From Rhetoric to Policy Action
From Rhetoric to Policy Action

AN ANALYSIS OF

AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM
IN SIX AFRICAN COUNTRIES

edited by
Tendai Murisa
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>Agricultural Development Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADMARC</td>
<td>Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation</td>
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<td>AKIS</td>
<td>Agricultural Knowledge and Information System</td>
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<td>ALDSAP</td>
<td>Agricultural and Livestock Development Strategy and Action Plan</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>Agricultural Policy Framework</td>
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<td>ASCU</td>
<td>Agriculture Sector Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>ASWAP</td>
<td>Agriculture Sector Wide Approach</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanisms</td>
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<td>ASM</td>
<td>Agricultural Sector Ministries</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme</td>
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<td>CAEC</td>
<td>Continuing Agricultural Education Centre</td>
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<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organisations</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CFA</td>
<td>Core Function Analysis</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for East and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CISANET</td>
<td>Civil Society Agriculture Network</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DEVPOls</td>
<td>Development Policies</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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EPA Extension Planning Area
EU European Union
EWS Early Warning Systems
FAAP Forum for African Agriculture Productivity
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
FANRPAN Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network
FARA Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GoM Government of Malawi
GoU Government of Uganda
GRASP Global and Regional Advocacy on Small Producers
GTZ Germany Technical Cooperation
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IFSN International Food Security Network
IHS Integrated Household Survey
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMTs Intermediate Means of Transport
JICA Japan International Development Cooperation
KASI Kenya Agriculture Research Institute
KCCE Kenya Co-operative Coffee Exporters Ltd
KEPSA Kenya Private Sector Alliance
KFAP Kenya Federation of Agricultural Producers
KIPPPRA Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
KNFU Kenya National Farmers Union
KPCU Kenya Planters Cooperative Union
KRDS Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
KUSCCO Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Co-operatives Ltd
MAAIF Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries
MALEZA Malawi Enterprise Zones Association
MASIP Malawi Agricultural Sector Investment Program
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MEGs</td>
<td>Malawi Economic Growth Strategy</td>
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<td>MGDS</td>
<td>Malawi Growth and Development Strategy</td>
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<td>MLHUD</td>
<td>Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development</td>
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<td>MLWE</td>
<td>Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment</td>
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<td>MFPED</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development</td>
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<td>MOA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
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<td>MOAFS</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security</td>
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<td>MOGLSD</td>
<td>Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development</td>
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<td>MPRS</td>
<td>Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategies</td>
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<td>MPSIP</td>
<td>Malawi Public Sector Investment Programme</td>
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<td>MRFC</td>
<td>Malawi Rural Finance Company</td>
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<td>NAADS</td>
<td>National Agriculture and Advisory Services</td>
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<td>NACHU</td>
<td>National Housing Co-operative Union Ltd</td>
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<td>NALEP</td>
<td>National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme</td>
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<td>NAPF</td>
<td>National Agricultural Policy Framework</td>
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<td>NASFAM</td>
<td>National Association of Smallholder Farmers in Malawi</td>
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<td>NARO</td>
<td>National Agriculture Research Organisation</td>
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<td>NARS</td>
<td>National Agricultural Research Services</td>
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<td>NCPB</td>
<td>National Cereals Produce Board</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Economic Council</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
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<td>NFPP</td>
<td>National Focal Point Person</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NOGAMU</td>
<td>National Organic Agricultural Movement of Uganda</td>
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<td>NSO</td>
<td>National Statistical Office</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>OPV</td>
<td>Open Pollinated Variety</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Public Accounts Committee</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>PEAP</td>
<td>Poverty Eradication Action Plan</td>
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<td>PFA</td>
<td>Prosperity For All</td>
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<td>PMA</td>
<td>Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture</td>
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<td>PRDP</td>
<td>Peace Recovery and Development Programme</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>PSDA</td>
<td>Private Sector Development in Africa</td>
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<td>SACA</td>
<td>Smallholder Agriculture Credit Administration</td>
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<td>SACCO</td>
<td>Savings and Credit Cooperatives</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<td>SFFRFM</td>
<td>Smallholder Farmers Fertiliser Revolving Fund of Malawi</td>
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<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
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<td>SOAS</td>
<td>School of Oriental and African Studies</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Traditional Authority</td>
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<td>TIP</td>
<td>Targeted Inputs Programme</td>
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<td>TSP</td>
<td>Training Support for Partnership</td>
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<td>TWC</td>
<td>Technical Working Committee</td>
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<td>ULC</td>
<td>Uganda Land Commission</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UPA</td>
<td>Urban and Peri-urban Agriculture</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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I am particularly grateful to my principals at Trust Africa for allowing me time to edit and finalise what I hope is a comprehensible discussion on gaps in contemporary agricultural policy making. The overwhelming interest by the contributors made the task of editing this book an enjoyable task - I thank you. Karen Mafundikwa of ZIVA diligently copy-edited this manuscript at times in very difficult circumstances. I believe she has ensured that the reader is not overwhelmed if not irritated by small language mistakes.

I am also grateful to colleagues and anonymous chapter reviews who have gone through the different drafts of the manuscript. The reviewers’ inputs have definitely contributed towards the improvement of the discussion and arguments. On behalf of my colleagues-the contributors, we thank you for your diligence, comments and suggestions. I remain indebted to my life partner Mzime, this book would not have seen the light of day were it not for the constant encouragement to complete the task, thanks for the quiet and solid support. Finally above everyone I thank God for His mercies and grace.

We dedicate this book to all the smallholders in the world who have had to constantly face the threat of famine, a failed crop and now increasingly eviction from lands that they have occupied for generations. This is our contribution to making sure that their plight remains on the policy agenda of our governments.
Foreword

Agriculture is back. African governments, regional institutions, policy think tanks, bi and multi-lateral organizations and private philanthropic organizations are actively developing or implementing programs aimed at agricultural recovery. It is also evident that at the global level agriculture is receiving a much higher level of attention than ever before. The Maputo Declaration of the African Union of 2003, committing member states to making agriculture a top priority in national development provides a cue to this edited volume. All parties to the agreement made a commitment to “increase public investment in agriculture by a minimum of 10% of their national budgets” and to “improve the productivity of agriculture to attain an average annual growth rate of 6%, with particular attention to small-scale farmers, especially focusing on women,” by the year 2015. This agreement led to the establishment of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) that is discussed in more detail in the introduction. The program aims to “help African countries reach a higher path of economic growth through agriculturally-led development, which eliminates hunger, reduces poverty and food insecurity, and enables expansion of exports.”

There are various reasons for this reorientation towards the development of agriculture, a sector previously ignored and left to the ravages of market forces during the adjustment years. The 2007/8 food crisis and consequent food riots in several North and West African countries are often cited as the turning point in terms of increased focus on agricultural policy reforms. The volume is based on independent but valid research to determine the adequacy of existing trends in agricultural policy making in contributing towards the goals established through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) in six countries: Ghana, Mali, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Malawi. These countries cover
West, East and Southern Africa and provide a basis for tracking trends in transforming agriculture and also in illuminating the similarities of issues that smallholders and African governments face. The book also provides a current examination of the extent to which civil society organisations are engaged in the agricultural reform policy processes and their capacity to invigorate the capacities of the smallholder sector.

Despite leaps in development in other regions and countries, such as China and India, Africa continues to face an acute food challenge and, broadly speaking, an unresolved agrarian question. Global trends indicate that poverty is still predominantly a rural phenomenon, with two thirds of the world’s poor constituted by the rural poor (IFAD, 2001, Borass et al 2007). The majority (about 65%) of the rural poor in Africa depend primarily on agriculture for livelihood. I believe that this book will contribute towards a deeper understanding of the issues negatively affecting agricultural development as well as provide valuable insights into the opportunities that exist in the selected countries for appropriate reform of the sector.

Akwasi Aidoo, Executive Director, Trust Africa

Note

1. Small farm households still constitute nearly two fifths of humanity (Bernstein, 2000).
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Tendai Murisa

Introduction

Policy debates on viable strategies to establish sustainable smallholder agricultural conditions and means of achieving food security are long overdue. Despite the claims that the food crisis of 2007/8 was a temporary shock, data released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other independent sources suggest that food prices will increase steadily over the next decade, despite occasional fluctuations (Evans, 2009). The number of the world’s food insecure is growing. Latest estimates indicate that approximately one billion people are food insecure or one in seven go to bed hungry every day (FAO, 2009, Action Aid, 2010: 7). The majority of these poor households are based in Africa’s countryside.

The primary purpose of this overview chapter is to provide a broad analysis of the current trends in policy making and a discussion of current constraints to the growth of agriculture, especially those facing the smallholder sector in Africa. There is particular emphasis on selected country case studies; Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania and Uganda. Critical questions that arise in such a discussion include; what has happened to Africa’s food production capacity? This is more pertinent if we consider the fact that at the time of decolonisation (of the majority of African countries) in the 1960s up until the 1970s, Africa was not just self-sufficient in food but was actually a net food exporter. Its exports averaged 1.3 million tons a year between 1966 and 1970. Today, the continent imports 25% of its food
with almost every country having the status of a net food importer (Bello, 2008: 1). The second question is: How and what kind of policy can aid the development of smallholder agriculture in the aftermath of the spectacular collapse of the ‘Washington Consensus’? The ‘consensus’ had unfairly promoted the superiority of the ‘market’ mantra over the period, without taking into account the economic context of many African countries and the role of colluding oligopolies. It was assumed that Africa’s food needs would be met through focusing on producing commodities where it had a comparative advantage, returns to source food on the global food markets. Consequently, the African state disinvested from agriculture and the sector. The food production systems suffered policy neglect for about 25 years ranging from 1979 to around 1994. The sector received an average of 4% from national budgets over the same period, remained excluded from technological innovations, locked out of sustainable financing arrangements but highly exposed to the commodity markets into which they have been unfairly integrated (Murisa & Helliker, 2011: 3).

The third and final question focuses on what it will take to ensure positive growth in Africa’s agriculture. Indeed, Africa’s agriculture has experienced a renewed interest for a variety of reasons including the need to utilize the so-called 60% of the continent’s arable but currently unutilised land (refer to Murisa and Parris forthcoming). Also significant is the need to increase the global food supply in the wake of increased demands for cereals from emerging economic giants such as China and India. How will policy reforms such as the CAADP initiative ensure improved allocation of support for farm input acquisition, infrastructure development and balanced and secure access to land and related natural resources?

The chapter is divided into four sections. The following section discusses the broader cross-cutting policy issues constraining agricultural reforms. It identifies a number of inconsistencies with regard to international development models. The second section analyses the responses of non-state actors (including rural communities and the associations that they form and also local and international NGOs) to current agricultural policy reforms. The third section examines the adequacy of the ongoing initiatives around agricultural reforms and exposes some of the gaps in the manner in which they have been conceived. The final section provides a brief description of the chapters.
There is an urgent need to develop the agriculture sector and institute broader agrarian reforms across most of Africa due to declining growth trends, high unemployment rates, unsustainable rural to urban migration, increased incidences of food insecurity, as well as the prevalence of poverty, vulnerability, and hunger. Emerging statistics indicate that the global population is projected to rise from 6.7 billion to 9.2 billion by 2050 thus necessitating a rethink of the agricultural production model.

However, the emerging discourse on resolving the food crisis and ensuring sustainable agricultural production remains weakly framed. Whilst it is acknowledged that the 2007/8 food crisis was in large part the result of structural imbalances in the world food chain (including production, exchange and consumption) the emerging discourse does not address these. A concerted and strident push for comprehensive agrarian reforms that effectively address the real constraints in agriculture, such as skewed land ownership patterns and the inefficiencies of commodity markets, is yet to emerge (Murisa & Helliker, 2011: 4). Parallel to this is the need to critically rethink the role of the state in agrarian interventions and change. However, rather than questioning the systemic causes of the agrarian crisis, we have witnessed an incoherent but highly amplified call to increase national budgets and encourage a ‘green revolution’ as if that alone would address the systemic issues that have negatively affected smallholder agriculture in Africa (Moyo, 2010: 308).

Africa in its entirety, except maybe for isolated pockets in South Africa and Egypt, has not yet started its agricultural revolution. Without such an agrarian transformation no further stage of development can be considered. Since independence, smallholder systems have either declined in productivity or remained stagnant except in export products. In its current state, smallholder agriculture is incapable of releasing a market food surplus that meets urban demand.

Furthermore, the precariousness of rural livelihoods has actually increased; many households continue to use simple technology and are dependent on the delivery of farm inputs organised by government agencies (Long, 2001: 101) and increasingly by non-state actors such as NGOs. What went wrong? The reasons behind the weakening of African agricultural systems are multi-faceted in nature. They include a weak analysis and
understanding of the challenges confronting the sector which has led to the formulation of incoherent policy frameworks and colonially-inherited, insecure land tenure systems that continue to marginalise smallholders especially women, limited innovation in agricultural technologies and a skewed international commodity trade regime. The sub-sections below discuss in more detail some of the cross-cutting challenges confronting agricultural development challenges within Africa.

**Inadequate Models of Development**

Starting from the 1970s into the early 1980s many newly independent African countries found themselves in a difficult position where they were struggling to repay loans from the WB and IMF. Most African countries were encouraged to effect economic reform programmes commonly known as structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) through the enticement of balance of payment support (BOP). The prescription for economic reform was standard; deregulation of national currencies and prices, commercialisation and privatisation of previously state controlled industries and public services (Fine, 2000 and Moyo and Yeros, 2005).

Agriculture suffered the most from structural adjustment; implementing countries were advised to unilaterally withdraw all support for agriculture and implement titling and commodification of smallholder agriculture land. Furthermore, implementing countries were advised to focus on exports where they have comparative advantage and this has led to a shift from traditional food crops into cash export crops.

The shift towards an export orientation has contributed towards the further insertion of smallholder production into the sphere of commodity production for the already saturated commodity market dominated by multi-national corporations (MNCs) and heavily subsidised Northern farmers (see below). In the process, this has affected their food production capacities. The liberalising approach has also meant the opening up of domestic markets to global competition leading to significant decrease in the prices of commodities, especially food crops, thus reinforcing the need to capture the elusive export markets. Such a policy regime promoted FDI led and dominated capital intensive extractive sector and statistics as recent as 2010 suggest that the pattern has not dramatically changed-fuel and mineral exports account for 64% of Africa’s exports whilst agriculture only contributes 10.2% (ECA, 2011: 4).
The liberalising reforms unleashed suffocating market forces by devaluing currencies. In the process the cost of production was raised due to the withdrawal of subsidies and the entrance of profit driven enterprises into the inputs market—a role previously carried out by the state agencies. The SAP regimes also generally led to the deflation of incomes/wages in agriculture. Meanwhile, the relative depreciation of the wages through currency devaluation and wage restraints has been met by rising commodity prices (Moyo 2010: 304). Thus, the smallholder does not only contend with increased input prices but also has to accumulate or secure sufficient resources to purchase finished products at exorbitant prices.

Uneven Commodity Markets

The legacy of African agriculture producing for the colonial ‘motherlands’ continues in its strongly promoted and internationally enforced export orientation and its forced integration into the ‘world market’ (FIAN 2009). Since liberalisation in the 1980s, agricultural land use patterns have changed to service world commodity markets to an extent that approximately 40% of the world’s total agricultural production is now traded across national borders. The rapid growth in international agricultural trade coupled with low world prices for primary exports and increasing competition in agriculture around the world have made it difficult for agriculture (especially the smallholder sector) in most of Africa to compete within this context. This was exacerbated by the hefty subsidies that OECD based farmers receive from their governments.

In 2004, both the USA and the EU produced roughly 17% of the world’s agro-exports. Canada, Australia and New Zealand together accounted for 15% and the major South American exporters (Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) 13% (Weis, 2007: 21). Approximately 62% of the world’s agro-exports in 2004 came from 4% of the world’s agricultural population. The large scale nature of production in these regions has contributed towards a 60% decline in prices of the big three cereals, maize, rice and wheat. The FAO notes that ‘depressed [commodity] world prices create serious problems for poor farmers in developing countries who must compete in global and domestics markets with these low priced commodities and lack safeguards against import surges (2003: 21).

Furthermore, agriculture in these developed regions is dominated by huge multinational corporations which dominate the agricultural downstream and upstream value chains through the use of patents on seeds,
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fertiliser and pesticides and by controlling the distribution networks. The economic muscle of MNCs engaged in agriculture such as Monsanto, Cargill, and Archer Daniels Midland became very apparent when the prices of wheat, corn and rice soared in 2008, leading to what is commonly referred to as the food crisis. While smallholders and the urban poor were facing the food crisis crunch, these agribusiness giants were enjoying soaring profits out of the crisis. Monsanto reported that its net income for the three months up to the end of February 2008 had more than doubled over the same period in 2007, US$543million to US$1.2billion (Lean 2008). Cargill’s net earnings soared by 86% from US$553million to US$1.3billion over the same period. Archer Daniels Midland, one of the world’s largest agricultural processors of soy, corn and wheat increased its net earnings by 42% in the first three months from US$363million to US$517million (ibid). The price of some kinds of fertilisers also tripled during the same period. The MNCs have managed to subordinate smallholder systems to their logic of production mostly because in many instances official government planning has focused solely on supply-side interventions such as securing improved seed and fertilisers while paying too little attention to where the increased production should go.

At a local level, the absence of state intervention in agricultural commodity markets has led to the emergence of a very exploitative cadre of middle-traders. These are often composed of rural elites with access to trucks and cash, able to buy commodities produced by smallholders. They take advantage of the challenges faced by smallholders in accessing markets and offer below market prices to the producers for onward selling into urban markets. Thus the removal of the state from commodity markets has not led to a ‘perfect’ market as envisaged by the liberalisation prescription but rather the emergence of colluding actors who mostly pursue super-profits in their dealings with petty commodity producers.

