analysis of Private Philanthropy and Public Aid," 2006, by Benoît Chervalier, Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Joseph Zimet, NGOs and Foundations Liaison officer at the Agence Française de Développement, undertaken in partnership with Sciences-Po Paris.
[38] According to the study, South Africa accounted for US$50 million, Nigeria for US$22 million, and Kenya for US$18 million.

governance. And yet citizen participation in the lion's share of these TBO-led initiatives is residual and attracts significantly less support.

The most consistent supporters of continental organizations are philanthropic foundations. This particularly applies to the institutions of higher learning like the African Virtual University (AVU) and the Association of African Universities (AAU—see profiles on pp. 307 and 308), research institutes with strong track records (such as CODESRIA, see profile on p. 313), as well as many international inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations in the area of environment. However, CSOs in particular are increasingly becoming dependent on well-resourced and well-staffed international NGOs, which are themselves Africanizing their operations and occupying center stage.

Private foundations have not been systematic in helping fill the gaps in these TBO-led initiatives, but have instead supported CSO initiatives in a piecemeal fashion. This approach has yielded success in human rights, a theme that remains at the core of the missions of many Africa-focused organizations. Yet while support is relatively consistent, it is not always sufficiently predictable or long-term. This tends to undermine continental initiatives such as advocacy coalitions and networks, which find it difficult to register impact beyond influencing norm-setting processes.

A second general finding is that the funding of regional organizations is by and large characterized by a lack of coherence, with both AROs and CSOs suffering from the fallout of this phenomenon. As the table on page 336 shows, private foundation support in the five themes of this study is extensive. Nevertheless, although foundations share information about their grantees, there are few systematic mechanisms to ensure coherent funding. While basket funding approaches are gaining currency, and while organizations who receive core funding are increasingly finding ways to coordinate their engagement with donors, systems and structures to ensure coherence on the donor side are thin on the ground.

As a result, strategic cross-fertilization among foundations and between foundations and bilateral/multilateral donors is less than optimal. Indeed, an important *raison d'être* for the survey is the relative lack of knowledge among private foundations as to each other's strategies.

Third, there is a general tendency among foundations to support project or program activities without paying sufficient attention to institutional strengthening. This emerged as a common refrain from CSOs, which felt strongly that foundations could do much more to help ensure their sustainability. Foundations are clearly better placed to address these needs than bilateral donors, whose multiple efforts to build capacity in AROs to date have consistently failed to achieve the desired results.

One notable exception is the Canadian International Development Research Center (IDRC), which has consistently supported research institutes, think tanks, and networks across Africa for at least three decades and has systematically sought to build sustainable institutions. Networks such as the Secretariat for Institutional Support of Economic Research in Africa (SISERA) and the African Economics Research Consortium (AERC) owe their continued existence to the consistent and strategic manner in which they have been supported by IDRC.

The Hewlett Foundation, which prides itself on building institutional capacity in all the fields it supports, has also recognized the pivotal importance of building strong local research institutions in developing countries as a means of engendering home-grown development policy. In February 2006, Hewlett's Board of Directors approved a US$100 million envelope over 10 years dedicated to strengthening independent think tanks and

research centers. The Hewlett approach explicitly includes strategic multi-year support to build and sustain institutional capacity[39]. Although the focus is on national institutions, it is likely a few sub-regional or continental CSOs may be supported. The Ford Foundation is exploring ways of building sustainable institutions in the domain of arts and culture.

A fourth, related finding is that private foundation funding for long-term support is becoming increasingly scarce, even as organizations look to foundations and other donors to invest in ensuring their predictability and sustainability. This may be partly due to the post-9/11 contraction in grant-making budgets discussed above, a phenomenon that led many foundations to revisit their policies and make decisions to cut funding to thematic areas that had attracted significant support in the past. On the other hand, in the spirit of the Paris Declaration[40], bilateral donors are striving to make their aid more coherent and predictable. A similar impetus is missing on the foundation side.

Another possible reason for the lack of long-term support is the changing of the guard in a number of major internationally focused foundations. The current leadership at the Rockefeller Foundation, for example, believes that supporting big initiatives and high-tech innovations provides the best chance for major developmental impact. This has led to new initiatives such as the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), a US$150 million program co-funded by Rockefeller and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation with the aim of transforming African agriculture through biotechnology.

Traditional areas of support have inevitably given way to this new thinking—with Rockefeller, for instance, deciding to cease funding to population programs in 2001–2002 after playing a pivotal role in setting the agenda and sustaining a number of CSOs over several decades[41]. Other foundations are considering following suit. Given that CSOs tend to follow the money, major changes in the priorities of private foundations will inevitably have serious consequences in key thematic areas.

Just as continental CSOs are finding it harder to obtain predictable, long-term support, they face increasing pressure to demonstrate their effectiveness and impact. The advent of results-based management has forced many organizations to upgrade their project management, monitoring, and evaluation systems to meet the multiple requirements imposed by their funders. As a number of those surveyed in this report emphasized, receiving funds from multiple donors can divert organizations from their core mission as key officers spend more and more time accounting for funding in a proliferation of reporting formats.

Unless foundations find ways to streamline and harmonize their approaches and requirements, the trend of upward accountability will increase, creating something of a paradox at a time when the demands are growing for greater downward accountability. At the same time recipient problems—such as insufficient capacity to cope with emerging demands and issues—also need to be addressed.

Observations by Theme
What follows is a brief identification of issues and trends in donor funding of AROs and CSOs, disaggregated by theme. A comprehensive list of donors and the organizations they support or have supported in the recent past can be found in the table in Annex VIII.