If the situation is not adequately addressed, the broad patterns of agricultural trade described here will deepen considerably in the coming decades, with grain and livestock exports from the major producing nations dominating the world market entwined with rising food import dependence in much of the developing world. Compared with the late 1990s, average grain imports from the developing region are expected to double by 2020 (Weiss, 2007: 24). These patterns point towards the increasing unattractiveness of smallholder agriculture and towards what others such as Bryceson et al. (2003), and Weiss (2007) call the ‘depeasantisation’ of Africa’s countryside.
Indeed, there is evidence that Africa is experiencing increased rates of urbanisation leading to congestion in the cities and increased informalisation of the urban economy due to the failure of the formal sector to absorb the large numbers of jobseekers. Others (see Cosatu, 2007, ECA, 2011) have called the recent economic growth trends a ‘jobless’ form of growth given its failure to create employment opportunities. The 2011 Economic Report on Africa states that, ‘the continent is experiencing jobless recovery...employment has been limited in many countries as much of the economic recovery has been driven by capital intensive extractive sectors, which have few forward and backward links with the rest of the economy (ECA, 2011: 3).

**Inadequate Policy Formulation, Implementation and Monitoring Capacities**

Even though the adjustment mantra is waning, most of Africa is yet to recover from the ‘technicist’ tradition that began at decolonisation but became entrenched by structural adjustment in policy-making processes. In the first decade of independence the supply side of the market for policy research was the exclusive preserve of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the UN and the donor community at large (Ajakaiye, 2007: 19). Trends have not really changed as current policy reform is still dominated by ‘policy craftsmen’ based in Western multi-lateral organisations and seconded to many African governments. An evaluation report on the performance of CAADP (discussed below) carried out by the UK based Overseas Development Institute (ODI) makes this interesting observation

One of the features of agriculture policy analysis and strategic investment planning in Africa has essentially been dominated by expatriate consultants and academics. As a result valuable experience has been accumulated by a large number of people from outside the continent (ODI-Nepad, 2010: 17).

As a result policy making in most of Africa is shrouded in secrecy the entire process tends to be ‘mystified” and is mostly dominated by elite and sections of political society. Technical language is often used to exclude the majority of other non-state actors. Complex permutations, equations and models are deployed and these are often beyond the comprehension of most members of the legislative assemblies with modest levels of education.
Currently it is difficult to determine the true value of African (especially smallholder) agriculture, especially when the aforementioned explanations for the collapse of agriculture are taken into consideration. Compounding the challenge is the lack of adequate planning capacities within African governments. Data on the actual numbers of households engaged in smallholder agriculture does not exist in many African countries. In Malawi for instance, there is no national identification system except for highly prized passports which the majority cannot attain. Lack of basic data such as average size of households, rural income activities, income sources, size of land etc. makes its difficult (if not impossible) to develop adequate plans.

However, others argue that such data is being generated by the fledgling non-state sector made up of NGOs, research institutions (cum policy think-tanks) and the representative unions. The proliferation of local institutions with policy research capacity has not yet made an impact on policy making. Ajakaiye (2007: 19) argues that

there exists a disconnect between the policy making process and the considerable base that policy researchers are producing—that is, full use is not being made of research findings generated in Africa when decision makers formulate policies.

Policy making is currently ad-hoc in nature and is driven either by political or donor interests. The envisaged synergies between local policy research organisations and governments’ policymaking processes are in many ways yet to emerge.

**Technological and Infrastructural Issues**

Contemporary challenges include the deceleration of agricultural technological transformation through reduced per capita utilisation of inputs such as improved seeds, fertilisers, etc. The majority of smallholders lack access to new technologies, for example, most smallholders in Tanzania, Malawi and Uganda still use hoes to till the land. In most instances the same smallholders are trapped by rising costs of inputs such as seeds, depend upon human labour and often have insufficient or poor quality land.

New technologies are not being generated fast enough again because of limited public and private investments, and global markets control. The inadequacy of investments into rural and agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation facilities, rural transport facilities (such as roads, bridges and ports, vehicles),
bulk food storage (and grain reserve) facilities as well as ancillary services such as electricity, have limited the expansion of food production, marketing and food distribution. Whereas prior to economic reforms research and development was the preserve of the state, it has been removed from the public domain and now serves the interest of large-scale agricultural producers.

Tracking fertiliser usage in Africa serves to demonstrate the negative impact of adjustment programmes. In the period just after decolonisation during the 1960s, fertiliser use grew rapidly until the end of 1970s and began to stagnate in the 1980s as subsidies to agriculture were withdrawn. Currently, only about 1.3 million metric tons of inorganic fertiliser are used in Africa annually representing less than 1% of global fertiliser production. Based on these figures the actual average rate of fertiliser application is 8kgs per hectare (Morris et al, 2007). A recent report by the McKinsey institute claims that Africa’s use of fertiliser has increased to 24 kilograms per hectare but this is only one quarter of the world average. (Sanghvi et al, 2011: 4) In the absence of viable alternatives most of the continent depends on costly imported fertilisers, except for South Africa, which has adequate production capacity.

As widely acknowledged in the literature most smallholders are women. Their access to technological inputs, such as improved seed, fertilisers and pesticides is often impeded by national legislation and customary laws which do not allow them to share land property rights with their husbands. Women heads of household are excluded from land entitlement schemes. Consequently, they cannot provide the collateral required by lending institutions or show documented proof that they have access to land. They are frequently not reached by extension services and are sometimes excluded from cooperatives, which often distribute government subsidised inputs and vital market information to small farmers. In addition, they lack the cash income needed to purchase inputs even when they are subsidised.

The technological disparities between farmers in the West and those in SSA have been exacerbated by the agricultural subsidy regimes in the world’s richest countries which altogether spend over US$200 billion subsidising their own agricultural sectors (Weis, 2007: 25).6 In contrast, these same countries devote less than US$1billion a year in official development assistance to agricultural development in the developing world (FAO, 2003).

The preceding discussion has highlighted the multi-faceted nature of the cross-cutting challenges that smallholders face in most of Africa. There are other issues that are localised in nature such as low literacy levels among smallholders in most of the African countries (see the chapters on Ghana, Malawi
and Mali in this book). Low literacy levels have been found to negatively affect the uptake of extension messages. Other challenges include the fragmentation of landholdings in Malawi and Tanzania (where average landholdings are 0.2ha per household) and new threats to tenure security because of new foreign investments in land such as in Mali, Tanzania and Uganda. These form a composite of issues that smallholders grapple with on a daily basis as they eke out desperate livelihoods within a very austere policy environment. But what exactly are they doing? Some of the most common rural responses have been rural to urban migration (already discussed above) and diversification into other non-farm income generating activities (see Murisa and Helliker, 2011). The sub-section below focuses on a brief analysis of how representative associations have emerged and also fared in defending rural livelihoods.

**Smallholder Representation and Policy Advocacy**

The failure of the ‘independence project’ and the consequent dismal performance of the adjustment programme in terms of improving opportunities and incomes especially within the agricultural sector have led to the re-examination of what the role of the state should be especially in rural development. The process has also extended to examining how agency can be deployed towards community development. The post-colonial period has been characterised by the invigoration of rural associational life through the formation of a variety of structured and unstructured local organisations which employ both legal and illegal tactics to achieve their goals. Others such as Moyo (2002: 2) argue that peasant organisations have a longer history of dispersed struggles against colonial and post-colonial repression and economic exploitation. The last 20 years (adjustment years) have seen a resurgence of forms of rural collective action made up of peasant associations, group farming, common property institutions and community-based resource management (Mckeon, et al, 2004: 4).

However, scant scholarly attention has been devoted towards these associational forms, especially lacking is an analysis of how they emerge, their social base and the roles they play in supporting rural livelihoods. These formations do not only address livelihoods issues but they have also contributed towards the democratisation process by nurturing a culture of citizenship amongst the members and also accountability on the part of the state. Webster (2004: 2) suggests that;
many of what now pass as peasant associations must be located in the larger landscape of new rural social movements that are less concerned with defending ways of life or blocking the intrusions of the state but rather are engaged in a process of delineating new political and cultural spaces.

These formations resist domination by the state, landlords, merchant capital, or men in the case of women’s associations (Mafeje, 1993: 17). In fact, these formations are potentially “...emancipatory forms that transcend received identities (roles) and erase the distinction between private and public existence” (McKeon et al, 2004: 5). Increasingly, maybe because of disappointment with the state, they have become centres of micro-democracy given the revolving nature of leadership, unlike within the state-supported traditional framework where positions are held for life. It is argued that petty commodity-producing smallholders belonging to these associational forms are active and an empowered force that continue to occupy the terrain of struggle over land and agrarian reform and have contributed towards the renewed interest into agricultural policy reform.

Rural local associational forms include savings and loans societies, self-help organisations, multi-purpose cooperatives, occupational groupings, farmers unions and, since the 1960s, rural-based NGOs. Most of them have emerged as part of an attempt to counter the retreat of the state from agriculture as a result of structural adjustment policies. The local organisations sometimes serve as defensive instruments in the everyday struggles of smallholders, to help contribute to the economic “viability” of rural households, and to help create the enabling conditions for the pursuit of autonomous livelihoods.

The larger unions or associations end up internally contradicted; in most cases they start off as membership driven formations but are eventually penetrated and civilised by the state or by donor capital (Moyo and Yeros, 2005). States have routinely incorporated farmers’ unions and association into their structures and used them as conduits of the state’s modernisation programme. As a result, most of the national smallholders’ unions have become appendages either of the state or the ruling party. Those that have been spared the state’s cooptation agenda have found themselves at the mercy of donor partners also pursuing a similar agenda of ‘modernisation’. Thus, separation between membership driven unions and rural intermediary NGOs is conceptually difficult to make in many situations. Furthermore, some national smallholders’ unions are led by elite rural elements that use the organisation’s
platform to defend their own class and political interests (see Moyo, 2010: 8) rather than genuinely represent the entire membership’s interests.

Beyond the national representative unions a variety of trans-boundary advocacy networks representing smallholder interests have emerged. Regional networks, such as the East and Southern African Smallholders Association Forum (ESSAF) and global formations such as Via Campesina, mobilise around common grievances especially the unfair trade in international agriculture. These networks have been at the forefront of representing smallholder interests in regional policy forums such as within the East Africa Community and SADC. Via Campesina has been behind the food sovereignty campaign (discussed in more detail below). However global initiatives such as Via Campesina are internally contradicted given the differentiation of the peasantry (smallholder) sector within the different regions (e.g. Western Europe, Latin America and Africa) and, typically, the differences in the material challenges that they confront.

Besides the representative associations, other non-state agents such as NGOs have penetrated Africa’s countryside. Their contribution to development, in particular to the rural sector, needs to be understood within the framework of development theory. Kwesi Prah (2011: 156) defines development as a process that facilitates the improvement and uplifting of the quality of life of people, so that they are able, to a larger measure, to attain their potential, build and acquire self-confidence and manage to live lives of reasonable accomplishment and dignity. Most NGO interventions up until the early 1990s were focused on developing alternative ways of re-arranging or creating new opportunities for income generation and also on strengthening social service delivery. Ever since the turn towards multi-party democratisation, NGOs have begun to contribute towards the development of alternative policy visions which alter the organisation of the economy, politics and social relationship. When it comes to policy advocacy, NGOs only begin to occupy meaningful political space if they are offering coherent alternatives to dominant models, practices and ideas about development (Bebbington, et al 2008: 3).

We deploy the above framework of development to analyse NGOs within the agricultural policy reform space. Although there is evidently renewed optimism in smallholder agriculture, we still note a gap in terms of non-state actors’ interventions in policy reform and their formulation of a coherent set of development alternatives to the dominant models. While the official processes surrounding the implementation CAADP seem to be
well supported by national governments and also the international donor community, support to civil society organisations on the other hand, especially the farmers’ representative associations and unions to proactively engage with the policy reform processes remains weakly and incoherently organised. Although many organisations focused on policy reform have emerged in this space, their actual impact on smallholder agricultural policy reform has either not been adequately examined or is very minimal. There remains a dearth of coherent and informed policy analysis, tracking and recommendation of viable options that can inform a more comprehensive process of smallholder agricultural development in most of Africa.

The development of policy advocacy focused civil society organisations in Africa has been highly uneven. The levels of internal competencies, in terms of technical skills, establishment of adequate structures and understanding of the processes of policy making differ across sub-regions and also within countries. Although sub-regions such as East and West Africa appear to have fairly thriving civil society organisations, this has not translated into improved and robust policy alternatives. Policy analysis and engagement skills are distinctly lacking in many of the organisations within the sector. One of the obvious challenges that these organisations face is their ‘silo’-approach. There is no evidence of attempts to create synergies and aggregate the skills resident within organisations operating within the same sector in the same country or even the same district. Networking and collaboration initiatives have been imposed mostly through donor conditionalities but they have performed dismally because of intra-organisational suspicions and competition. In other instances, grassroots based unions or associations have been co-opted by NGOs as junior partners into networks but this have been purely for fundraising purposes.

However, it is not all gloomy as we have noticed isolated pockets of centres of best practice. In Ghana, SEND has carved a niche for itself in the area of budget analysis and they publish expenditure tracking reports which are also used by other advocacy organisations (see Chapter 2). In Malawi NASFAM has managed to penetrate the policy space to an extent that it chairs one of the CAADP implementation sub-committees. However, the NASFAM position is precarious, especially its cosy relationship with government (see Chapter 4). At a Pan-African level, international organisations such as Oxfam and Actionaid and African think tanks such as the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) have made a significant contribution towards exposing the inconsistencies of donor led agricul-
tural interventions such as the Alliance for the Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and also exposing the recent land grabs (alienations) that have swept across Africa. African think-tanks such as AIAS and HARKHIADHI have been at the forefront of cutting edge research on the state of inequitable land relations in Africa and the negative impact on rural livelihoods and national development. The AIAS has also provided technical support to social movements and international NGOs.8

Civil society organisations face challenges connected to capacity issues—especially what Moyo (1992: xxi) has referred to as ‘craft competency’ and ‘craft literacy’9 skills. There is reason to believe that these capacities can be raised through a number of specialised interventions (see Chapter 8).

**CURRENT INITIATIVES IN RESOLVING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY**

The most current and notable developments in Africa’s attempts to improve agriculture include CAADP, the Group of Eight’s (G8) commitment to food security through the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI) of 2009 (discussed below) and the Alliance for the Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA). AGRA10 is the single largest investment in agriculture; approximately US$361million was released to realise the goals of the various programmes of AGRA from 2007 to 2009. The largest contributor has been the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) which has so far contributed US$197million. AGRA’s main objective is to tackle hunger in Africa by ‘working to achieve a food secure and prosperous Africa through the promotion of rapid, sustainable growth based on smallholder farmers’.

A detailed analysis of AGRA reveals that most of the emerging critiques have questioned the efficacy of a ‘green revolution’12 that attempts to mimic a similar intervention in Mexico and the Indian sub-continent which did not adequately factor the needs of smallholders. It remains focused on production using the same industrial agricultural model but with a few variations; an expanded role for multi-national corporations (MNCs) and a heavy reliance on genetically modified organisms (GMOs).13 The relationship between AGRA and GMO companies such as Monsanto has been denied on several platforms despite a number of studies that have tracked the grants issued by AGRA to organisations that have strong relationships with the GMO industry (see for instance Bereano and English 2009). The following sub-section discusses the CAADP initiative and identifies some
of the gaps in the formulation of the plan. The discussion also develops a linkage between CAADP and the G8 initiative on food security in Africa.

CAADP AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

As mentioned previously, Africa’s agricultural revival is being pursued under the auspices of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development’s (NEPAD) initiative aptly called the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). CAADP’s seven-part vision for agriculture in Africa includes food security, improved productivity of agriculture to attain annual growth rate of 6%, with particular attention to small-scale farmers and women, as well as dynamic agricultural markets and sustainable use of the natural resource base. It was envisaged that CAADP would contribute towards the achievement of the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) – halving poverty and hunger by 2015.

Table 1.1: Features of CAADP

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Emphasis on African Ownership</th>
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<td>The NEPAD-wide emphasis on African Ownership and leadership backed by financial and political commitments by national governments has raised the credibility of the agenda.</td>
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<th>Agriculture-led Growth to Achieve MDG1-Poverty Reduction</th>
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<td>The emphasis on the centrality of Agriculture to instil dynamism within African economies has contributed to the increasing prominence of agriculture on the development agenda.</td>
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<th>A Conviction that Africa Can Do Better</th>
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<td>The philosophy underlying the entire AU/NEPAD effort (including CAADP) is reflected in the conviction that Africa can do better and differently in a more efficient and organised manner.</td>
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<th>Consistency and Continuity in Regional and National Development Efforts</th>
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<td>This is being facilitated by a specific set of shared long term growth and investment targets. The processes surrounding the implementation and programme monitoring are supported by dialogues and peer review tools meant to stimulate and broaden the practice of benchmarking.</td>
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<th>Partnerships and Alliances</th>
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<tr>
<td>Even though driven by African governments there is recognition of the need for sustainable partnerships with national government and development partners in order to improve future development outcomes.</td>
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Source: Based on various articles written about CAADP (see www.caadp.net)
The commitments outlined in CAADP have subsequently been reaffirmed with numerous declarations; (i) the Sirte Declaration on the Challenges of Implementing Integrated and Sustainable Development on Agriculture and Water in Africa (AU 2004), (ii) the Abuja Declaration on Food Security (AU 2006b), and (iii) the Abuja Declaration on Fertiliser for the African Green Revolution (AU 2006a). In addition to reiterating support for CAADP, these declarations added new directives requiring member country compliance. The Sirte Declaration, for example, called for the establishment of a common market, while the Declaration on Fertiliser set a target of increasing fertiliser use from an average of 8 kilograms per hectare to 50 kilograms per hectare by 2015. The Food Security Declaration designated specific crops as strategic commodities needing special attention, including rice, maize, legumes, cotton, oil palm, beef, dairy, poultry, and fisheries products at the continental level and cassava, sorghum, and millet at the sub-regional level; the commodities were identified to be the basis of a continental free trade area.

The original CAADP document from 2003 did not offer any plans to operationalize the program (AU/NEPAD, 2003); it merely outlined the five pillars (discussed below) around which investments and programs could be developed. The document did, however, indicate that the estimated investments are US$251 billion for the period 2003–15 for all of Africa, or around $17.9 billion a year. Although the actual means in which additional financing was to be secured was not discussed. Two months after the endorsement of CAADP by the AU Assembly in July 2003, the collective ministers of agriculture requested that the FAO assist the regional economic communities (RECs) and country governments in preparing national plans to implement CAADP. In response to the fifth resolution of the Maputo Declaration regarding the preparation of bankable projects under CAADP for the mobilisation of resources, the ministers of agriculture met with the NEPAD Implementation Committee in Rome in September 2003. This meeting concluded that national medium-term investment programs (NMTIPs) and bankable investment project profiles (BIPPs) would be formulated as vehicles for implementing CAADP. By the end of 2006, FAO had supported 50 countries of the AU.

CAADP has identified five areas (referred to as pillars within the CAADP language) to be supported by the increased budgetary commitments into agriculture. Pillar one is focused on extending the area under sustainable land management. The second pillar focuses on improving
From Rhetoric to Action

rural infrastructure and trade related capacities. The main objective within this pillar is to accelerate growth in the agricultural sector by raising the capacities of private entrepreneurs, especially local agro-dealers, to meet the ever changing market requirements. The third pillar is aimed at increasing food supply and reducing hunger by raising smallholder productivity and improving responses to food emergencies. The fourth pillar is focused on improving agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption. It aims to improve agricultural research systems in order to disseminate appropriate technologies. The fifth pillar is focused on the sustainable development of livestock, fisheries and forestry resources.

Since 2003, significant resources have been mobilised for CAADP’s activities. The first CAADP meeting took place in March 2005 in Bamako where about 150 international delegates met to determine and agree on an action plan. Financial institutions such as the African Development Bank (ADB) committed US$150 million towards sustainable water management in order to increase food security, while the Italian Government pledged US$250,000.

Since then, progress on the implementation and realisation of CAADP goals has been uneven. Twenty two countries had signed the CAADP compact by the end of 2010. An evaluation carried out by the UK based Overseas Development Institute (ODI) found that CAADP had positively influenced agricultural policy making in Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and Zambia. Other statistics show that between 2003 and 2009 about fifteen countries grew at annual rates of 5% or more between 2003 and 2009, which is very close to the targeted CAADP goal of 6%. Overall, the number of countries that have reached or exceeded the 6% CAADP growth target for agriculture has gone up from 5 to 11 since 2003. Estimates indicate that about a dozen countries have reached or exceeded half of the Maputo budget target, but only five countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali and Rwanda) have achieved or exceeded the 10% target. The ODI evaluation report identified Ethiopia and Rwanda as having made significant progress towards incorporating CAADP targets and principles into national agricultural policy making and planning (Nepad, 2010).

However, there is still a need to analyse how the overall agricultural budget prioritises the smallholder sector (especially women). Initial investigations reveal that more than 50% of the allocations goes towards recurrent overhead costs within the Ministry of Agriculture. This even applies in countries currently allocating less than 10% to agriculture.
Beyond funding, the formulation and focus of the CAADP strategy raises more challenges than prospects for growth. It is framed within the ‘catch-up’ mentality where Africa’s lack of progress is attributed to late development. CAADP thus adopts a modernisation approach albeit with a human face (refer to Pillar 3). Despite the noble intentions of the Maputo declaration, very little progress has been made in terms of the actual allocations towards agriculture, except for a few countries such as Mali and Malawi (see Chapter 4). Malawi has established a very ambitious inputs subsidy programme for small scale farmers. Almost all the CAADP country plans set targets for productivity and output. But they do not always present these targets in a way governments can deliver, such as kilometres of road to construct and the actual number and location of warehouses to be built, rather they vaguely commit to increasing access to markets (Sanghvi, 2011: 2).

Although measures have been taken to ensure that CAADP is home-grown, it is overly dependent on donor funds. Most of the policy and technical support (especially in the design of the strategy and monitoring of progress) is being sourced from outside the continent. Sensitive structural issues such as skewed land ownership patterns, land grabs and the inequitable relations promoted by the global commodity chains have not been tabled as deserving policy attention. The shift in emphasis neglects the weaknesses embedded within the inappropriate model of macro-economic development that was promoted by the Bretton Woods Institutions since the late 1970s through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). One of the most common result of SAPs was the withdrawal of the state from agriculture and the privatisation of agricultural marketing boards across Africa. As already noted the process led to a new emphasis on an export led (cash crop based) agricultural model at the expense of staple food crops. (Moyo and Yeros, 2005). The contradiction between the intentions of the Maputo 2003 declaration on agriculture and the prescription of mainstream development assistance should not be overlooked, especially in a context where more countries in the region depend on direct budgetary support (DBS) from external partners.

The delineation of issues affecting agriculture into five pillars and then to isolate Pillar 3 as focused on vulnerable smallholders is problematic. Firstly, there is no coherent analysis outlining why vulnerable households exist. What are the processes that have induced this differentiation? In taking this route, CAADP falls into the trap of attempting to revive a bi-modal agricultural structure where one sector is prioritised as more market
oriented than the other. Such thinking still dominates many national agricultural planning departments and it has perpetuated constraints of accessing markets on the part of smallholders. Secondly, CAADP dwells on the ‘soft issues’ of agrarian reform at the expense of the ‘hard’ and political issues such as land reform. Sustainable land management (Pillar One) has been narrowly conceived to refer to conservation farming, making an assumption that the colonial question of land alienation has been resolved or no longer needs resolution. This is a matter of concern, especially in a context where the industrialisation project has been abandoned, except maybe in South Africa. Challenges around insecure forms of access to land and water are not raised in the CAADP analysis of issues affecting agriculture, when in fact they are at the root of the declining yields among smallholders.

CAADP prefers to address the more technical aspects of agriculture and, unfortunately, avoids both the political and social relations of production mediated by local government institutions (including chiefs) and agrarian labour relations (in post settler colonies such as Kenya). Agricultural recovery cannot be premised solely on the technical aspects of production and CAADP needs to revisit this oversight. Furthermore, the architects of CAADP uncritically embrace the logic of commodity markets. In fact, they try to find ways of accelerated insertion into these markets, despite the obvious unfairness of the global commodity chains mediated by multi-nationals. Furthermore, CAADP’s Pillar 3 is designed within a very welfarist framework. Critics such as Shivji (2006) lament this as a shift from developmentalism to welfarist poverty reduction.

Even when evaluated on a purely technical production focus basis CAADP still has some challenges. The priority and thrusts of the CAADP policies (especially Pillar 4), are all geared towards increased agricultural productivity and growth and commercialisation through improved seed varieties, fertiliser use intensification (as confirmed by the Abuja Declaration). Implicit in these efforts is the promotion of monoculture approaches with all its attendant implications pertaining to the multi-functionality of agriculture (Mushita et al 2011). Improved varieties in the form of hybrid seed and fertiliser achieves the desired short to medium term objective of attaining economic growth and food security at the expense of long term sustenance of biodiversity and ecosystem maintenance. There are high risks for accelerated genetic erosion associated with monoculture approaches as the immediate objective will be profit maximization. There is an increased
rallying towards commercially profitable crops at the expense of food crops which at the local level promote dietary and genetic diversity (ibid, 2011).

The architects of CAADP claim that the programme is based on an ethos of inclusive participation off all relevant sector players from within and outside the state in developing, implementing and monitoring agricultural policies and projects. However there is very limited evidence that stakeholder participation in CAADP processes is generating the required representativeness and the desired substantive contributions to policy design and implementation (ODI-Nepad, 2010). A review on non-state actor participation in CAADP identified a number of systemic challenges that inhibit the quality of participation and these include the questionable legitimacy and accountability of the organisations representing certain constituencies and limited resources, knowledge and skills for effective participation, particularly by those representing poor or disadvantaged communities. Despite the wide recognition for the need to develop African expertise to ensure effective ownership of agricultural policy very little progress has been to incorporate local expertise based within research institutions and universities. Recently the CAADP secretariat recruited a team of external experts based at the ODI in the UK to carry out an evaluation of the progress made by CAADP after seven years of implementation.

**Global Donor Architecture of Enhancing Food Security in Africa**

In 2009, heads of state of G8 member countries met in L’Aquila, Italy and acknowledged that there has been a longstanding underinvestment in agriculture and food security. The price trends of food combined with the economic crisis have led to increased hunger and poverty in developing countries; more than a further 100m in extreme poverty. The number of people living in hunger now exceeds 1billion. Also, the food crisis of 2007-8 negatively affected the prospects of meeting the MDGs. The leaders agreed to invest US$200 million over three years to encourage the rural development of poor countries under what is commonly referred to as the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI).

It was soon recognised that the member countries do not have an adequate coordinating mechanism to manage the fund and the World Bank was invited to manage the trust fund. In turn, the World Bank renamed the fund to the Global Partnership on Agriculture and Food Security (GPAFS). The main objective of the Fund is to improve food security and
incomes in low income countries through assistance to agriculture. The Fund provides support to country led initiatives. Notably, private philanthropy foundations and corporates such as the Gates Foundation have been approached to contribute towards this fund. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has been invited to provide technical support in the identification of beneficiary countries and also in the preparation of Agriculture and Rural Development strategies. Furthermore, the FAO is supporting the preparation of country led investments, strategies and plans in the context of the CAADP (discussed above). The Fund provides both public and private sector financing in the form of grants, loans and equity investments. It supports programmes and initiatives that: (i) link farmers to markets, (ii) reduce risk and vulnerability, (iii) improve non-farm rural livelihoods and (iv) provide technical assistance and capacity development. To date, the CAADP secretariat and Rwanda, Malawi and Kenya have accessed these funds.

Civil Society and the Shift towards Food Sovereignty

At the margins of renewed efforts to reform agriculture policies through CAADP and related initiatives, civil society based activists are making a radical demand for food sovereignty. The Nyeleni declaration of 2007 for food sovereignty includes the need to urgently prioritise local agricultural production in order to feed people, improved and secure access to land, water, seed and credit by the smallholders. Contained within these demands is the need for comprehensive land reforms that ensure land goes to the tiller and safeguard water and other natural resources as public goods. The declaration demands the right of family farmers and peasants to produce food and the right of consumers to be able to decide what they consume, how and by whom it is produced. It urges the re-introduction of trade control at the country level by demanding that states protect themselves from low priced agricultural and food imports from the developed regions.

The demands contained within the Nyeleni declaration are in contrast to the CAADP strategy. Civil society through the Nyeleni Declaration speaks boldly against unfair and insecure forms of access to land and even calls for pro-poor land reforms. In contrast, CAADP speaks of bringing more land under sustainable management, implying increased investment on the land (which can feasibly be made through the foreign direct investment model). Civil Society’s position is focused on enhancing local food production for local consumption at fair prices, while the CAADP seems
to desire accelerated integration into global commodity chains. In terms of technology use, civil society’s position on environmentally friendly land use patterns is in opposition to the CAADP’s pursuit of increased inorganic fertiliser and hybrid seed use in order to increase yields. Consequently, when civil society begins to agitate for local seed banks as a response to the insecurity posed by large multi-nationals responsible for seed production, CAADP finds itself trying to increase the uptake of hybrid seeds.

However, it is important to bear in mind that civil society is far from homogenous, rather, it is characterised by it diversity, loose structures and competition. There is a notable lack of coherency with regards to the vision on agrarian reform. Indeed, there are many NGOs that have embraced the CAADP agenda and participate in the non-state actors’ platform without questioning the contradictions raised in this chapter. Others, such as the AIAS and the TCOE led People’s Dialogue network, have adopted a position of principled engagement in which they have levelled weaknesses within CAADP and sought to raise awareness from within. There is no evidence that CAADP has engaged with civil society based networks and movements promoting the food sovereignty agenda such as La via Campesina, TCOE and the People’s Dialogue. International NGOs such as Action Aid and Oxfam have made a similar demand for food sovereignty. In its recent article entitled ‘Fertile Ground’, Action Aid argues that ‘empowering local farmers to produce more food for local markets is the bedrock of global food security’. However, others (see for instance Kachule, 2008) have argued that smallholders are too weakly organised to make a major impact on agricultural policies.

**Outline of the Book**

This last section of the introductory chapter is devoted towards briefly outlining the contents of the national chapters that follow. The writers are nationals of the countries that they analyse and most of them have significant expertise on the subject of agricultural policy making. The chapters are uneven and do not necessarily share a similar epistemological approach in terms of development. The researchers from Kenya and Tanzania belong to the radical left group and adopt a political economy class-based form of analysis. Others are pessimistic about local forms of organisations and analyse agricultural development from a purely modernist approach, thus dwelling on the backwardness of the smallholder sector and the need for ‘catching up’.
The chapter on Ghana is based on a comprehensive review of the agricultural policies and the processes surrounding their formulation and implementation. The chapter discusses in more detail the extent to which the current Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II) and Sector Plan agenda relate to the goals established within the CAADP compact. The role of policy advocacy by small holder farmers’ unions and other intermediary NGOs is subjected to further scrutiny and the fact that there has been very limited energy devoted towards developing synergies within the relevant organisations is highlighted. The chapter on Kenya examines how the historical and ethno-regional interests within the various ruling regimes have shaped the performance of the smallholder sector. It also analyses some of the strategies smallholders and their allies have forged to respond to the diminishing budgetary allocations to the sector since the 1980s. The paper grapples with the identification of the policy obstacles and other factors currently working against the sustainable development of smallholder agriculture in Kenya.

In chapter 4 on Malawi, Richard Kachule discusses the recent policy measures that have contributed towards the country’s transformation from being a net importer of food to becoming self-sufficient within a short period. However, Kachule notes that despite this turn around due to the existence of supportive policies and strategies within the agriculture sector, there has been very limited improvement of the plight of smallholder agriculture. The author identifies low productivity, poorly functioning input and output markets and diminishing land sizes as some of the constraints currently negatively affecting agricultural development. Kachule rows against the tide; in a context where the country is being celebrated for achieving food security, he concludes that the measures that have been adopted are not comprehensive and sustainable to secure permanent growth in the sector.

The chapter on Mali introduces a new dimension. Besides being the only Francophone country in the project, there are also unique developments. Although the government of Mali has shown an interest in smallholder agriculture since the turn of the century, and has since 2008 been allocating more than 10% towards agriculture, most resources have been devoted to the development of the cash crop sector. The skewed preference for cash crops has led to a near collapse of the smallholder sector in food crop producing areas. The issue has been further compounded by land insecurities caused by the new forms of land investments led by foreigners.
and some sections of the Malian elite. Interestingly, Mali seems to have a much more sophisticated and networked rural focused set of civil society formations, operating from the local right up to the national levels.

The chapter on Uganda provides a descriptive overview of the agricultural and rural development initiatives adopted since the 1990s. It devotes significant attention to an analysis of the performance of the recent development policies such as the PMA and NAADS on activities agricultural extension and exposes the inadequacies of the policy measures. The author takes pains to explain the reason behind the decline in agriculture productivity within a context of renewed policy intervention in the sector. The steady decline in agricultural productivity from 7.9% of GDP in 2000/01 to 0.7% of GDP in 2007/2008 is sobering, especially given the euphoric context of CAADP.

In Chapter 7, Shivji discusses the extent to which structural adjustment and neoliberal policies have worked against the smallholder sector in Tanzania. This chapter, unlike the others, goes into much detail about the nature of the (new) land question(s) and how it is affecting smallholder agriculture. She notes the shrinking contribution of agriculture to GDP and the decline in productivity in a context where there are very few urban based jobs being created. The chapter also provides a succinct critique of the limitations of civil society based forms of interventions in the struggles to secure land rights and agricultural productivity for smallholders. The author also casts a very negative but insightful view of policy advocacy as currently practiced by civil society organisations. She argues that if demands for policy reform are carried out without adequate mobilisation of the communities concerned, the process is likely to perpetuate uneven power relations and the emergence of another tier of agents who claim to ‘speak’ on behalf of the communities. According to Shivji, communities should be mobilised to speak on their own behalf.

**Conclusion**

The continuing agricultural crisis in SSA, especially in light of the food crisis of 2007-8, is unfolding in a context where there is no clear alternative development framework for agriculture. This leaves room for developing a new perspective and for offering new solutions. While we applaud the recent commitments by African governments to increase annual budgetary allocation to agriculture by 10%, we are not fully persuaded that this will be an adequate response if the systemic sources of agrarian de-accumula-
tion and state divestment from agriculture in the past two decades are not addressed (Moyo, 2010: 308). The goals established through CAADP are indeed very noble. However, they remain highly inadequate if individual country contexts are not taken into consideration and if there is insufficient integration within a broader macro-economic policy framework of smallholder agriculture development at national and sub-regional levels. Current projections are that poor households in Africa’s countryside and urban areas will have to allocate a greater proportion of their expenditure to food, resulting in diets becoming less diverse and lower in quality and energy intake (calories consumed) (Hart, 2010: 8).

The country chapters that follow demonstrate the inconsistencies of the policy framework guiding agriculture and the domination of externally imposed patterns of development with very minimal engagement of the intended beneficiaries. Although there is renewed interest within donor communities and other African governments for an agricultural revolution, the ingredients of that revolution have not yet been properly defined. Current initiatives led by the Alliance for the Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) have not adequately clarified their position on GMO based innovations. There is currently no consensus on the suitability and effectiveness of the latter to deliver such a revolution. There is an urgent need to revisit the architecture of CAADP and address some of the glaring gaps in the strategy. It is also imperative to develop a consensual definition on what this agricultural revolution entails, in order to avoid assumptions regarding suitability of scientific innovations originating from the laboratories of the US in the development of GMOs. The proposed agricultural recovery based on smallholder production is very complex and multi-dimensional and should ideally have four interrelated dimensions; improvement of policy and legal process, addressing the technological and infrastructural issue, reforming the social controls and organisation of production and the international economic trade systems. The final chapter of this book contributes to the discourse on what should constitute a coherent strategy for agricultural growth.