Governance: As highlighted in Section III of this survey, the 'good governance' agenda is not new to Africa, or to donors. Some aspects of this agenda—particularly those related

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[39] Draft Implementation Plan, Hewlett Foundation Think Tanks Initiative, 2007.
[40] http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html.
[41] Interview with Peter J. Matlon, Managing and Interim President, Rockefeller Programs for a Green Revolution in Africa, July 2007.

to rule of law and electoral democracy—have attracted donor support for a number of years. Civil-service reform and the decentralization agenda, for example, constituted a pillar of bilateral support from the early 1990s onwards, with donors keen to replicate Northern New Public Management approaches in developing countries.

The current incarnation of governance, linked to the new aid relationship, remains largely the preserve of intergovernmental donors. It is also largely technocratic, as evidenced by the mission of the few organizations working explicitly on governance (such as the Center for Corporate Governance in Kenya). Nevertheless, private foundations are beginning to recognize the importance of more overtly political engagement by civil society in what is essentially a statist agenda. As highlighted earlier, this has led the Open Society family to invest significant resources in AfriMAP as a means of promoting a pluralistic and more people-serving governance agenda in political, economic, as well as corporate spheres. The MacArthur Foundation's Africa program is dedicated to strengthening rule of law through support to justice and rule of law.

Peace and Security: Again, this is a theme on which bilaterals, the EU, and UN lead. With the recent ending of long-running conflicts in some African countries, bilateral donors, working closely with the World Bank and European Commission, are now focusing on post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform. These donors have created new categories to classify states—such as 'failed states', 'low-income countries under stress', 'countries emerging from conflict', 'post-conflict countries', and so on—as a means of streamlining their assistance. At the ARO level the emphasis is the AU-led peace and security agenda.

As highlighted in the profile of the AU's Peace and Security Directorate (see p.69), support to this agenda is largely donor-driven and high in transaction cost due to poor donor coherence and low absorptive capacity in the AROs. Private foundations support important aspects of the agenda from a civil society perspective, such as initiatives on women and peace-building. However, as highlighted earlier, there is no overarching framework for such support, with each foundation using its own internal criteria to make funding decisions. CSO capacity therefore remains weak and its impact fragmented.

Human Rights: Private foundations have long supported rights-focused regional actors in Africa, and this arguably constitutes the biggest success story to date. As noted earlier, this is in large part because human rights are at the core of the mandates of a large number of foundations. The foundations' focus on rights also reflects the geopolitical divide among donors. Bilateral donors are wary of upsetting governments and rarely stick out their necks to support human rights-focused CSOs, instead preferring to support safe and uncontroversial issues to preserve bilateral relations, which inevitably have political and economic dimensions. By their very nature, multilateral IGOs are owned by countries, and this limits their choice of themes and approaches to funding.

Because they are independent from such influences, foundations constitute the natural funding partners for human rights-focused civil society. The result is a growing formation of CSOs engaging with and influencing the discourse and practice of human rights in Africa. In particular, foundation support has enabled them to help shape regional instruments and entities, while building a regional awareness of rights that has reverberated at national level. A real opportunity exists to ensure that important innovations such as the African Court hand down decisions that can have a direct impact on the protection of human and people's rights within African countries.

Furthermore, foundations are moving beyond support for traditional first-generation rights and providing funding for advocacy and interventions around second-generation rights such as the rights to health, gender equality, and land. This nevertheless remains an

under-developed area, in part because of the difficulty of holding governments to account for delivering what are essentially development rights.

Environment: As highlighted earlier in this section, the environment accounts for the highest volume of international foundation grant-making after health, and alongside education. Within this field, agriculture receives consistent and significant support. A number of agriculture-focused continental think tanks are profiled in this report, including ANAFE (p. 202), ASARECA (p. 213), AFORNET (p. 195) and FARM-AFRICA (p. 233). The G8 interest in promoting biotechnology in African agriculture also means more and more bilateral and multilateral funding is likely to flow to this sub-theme.

However, with foundations such as Rockefeller and Gates throwing their full support behind the Green Revolution via AGRA, dissenting voices—including civic actors concerned that aspects of biotechnology such as GMOs will have detrimental effects on Africa's biodiversity—should not look to these foundations to support their advocacy and awareness-raising efforts. Again, on IPRs, foundations may find themselves in a conflict of interest between driving 'Big Push' approaches that favor multinational corporations and protecting the rights of developing countries and communities. This concern also applies to climate change (an issue on which few organizations focus), water, and environmental governance, among other areas.

Population: There is a historical trend of funding for population programs at a regional level. Indeed, the majority of organizations working on population or related issues— such as the Centre for African Family Studies (CAFS, see profile on p. 288) and the African Population and Health Research Centre (APHRC, p. 286) were established by U.S. foundations that pioneered the development of the population and reproductive health field. Other major actors in the field, such as the African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF, p. 283) and the Association for the Promotion of Traditional Medicine (PROMETRA, p. 293) have also enjoyed long-standing partnerships with U.S. foundations.

However, a theme that once attracted significant private foundation support over the years now appears to be a candidate for divestiture. The Rockefeller Foundation, which was pivotal in the establishment in a number of the organizations profiled in this survey, made a policy decision in 2001 to cease support to population-focused CSOs in favor of new approaches. At a time when Africa faces onerous demographic and related population challenges (as discussed in the Thematic Overview), the institutional architecture for the promotion and implementation of population policies is in danger of collapse. This could have serious consequences on population-focused organizations, at a time when the AU is only now beginning to take leadership on the issue.