Notes

1. The term Washington Consensus was coined in 1989 by economist John Williamson to describe a set of ten relatively specific economic policy prescriptions that constituted the “standard” reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing countries by Washington, D.C.-based institutions such
as the IMF, World Bank, and the US Treasury Department. The prescriptions encompassed policies in such areas as macroeconomic stabilization, economic opening with respect to both trade and investment, and the expansion of market forces within the domestic economy.

2. Despite the fact that the US, UK and France continued to provide subsidies to their farmers.

3. There are diverse definitions of sustainable agriculture but for the purpose of this discussion I identify with the Action Aid (2011) position which states that this form of agriculture should include agro-ecological considerations, low external input with an emphasis on organic fertilisers, integrated crop and pest management and water harvesting in dry land area (see final chapter).

4. Evidence from contemporary research (see for instance Moyo, 2008) shows that most of Africa faces different forms of land questions that range insecure tenure forms, land fragmentation-as land has to be sub-divided to give adult members of the lineage group (see Murisa, 2009), land concentration amongst elite groups and even more recently widespread land sales of vast tracts of land. The different land questions confronting African countries have been adequately treated by Moyo (2008) and Murisa and Helliker (2011)-the reader is referred to these texts.

5. According to the Oxfam GROW (2011) report- 4 multinationals control 50% of the seed market, 3 control 90% of grain trading and 6 control 75% of the agrochemicals sector.

6. The actual dollar figure to rich country agro-subsidies varies significantly with the World Bank’s oft cited estimate being US$1billion a day.

7. The most recent studies on rural associational life include Romdhane and Moyo (2002), Moyo and Yeros (2005), Murisa (2009).

8. The AIAS prepared the AGRA evaluation report on behalf of Actionaid and also carried out a study on the state of Food Security in Southern Africa on behalf of the Southern African Trust (SAT).

9. According to Moyo (1992: xxi) craft literacy is the capacity to conceptualise a successful management process. It is the kind of capacity that leads to the construction of blueprints or alternative models that can be applied in different situations. Craft competency on the other hand refers to the ability to understand and apply, with regularity, a model or blueprint that has been developed by someone other than oneself.


11. The ‘green revolution’ refers to the development of new varieties of food plants and altered agricultural practice that greatly increased crop yields. It started in Mexico in 1944 and spread to India and neighbouring countries in the 1960s.
12. GMOs are a manipulation of elements within the genome of the crop that would not occur in nature, such as by inserting genes from a completely different species (Bereano and English 2009).

13. Not widely discussed in the earlier CAADP documents and looks like an afterthought even in the development of the strategies to achieve the objectives under the pillar.

References


An Analysis of Smallholder Agriculture, Policy-Making and Advocacy in Ghana

John Baptist D. Jatoe

Introduction

On October 2009, the Government of Ghana pledged to fulfil the commitments laid out in the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II) and Sector Plan agenda in a new Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) compact. Among other things, the compact affirmed Ghana’s commitment to increasing public investment in agriculture to at least 10% of her national budget. Another important pledge is to improve agricultural productivity to reach an average annual growth rate of 6% by 2015, while paying close attention to small-scale farmers, especially women. Under the compact, oversight and coordination of the implementation of the above partnerships will actively involve stakeholders such as CSOs, the private sector, trade unions and agricultural bodies/associations. However, the national context within which participation of smallholders is to be achieved or organised is not
clear. In particular, a framework that provides for the participation of small-holders in national policy making is not apparent. In addition, the forms of mobilisation (for example, organisations) responding to the challenges confronting smallholders in Ghana have not been adequately analysed.

An understanding of the country context and the state of policy advocacy will help design interventions to enhance institutional capacity for monitoring and holding government accountable to the people and its partners. Indeed, as Trust Africa (www.trustafrica.org) points out, sustainable and equitable development policies are most likely to emerge only when a broad range of stakeholders have the capacity to advocate for their needs and aspirations. Yet, in Africa the least influential actors in agricultural development initiatives are the hundreds of millions of poor, small-scale farmers – the majority of them women – who are the lifeblood of most of the continent’s economies.

**An Overview of Agriculture in Ghana**

The most recent Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS 5) estimates the national population at 22.2 million, with 51.5% being females. Children under 15 years account for about 40% of the population, while those aged 65 years and older form 4.7%. With regard to regional distribution of the population from the survey, Ashanti, Greater Accra and Eastern regions constitute about 44% of the estimated total population. The Upper East (1.1 million) and the Upper West (0.8 million) regions recorded the lowest population. The estimated number of households in Ghana is 5.5 million with a higher proportion in the rural areas (3.1 million) than in the urban areas (2.4 million).

The survey data indicates that about 31% of adults (or a little over 4 million people) have never been to school. A further 17% attended school but did not obtain Middle School Leaving Certificate or Basic Education Certificate Examination (MSLC/BECE). About 39% of adults have the MSLC/BECE certificate and only about 14% obtained secondary or higher level qualification. Thus, about half (6.4 million) of adults in Ghana neither attended school nor completed middle school/junior secondary school. There is also a clear gender gap in education, with almost twice as many females (2.7 million) as males (1.4 million) never attending school. In addition, there are fewer females (0.7 million) than males (1.1 million) with secondary or higher qualification.
The majority of the working population is employed in agricultural activities (55.8%), followed by trading (15.2%) and then manufacturing (10.9%). About 3.4 million households in Ghana own or operate a farm or keep livestock. In terms of type of work engaged in by the currently employed, 55.9% of those who worked during the reference period are self-employed, with 32.1% engaged in agricultural activities and 23.8% in non-agricultural activities. In both rural and urban localities the proportion of female contributing family workers, in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities is much higher (32.3%) than the proportion of male in the same category (17.7%). Out of the estimated 4.7 million children aged seven to fourteen years, an estimated 13% were economically active. An overwhelming majority (97.8%) of the economically active children are contributing family workers. Only 0.4% of these children are in some form of apprenticeship. A majority (89.3%) of these children are engaged in agriculture, which is also the main industrial sector in the rural areas (Ghana Statistical Service, 2008).

Cassava, plantain and pepper are harvested by the largest number of households in Ghana. Also, the majority of farm households (2.5 million) harvested maize. Other major crops, in terms of number of households involved, are sorghum/millet/guinea corn (848,527), cocoa (725,480), groundnut/peanut (698,905), beans/peas (501,484), and rice (306,153). Maize is the only staple grain which is grown extensively in all coastal, forest and savannah zones. More than half of households that grow kenef, groundnut/peanut, tobacco, rice, other tree crops (sheanut and cashew nut) and beans/peas, and virtually all the households that grow cotton and sorghum/millet/guinea corn, are located in the savannah ecological zone. Overall, the savannah zone accounts for about half (50%) of the crops harvested, but less than one third (26%) of total value of sales; production being mainly for subsistence.

The Ghana Statistical Service (2008) estimates that about 1.8 million households in agriculture hired labour on their farms and about 1.9 million purchased locally made hand tools. In addition, more than half a million of the households that harvested crops purchased seeds, bags, insecticides, containers, herbicides, strings and fertilisers. Among the expenditure items incurred on crop inputs, a substantial amount (43%) was spent on hiring farm labourers, and as much as 19% of the amount was spent on inorganic fertilisers alone. The majority (at least 70%) of the households purchase their agriculture inputs from the private sector. Out of the total expendi-
ture incurred on livestock, a sizeable amount (42%) is spent on animal feeds including salt. As in crop inputs, more than 80% of many types of livestock inputs are purchased from the private sector. With regard to fish inputs, about 43% of the expenditure incurred in this agriculture category is on hiring of labour, and all the inputs are purchased from the private sector.

The three main sources of household income in Ghana are income from agricultural activities (35%), wage income from employment (29%) and income from self employment (25%). Remittances constitute less than 10% of household income. Ghana produces 51% of its cereal needs, 60% of fish requirements, 50% of meat and less than 30% of the raw materials needed for agro-based industries (Government of Ghana, 2007). Production of roots, tubers and vegetables such as tomatoes and onions, the most widely used staple food crops, is rather erratic and fluctuates between scarcity, sufficiency and glut, depending on the vagaries of the weather. Agriculture continues to contribute the largest share to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), even though the share of the sector in national output declined from 44% in 1990 to 37% in 2005 (see Table 1). Since 2000, the contribution of agriculture to total GDP has varied between 35.8% and 37%. Agricultural growth increased from about 4% in 2000 to 6% in 2005, but much of the recent growth has been stimulated by the cocoa industry.

Table 2.1: Sectoral Contribution to GDP, 2002 – 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1993 constant prices (%)
Source: Ghana Statistical Service; ISSER, 2009

Agriculture is predominantly practiced on smallholder, family-operated farms using rudimentary technology. These farms produce about 80% of Ghana’s total agricultural output (Government of Ghana, 2007). Agricultural activities are mainly concentrated in rural areas or the countryside; about 85% of rural households are engaged in crop and/or animal keeping
compared to only 28% of urban households (Ghana Statistical Service, 2008). Also, rural savannah has the highest percentage of households in agricultural activities (92%), with rural forest and rural coastal areas reporting 86% and 73% of households, respectively. About 38% of women have direct responsibility for agricultural activities in Ghana.

About 90% of farm holdings are less than 2 hectares in size. Larger scale farms and plantations produce mainly palm oil, rubber and coconut and to a lesser extent, maize, rice and pineapples. Agricultural production is generally dependent on rainfall, although an estimated 6,000 farm enterprises nation-wide were using some means of irrigation in 1999. In 2002, the total area under formal irrigation was estimated at 11,000 hectares whereas the potential area – including inland valleys – that could be developed for irrigation is estimated at 500,000 ha. As of 2000, the Ghana Irrigation Development Authority (GIDA) identified 32,000 hectares of under-developed inland valleys throughout the country that could benefit from moisture improvement technologies for food production.

In Ghana, like elsewhere, small scale farmers or smallholders are not a homogenous group. They differ by broadly perceived defining characteristics of smallholder agriculture such as low input use, limited land and capital, and low market engagement as well as landholding size (Chamberlin, 2008). Yet, many strategy discussions rarely break down the group beyond basic agro-ecological divisions (e.g., north and south or coast, forest, and savannah). This shortcoming has been identified by Asuming-Brempong et al. (2004) who note that failure to differentiate between various livelihood contexts and production objectives has led to current undifferentiated policies that miss a large portion of the smallholder segment. In particular, they argue for the differentiation between poor and non-poor small farmers who are not currently engaged in markets. The poor will not be able to benefit from many of the targeted interventions (such as high-input, high-output technologies). Similar arguments have been made for gender-specific strategy formulation (Coulombe and McKay 2003; Aryeetey and McKay 2004; ISSER 2007).

In order to improve targeting, the recent policy review during the formulation of FASDEP II (the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA)) identified five categories of farmers in Ghana. These were described as large-scale commercial, small commercial, semi-commercial, non-poor complex diverse risk prone and poor farmers. It was also concluded that the earlier FASDEP failed to recognize the different categories of farmers. Therefore the pursuit of a modernised agriculture under FASDEP II proposes to
target different categories of farmers according to their needs. Risk-prone, largely subsistence farmers will be targeted with interventions to reduce their vulnerability and help them improve productivity. Smallholder commercial and semi-commercial farmers will also be supported to improve productivity and to integrate them into markets competitively.

In order to achieve this, on-going efforts to develop Farmer Based Organisations (FBOs) as part of the strategy for improved access of smallholders to services will continue. The aim is to encourage the evolution of FBOs at the grass roots and network them through a hierarchy of local, district and regional groupings to a national apex. It is expected that this will give the FBOs power to bargain. The needs of the existing commercial farmers (both large and small) will also be addressed by the policy. Support to the commercial sector is particularly relevant because the strategy is to forge links between commercial and smallholder sector for their mutual benefit. This is consistent with government’s transformative goals for small farmers such as increased participation in markets and higher productivity, through better access to and use of input and credit markets.

**Research Methods**

The research leading to this paper combined both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was obtained through desk review of various reports, policy documents and published literature. The study reviewed Ghana’s agriculture sector, the policy process, and the current Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II) and Sector Plan agenda in a new Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) compact. Primary data was obtained from key informant and focus group discussions with government officials currently engaged in agricultural policy-making and implementation. I also held interactions with various organisations involved in policy advocacy with emphasis on securing better policies for small holder farmers. The data was then synthesized and reported. The study employed an analytic framework that was developed during a 2-day methodology workshop held in Dakar, Senegal. The primary purpose of the analytic framework is to ensure the comparability of the results of the country scoping studies for the six countries involved in this project.
**KEY ISSUES AND INTERVENTIONS IN SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE**

The Government has applied a number of instruments to address the constraints in the agriculture sector with a view to modernising it. The thrust of the approach has been public-led service delivery, complemented with donor-funded stand-alone projects. However, experience has shown that donor-funded stand alone project activities and impacts are seldom sustained because of inadequate plans for phasing out and mainstreaming project activities with budgetary support from the central government. The current policy proposes a sector-wide approach for multi-donor budget support, in order to improve coordination among donors and consistency of the latter with sector policies. A brief review of some policy interventions in the agriculture and their effects on access to agricultural input and supply markets follows.

**INPUTS SUPPLY SYSTEMS AND SERVICE DELIVERY**

In the 1990s, Ghana undertook reforms in the research and extension systems with funding from the World Bank. The reforms were geared towards building the capacity to deliver improved extension to agricultural producers through Research Extension Liaison Committees (RELCs). While the institutional arrangements under different projects were maintained, the systems failed to deliver the needed service to farmers through the bottom-up and participatory approaches as envisaged. Later attempts introduced private sector participation in the delivery of veterinary services, and more recently, the piloting of pluralism in extension services (Government of Ghana, 2007). The response of the private sector in providing veterinary services to livestock farmers has been low. In the case of the general extension services, there is lack of awareness about the policy of extension pluralism. Also, the few pilots on the ground show that private sector service providers have their strengths in group development and business related services rather than in the delivery of technical information.

The use of contact farmers for dissemination of extension messages has worked but tends to limit access of poor risk prone farmers to extension services, because extension agents prefer to work with farmers who are outgoing and can demonstrate ability to utilise technologies. Farmer-based organisations (FBOs) are being developed as part of the strategy for improved access of smallholders to services such as extension. However, the pilot projects have devoted their energy towards ensuring that FBOs access
the FBO Development Fund for the purchase of equipment, but they have in the process neglected efforts to build the capacity of these formations to demand access to services.

Irrigation is seen as a necessary instrument for the modernisation of agriculture, and in particular, for reducing vulnerability of smallholders to rainfall variability. However, the expansion in irrigation is slow and the productivity of public systems is low due to poor management. Yet, not much attention is given to informal systems largely patronized by smallholders. The use of small, individual water lifting devices has contributed to increased food production in the Upper East Region and can be replicated in other parts of the country. Water Users’ Associations can contribute substantially to the management of irrigation schemes, but governance systems need to improve to include women.

Weak links in commodity value chains limit income growth. Interventions in the cocoa sector have enabled cocoa farmers to use more fertiliser, improved varieties and better agronomic practices, leading to increased productivity in the sector. These, together with price incentives, have contributed to poverty reduction. However, food crop smallholders have had to contend with the high costs of inputs. Most of the smallholders face liquidity challenges and this is exacerbated by the lack of credit facilities. The unavailability of affordable credit for smallholders has dampened their demand for agro-inputs e.g. technologies for sustainable management of land and the environment. For example, in 2005/2006 the share of households that reported using credit from formal and informal sources averaged less than 20% in every zone. Credit is more frequently used in the coast and forest zones than in the north, where the bulk of smallholders operate. Also, liberalisation of input markets has not increased competition substantially but has introduced quality challenges because of insufficient regulation. The government of Ghana has used tax exemptions as an incentive for the private sector to be involved in the sector, but these measures remain inadequate due to other constraints such as the high cost of energy and poor infrastructure.

**Producers Organisation**

In post-independence restructuring, especially during the early 1960s, the government of Ghana sponsored producer cooperatives to enhance joint production under the umbrella of the United Ghana Farmers’ Cooperative Council (Dadson, 1988). Although the landscape of cooperative
organisation continued to experience various changes, succeeding governments maintained a permissive and liberal approach to the development of cooperatives. This was, in part, because public policy tended to view the cooperative form of economic organisation as a tool for rural economic development (Dadson, 1988). In fact, cooperatives and other forms of farmer groups were the channels for obtaining subsidized agricultural credit during different periods until the current period. The ongoing efforts at developing FBOs stem from the government’s desire to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of extension service delivery to farmers in Ghana. A good example is the Agricultural Services Sub-sector Investment Project (AgSSIP) where the government set up the FBO Development Fund in an attempt to encourage the formation of independent grass root organisations of farmers. The government, through its current agricultural sector policy (FASDEP II), recognizes FBOs as partners in agricultural development. The Livestock Development Project and Crop Development Project of the government carried out several activities through FBOs. In addition, the agricultural component of the current Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) specifically targets its credit at FBOs whose membership is made up of small scale producers.

Gender inequality in the agriculture sector has undermined the achievements of sustainable agricultural development because programmes and projects are not systematically formulated around different needs, interests, roles, responsibilities, status and influence in society of women and men. Female representation is very low within the parent ministry. Women are only 16% of the total workforce, and only 9.5% have achieved a high enough status to participate in decision making. Dissemination of new and improved technologies through extension services is highly unbalanced between women and men farmers, with as little as 20% of services reaching women. RELC’s do not focus much on gender issues nor on women in agricultural development activities during the period of prioritization. Gender sensitisation and training programmes held for various categories of staff are achieving an impact at an individual level but this is yet to be translated into practice.

The passage of local government Law (Act 462) requires implementation of policies at the district level. However the capacity constraints at local government which include the inadequate flow of funds to the districts, and the lack of adequate attention to the development of coherent local policies and programmes have negatively affected participation of non-state actors.
The institutional capacity to implement policies in a decentralised framework is still weak. The project approach has not benefited districts fairly. There is evidence to suggest that even districts that have benefited from a multiplicity of projects have not adequately implemented them for the benefit of the communities due to lack of effective coordination. In addition, the impact of policies and projects has not been well documented as most of the monitoring reports tend to focus on activities and outputs.

**Liberalisation and Agricultural Exports**

As part of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, Ghana dismantled various price and non-price measures that pervaded the economy in earlier periods (Oduro and Kwadzo, 2007). The Ghana Food Distribution Corporation (GFDC), initially established to manage buffer stocks in maize, rice, beans, and groundnuts was privatised, just as the Ghana Cotton Development Board (GCDB). Market reforms saw the removal of subsidies (including fertilisers and credit to agriculture) and privatisation of input marketing. State provision of mechanization services to farmers was terminated. Guaranteed minimum prices for maize and rice were phased out. Apart from minimum wage legislation and government setting of the producer price for cocoa, there are no regulations on or support for the production and marketing of agricultural goods within the smallholder sector. Recent experimentation with subsidized tractor services for land clearing, block farming and a fertiliser coupon system were mostly an ad hoc response to the 2008 world food crisis.

The need to diversify exports from traditional commodities was promoted in the mid-1990s under the Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme, but the focus was on creating price incentives and using fiscal instruments to boost trade in non-traditional agricultural exports. However, the incentives were not adequate as structural and capacity problems have been a major drawback. The government has introduced major initiatives to enhance competitiveness of the non-traditional export sub-sector, and the horticulture sector in particular has become the country’s focus for agricultural export diversification. Interventions in this area, plus higher price incentives for the cocoa sub-sector, have impacted positively on poverty reduction among the export crop producers.

Recent shocks to the pineapple industry from the introduction of MD2 exposed the country’s lack of preparedness to respond to changes in international markets. Market information, market intelligence and continued
innovation are necessary for success in international markets. The growing importance of private standards of good agricultural practices (GAP) on the international market is also challenging participation of smallholders in high value commodity chains, especially for export. There is need for skills development within the sector. Product and cluster development, and innovative linkage arrangements between agribusinesses and smallholders are necessary for improving competitiveness in international agricultural trade.

**Natural Resource Management and Ghana’s Agriculture**

Ghana’s agriculture is natural resource-based, with extensive crop and livestock production systems, hunting, rain-fed agriculture, and fish from natural water bodies. Traditional practices such as bush burning and the improper use of technologies such as irrigation and agro-chemicals do not engender sustainability of resource use. For example, 69% of the total land surface of Ghana is prone to severe erosion, at a cost of 2% of GDP. Although the problem is in all the agro-ecological zones, the savannah regions are affected the most. Land degradation, desertification and soil erosion hit hardest at the local level and those most affected are the poor who depend on natural resources for their survival. ‘Women’s work’, particularly work performed by poor women, is strongly affected by environmental degradation. Communal ownership of land and absence of demarcated grazing lands result in over-grazing and conflicts between livestock keeping and crop farming. The practice of bush burning for crop production results in loss of fodder for livestock during the critical dry season period.

Unfortunately, most farmers in Ghana are not aware of the linkage between inappropriate tillage and water management practices on one hand, and environmental degradation on the other. With an estimated 64% of the natural wealth of Ghana locked up in crop lands, there is need to address poor agricultural land management. The prudent management of agrochemicals and drainage is crucial to sustaining the natural resource base.

In spite of the existence of rules and regulations on environmental management for agricultural land use activities, major stakeholders are unaware of these and enforcement is weak. Past efforts by the Government and its partners have yielded some positive results. However, attempts at scaling up of these sustainable land management (SLM) practices have faced a number of barriers, including cost and limited access to relevant inputs within an environment of limited credit, and land tenure systems that do not favour investments in improvements to land.
Climatic changes and other natural hazards expose Ghana to various types of natural and man-made hazards, which have occurred with increasing frequency in the last twenty years. Natural phenomena, especially floods and drought, regularly result in disasters that cause severe food insecurity and disruption of livelihoods. These disasters disproportionately impact enterprises of poor smallholders and increase their vulnerability to food insecurity. Furthermore, the land degradation aggravates the impact of these disasters.

Ghana has a national water policy that aims to achieve an efficient and effective management system for the sustainable development of water resources. The policy focuses on water resource management, urban water supply and community water and sanitation. It recognizes the important role of agricultural water management and irrigation in the country. Some of the underlying principles of the policy relevant to agriculture are: a) minimizing activities that have the potential to negatively affect the integrity of water resources; b) coordinating water resource planning with land use planning; and c) ensuring participatory decision-making at the lowest appropriate level.

The issues related to water resource management in agriculture surround farming in catchment areas and along banks of water bodies and discharge of effluents from agro-industries into water bodies. The absence of geo-political demarcation of water resources compounds the problems of common property. FASDEP II recognizes the need for collaboration between relevant agencies for awareness creation, advocacy of development and enforcement of regulations and guidelines for efficient and sustainable exploitation, and utilisation and management of water resource.

**Macro-Economic Policies and Development Strategies**

The performance of the agricultural sector is affected by macroeconomic policies, including trade (exchange rates, quotas and tariffs); fiscal (public expenditure management, tax); and monetary (interest rates) policies. Although interest rates are falling, the lending rates for agriculture are still high. The dominant perception among formal financial institutions is that the agricultural sector is a high risk and costly sector for financial services delivery. These attitudes continue to adversely affect credit supply to the sector. Besides, producers in the agricultural sector, with their low productivity, cannot compete with the commercial sector for funds.
Between 2000 and 2004 there was a substantial surge in the importation of staple foods such as rice, poultry products and tomato paste, and the trend has not changed. Government tax policy has been supportive of agriculture where tax holidays of close to 10 years are given, depending on the type of investment. Unfortunately, tax exemptions have not been an effective instrument for supporting agriculture as other constraints such as high cost of energy and poor infrastructure have been inimical to investments in the sector. Currently, the MoFA is proposing a shift in government budget or debt relief funds towards improving the physical environment for agricultural investments. In addition, it is proposed that the government removes corporate tax for producers and processors in the sector.

Overall, macroeconomic policy management does not appear to have a systematic process in place where effects of exchange rate on key agricultural commodities are factored into the economic policy management. Such a process would help to determine the levels of exchange rate and tariff that provide sufficient incentives to expand exports and reduce imports.

Ghana has developed a medium term Private Sector Development Strategy (PSD) that focuses on using the private sector to deliver quality inputs and products, through operation of markets. The PSD Strategy aims to enhance Ghana’s competitiveness by removing physical and regulatory constraints on the operation of markets, complemented in the short-term with direct, targeted state support to specific export industries under the Presidential Special Initiatives (PSI) programme. The strategy is designed to address constraints faced by micro and small enterprises, which encompass most agribusinesses. The agricultural sector is expected to benefit from the broad-based pro-market reforms of the PSD strategy and particularly because the constraints related to agribusiness that the PSD Strategy seeks to address are consistent with those identified in FASDEP II.

The instruments for improving the environment of private sector development are specified in the trade policy. Tariffs and quotas will be used to ensure fairness in pricing, but not to discourage competition. Tariffs will also be used as a short-term measure to counteract unfair trade practices and to encourage domestic production of strategic commodities (GoG, 2005). The tariffs will then be replaced with long-term concessionary investment finance. Fiscal incentives and other forms of direct and indirect support will also be introduced for capital investments in technology upgrades and research and development. The trade policy explicitly recognizes the infrastructure and regulatory needs of agricultural produce exports, includ-
ing cold chains for perishables and phyto-sanitary inspection services for all produce. However, the policy instruments focus on the commercial or agribusiness sector, thereby bypassing the majority of operators in the sector. The MoFA intends to promote linkages between agri-business and smallholders to enable the latter to benefit from the incentives.

Trade protocols such as ECOWAS limit the use of tariffs to protect domestic producers. However, the extent to which this negatively affects staple crops such as rice and maize has not been adequately established. The Government has announced a new initiative aimed at building the capacity of trade experts at MoFA and other relevant MDAs in trade policy analysis and negotiation skills. As part of its policy monitoring and coordinating role, MoFA will support the establishment of a system that will regularly analyse effects of exchange rate management, taxes and other trade instruments on agriculture, to inform government macro policy decisions. The Private Sector Development Strategy states that in respect of macroeconomic environment, financial sector and infrastructure development, the government will integrate private sector concerns into their implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This provision creates the opportunity for MoFA to monitor those aspects of macroeconomic policy that affect the private sector in agriculture. Current policies of the transport sector aim to foster collaboration and facilitate activities of other sectors such as food and agriculture. Under FASDEP II, MoFA will take advantage of the strategies listed below and liaise with the relevant ministries in the transport sector, to ensure that the transport needs of the agricultural operators are met. The policy principles in the table provide a framework guiding thinking within the transport sector and how it can add value to the agricultural and broader development strategy.

- Transport planning will be fully integrated with development planning and service provision.
- Transport infrastructure investments will be targeted to better serve population, production and tourist centres aiming to reduce overall transport costs to the government and users.
- A bulk goods transportation strategy will be developed based on specific user needs, identifying critical investments in the rehabilitation of railways and inland waterways infrastructure.

Other facets of the strategy of relevance to FASDEP II are:
• Establish consultation mechanisms between transport sector MDAs and other Sector Ministries.

• Improve accessibility by determining key centres of population, production and tourism, identifying strategic areas of development and necessary expansion.

• Reinstate labour-based methods of road construction and maintenance to improve rural roads and maximise employment opportunities.

• Develop, rehabilitate and maintain existing railway infrastructure to ensure services are sustained to move freight and passengers more efficiently.

• Remove obstacles that impede the free movement of bulk goods in the Volta Lake and provide adequate infrastructure such as landing stages and warehouses for bulk goods transportation on the Lake.

Agricultural Labour:
HIV/AIDS and other Communicable Diseases

An important vulnerable group is HIV/AIDS-infected persons and their caregivers. The impact of the disease includes loss of household labour and high dependency in households. For the infected, their low immune system requires proper and adequate nutrition. The existing policy on HIV/AIDS recognizes the need to train Agricultural Extension staff on HIV/AIDS prevention to enable them to provide basic information to clients, who are mostly in the rural areas. Under FASDEP II, this policy is being broadened to include workplace awareness creation, which would commit the Directorates of MoFA to consider HIV/AIDS issues as an integral part of job functions, and to plan and allocate resources for HIV/AIDS programmes for the staff within the directorates.

Other important ailments that have a debilitating effect on farm households are malaria and guinea worm. Under FASDEP II, MoFA will collaborate with the Ministry of Health to facilitate dissemination of information on the control of these ailments. Considerations for these diseases will be systematically incorporated in food and agriculture interventions, while at the same time incorporating agriculture considerations in AIDS programmes.
Land Policies and Access to Agricultural Land

Under colonialism, English common law was grafted onto Ghanaian communal societies without taking into account the differences between the early nineteenth century capitalist economic structures and the egalitarian communal institutions of Ghana (Agbosu 2000). That oversight, among other factors, laid the foundation for conflicts between the customary law and practice and the Anglo-American common law, its notions and conceptions of tenure. Consequently, land transactions were beset with conflicts between the customary practices, norms, usages, and jural postulates governing the indigenous land law, and the Anglo-American conceptions of tenure and its common law notions. While several disparities existed in the internal arrangements for land administration and control in each individual polity in the country, three factors were common to all the systems. These were: (a) an inherent right in the individual member of a land-holding group to benefit from the land regarded as a common asset and resource; (b) the recognition of certain members of the community as having the power of control over how rights to benefit may be exercised; and (c) the lack of individual ownership of the soil itself. The paramount title was accepted by the communities as vested in the groups, such as the stool, the clan, or the family, all of which are corporate juristic entities. Land tenure systems operated on the basis of these common factors and these could be employed to harmonize the systems within the framework of a national land policy and to develop a common law. However, this was not done.

Land tenure in the Ghanaian context (like other African countries) is the relationship (legal and customarily defined) among people as individuals or as groups with respect to land. Customary land tenure systems have been radically affected by conflicting land administration and acquisition practices, emanating mainly from legislative interventions, the introduction of commercial agriculture, population growth in some localities and, urbanisation, among other factors. Currently, Ghana maintains a plural land tenure system. One of the key guiding principles underlying the Government of Ghana’s land policy is the fact that land is considered to be a common national or communal property resource, held in trust for the people, which must be used in the long term interest of the people. Changing pressures have made subsistence agricultural land acquire real value with rising land prices and high opportunity costs. Demand appears high and landholders (chiefs, queen mothers, family heads, and individuals) have responded accordingly, sometimes in direct contravention of the statutory requirements and regu-
An Analysis of Smallholder Agriculture, Policy-Making and Advocacy in Ghana

Physical development has overtaken the formal planning process, with the emergence of flourishing agricultural and housing land markets in almost all the villages that were visited in the preparation of this study. The evidence suggests that land tenure is fast moving away from family and share cropping arrangements to short term rental and hiring – thus increasing insecurity and reducing investment incentives.

Available agricultural land is declining due to population pressure and urbanisation. This is increasingly limiting access to land and causing changes in the spatial distribution of crops. This is evident in the shift in cocoa production from the Ashanti, Eastern and BrongAhafo Regions to the Western Region and replacement of yam by cassava in the transitional zone. Insecurity of tenure is widespread, largely because of customary land tenure systems in which there are no legal titles. Customary rules governing the alienation of communal (e.g. family, clan, skin, stool) lands are governed by the basic principle that for an alienation to a non-member of the group to be valid, the head of the group must act with the consent and concurrence of the accredited members of the group. Some of the major difficulties faced by strangers include identifying those responsible for this administrative function in each case, difficulty in identifying the right authority to mediate disputes and the uncertainty in the operation of the rules on alienation (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). These, coupled with lack of legal titles make customary land tenure systems in Ghana inherently insecure. In addition, boundaries are unclear and communal ownership invests rights in all but gives responsibility for management to none (Agbosu, 2000). Insecurity of land rights could limit investment and threatens the livelihoods of migrant populations in farming communities and the sustainable use of land through intensification. Discrimination against women in the land allocation processes is widely reported. Fewer women obtain land and when they do they often have smaller and less fertile pieces of land, which they tend to hold on less secure terms than those of men. Less than one third (31%) of households headed by women own land (Government of Ghana, 2007; ISSER, 2007). The situation is further complicated by the fact that there are geographical variations in women's access to land, with more restrictions on women's access to land in the northern regions of Ghana than in the south. The co-existence of many systems of law regulating land in Ghana presents special difficulties, particularly for the more vulnerable sections of society, including women and the rural and urban poor. One of the reasons for this gender inequality in access to land is that an estimated 80% of the land in Ghana is owned and governed by traditional rulers under gender-biased cus-
tomary practices. The Land Administration Project was initiated as part of government’s efforts to create an efficient and effective land administration system that ensures tenure security for all, particularly women. The strategy is intended to enable the LAP to formulate comprehensive development interventions that would mainstream as well as address gender related problems at the traditional and the Land Sector Agency (LSA) level. The strategy is a result of the review of studies and relevant information from the project and other land related initiatives, an assessment of the aspirations of civil society, consultation, surveys and focus group discussions.

The main objective of the strategy is to facilitate the mainstreaming of gender into the land sector. The strategy seeks to promote a coherent and sustained approach to addressing women and men’s concerns for equitable development in relation to land administration through gender sensitive data gathering, participation in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation processes of the project. The strategy has five (5) strategic thrusts critical for accomplishing the LAP’s gender objectives including public education, capacity building, establishing institutional processes, advocacy and collaboration and networking.

**Key Actors — Analysis of the Institutions Involved in the Policymaking Process**

**Agricultural Policy Making in Ghana: An Overview**

At the sub-regional level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS has developed an ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) to address food security in the sub-region in conformity with existing regional and international commitments. ECOWAP is expected to have a significant impact on the ecological, economic, institutional and social environment. The objectives of the policy include the need for increased food production and income generation, increased inter-country trade, strengthened producers’ organisations and greater involvement of women in socio-economic decisions that affect household livelihood opportunities.

Ghana’s national vision for the food and agriculture sector is ‘a modernised agriculture that delivers a structurally transformed economy, with food security, employment opportunities, as well as reduced poverty’ (GoG, 2007). This is inextricably linked to the national vision in the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II), and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) of the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The national vision and policy is consistent with various international declarations since 1992, which identified food security as an important underlying and cross-cutting issue that had to be addressed in order to ensure the sustainable reduction of absolute poverty. This realization formed the basis for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The food and agriculture sector has direct impact on at least five of the MDGs, making agricultural development policies crucial to the attainment of these globally agreed to goals.

The current agricultural policy is captured in the new Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II), which has been informed by shortcomings of its predecessor (GoG, 2007). The objectives for agricultural development in Ghana, as outlined in FASDEP II, are:

- Food security and emergency preparedness
- Improved growth in incomes
- Increased competitiveness and enhanced integration into domestic and international markets
- Sustainable management of land and environment
- Science and Technology Applied in food and agriculture development
- Improved Institutional Coordination

According to the medium-term development plan, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy II (GPRS II), agriculture is expected to lead the growth and structural transformation of the economy. It is envisaged that such a growth path will enable the country to maximise the benefits of accelerated growth, given the high incidence of poverty in the agriculture sector. Areas earmarked for intervention by modernising agriculture, as specified in the GPRS II are:

- Reform of land acquisition and property rights
- Accelerating provision of irrigation infrastructure
- Enhancing access to credit and inputs for agriculture
- Promoting selective crop development
- Improving access to mechanized agriculture
- Increasing access to extension services
- Provision of infrastructure for aquaculture
- Restoration of degraded environment
The specific performance targets for the agriculture sector as presented in FASDEP II are:

- Agricultural growth rate of 6-8% per annum over the next 4 years
- Crops and livestock leading the growth at an average annual growth rate of 6%
- Forestry and logging, and fisheries, each growing at 5% per annum
- Broad policy principles against which all future activities will be justified, which also serve as a guide for policy implementation are:
  - The Government of Ghana (GoG) shall strive to achieve the Maputo Declaration of allocating at least 10% of annual government expenditure to the agricultural sector
  - There shall be targeting of the poor in appropriate aspects of policy and programmes
  - The Government shall pursue regional balance in agricultural development, building on regional comparative advantage

All policies and programmes will be designed from a gender perspective, enabling the government to work towards gender equality in the agriculture sector. The GoG will also ensure that investments in the sector are scientifically based, environmentally sustainable and considered on the basis of economic feasibility and social viability/sustainability. Furthermore, all the policy and programmes will be implemented within the framework of decentralisation and all agricultural structures of decentralisation will be strengthened and inter-sectoral collaboration will be pursued in the implementation of policies and programmes. The strategy encourages the GoG to partner with private sector and civil society in policy implementation and review. In addition, the GoG commits itself (through the strategy) to foster an enabling environment for the provision of key infrastructure (irrigation, roads, storage, and energy) and information, by the private sector and where necessary provide such infrastructure.