Emerging African Philanthropy
The Africa Grant-Makers Affinity Group (AGAG)[42] attests to the sustained focus among private foundations on region-wide approaches in Africa. Yet of the 30 or more foundations registered as members of AGAG, only one focuses exclusively on Africa. This clearly indicates that African philanthropy is in its formative stages, a reality borne out by the fact that the preferred destination for U.S. foundation capital is European grant-making institutions.

Nevertheless, a number of African grant-makers—albeit dependent for resources on sources outside Africa—are beginning to carve out space and provide funding,

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[42] AGAG was AGAG was established in 2000 out of the South Africa Grantmakers Affinity Group (SAGAG), which had existed since the 1980s, focusing exclusively on mitigating apartheid in South Africa. http://www.africagrantmakers.org.

particularly to continental CSOs. A cross-section leading African funders is reviewed briefly below.

TrustAfrica: The Ford Foundation was instrumental in the birth of TrustAfrica, especially at a time when many donors were pulling out of Africa in 2001. Ford wanted to signal its long-term commitment to Africa, as well as increase the level of resources committed to the continent[43]. TrustAfrica seeks to strengthen African initiatives that address difficult challenges confronting Africa. Its critical areas of focus are resolving conflicts and securing peace; promoting inclusive policies on citizenship and identity; and advancing economic integration. It works principally through collaboration and partnership with like-minded institutions and donors, and as a catalyst and convener it is committed to generating and testing new ideas[44]. TrustAfrica also gives small capacity-building grants to help promote sound management, transparent governance, effective communication, and sustainable results among NGOs in Africa.

African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF): Based in Harare, Zimbabwe, ACBF is an independent capacity-building institution established in 1991 through the collaborative efforts of three multilateral institutions—the African Development Bank (AfDB), World Bank, and United Nations Development Program (UNDP)—together with African governments and bilateral donors. It affords African countries a significant opportunity to rethink the effectiveness of external technical assistance vis-à-vis the building of indigenous capacity. ACBF, which initially focused on economic policy making, now aims to build African capacity across the board. Its areas of coverage now include economic policy analysis and management; financial management and accountability; strengthening and monitoring of national statistics; public administration and management; strengthening the capacity for policy analysis capacity among national parliaments; and professionalizing the voices of the private sector and civil society. ACBF using three funding mechanisms: direct funding, co-financing, and parallel funding. It also provides technical and advisory assistance project beneficiaries at several levels in the project management cycle.

African Women's Development Fund (AWDF): A fundraising and grant-making initiative set up to support the African Women's movement, AWDF was established in 2000. It explicitly sets out to build institutional capacity and support program development as key strategies toward women's empowerment. It works in six thematic areas: women's human rights; political participation; peace-building; health and reproductive rights; economic empowerment; and HIV/AIDS. Its philanthropic goals include investing in the efforts of African women engaged in innovative efforts to develop their communities; increasing the amount of resources available to women's organizations and projects in Africa; strengthening the capacity and infrastructure of women's organizations; advocating with other donors and policy makers for resources for African women; and establishing alliances and building relationships with other grant-making institutions within and outside Africa, individual donors and organizations committed to promoting and protecting women's rights. From the time it began grant-making in October 2001 to November 2006, AWDF awarded grants worth nearly US$5 million to 386 women's organizations in 40 African countries. Grants range from US$1,000 to US$40,000, with grants of US$20,000 or more going only to organizations with a regional focus.

Southern Africa Trust (SAT): An independent, regional, nonprofit agency registered in South Africa and dedicated to strengthening civil society, SAT provides grants to CSOs as one of its five core strategies. Others include capacity building; policy dialogue; evidence-based advocacy; and creating an enabling environment. SAT's vision is for

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[43] Presentation by Barry Gaberman at the TrustAfrica launch in Dakar, Senegal, on June 6, 2006.
[44] http://www.trustafrica.org.

poverty eradication policies and strategies across the region to work, and it aims to help ensure the poor to have a better say in shaping policies to overcome poverty in Southern Africa. Although its focus is sub-regional, SAT is a firm believer in regional approaches and is investing significant resources in engaging with the Pan-African Parliament, NEPAD, and the APRM—all of which, like SAT, are located in Midrand.

Conclusion

What has clearly emerged from the above analysis is that although regional initiatives in Africa are firmly on the radar screen of foundations, there is competition for resources and growing demands for improved accountability and stronger impact. Furthermore, it is unlikely that U.S. private foundations will be inclined to commit to long term funding of continental organizations. By endowing organizations such as TrustAfrica and AWDF, private foundations have already begun to point the way to the future. Over the next 10 to 15 years, therefore, African philanthropy will continue to grow, as other donors realize that registering sustained impact in Africa will not be possible without ownership of the grant-making agenda by African organizations.

As a result, and given the commitment of existing African grant-makers to regional approaches, the continental field is likely to grow exponentially in the coming years. However, and to survive in the knowledge economy of the 21st century, organizations working in this space must also become more innovative and entrepreneurial in their ways of working, as those unable to adapt will surely die. Among other things this will entail much greater dexterity, more consistent networking, less fixed structures, and lower overheads. The emergence of new foundations (such as the Google Foundation and other "dot-coms") that emphasize information and knowledge management speaks to the critical need for AROs and CSOs alike to recognize that they are primarily in the knowledge business and to act accordingly.

V. GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The purpose of this section is to highlight gaps identified in the survey—both on the recipient side and as related to donor engagement. Gaps refer to lacks, shortfalls, or interventions that have not been successful. On the basis of this gap analysis, this section identifies and spells out potential opportunities for enhanced collaboration between AROs and CSOs, private foundations, and other donor organizations. Opportunities relate mainly to how donors can add value to existing and potential initiatives being undertaken by AROs and CSOs. It should be noted here that since AROs tend to receive support from bilateral and multilateral inter-governmental sources, the below discussion will refer largely to CSOs and non-governmental think tanks working regionally or continentally in Africa.

It should be noted that in the pages that follow, gaps and opportunities are analyzed from a macro perspective, albeit with reference to examples as needed. This is intended to complement the detailed theme-by-theme analysis in the previous section on context and emerging challenges. The rationale for this is that to the extent that can be generalized, the problems faced by CSOs ring true across the landscape. Similarly, most funding gaps and opportunities identified can be said to apply across the spectrum of donors.

Gaps

Despite the exponential increase in the numbers of regional actors and the scope of their work, and notwithstanding the mounting interest within the donor community, the survey

identified a number of gaps that must be addressed if regional approaches are to make a tangible and lasting contribution to Africa's development.

An overarching and common gap is in *institutional capacity*. The majority of CSOs — even those with distinguished track records, reasonably strong funding bases and well-staffed secretariats — lack the fundamentals for institutional sustainability. Constraints affecting sustainability include poor recruitment, inadequate staffing, inability to retain staff, absence of career and succession planning, ineffective training, weak administrative systems, ineffective monitoring and evaluation, and poor uptake of technology. The growing international market for development and humanitarian expertise places a sizeable burden on modest-sized African CSOs that cannot compete with the UN, international NGOs and others—leading to a high staff turnover and systematic erosion of institutional memory.

In many TBOs, there exists a gulf between mandates and capacities to deliver, a problem that persists despite being highlighted by repeated donor evaluations. The AU, for example, has seen a multiplicity of initiatives to build the capacity of the Addis Ababa-based Commission. However none of these initiatives has been able to address institution building systemically. This failure, exacerbated by the dynamics of internal politics common to such institutions, means that the AU Commission's ability to deliver remains well below par, especially in light of the expansive agenda laid out in the Constitutive Act. Bilateral donors, who provide the bulk of support to AROs, have failed to address this systemic concern, and have instead tended to privilege the advancement of their own agendas. In light of the fragile nature of African civil society, the patent lack of institution building in a large number of CSOs undermines their mission. This is an area in which private foundations—which view institutional strengthening as a key to sustainability and can bring different experiences to bear—can help make a difference.

A related concern is in the area of governance. Many CSOs have a tendency to focus on upward accountability—whereby they expend significant energy satisfying the requirements of boards, councils of management, and donors. More often than not, this is achieved at the expense of downward accountability—the responsibility AROs have to their stakeholders. At the same time CSOs need to ride up to the challenges of emerging issues. Indeed, and with particular reference to CSOs, the governance structures many regional organizations have put in place come across as either nominal or overly elaborate, working against transparency and accountability, and in extreme cases sparking contestation over power. All this affects the ability of the organizations in question to deliver on their work. Governance constitutes an important dimension of institutional sustainability, and more attention should be paid to this area.

A second gap concerns the *relevance of programming*. Many CSOs include long shopping lists of thematic areas as part of their work program. However, more often than not, impact tends to be registered in a subset of these areas. One CSO included in the survey in Section VII listed close to 10 themes as part of its program. However, and tellingly, a caveat on its website states that due to a lack of funding it has only been able to implement programs in two of these themes. This phenomenon is common to AROs and CSOs alike.

To some extent, the gap relates to how CSOs, think tanks and research institutes define their comparative and competitive advantages and set their program agendas. Some simply fail to undertake rigorous agenda-setting program development exercises to establish what they should be doing proactively and reactively. This is also often a function of weak institutional capacity. However, another driver is the fact that donor decisions on which themes to support have a herding effect among recipients, creating a

supply orientation in an environment that requires that recipient organizations be largely demand-driven.

As one think tank featured in the survey noted with reference to health, while many donors are putting more and more funding into HIV/AIDS in Africa, other priority areas are receiving less support. One such area is maternal and child mortality, which together account for some 5.1 million of the estimated 8 million deaths caused in Africa each year by preventable, treatable, and manageable diseases and health conditions. Given that annual deaths from maternal mortality amount to almost double the number of annual HIV-related deaths, and that women are biologically more vulnerable to HIV, and that mother-to-child transmission of HIV is growing, support is needed for advocacy to influence policy on both issues.

Setting or changing policy norms at continental or sub-regional level is the stated aim of a number of advocacy networks or coalitions. However, a third gap of significance is the question of *non-compliance*—the failure within countries to implement norms and standards agreed at continental and sub-regional levels. There exists a vast chasm between enshrining progressive ideas into pan-African declarations, charters, or treaties, and ensuring that these policy provisions are implemented in country. This is in part a function of the nature of postcolonial Africa, involving a high transaction cost for any CSO or even TBO wishing to hold African leaders to account for what they have signed into law.

Fundamentally, it is also due to the nature of the transnational agenda-setting process itself, whose biggest flaw is that although member states sign and ratify these norms and standards, they are non-binding. As advocacy-focused CSOs have recognized, compliance involves citizen pressure, and it is this recognition that has spawned a host of rights-based continental initiatives, including some focused on gender, child rights, and landmines.