**Policy Consultations and Major Actors in Agricultural Policy**

The process of formulating FASDEP II included an extensive review of past interventions in the food and agriculture sector and the preparation of building blocks for the policy. FASDEP I was meant to provide a framework for modernising the agricultural sector, which would in turn act
as a catalyst for rural transformation, in line with the goal set for the sector in the prevailing national development plan, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I). As part of the process of formulating FASDEP II, a poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) of FASDEP I, concluded that the policies would not achieve the desired impact on poverty for a number of reasons, including the following:

The expectation of modernising poor smallholder agriculture was unachievable because of improper targeting of the poor within an environment where the drivers of modernisation, access to credit and technology, good infrastructure and markets are very limited. Problem analysis was weak and did not sufficiently reflect the perspectives of clients or their needs and priorities. It did not specify the process by which the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA), the lead implementing authority, was to stimulate response from other ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) for interventions that fell outside its domain.

The current agriculture sector policy (FASDEP II) ensures consistency with national development objectives as specified in the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II (GPRS II). Among other things, the GPRS II aims to achieve accelerated and sustainable shared growth, poverty reduction, gender equity, protection and empowerment of the vulnerable and excluded within a decentralized and democratic environment. FASDEP II, which is more broad-based than its predecessor, seeks to enhance the environment for all categories of farmers, while targeting poor and risk-prone and risk-averse producers. This was made possible through an extensive stakeholder consultation process which incorporated lessons learnt from implementation of FASDEP I, and sub-sector policies and strategies dating back to 2002.

The policy review process identified the critical thematic issues that need areas as: (i) human resource development, (ii) technology development and dissemination, (iii) promotion of specific commodities for markets, (iv) improved financial services, (v) infrastructure development, (vi) cross-cutting issues (e.g. gender, land, etc) and (vii) an improved implementation framework.

These thematic areas formed the basis for seven working groups, with members drawn from MoFA, Development Partners (DPs) and other Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). The groups produced initial inputs, which were used to produce a zero draft for discussion within MoFA.
and comments from DPs. The same draft was also presented to stakeholders at a MoFA performance review meeting.

Stakeholder consultations held in one district in each of the ten regions, sought views on the agriculture sector constraints and how they could better be addressed. In addition, stakeholders in agricultural input supply, based in Accra, were consulted for their inputs. The views from the consultations and comments on the zero draft informed the preparation of the First Draft, which was again circulated to stakeholders for comment and used for regional consultation workshops. Separate consultations were held with MDAs, the banks and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Agriculture.

**Roles of Key Stakeholders under FASDEP II**

The Ministry of Food and Agriculture has the lead responsibility within the context of a coordinated Government Programme. The Mission of MoFA is to promote sustainable agriculture and thriving agribusiness through research and technology development, effective extension and other support services to farmers, processors and traders, for improved livelihood. In line with this mission, the lead ministry is to provide overall coordination of the implementation of the strategy. Under FASDEP, Private Sector and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are expected to participate in policy dialogue to ensure that their interests are reflected. They are also expected, where possible, to invest in productive activities in the sector and ensure that commercialisation is balanced with social responsibility and environmental sustainability. CSOs are also expected to provide training support and skills improvement of the sector’s manpower. Development Partners are expected to contribute financial and technical resources to support the achievement of sector objectives within the parameters of the prevailing policy framework. In addition, they are expected to engage constructively in on-going policy dialogue on all policies relevant to agriculture and related sectors. Other MDAs are expected to ensure that their policies and programmes are consistent with FASDEP II (Government of Ghana, 2007).

**State of Policy Advocacy**

This section discusses the state of policy advocacy in Ghana with particular reference to activities of organisations that emphasise policy issues affecting small holder farmers. The discussion covers such aspects as who is involved, their activities and approaches employed, and analyses selected
outcomes of the various approaches and advocacy efforts. In addition, advocacy capacity of actors is assessed and suggestions for strengthening policy advocacy processes are made.

Civil society organisations (CSOs), broadly defined to include all voluntary associations that actively participate, at least periodically, in influencing public policies, have a long history in Ghana (Abdulai and Quantson, 2009). But the activities and contribution of CSOs have seen marked increases especially since the mid-1990s. The 1990s witnessed the emergence of CSOs of different types and sizes including think tanks, policy centres and research institutes. The participation of CSOs in policy dialogue processes got boosted by the National Economic Forum in 1997, and also during the National Economic Dialogue in 2001 (Abdulai and Quantson, 2009). Several civil society coalitions and networks are now engaged in policy dialogue with government. Ghanaian CSOs also actively participated in the formulation of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II).

However, it is not clear whether programming inter-relationships exist amongst civil society organisations as there appears to be a lack of effort to work together. While there have been marked improvements in the involvement of civil society in the past two decades, Ghanaian CSOs remain weak due to their fragmented ranks. They tend to focus so much on their individual goals to the detriment of a singular national goal (Abdulai and Quantson, 2009).

Chances of duplication of efforts may be high because a number of persons serve as executive members of multiple farmer organisations. Evidence of this may already be showing, as all the organisations covered in this chapter tried to lay claim to virtually the same successes. There is currently a multiplicity of organisations, each describing itself as an umbrella group for farmers’ associations or advocating for smallholder farmers. These include Farmers Organisation Network in Ghana (FONG), Ghana Trade and Livelihoods Coalition (GTLC), Farmers Platform of Ghana (FPG), Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana (PFAG), Ecumenical Association for Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development (ECASARD), General Agricultural Workers’ Union (GAWU), SEND Ghana, Food Security Policy and Advocacy Network (FoodSPAN), Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen (GNAFF), Apex Farmers’ Organisation of Ghana (APFOG), Ghana Agricultural Associations Business and Information Centre (GAABIC), and more recently the Ghana Federation of Agricultural Producers (GFAP). As discussed below all these organis-
tions, along with others, try to engage in policy advocacy in the agricultural sector and compete for resources in the process.

These trends suggest nuances of interest group politics by a few with access to information who appear to be jockeying for positions of leverage to access development aid. Generally, Ghanaian CSOs lack a coordinated front to engage with the government effectively. In fact, CSOs seem to spread themselves thin with outright duplication, while at the same time pursuing the sources of funding in an uncoordinated fashion (Abdulai and Quantson, 2009). Most CSOs lack the capacity for policy analysis and the requisite research abilities needed to proactively engage with the state and her development partners. These deficiencies limit the capacity of CSOs at both national and local levels to effectively mobilise their grass roots for policy dialogue and participation in the policy process.

**Conclusion**

There seems to be a good number of organisations that are seeking to influence agricultural policies in favour of smallholder farmers. Each of the advocacy organisations seems to be working directly with smallholder farmers. However, the actual act of advocacy is left in the hands of a few organisations whose activities are significantly influenced by the preferences and priorities of funding organisations and this may suggest a weak civil society. Farmer-based advocacy organisations, a key stakeholder in the agriculture sector, do not seem to get the recognition they deserve in the policy making process and hence are not adequately involved in critical formative stages of policies.

Findings from the field indicate that there is need to increase sensitisation and mobilisation of civil society to improve consciousness and stimulate participation. More effort should be devoted towards educating the citizenry on issues on globalization and how various local and international agreements/protocols affect their lives. It is also important to champion public education on citizens’ rights and responsibilities and the implications of government’s actions for their livelihood security. Such efforts could be channelled through some of the organisations mentioned above to improve ownership of advocacy issues and the framing of the agenda.

**Note**

1. This section draws extensively from the current agricultural policy of the Government of Ghana, FASDEP II.
References


Agriculture in Kenya remains a dominant sector of the economy accounting for 25% of GDP and 60% of export earnings. The sector also indirectly contributes another 27% to the GDP through linkages with manufacturing, distribution and service related sectors and accounts for 60% of total national employment. Out of the total labour force, women contribute 75% of the labour force (Republic of Kenya, 2004a). The majority of Kenya’s population (80%) lives in rural areas and derives its livelihood from agriculture. Approximately 51% of the population is also food insecure (ibid.). Agriculture growth is thus critical for economic development and alleviation of poverty. A comprehensive understanding of the historical and current national agricultural development issues is a critical initial step in identifying the combination of policies that may contribute towards turning around smallholder agriculture.

The centrality of the agricultural sector to national development is exemplified by policy documents that have been produced since the 1960s. The purpose of these policy documents has been to engender meaningful development through the eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease. Indeed, the core policy document, *Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965* on ‘African Socialism
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and Its Application to Planning in Kenya’, broadly spelt out the developmental contours that the post-independence nationalist regime would take. The document envisaged a form of imbalanced development biased towards the high potential agro-ecological areas in Kenya in Central and parts of the Rift Valley provinces. These two provinces are inhabited by the core ethnic political constituencies of the post-independence government. These communities constituted the most politically and economically mobilised communities who, through the ideological debates between the political parties KANU and KADU, were able to impose pressure on the incumbent government to fulfill the nationalist promises of land and freedom.¹

In specific terms, ethnic communities supporting both political parties were predominantly made up of smallholder farmers; those with landholdings between 5 to 7 acres, which were resettled in the former “white highlands” in the Rift Valley and Central province. The government’s resettlement policy had brought in a wave of largely Kikuyu peasants into what were previously white owned farms. This policy was undergirded by the ethnically selective provision of government support services. However, Kenya’s ‘golden age’ (from the time of independence in 1963 up until the late 1970s) – the basis of its international reputation for so-called successful development – of capitalist economic growth was short-lived. By the late 1970s/early 1980s, a host of internal and external factors converged to reverse the modest gains in welfare that had been achieved (see Lofchie, 1989).

The smallholder sector continues to face a myriad of challenges related not only to colonial and post-colonial state policies, but also misguided development theories and models (see Cohen, 1988). Agriculture in Kenya has undergone major changes over the past decades since the implementation of structural adjustment beginning in 1988 and other sectoral reforms. The effects of these policies and programs on agricultural productivity continue to be debated. Donor-supported evaluations present evidence of a broad economic turnaround in Africa based on increased agricultural productivity growth. Macro-economic and agricultural sectoral reforms are identified as major factors explaining the rise in productivity growth (see USAID, 1993; Block, 1994; Sahn and Sarris, 1991; World Bank, 1994). However, in contrast, analyses supported by UNICEF and FAO have strongly questioned the effects of structural adjustment and/or food sector reform on agricultural productivity growth and household food security (see Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1987; Mosley 1994).
This study examines the historical and current performance of the smallholder sector in Kenya. It analyses some of the strategies smallholders and their allies have forged to respond to the diminishing government budgetary allocations to the sector since the 1980s. It addresses several questions. What policy and other factors currently work against the sustainable development of smallholder agriculture in Kenya? How have the smallholders responded to these challenges? Section one examines the national profile of smallholder agriculture in Kenya. Section two describes the methodology used for data collection and analysis. This is followed by a discussion of key issues in smallholder agriculture and the nature of government interventions in the sector. Section four analyses the nature of agricultural policy making in Kenya. Section five deals with the state of contemporary policy advocacy, it does so by looking at the responses of farmer organisations to the changing fortunes of agricultural development in Kenya. The final section constitutes recommendations and concluding remarks.

Smallholder Agriculture in Kenya

The post-independence agricultural policies about the smallholder sector in Kenya trace their roots to the colonial period (see Alila, 1977). Colonial policies favored mainly the White owned, large scale commercial farm sector. Kenyan agriculture had a dual structure under which British colonial agricultural policy emphasised separate development of European settlement areas. The core purpose of the dual policy of agricultural development was the creation of an agrarian capitalist economy, geared towards repaying loans earlier provided by the British Treasury to build the Mombasa-Kampala railway, a key valve for British imperial resource extraction (see Leys, 1975). A key pillar of this strategy entailed the massive dislocation of indigenous communities and their ‘containerization’ in native reserves, which provided a constant source of cheap labour for colonial capital. In total, 11 million acres was carved up for the development of a white settler enclave which straddles the present day Central and Rift Valley provinces (see Sorrenson, 1968).

Over time, increasing population pressure in the reserves led to technological stagnation, underdevelopment and low food production. These contradictions crystallized into the Mau Mau radical rebellion for land and freedom which accelerated the process of decolonization. A core political constituency of this rebellion was a closely forged alliance between squatters residing in the Rift Valley, who bore the disproportionate brunt of colo-
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...lational dislocation and social deprivation and the emergent petit-bourgeoisie, both in Nairobi and in the farms in the Rift Valley, who gave coherence to the movement (Furedi, 1989; Kanogo, 1987).

Colonial response to the agrarian rebellion was in the form of the Swynnerton Plan, which instituted reforms in land tenure (titling) and rural economy in Central Province. In a bid to stem the Mau Mau rebellion, the colonial state instituted a rapid land titling programme whose purpose was to isolate the radicals while cultivating a conservative smallholder class. This set the basis of post-independence agrarian conflicts. Land titling was aimed at rewarding loyalists while isolating the radicals, through the creation of a politically conservative Kikuyu agrarian class that could act as the counterpoise against any future militant nationalists among the Kikuyu (Leys, 1975; Harbeson, 1973). The net impact of this programme was thus to incorporate the emerging smallholder class into the global export commodity markets, through the simultaneous introduction of cash crops (coffee, tea) and improved farming techniques, in the context of an accelerated land titling programme. Land was therefore critical, not only to processes of class formation, but also informed the critical issues around which the Lancaster House independence talks revolved (see Wasserman, 1976; Harbeson, 1973).

To be sure, ethnic communities in Kenya were integrated differentially into the colonial agrarian capitalist economy. The subsequent emergence of cooperatives, new farming techniques and cash crops in the post-colonial period, largely placed the Kikuyu at the forefront in the struggle for control over post-independence national resource distribution. The colonial agrarian economy deliberately generated ethnic-based inequalities, thus polarizing relations between Central province (where the Kikuyu predominantly reside) and the rest of Kenya (Ngunyi, 1996). These ethnic-based inequalities created the basis on which future ethnicisation of political processes would advance. Coming to terms with the partial success of post-independence smallholder agriculture in Kenya therefore requires an examination of the role of smallholders as a critical political constituency of the nationalist government.

There are very rich debates on the peasantry in Kenya. These debates revolved around the nature of the peasantry and its dynamics (see Kenya: the Agrarian Question, Review of African Political Economy 1981, No. 20). Colin Leys (1975) et al. pioneered studies on the relation between land and class formation and consolidation. Mukaru Ng’ang’a (1981) asserted that the colonial state’s land titling programme isolated radicals and...
created a conservative smallholder class which led to post-independence agrarian conflicts. After he examined what was happening at that time to the peasantry, he concluded that, the expansion of the peasantry seemed to take place in tandem with the interests of foreign capital. Thus, while local capitalist interests may have sought to destroy peasant production, foreign finance capital seemed to struggle to preserve the peasant commodity production. Yet, the general assumption of the peasantry as a class in itself betrayed the multi-occupational nature of the emerging rural social structure. Moreover, the weak generalization of this study stems from its focus on Central province alone. The responses of peasantries in other parts of the country are not known.

This is also true of Nyong’o’s (1981) analysis. According to him, while foreign finance capital was actively encouraging capitalist development in Central, the tendency in Nyanza was toward the stagnation and/or destruction of the middle peasantry. Indeed, rather than capital accumulation, an alliance of merchant capital and peasants fought against the land titling programme in Nyanza. The net consequence was the propagation of increased migration of wage labor to other parts of the country, especially urban centers, due to the limited capitalist development in Nyanza. This partially explains the differential political and economic performance of the peasantry in terms of its limited resource mobilisation capacity to pressure the state to implement pro-peasant agricultural policies.

On the contrary, while the logic of polarization is apparent in capitalist development everywhere, Leys (1971) saw the expansion of the peasantry in the Kenyan context as an obstacle to capital accumulation. Instead of consolidating capitalism, a frozen peasantry merely served to solidify the emergent patron-client relations characteristic of the Kenyan political economy. Despite expanded peasantisation processes, Kenya’s uni-modal model of development registered an annual agricultural growth rate of 4.9 and 3.8 % between 1964-1974 and 1975-1978 respectively. By 1977 smallholders were producing approximately 30% of Kenya’s coffee and tea.

By the late 1980s, there was what is commonly referred to as the end of the coffee boom, external oil shocks, declining internal production and rising indebtedness; the state increasingly faced fiscal problems. This led to the imposition of paternalistic structural adjustment programmes emphasising budget rationalisation and administrative decentralisations. The need to fill the vacuum left by the inability of the state to provide social services witnessed the rise of a vibrant peasant-based self-help movement
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– Harambee – which was geared toward provision of rural social services. The small and middle peasants who constituted the bulk of the self-help movement in Kenya seemed to force the Kenyan state to be minimally accountable to the public in the realm of social services (See Barkan and Holmquist 1989, p.361).

Yet Widner (1994) seems to dispute this hypothesis. Her findings indicate that with regard to their capacity to support broad national policies favorable to agriculture, most “semi-competitive systems are alike (p.128)”. A semi-competitive political system generates such policies for reasons that have little to do with the character of the regime (ibid). In this instance, higher producer prices and pressure against overvaluation of the currency derived from the personal interests of senior officials of the Agriculture ministry and elites in both the Kenyatta and Moi regimes. During this period, producers and smallholders boasted receipts of over 90% of the world market price for coffee and tea. However, this is only indirectly related to the nature of electoral rules which delineate the space for public contestation of policies.

Indeed, with the change from Kenyatta to Moi, changes in electoral rules had far reaching effects on the “voice” of smallholder farmers. This transition coincided with the disintegration of the nationalist coalition and the consolidation of presidential authoritarianism (Nyongo’o 1989). Characterised by de-institutionalisation of the agricultural parastatal sector and the “looting” of erstwhile Kikuyu capital, Moi sought to build his Kalenjin political base in close alliance with Asian capital and a galaxy of ethno-regional patrons in order to consolidate control of the state. Hence, the concomitant development of Nyayo tea zones was biased toward the tea sector farmed largely by Kalenjin smallholders, leading to the gradual neglect of the coffee sector (a Kikuyu mainstay). The net consequence over time was the de-mobilisation of smallholder organisations and their re-orientation toward “service delivery” at the behest of the state. Furthermore, increasing global competitiveness through liberalisation and deregulation of the agricultural sector left the smallholder sector unprepared to respond to the surge in imports and lessened state protectionism.

Methodology

This study combined secondary and primary data collection methods. Secondary socio-economic data was obtained from Government Agricultural Annual reports, statistical abstracts, Welfare Monitoring Surveys, and
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Economic Surveys. Archival research and compilation of statistical data were used to support the qualitative data whenever possible. Information from these publications was used to map the national profile of the smallholder agricultural sector and to provide the background on which the dynamics of farmer advocacy can be understood.

This was followed by fieldwork which utilised a semi-structured questionnaire. Interviews with individuals and focus groups were done using the questionnaire. Fieldwork was conducted across a sample of sites with substantial smallholder agriculture and advocacy movements. Interviews were held with key informants including leaders of advocacy organisations and senior civil servants. Questions focused on marginalisation of smallholder farmers and/or their differential treatment by the state vis-a-vis the lavish state support of large-scale farming, especially in Rift Valley and Central. This disproportionate treatment of farmers primarily highlights problems of land tenure and related policies. These are clearly mentioned in the AU CAADP document, specifically the Pillars of Smallholder Production, and easily fit within the problematique of agricultural policy in Kenya. The adoption of AU/CAADP framework points to the need to look at land and water management, labour and inputs and technology and market access.

Key Issues in Smallholder Agriculture

Consistent growth in agricultural productivity in Kenya is constrained by a number of factors. Key among these factors is inequality in landholdings and inefficient land use patterns; inefficient marketing systems characterised by poor roads, limited storage capacity and poor access to markets; low and inappropriate use of improved inputs such as fertilisers and certified seeds due to high costs; and low investment in agricultural research and development. In addition, low levels of value addition to agricultural products make key agricultural exports less competitive on the global market.

Nevertheless, a desire for a commercially oriented and internationally competitive agricultural sector continues to inform current government agricultural development objectives of poverty reduction and meeting the first MDG goal of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (The African Executive, 21-28, May 2008). Current initiatives undertaken by the Agriculture ministry are geared toward addressing the challenges and constraints affecting smallholder farmers through increased commercialisation. Prominent among these policies is the review and harmonisation of the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks, in order to create an
enabling environment for production and marketing. In addition, privatisation of non-core functions of the parastatals and ministries is being undertaken to bring about efficiency, accountability and effectiveness in administrative operations and to increase access to quality farm inputs and financial services (ibid.). In this context, key issues in the smallholder sector can be understood along the four NEPAD/CAADP priority pillars for comprehensive agricultural development in Africa: land and water management, rural infrastructure and market access, food supply and hunger reduction and agricultural research and development.

**Land and Water Management**

Kenya’s agricultural production patterns are based on a dual land ownership structure, characterised by a well-resourced large farm sector specialising in export crops (coffee, tea, wheat, etc.) and poorly resourced “communal” areas with high land pressure, poor infrastructure and persistent food insecurity. Indeed, the large farm sector dominates the less than 20% of land in Kenya categorised as high-medium potential arable land with average annual rainfall of 1,200 mm. The long rains in these areas extend from March to June while the short rains occur from October to December. These skewed land distribution patterns are further segmented along class, ethnic, gender and generational terms.

In Kenya, farmers are conventionally categorised into large, medium and small farmers. Large farmers are those with holdings of 20 hectares or more; medium farmers’ holdings range from eight to twenty (8-20 ha) while small farmers are categorized as those with holdings of eight hectares or less. In the mid-1970s, the three categories accounted for 20,000, 270,000 and 10,340,000 farmers respectively (see World Bank 1984). Recent estimates show that 59.5% of the population operates small farms between 0.01-3.0 hectares, 11.4% operate over 3 hectares and 22.7% hold tiny plots of land (see Welfare Monitoring Survey II 1994). Indeed, landlessness is estimated to hover above 30% of the total population. While small farmers are found all over the country, large farms are largely a phenomenon of the Rift Valley especially in UasinGishu and Trans Nzoia districts. Large farms in these districts mainly grow maize and wheat although there are significant medium farms that grow the same crops. With minimal variations, current statistics indicate that small farms continue to account for over 70% of total crop production while the rest is shared between medium and large farms (see Welfare Monitoring Survey, II 1994; Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey, 2005).
The bulk of production and consumption of total crops is accounted for by holdings of less than 3 hectares. Most of the crops produced are consumed within the areas of production. Apart from cash crops, fruits also account for a very low proportion of sales and consumption. Explicit government policy support in the 1970s and 1980s encouraged small-scale producers to adopt and expand the production of selected export cash and food crops. The government thus expanded crop buying and processing capacity to service new areas in production. It also provided credit and extension support to producers, and maintained a relatively extensive network of collection depots for encouraging smallholder marketing of cereals. Acreages under these crops have slowed down considerably since the early 1990s. Indeed, no crop has registered a higher rate of growth in the 1990s than in the 1980s except French beans and, marginally, pyrethrum (see Nyoro and Jayne 1999).

Limited expansion has generally occurred since 1990 in the low potential arid and semi-arid areas because of population pressure in the high potential areas and the resulting shortage of additional fertile land. This implies that future production growth in Kenya will rely on increasing production strategies comprising intensive use of productivity enhancing inputs and/or shifting to higher-valued crops.

Currently, Kenya's total irrigated area is about 80 000 hectares (ha). Public and private small-scale irrigation is still less than 50 000 ha. The bulk of water management practices by smallholders revolve around the use of rainwater harvesting, bucket irrigation, gravity fed sprinklers, pedal pumps, motorized pumps, and small earthen dams. These practices depend on the availability of adequate water volumes of rivers and consistent rainfall patterns. However, droughts, erratic rainfall patterns, competition for water resources by both industry and agriculture, and human-wildlife conflicts hamper adequate access to water.

The need for pro-active policies for soil and water conservation is underscored by the recent eviction of peasants from the Mau Forest – Kenya's largest water catchment area – which is crossed by major rivers. The water from Mau forests serves more than 4 million people inhabiting more than 578 locations in Kenya and several locations in Northern Tanzania. In addition, the Mau Complex provides continuous river flow and favourable micro-climate conditions which are essential to crop production as well as biological diversity. The government adopted the new National Land Policy (2009) and entrenched land as a constitutional category in the new
constitution (August, 2010). Both moves seek to provide a framework for comprehensive land reforms as part of the overall constitutional review process. In the course of implementation of the National Environment Action Plan (NEAP) and Environment Management and Coordination Act (1999), the government established the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), responsible for setting and enforcing environmental standards. These standards were fully operational by 2005, in tandem with a natural resource inventory and valuation process.

RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND MARKET ACCESS

The importance of rural infrastructure in lowering production costs and easing market access is crucial for promoting agricultural productivity. Improved access to markets is facilitated by the construction of rural access roads and harmonization of taxes, improving the delivery of government research extension and formulating food security policies and programs. These policies are predicated on the government’s commitment to gradually increase budgetary support to the agricultural sector to at least 10% of the National budget, in line with the Maputo Declaration.

Inadequate rural infrastructure has made agricultural and industrial goods in Kenya uncompetitive in the region and internationally. For instance, only 4.6% of rural households have access to electricity compared to about half in urban areas (SID Report, 2004, p.28). Indeed, energy costs constitute over 40% of total manufacturing costs. Hence, agricultural produce in Kenya is marketed in different ways. Farmers sell directly to consumers in local markets through cooperatives, middlemen, and export sub-contracting. However, export sub-contracting is still not well-established due to the high costs involved with meeting technical (sanitary and phytosanitary) and financial standards for entry. Furthermore, market information is lacking so that farmers who transport their produce to distant urban and rural markets often lose out when prices are not favorable. Mismanaged marketing cooperative societies and unions rarely pay farmers promptly. As a result, farmers are exploited by middlemen who pay farmers low prices when traditional buyers are no longer available.

The government’s focus is on reducing transport costs by improving rural roads and reducing fuel taxes, bringing down the cost of electricity to reduce irrigation and factory operating costs, and strengthening communications to improve access to market information. Reforms are being undertaken to improve competition in inputs distribution and marketing
and to resolve governance issues in the inputs market. These include enforcing the law against fraudulent practices by suppliers and marketing agents. Revitalisation of cotton and rice production will be supported by means of rehabilitation and development of irrigation systems and introduction of new high yielding seed varieties (see Daily Nation, August 23 2009).

The Kenyan smallholder farmers have been left out of extension and marketing services and access to cheap credit for a long time. However, new initiatives by government are reversing these trends. Recently, the GoK’s refurbished Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) entered into an agricultural financing agreement with a private sector bank where the former provides guarantee for loans. Farmers’ groups can now access credit for buying inputs. For example, the recent Kilimo-Biashara (“agri-business”) initiative between the Government and the private sector, where farmers access credit at affordable rates from a commercial bank credit facility of Ksh.3.2 billion. The purpose of this initiative is to enhance food security.

Tentative data indicate that the initiative has issued credit to approximately 180,000 farmers surpassing the initial target of 35,000 farmers. Those borrowing less than Ksh 50,000 are categorized as smallholders. This initiative has contributed towards an increased production and has in the short term mitigated the effects of drought.

Furthermore, the GoK’s Ministry of Agriculture has recently introduced 1,500 rural based information desks providing extension and advisory services to farmers. The service is complemented by radio programmes in local languages which are instrumental in disseminating topical issues affecting smallholders in their production and marketing process. Government extension services also focus on marketing and value addition to enable farmers to access wider markets and realise higher returns.

However, issues of graft still negatively affect the proper implementation of government policy. The National Cereal and Produce Board – the national body charged with managing the country’s strategic grain reserve – is charged with stabilising the producer prices and encouraging further production. In order to stabilise fertiliser prices, in May 2009 the government authorised the relevant state corporations to procure 35,000 metric tonnes of fertilisers. The institution has been rocked by corruption scandals over irregular sale of maize stocks at a time of ravaging droughts. Its perennial incapacity to offer better prices to farmers remains a problem.
Agricultural Research and Development

The knowledge and capacity for technology development and application in Kenya is still inadequate. Limited skills and poor local leadership have been cited as the most important barriers to effective information flow to farmers, whereas government and NGO based extension service providers stress lack of resources to mobilise communities and poor communications with researchers leading to information distortion (see Rees et. al. 2000). Furthermore, due to the inadequate capacity of the leading state research institutions, farmers continue to complain about lack of information on technical details of farming. Such information includes details on chemical application rates, how to manage late blight in potatoes, where to get certified seed, the most appropriate varieties for a given location, housing and management of livestock (ibid).

Government policies and financing have generally tended to favour the development of a private sector that depends on expensive equipment imported from abroad. While there is a growing development of production of low-cost equipment by small-scale entrepreneurs/artisans such as low-pressure butterfly sprinklers and pedal pumps, this industry is handicapped by lack of access to credit and poor distribution systems. Overall, there remains little national awareness of innovative, lower-cost technologies and their possibilities. The pump importers are also severely handicapped by strict borrowing conditions, high import duties and costs of input materials, and restrictive import licensing (FAO, 1997). Marketing, distribution and servicing of equipment is very poor. Pump breakdowns are a major problem; farmers are not trained to maintain pumps and do not generally have spare parts. Overall, while the government has put a lot of effort into crop and livestock research, much less effort has gone into support for agricultural engineering.

Moreover, the costs of technological equipment, especially motorized pumps, are still high. Such equipment presupposes a substantial cash outlay. Yet farmers do not have collateral to secure adequate loans either from the agricultural finance corporation (AFC) or from commercial banks.

A host of donor-government collaborations have also seen the establishment of projects and programs geared towards building smallholder farmers’ capacity. In recent years, NGOs have provided small loans to groups whose collateral is peer pressure, but these do not have sufficient capital to expand and probably cannot administer such loans profitably on a commercial basis (ibid). Other donor and NGO related programs
make use of group approaches to achieve economies of scale in extension services, input procurement and sale of farm produce. For instance the National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Program (NAPEL); Kenya Agricultural Productivity Program (KAPP) and National Acceleration Agricultural Input Access Programme (NAAIAP). The latter programme also seeks to address farmers’ capacity by facilitating access to farm inputs in order to engender productivity. Initiated in July 2007, the program targets an outreach of approximately 2.5 million smallholder farmers throughout the country. So far, it has granted 36,000 resource poor farmers with both planting and top dressing fertilisers and seeds adequate for one acre of maize per beneficiary.

Long-term processes of agricultural research and development revolve around linking farmers’ demands, extension provision and the direction of research. Hence, the process of rationalising the network of all agricultural research institutes by consolidating operations into the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI). Efforts are also underway to evolve a regulatory framework to guide the cultivation of biotech crops, following the signing into law of the Biosafety Bill in 2009. Increased acknowledgement and support is also sought to develop new options for greater private sector participation in biotechnology and extension services. Ultimately, the effectiveness of government policy interventions will depend on the balance of socio-political forces in the policy making process in Kenya.

**Evolution of Agricultural Policy Making in Kenya**

The politics of agricultural policy and, indeed, most sectors of the Kenyan economy are characterised by the partisan exercise of presidential powers, linkage between ethnicity and agricultural production systems, the quest for rent extraction and patronage by favoured groups/individuals. This partially explains the recent trends towards the disregard of evidence-based policy formulation, and the gleeful expectation of access to donor funding (Ng’ethe and Musambayi 2004). Such informal practices can be traced way back to the Kenyatta and Moi regimes and has assumed greater proportions in the present Kibaki regime, evidenced by mega corruption in the sugar industry and fertiliser trade (*The Standard*, 26 June 2003; *The Standard*, 12 February 2007; *East African Standard*, Wed 28th October 2009; *The Standard*, 05/04/2009; *East African Standard*, Wed 19th May 2010; *The Standard*, 10/02/2010).
However, some authors (Bates, 1989) question the tendency to view the political elite as homogenous. Understanding the complexity of policy making process in Kenya entails the disaggregation of the elite in order to expose the differential leverages brought to bear on the policy process by different factions (see Alila 2006). The nature of policy making in Kenya revolves around the influence of ethnic political constituencies inhabiting high to medium potential agro-ecological zones which have, since the colonial period, dominated the bulk of the cash crop economy in Kenya. Kikuyu peasant movements since the post-colonial period have been instrumental in shaping the content of agricultural policy making through their electoral support for nationalist parties and movements. Indeed, the agricultural smallholder sector formed the backbone of nationalist parties and accounted for the high economic growth rates during the 1960s and 1970s.

In the Kenyatta regime, the patron-client framework embraced the “commanding heights of the economy including parastatals, financial institutions, the provincial administration and governmental departments which were manned by members of the Kikuyu ethnic community” (Ng’ethe and Musambayi 2004). To consolidate post-independence land tenure reforms, the Kenyan government undertook policy interventions that encompassed land re-distribution and resettlement, the provision of agricultural extension services and the opening up of new land frontiers through irrigation, among others. Economic growth engendered by land tenure reforms was also maintained by high levels of political repression.

The Kenyatta regime’s development trajectory was guided by the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 which was geared toward the development of smallholder farming, especially cash crops through the purchase of land, provision of support services like research, extension, animal health and credit. This development strategy was embedded within a uni-modal approach to agricultural development, which centered on the assumption that smallholdings are comparatively more productive than large farms. In addition, a small percentage increase in productivity from many millions of small farmers would significantly enhance food security more than large farms, which would require a larger increase in output to bridge the same gap. This model of development launched Kenya on a trajectory of average growth rate of 6% per annum in the 1960s and 1970s, with agriculture alone growing at an average rate of 4.9% and 3.8% per annum in the 1960s and 1970s respectively.
Following in the footsteps of the Kenyatta regime, the Moi regime sought to cultivate his own ethno-regional base of support, albeit among Kalenjin and an alliance with Asian capital, by literally “looting” from Kikuyu capital. To cement his political base, ethno-regional barons seen as enjoying the support of their ethnic constituencies were often welcomed into the clique around the presidency. And whenever they lost their ethnic support bases they were summarily pushed out into political oblivion. While Kenyatta ruled at a time of economic prosperity, Moi was elected within a context of deteriorating economic circumstances. Consequently, political repression, the pillar of order under Kenyatta deepened in many ways under the Moi regime.

Agricultural policy formulation and implementation was characterised by the cartelised and/or populist determination of producer prices and outputs of mainly coffee, tea, horticulture, sugar, and pastoralism. Directives from ‘above’ often had to be fitted within thin budgetary allocations with negative consequences for projects for which the funds were earmarked. In any case, the policy of expending resources in high potential areas seems to have engendered ethnic inequalities, with respect to the development of the cash crop economy. This has resulted in wide regional differences in access to infrastructure and certain agricultural services (see SID 2004; Readings on Inequality in Kenya, 2007; UNDP 2002). Without any significant change in the structures of presidential authoritarianism, successive changes of political leadership have led to continuity rather than significant change in the agricultural policy. The net impact is that smallholder “voice” and pro-poor policies have been neglected.