Nevertheless, advocacy-focused CSOs are only now beginning to grasp the reality that getting issues on the continental and sub-regional agenda constitutes the beginning, and not the end of the process. There is a growing recognition of the need for patient strategy to advance domestication, national implementation, and monitoring. However, while donors supporting advocacy are aware of its long-term and multidimensional nature, this is often not matched by the scale and scope of support needed. The result is that no campaign in Africa has as yet been able to successfully run the full gamut of advocacy.

Linked to this is the *absence of creative and effective systems to assess impact*. There remains a problem with the way most AROs and CSOs conceptualize their performance objectives and targets, exacerbated by the privileging by some donors of quantitative output at the expense of indicators of qualitative outcome. One tendency is for bilateral donors to consider volume of funds disbursed as a measure of their success, paying insufficient attention to issues of absorptive capacity (see below) and the extent to which the recipients of funds are able to achieve lasting impact. Questions of how best to measure processes that yield medium- and long-term results, as opposed to quick wins, are being grappled with across the development system, and this is an area in which more work is needed—on both sides of the ARO-donor nexus.

Financing is another area in which AROs in particular continue to experience difficulties. AROs such as the AU and RECs all rely on assessed contributions from member states to cover their core program budgets. Inevitably, while a few member states are able to meet their commitments, many smaller and poorer nations remain consistently in arrears, leaving the secretariats of the respective AROs short of money and unable to fully implement their work programs. At the AU's January 2007 summit, member states

approved a budget of US$133 million for the AU Commission's operations and programs. Of this amount, US$97 million is due from member states' assessed contributions, and the remaining US$26 million from requests to external partners. On paper, this means the AU is dependent on donors for less than 20 percent of its budget. In practice, the percentage is likely to be higher, especially since annual budgets approved by member states have tended to be one-third of the amount requested by the AU Commission.

Innovative schemes have been introduced in a bid to address this problem, among them a community levy of 5 percent on all imports originating from outside ECOWAS and ECCAS countries. There is also a proposal under consideration at the AU to tax air travel. However, with member states using such taxes to fund domestic poverty reduction commitments, schemes of this nature have not been fully implemented. Inevitably, this leaves many AROs highly dependent on external donor funding, in the process eroding the principle of African ownership and often creating the kinds of distorted incentives that make effective program delivery difficult.

The most common problem cited by survey respondents of the CSO variety is the lack of core support, a deficit that forces them to use funds earmarked for use elsewhere, spreading scarce resources too thin to be able to deliver effectively on any single aspect of their work. Even where project funding makes up a significant proportion of budgets, there is a lack of consistency in which areas of work are supported, funds arrive in a less than timely manner, and dependence on funding for multiple projects registers a high transaction cost on CSOs, which end up being pulled in several directions simultaneously as they seek to satisfy different donors. This explains the apparent paradox, evident in some of the profiles, whereby CSOs with sizeable budgets and significant donor support cite challenges related to resource mobilization.

What emerges clearly is that AROs spend much of their time trying to make ends meet in the immediate and short term, in the process losing perspective on longer-term strategic goals, both institutional and programmatic. For their part, donors are not doing enough to promote strategic long-term visioning, whether among well-established AROs or those with potential to make a real impact. Doing so would also necessitate a commitment to providing sustained technical assistance as well as predictable, flexible support for up to 10 years.

Another important gap is in *knowledge sharing and networking*. Although policy-relevant research is expensive, a number of CSOs invest in gathering data and publishing findings in order to inform policy advocacy. Institutions of higher learning also generate research, while most CSOs generate a host of publications to disseminate the outcomes of their research. However, these strategies fall far short of the mark and rarely achieve their intended purpose. The wide array of dissemination media now available as use of the Internet spreads exponentially has not been effectively exploited, as evidenced by the weak or non-existent online presence of many AROs, and the poor response time to requests for information. Information is still viewed as a one-directional function comprising publishing and dissemination. As such, products are generated without sufficient attention to audience, leading to a waste of funds and less than optimal impact. Staffing in many AROs reflects this lack of prioritization.

By and large, knowledge-based CSOs in Africa have as yet failed to harness emerging approaches to communicate the results of policy-relevant research being pioneered by think tanks in the global North. Furthermore, many AROs have not yet been able to fully grasp the critical importance of sharing knowledge and interacting with each other, partners, and stakeholders to foster better or new collaboration, in the process creating new value. Coupled with less than optimal outreach, this poor appreciation means many AROs work in isolation. In many AROs, a culture of secrecy remains the order of the day.

While some donors have recognized knowledge sharing as a major challenge among AROs, there remains scant support to address this in any meaningful way.

Opportunities
A host of opportunities to address some of the above gaps are discussed below.

One is the tremendous momentum around the new regionalism that has been built, and continues to grow, since the advent of NEPAD (2001) and the AU (2002). Regional and sub-regional institutions are growing in importance, signaled by an increase in donor interest and the seriousness being accorded to these institutions by developed countries. The Africa Partnership Forum (APF), which meets yearly to review and monitor progress in implementing the G8 Action Plan on both sides, is one of many signs of the new currency of regional approaches.

Energized by these developments, and with a view to advancing the agenda or pushing for alternatives, CSOs have begun to organize continentally. While indigenous CSO capacity remains weak, particularly at continental level—and although this process is currently being led by international NGOs that are much better resourced and employ skilled Africans to lead their campaigns—a significant window of opportunity exists for more systematic and deeper engagement by African CSOs.

Their teething problems notwithstanding, the AU's ECOSOCC, Pan-African Parliament, and Peace and Security Council are among recently created organs that hold the potential to serve as important deliberative spaces for the construction of a people-centered African Union. Similar opportunities exist in the sub-regions. NEPAD's system of national civil society focal points may be less well conceptualized and developed, but it nevertheless remains important as a means of ensuring citizen buy-in to and participation in the Partnership's implementation.

Of more immediate promise is the emerging continental framework for the environment and sustainable development (highlighted in the previous section of this report). NEPAD's Environmental Action Plan (EAP), a far-reaching blueprint for sustainable development in Africa, demonstrates the value added of regional policy processes. The EAP is one recent example of the large number of regional or sub-regional norms, standards, and policies yet to be fully implemented. These include the AU Constitutive Act, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, REC protocols and treaties on security and development, the Declaration on Democracy, Governance & Elections, environmental conventions on water, biodiversity, biosafety and climate change, and global targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). CSO coalitions and networks are already making it their business to breathe life into some of these and ensure their implementation. There are opportunities to do much more in this area.

The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) was instrumental in developing the NEPAD EAP. Ministerial gatherings offer important strategic spaces for governments to strategize transnationally with a view to developing common frameworks. CSOs have recognized this opportunity and started to target these meetings with campaigning. In April 2007, the African Public Health Rights Alliance (APHRA, p. 120) took its '15% Now!' campaign to the Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, in the process successfully influencing the main outcomes. Opportune as these might be, the proliferation of sectoral ministerial gatherings—finance ministers are convened three times a year by different AROs, for example—call for a major exercise of rationalizing and streamlining.

The growing interest among donors in supporting regional programs is a relatively new phenomenon, one that continues to be dwarfed by the volumes of aid disbursed at

country level, mainly by bilateral and multilateral donors. However, with the advent of support arrangements such as the EU's AU Peace Facility and bilateral programs of support to the AU and RECs, donors are recognizing investing in regional programs as a strategy to leverage the impact of country funding. U.S. foundations have pioneered regional funding for CSOs, for instance providing long-standing support to the field of population, such as the Centre for African Family Studies (CAFS, p. 288) and African Population and Health Research Centre (APHRC, p. 286), and human rights, such as the Coalition for an Effective African Court on Human and People's Rights (p. 132).

A major opportunity presents itself for donors to 'grow' the field by establishing a working division of labor to ensure that effective AROs or those with potential receive adequate support. There is also a chance that donors can transcend traditional boundaries (foundation-bilateral-multilateral-private sector) and establish innovative joint arrangements. With new donors asserting themselves in Africa, among them China, coherence and consistency among donors is clearly needed.

The emergence of African philanthropy presents another important opportunity for AROs to gain critical support for their work. The field is small but growing. TrustAfrica, established in June 2006 and based in Dakar, Senegal, is the first foundation of its kind, consciously promoting regional approaches in peace and security, regional integration, citizenship and identity, and trade and private sector investment. The Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF)—established in 1991 by the World Bank, UNDP, and AfDB and based in Harare, Zimbabwe—provides management and institutional support to a number of regional and sub-regional organizations, including research institutes. The Southern Africa Trust, based in Midrand, South Africa, is a leading proponent of integrated regional approaches to addressing common development problems, and grants to organizations as well as processes, primarily but not exclusively in the SADC sub-region.

Finally, and in light of the gap in knowledge sharing highlighted earlier, opportunities exist to strengthen linkages among AROs to promote mutual learning, foster stronger collaboration, and enhance overall impact. To an extent, this is already happening; issue-based continental coalitions led by international NGOs have dramatically improved the strategic sharing of knowledge around opportunities to influence the AU agenda. These coalitions have also commissioned research, the results of which have been harnessed by sophisticated advocacy campaigns. Initiatives such as the African Virtual University are exploiting the increasing accessibility of information and communication technologies (ICTs) throughout Africa to link geographically dispersed communities and promote learning. The time is ripe to build good practices such as these towards fostering a culture of knowledge sharing, learning, and networking among AROs.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of Findings
The survey confirms that regional approaches are gaining in currency in Africa as an important dimension of the quest for sustainable development. This is evident in efforts among AROs to reconfigure the continental institutional landscape and forge new collaboration arrangements. The exponential growth among non-state actors and the emergence of trans-national African civil society, with multiple spaces opening up for CSO participation, also bears out this trend.

These developments have attracted growing interest among donors of different types in supporting regional approaches as a strategy to leverage country programs—which attract by far the greatest proportion of funding from bilateral and multilaterals donors. In

particular, private foundations have maintained a long-standing commitment to NGOs and CSOs, notably in the population and human rights fields, but also to a lesser extent in environment and peace and security, with a new and emerging interest in governance.

The survey has identified a number of gaps that provide the opportunity for donors, especially private foundations, to help make a difference in the regional domain in Africa. These include the widespread lack of institutional capacity; questions over the relevance of regional programming amid a proliferation of actors; the endemic problem of non-compliance with continental norms and standards; the absence of systems to assess medium- and long-run outcome-related impact; concerns over levels and type of funding; and a deficit in knowledge sharing and collaboration among continentally-focused organizations.

The survey documented and analyzed progress in each of the themes, along with the different challenges faced. The growing number of organizations working across the themes as well as in other areas not specifically covered by the survey—such as trade and regional integration, gender and social development, and economic and social policy—speaks to the fundamentally cross-cutting nature of Africa's development challenges. As such, each theme should be viewed less as a disciplinary barrier and more as part of an overarching sustainable development nexus.

With the above summary of findings in mind, the challenge for private foundations is to build on the strong foundations already established by previous support to ensure a stronger, more coherent, interlinked, and sustainable landscape in Africa. While the emphasis should be on civil society, this should not preclude selective, issue-specific donor engagement with AROs, particularly on issues affecting the ability of citizens to fully participate in development decisions.

Recommendations
The recommendations that follow are primarily targeted at private foundations, the primary audience of the survey. Nevertheless, and in the process, they also include recommendations for CSOs, think tanks and research institutes. In light of the cross-cutting nature of the gaps and challenges identified, and given the differences in remit from one foundation to another, the recommendations are deliberately strategic, offering concrete proposals without being too prescriptive.

1. Build Sustainable Capacity: The question of capacity is fundamental to the future effectiveness of regional institutions and initiatives. In light of the proliferation of actors, the scale and scope of need is sizeable. Capacity encompasses institutional as well as human capacity and skills development, and relates to recruitment and staff retention, career and succession planning, internal training, administrative, financial and reporting systems, monitoring and evaluation, and technology, among other aspects.

In response to this challenge, and to ensure the sustainability of the field, *private foundations* should place special emphasis on supporting institutional capacity as a core component of funding decisions, particularly as related to NGOs and CSOs. Where the need exists, such support should be predicated on addressing systemic organizational and human capacity constraints, with a view to setting the organizations in question on a sustainable path.

Foundations should develop clear benchmarks for institutional sustainability and use their networks of contacts to leverage the best available technical expertise to support their investments. Such support should be medium to long-term in duration. It may be necessary for foundations to ring-fence specific funding dedicated to strengthening institutional capacity. Such a dedicated fund could, for example, focus on a long-term

effort to build the capacity of civil society to influence regional norms, standards, and initiatives, or help build civil society capacity to monitor and evaluate impact on outcome.

AROs and CSOs should recognize the centrality of institutional sustainability to the success of their missions, and should each develop a phased multi-year institutional strengthening strategy that is in sync with their respective work programs, highlighting the contingencies between program delivery milestones and incremental increases in institutional capacity. Proposals submitted to donors for core support should routinely include such multi-year strategies.

2. Ensure Stable and Predictable Funding: Both at the level of NEPAD and the AU, and among small to medium-sized CSOs, there are gaps between program goals and objectives and the availability of resources to deliver. While this can be due to overly ambitious organizations setting unattainable goals, it is often due to a lack of funding and relates to the question of sustainability.

Private foundations should ensure that available resources are sufficiently stable and predictable to enable CSOs in particular to deliver their mission—bearing in mind the need for sufficient administrative support to ensure program delivery. Resource scarcity impedes long-term strategic decisions and is contrary to the spirit and commitment to long-term targets such as the MDGs. To deal with this funding gap, organizations need to identify long-term financial resources to ensure the sustainability of their program activities as well as to rethink and challenge their nonprofit status. Private foundations could contribute in exploring this terrain.

Core resources should be provided to enable stable and sustained programming according to agreed objectives. Funding for projects should add value to core support, or risk distorting incentives by providing piecemeal support that does not advance the CSOs' core missions. Delays in disbursing funds, a problem highlighted by a number of organizations, seriously hamper program implementation and should be minimized. In addressing the widespread requirement for increased volume, foundations should also ensure the recipients have the capacity to absorb new money.

Recipients of funding need to develop innovative mechanisms and approaches not only to mobilize funds but also to maximize impact from available resources. In order to make a compelling case for increased funding—whether in asking for a larger proportion of core versus project funding or in seeking core funding where none existed previously—CSOs need to develop more empirically sound and demand-driven approaches to setting program goals. These approaches need to bear in mind the existing landscape, avoid duplication, and embrace partnership with others on the basis of a clear and symbiotic division of labor.

AROs should rationalize their programs, simplify complex procedures and arrangements, limit their core focus to what they are best placed to deliver, and establish effective partnerships with other AROs based on a clear division of labor. On that basis, they should find ways to secure sustained, predictable, timely, and long-term support from member states. Such support would indicate a serious commitment to the mission and ensure the AROs are better insulated against external agendas. AROs should take steps to ensure that support offered by or canvassed from external donors is streamlined with, and helps deliver the objectives of, the core program of work.

Where these do not currently exist, AROs should proactively develop mechanisms for agreeing on priorities, pooling funds and streamlining reporting. Project support should only be solicited where it adds value to the organizations' core mission.

3. Strengthen Ownership, Coherence, and Coordination: As highlighted in the survey, programming is often supply-led and donor-driven. Furthermore, recipient relationships with a multiplicity of funders each providing support on the basis of its own priority issues and agendas introduce a high transaction cost that erodes the organizations' ability to establish context-responsive goals and deliver on them. This lack of donor coherence emerged as a key finding of the survey. While bilateral and multilateral donors are particularly culpable in this regard in their support to AROs, private foundations—with a range of charitable missions—often work in isolation. As a guiding tenet when engaging with continentally-focused organizations, the Foundations should harness the Paris Principles, in particular those pertaining to recipient ownership, mutual accountability and policy coherence.

Private foundations should invest in strengthening recipient ownership to encourage programming that is relevant to the challenges on the ground. To foster ownership, allow the space for these organizations to set their priorities and improve cost efficiency, foundations should develop more coordinated funding approaches. This might be achieved by 'subcontracting' funding to entities, such as TrustAfrica, that work exclusively on regional approaches in and on Africa. Foundations of this nature with detailed knowledge and a wide appreciation of the terrain are best placed to coordinate the management of pooled funds dedicated to strengthening the field.

To foster greater coherence, and taking into account the differences in charitable purpose from one private foundation to another, it should be possible to arrive at a consensus on the key challenges facing AROs and CSOs, and on that basis pool funds to address these challenges. Where a challenge does not fall within the remit of a particular foundation, that foundation should not be compelled to invest in the area at hand. However, the objective of coherence should not be undermined by earmarking. Private foundations would do well to consider the principles contained in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness[45], endorsed by more than 100 countries.

Foundations should develop systematic ways to share information on continentally-focused organizations requesting funds, either through regional entities endowed for the purpose or via other arrangements. On this basis, coordinated approaches could be developed to ensure sustained support for leading actors as well as potential winners. Flexibility is key, enabling foundations to respond to the dynamic and rapidly changing regional landscape. Where possible, coordination among private foundations should also seek to establish common reporting formats to reduce transaction costs on recipients.

Donor coherence also demands that _AROs and CSOs_ be more consistent in designing programs and projects that reflect their mission, vision, and objectives amid fast-changing priorities in the region and the urgency for donors to address emerging issues.

To strengthen ownership and effectiveness, continentally-focused organizations should build synergies with each other. While CSOs may address different themes using a variety of strategies, they are united by common purpose and share the overarching objective of contributing to Africa's development. There is a critical need for CSOs to partner with each other more systematically, as well as with AROs and community-based organizations (CBOs), which ensure that the perspectives of marginalized groups are taken into account in regional initiatives. Such partnerships should be developed on the basis of distinct comparative advantage, a clear division of labor, and transparent and effective governance.

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[45] OECD 2005, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, accessible at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf

4. Back Systemic Advocacy for Social Change: As highlighted in the report, advocacy conducted by CSOs has tended to be *ad hoc* and lack long-term perspective. Furthermore, the sheer size of the continent and scope of the challenges at hand require that advocacy be well-designed, undertaken in coalitions and designed to bring about tangible policy changes not simply at the continental level but also at sub-regional, national, and sub-national levels. International NGOs working at regional level in Africa have internalized these lessons and ensure substantial and sustained support for their campaigns, to great effect.

In providing funds to CSOs undertaking advocacy to influence continental norms and standards, _private foundations_ should bear in mind the process orientation and long-run nature of advocacy. In doing so, foundations should be prepared to commit to supporting campaigns in the medium- to long-term, so as to have the best possible chance of brokering social change.

On their side, _CSOs_ should ensure that advocacy campaigns go beyond securing signatories or ratifications to continental treaties, charters, or related standards. It is imperative that advocacy strategies be developed that run the gamut, from influencing policy to ensuring the domestication, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of policy within countries. On issues such as population, linkages should also be made with global partners and campaigns.

5. Enable Better Dissemination and Networking: The majority of continentally-focused organizations, including cross-cutting research and higher education institutions, are in the knowledge business, generating a high volume of published materials. However, and almost without exception, their dissemination is weak, depending largely on outdated and expensive methods. They rely on one-way transmittal of information to undefined audiences, and fail to ensure ongoing and high-quality feedback. They also fail to effectively harness ICTs, which enable more targeted dissemination as well as feedback and continuous engagement with stakeholders. All this leads to less than optimal program formulation and implementation, and an ivory-tower mentality.

In light of the fact that advocacy is fast becoming a tool of choice in regional processes, _CSOs, research institutes and think tanks_ should urgently review their information and dissemination strategies with a view to developing more sophisticated, better-targeted approaches. A fundamental shift is needed from one-dimensional, wide-spectrum information dissemination to a more interactive model drawing on emerging approaches to sharing knowledge and communicating policy. Such strategies should be rooted in an understanding of communication as a means of strengthening program delivery, as opposed to a downstream public relations function. Advocacy will also benefit from this approach.

As part of its upcoming think-tank initiative, the Hewlett Foundation is considering investing resources in communicating the results of policy. Other _private foundations_ could learn from this initiative, and contribute to a major rethinking of the information-communication-knowledge continuum and the role of knowledge networks in enhancing the impact of continentally-focused organizations. Prospective approaches such as e-learning, along the lines of the African Virtual University, could also be retailed by donors currently successfully supporting networking in other regions.

6. Invest in Research: The lack of policy-oriented research is a missing link in the field. While a number of policy research institutes (PRIs) and institutions of higher learning consider research a core competence, this research is not necessarily linked to continental and sub-regional policy agendas. Conversely, the high cost of producing research has affected the ability of organizations working on regional issues to generate

the evidence base. The link between research-focused and advocacy-focused regional organizations is also weak. The result is that CSOs working to influence policy are either forced to dig deep to commission research, or end up embarking on advocacy without the necessary evidence to convince policymakers.

Although research is expensive, private foundations can help make a significant difference to the rigor and effectiveness of future advocacy efforts by investing strategically in policy-relevant research led by independent think tanks and CSOs. This might range from studies like the African Governance Report (AGR), produced by the Economic Commission for Africa in collaboration with national policy research institutes, to research on Union Government being conducted by a coalition of CSOs. Strengthening the role of universities in policy-relevant research, and ensuring they are networked (along with PRIs) to advocacy coalitions, should also be supported.

An initiative supported by private foundations to strengthen the research base for CSO advocacy could begin with an audit of existing research focusing on issues such as access, policy relevance, and product impact. Such an audit would help to identify gaps and help inform future research agendas.