This tradition of policy making has been reinforced under the Kibaki regime. Indeed, Kibaki’s tenure has been understood as the opportunity for the re-grouping of corruption networks. Hence the mega-scandals related to the sugar industry and fertiliser prices. It is notable that prior to his election in 2002 as Kenya’s third president, Mwai Kibaki had been associated with the ruling class in Kenya for over fifty years. Policy making in Kenya thus takes the form of selective granting of trade licenses, import/export restrictions undergirded by a heavy regulatory framework involving government in all areas of agricultural legislation. This framework has provided a ready source of rent for political patrons and clients alike.

Western donors have played a significant role in the marginalisation of smallholder voices since the 1980s. The onset of the crisis of the African states in the late 1970s into the early 1980s characterised by declining
agricultural production, forced a re-think of the early postcolonial growth model. While the latter was based on active state intervention in the economy, the 1980s witnessed state withdrawal from the economy through liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation policies that favoured the active involvement of the private sector. In Kenya, this meant the erosion of the material basis of the earlier smallholder sector. Hence the stagnation, increased indebtedness, poverty and inequality that characterise the smallholder in Kenya today.

By the 1980s, internal (government) policy reviews, academic studies and external donor reports converged around the notion that the institutional edifice undergirding the uni-modal model had developed strong vested interests. Vested interests were cited as interfering with public policy formulation and implementation and consequently the inefficient utilisation of scarce resources through skewed allocations toward clientelist networks. Unequal inter-industry terms of trade manifested in lower urban food prices. Higher urban consumer good prices was actually siphoning surplus from the rural areas where the majority derived their livelihoods, resulting in the deepening of rural poverty. Prescriptions to this dilemma entailed market liberalisation and removal of price controls which were however short-term in orientation. One argument suggests that the lack of local stakeholder consultation during these processes created mistrust and misunderstanding between the government and donors and represents the area where the gap between policy formulation and implementation was widest. This is largely because implementation of reforms in the agricultural sector was largely tied to the release of donor aid (O’Brien and Ryan (2001) cited in Alila 2009).

In retrospect, in the context of a colonially-inherited ethnic social division of labour and ‘rigged’ agricultural development strategies, neoliberalisation policies have deepened horizontal inequalities. Such inequalities are manifested in emerging land uses and economic activities in parts of Central and Rift Valley regions, through the accelerated uptake of high value horticultural farming. Yet, all-round positive effects on agricultural productivity results from credit provision, extension advice and public provision of social amenities to smallholders (Bigsten and Ndung’u 1992). Thus, despite improvements to agricultural pricing policy in Kenya during the 1970/80s period, there were still large administrative problems in the marketing of agricultural produce, supply of inputs, and provision of credit. Delays in payments to smallholders, with strong disincentive effects arising
from uncertainty, are legend. Hence the cycle of gluts and deficits that characterises the agricultural sector.

Policy reform in the 1990s was therefore re-focused on smallholder agricultural development to achieve poverty reduction targets and boost agricultural productivity. The new donor onslaught was marked by the abolition of price controls in 1994 and the promulgation of private sector-led Agriculture Sector Investment Programs (ASIPs), to improve the effectiveness of donor assistance by moving beyond project-based approaches to include broader forms of public expenditure support. Donor concerns about mismanagement of funds have, however, on occasion slowed down reform processes. Despite this, numerous attempts have been made to revive agricultural development through publication of various policy statements. An example is the Kenya Rural Development Strategy7 (KRDS) (Republic of Kenya, 2002a) developed by government in November 2002 and embedded within the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (Republic of Kenya, 2001).8 In 2004, the Government also adopted the Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (SRA) that constitutes the reference framework for the development of agricultural sector for the following ten years, 2004-2014. SRA was the response from agriculture-related ministries (Republic of Kenya, 2004a).9 The SRA is integrated in the national Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS) policy document, developed by the Kibaki regime in December 2002 (Republic of Kenya, 2003).

However, the introduction of the CAADP/AU framework for rejuvenation of African agricultural development has continued to generate tensions with the Agriculture Ministry. First, it is seen as competing with the Donor-financed SRA which is managed by the Ministry. Secondly, adequate budgetary allocations in the ministry do not reflect commitment to CAADP. Agriculture ministry bureaucrats argue that SRA has already captured most of the issues addressed in the CAADP priority pillars for investment. Moreover, neither the director of policy at the Agriculture ministry nor the secretariat personnel seem to be motivated since their new responsibilities in the process are not adequately remunerated.

Modest achievements of the CAADP process include increased resource allocation to the agricultural sector from a low of 4% in year 2001/02 to 6.8% in 2007/08. Though it is difficult at this stage to ascertain if the increased budgetary allocations are due to the need to align with the goals of CAADP. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that allocation to
agriculture in the 2009/2010 financial year dropped to less than 4% again. The process has also partially increased the need for evidence-based policy making advocacy. The stocktaking report undertaken for CAADP shows the policy, programmatic and institutional interventions that will need to be implemented in order to achieve CAADP and MDG1 targets.

By and large, the budgetary process offers the only guarantee that the government will implement programs and projects proposed by various ministries. For the agricultural and related ministries, this entails presenting priority areas for funding in order to meet the objectives of the sector. This is because the budget contains a priori determined resource allocations, according to the revenue proportions set aside for the development budget in general. However, in certain cases political considerations may derail ministerial development plans due to the re-organisations of spending priorities done by the finance ministry without consulting the relevant technocrats at the agriculture ministry. In view of such problems, the government adopted the medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) which allocates resources according to a three-year rolling budget so as to align program and projects to the allocated funds.

State of Policy Advocacy

This section examines the actors, strategies and outcomes of some farmer organisations engaged in agricultural policy advocacy in Kenya. Small-scale, resource-poor farmers in Kenya have attempted to engage in representational activities to influence agricultural policies under colonially-constructed export enclave policy conditions that are less than optimal for representational politics (Ngethe and Odero 1994). The changing policy context engendered by economic liberalisation has led to the redefinition of the roles of various actors and processes that have hitherto informed agricultural policy making in Kenya.

The main actors in the current policy making process comprise government, parliamentary caucuses, farmer-dominated civil society organisations and donors. Understanding the state of policy advocacy in Kenya is illustrated by Alila and Atieno’s (2004) five categorisations of forms of policy making in Kenya. These are bureaucratic initiatives both requiring and not requiring cabinet approval, executive directives, budget policy decisions, other domestic policy initiatives, and external policy initiatives.

Briefly, policy making immediately after independence until the late 1980s was dominated by the policy inputs of state bureaucrats, through a
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 processo in which technical program and project proposals were prepared and handed over for cabinet approval. Policy making therefore revolved around the level of directorates and permanent secretaries and their technical personnel. Policy making during this time lacked broad-based consultations. Hence, there were high rates of failure whenever it came to implementation processes. Local communities simply saw government interventions as mere predations on their lifestyles.

However, consistent with patrimonial authoritarianism, dominant bureaucratic involvement in policy making has been emasculated by the persistence of executive assertiveness in determining policy input-output balance. Furthermore, within the executive, policy making has increasingly been dominated by a small closely coordinated clique between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Kenya (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001). There has also been an enhanced involvement of technical assistance experts. While the latter have been instrumental in training policy advisers, they often weaken local ownership of development processes due to the conflicting objectives of donor countries and organisations and the host government.

In recent years, voices of new actors in the policy making process have been recognised. Comprised of parliamentary caucuses, civil society organisations and smallholders, their voices and tactics to pressurise their representatives have led to a more systematic and inclusive process. Indeed, the PRSP and the ERS-WEC were relatively consultative compared to previous policy documents. Central to the pluralisation of the policy making arena has been the reconstitution of parliamentary committees on the one hand and the formation of parliamentary caucuses on the other. These are supported by the existence, albeit at a low level of mobilisation, by farmer-dominated civil society organisations like SUCAM (Sugar Campaign for Change in Western Kenya), NGOMA (“GombenaMahindi” to cover maize and dairy farmers in the North Rift), SAWA (“SautiyaWafugaji” – North Eastern pastoralists) and MAMBO (“MatundanaMboga”) for horticulture in Eastern province.

However, the structure of agricultural interest representation has witnessed change and continuity in the actors involved, the nature of their activities, modes of policy engagement and success in influencing policy outcomes. These varied outcomes reflect variation in the institutional capacities of farmer organisations at various levels of representation. Unfortunately, intervening between farmer organisations and policy out-
comes is a pervasive neo-patrimonial culture that continues to determine the direction and content of agricultural policy. The little political space for maneuver has been legally delineated through the Cooperative Societies Act (2004) which spells out strict criteria from the establishment of a farmer organisation at the lowest level (a primary cooperative society) to the apex organisation representing all the member cooperative societies (a union). As a result, farmer organisations in Kenya are organised on a commodity basis at various levels of representation ranging from the national to the district levels. Indeed, due to the political basis of agricultural policies in Kenya\textsuperscript{12} (Bates, 1981), some farmer organisations have come to be more influential than others when it comes to the representation of farmer interests in public policy.

In Kenya, the demand side of policy formulation has mainly been dominated by three key farmer organisations: Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives (KNFC), Kenyan Planters’ Co-operative Union (KPCU) and Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers (KENFAP).

**The Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives (KNFC)**

The umbrella KNFC was formed on 28th April, 1964 as the Apex co-operative organisation of the Kenya cooperative Movement.\textsuperscript{13} This umbrella body represents eight (8) institutions with specific functions.\textsuperscript{14} At the middle level are countrywide District co-operative unions categorised as secondary co-operative societies. The lowest level comprises over 12,000 registered primary co-operative societies. The mandate of the KNFC – the body representing small and large cooperative farmers nationally and internationally – is to advocate for favourable policy and legal reform for all cooperatives. The body is governed by a National Governing Council made up of seven regional/provincial representatives.

Recent notable achievements include successfully lobbying the Government on the passage and signing into law of the SACCO Bill (November, 14, 2008). The Bill opposed the retrenchment of employees as that would have affected the membership of SACCOs which are considered a critical source of credit by smallholders. Three new projects valued at $83,668 were also inaugurated after successfully lobbying for the inclusion of Kenya’s cooperative movement in the 2008 ILO/COOP Africa Programme. Each project is implemented by the Kenya National Federation of Co-operatives, Co-operative Insurance Company of Kenya, and Urara Farmers Co-operative Society.\textsuperscript{15} New income generating projects have been
founded under the Japanese funded “One Village One Product” (OVOP) initiative that emphasises value addition to and market access for agricultural produce. The KNFC has also successfully lobbied for change in the co-operative leaders elections procedures to avert succession crises in its leadership. A major resource is its close collaboration with the Cooperative Ministry which has organised capacity building workshops for training, corporate governance and financial policies.

However, an institutional culture of poor management, corruption, nepotism and conflicts of interest, in which its individual employees compete for consultancy services with the organisation, has over the years weakened the capacity of the organisation to effectively represent the cooperative movement in Kenya (Gamba at al.1999, p.4). For instance, it failed to renew its membership with ICA. It therefore lost opportunities for projecting an international voice for farmers. Indeed, the leadership vacuum has been contested by other national organisations and cooperative unions which have become vocal advocates for their members’ interests.16

Attempts at KNFC’s revitalisation were preceded by nationwide provincial co-operative leaders meetings in which new ideas were sought from farmers to legitimise the emerging governance structure – through elections of new leaders – and new mandates. The organisation was then re-launched on 30th November, 2007. The national co-operative leaders’ conference then resolved to evolve a new financing and governance structure. At the core of this process was the revision of its bylaws in consultation with the Ministry of Co-operative Development & Marketing and other cooperative unions. Remaining challenges include: the lack of effective leadership, poor member contributions, and accumulated financial liabilities, low staff morale and staff salary arrears.

The Kenya Planters Cooperative Union (KPCU)

During the colonial period the KPCU17 served as the marketing vehicle for White coffee farmers. Its core mandate has since revolved around negotiating with the government for higher producer prices and improved services for coffee farmers. The Kenya Planters’ Cooperative Union (KPCU) was the largest national coffee farmers’ cooperative union representing both small farmers and large scale coffee growers. Indeed, at the peak of its performance in the 1960s and 1970s, the KPCU enjoyed the patronage of political elites from the Central province, a major coffee growing region. However, by the time of its collapse it was owed a whopping Ksh.3.4 billion
by politically influential people. A pervasive neo-patrimonial institutional culture has weakened its organisational ability to represent farmers over time, although the union currently still represents over 700,000 farmers and boasts a large infrastructural network which covers a number of collection points in several key agricultural provincial towns including Nakuru, Bungoma, Nandi Hills and Kisii.

Two typical incidents suggest a hard road ahead for the proper functioning of KPCU. First, the Cooperatives Minister, according to recent moves, seems to favour the new parallel marketing agency – Kenya Co-operative Coffee Exporters Ltd (KCCE) – and indeed was reported to be negotiating to take over the “Kahawa House” warehouses belonging to KPCU. The KCCE is an initiative by the smallholder coffee farmers. It was formed to maximise returns on coffee sales by engaging directly in coffee marketing rather than going through the auction system. Barely eight months since its inception, over 110 coffee societies have signed marketing agreements with the state-backed marketer to earn better prices for their produce. Second, the Agriculture Minister in Kibaki’s government, in violation of the Coffee Act, replaced the incumbent directors in the Coffee Board of Kenya with political appointees with no background in coffee marketing. The Act requires that members of the board must include representatives of coffee traders and exporters. Similar incidents have also emerged around the irregular seizure of milling licenses for local cooperatives and awarded to what are perceived to be “politically correct” coffee millers (Daily Nation, Tuesday, December 8, 2009; The standard, September 22, 2009).

Leadership wrangles, corruption, court cases and mismanagement have adversely affected its financial and organisational stability. These issues have frequently caused major disagreements between the Board of Directors and the management staff. In 2005, the then minister for Cooperative Development and Marketing, Mr. NjeruNdwiga, in a statement to parliament, listed the debtors who had borrowed money from KPCU ranging from 30 – 600 million Kenya shillings. The list includes prominent personalities associated with past and present regimes (see www.http://investmentnews-kenya.com/pages/stories/kenya-planters-cooperative-union.php).

A dispute resulted in all members of the management team resigning in September 2008. Kenya has thus been unable to match the previous volumes of coffee exports to China in the last two years due to wrangles at the Union (The Standard, August 8, 2009). Prior to 2008 revenues from coffee exported to China averaged KSh1.4 billion. The same problems have
seen KPCU fail to pay farmers promptly for their produce. Out of frustra-
tion, some farmers in the Rift Valley and Western provinces have uprooted
their coffee trees and smuggled hundreds of thousands of tonnes of Kenyan
coffee for sale in the Ugandan market, leading to a serious deficit in the
local market.

Delayed payments to farmers have forced cooperatives affiliated with
the union to market their coffee through private agents, thereby adversely
impacting on KPCU’s financial income base. Other coffee cooperatives are
reacting to this situation by revitalising their secondary cooperative unions,
so that the unions can provide the services that KPCU used to render.
Indeed, an emerging trend is that the majority of the farmers from Central
and Eastern provinces, key coffee growing areas, are defying their manage-
ment committees and deciding on a Miller and marketer of their produce,
alleging corruption and years of intimidation. To illustrate; in Central
province a Mugama Farmers Cooperative Union has already acquired
a license to directly mill and market coffee to the international market
without going through KPCU. The construction of its coffee milling plant
at Maragua is almost complete. Meru Central Coffee Farmers Union has
also leased KPCU facilities to enable it to mill its coffee. The two unions
have acquired trading licenses to enable them to market their coffee directly
(The standard, January 10, 2010). Whether the lowering of charges for
milling, handling and quality analysis will reignite confidence in the union
and invite an increased inflow of coffee from farmers is not yet clear.

The Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers

The Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers was founded
in 1946 as the Kenya National Farmers Union (KNFU) to serve the inter-
est of the large-scale White settler farmers. After independence in 1963,
it changed its constitution in 1973 to accommodate small farmers. Thus
during the 1960s and into the 70s, the union was a vocal representative of
small farmer interests, through the demands for price control and equitable
distribution of land. While new policy issue areas have since emerged, it
still remains one of the largest small farmers’ organisations to date.

The liberalisation of the economy since the 1980s has dealt a heavy
blow to its institutional capacity and smallholder base. Consistent with lib-
eralisation pressures, the union allowed individual and corporate mem-
bership. Corporate membership saw the absorption of commodity associations,
other cooperatives, and firms into the new Union. Its membership thus currently comprises 42,000 individuals, 2,500 groups with 30-50 members, 16 commodity associations, and corporates (SACCOs & cooperatives).

In June 2006, KENFAP commissioned a study through the support of GTZ/PSDA. The recommendations of the report suggested the re-orientation of its traditional advocacy mandate to a more service-oriented organisation providing capacity building (e.g. training and facility provision, produce processing, consultancy) and lobbying for constituency development funds, inputs and better prices. Indeed, the need to rejuvenate its core activities since 2002 stemmed from the weak financial capacity of the organisation which required a business orientation entailing diversification into other income generating projects. Core to this process were grassroots recruitment drives and attempts by the leadership to network with both local and international partners.

The federation’s new vision is to realise “empowered Kenyan farmers with a strong voice” through the effective representation, provision of professional consultancy services as an income generating activity of the organisation at subsidised/concessionary rates for the members and at commercial rates for the non-members; conduct research and promote intra- and inter-sectoral co-operation. Key challenges that continue to hamper its activities are the lingering political associations with political elites, a thin resource base, lack of competent and motivated staff and credit facilities.

One significant finding is that cooperative unions in the agricultural sector are not as active in the policy advocacy space as non-agricultural cooperative unions such as KUSCCO and NACHU. Furthermore, they do not have the same capacity to effectively voice the concerns of their core constituencies. The recurrent theme is that the advocacy capacity of the farmer organisation has been weakened considerably due to neopatrimonial institutional culture, inadequate technical personnel, thin financial base and general mismanagement. Capacity building programmes are critical in this regard. Historically, farmer organisations served as incubators for politically ambitious union leaders and as patronage machines for politicians seeking to shore up their political support bases. Especially in Kenya, where ethnic mobilisation is a very significant feature of politics, state resources have most often been channelled to areas perceived to be friendly to the incumbent regimes. This is true of the harambee movement as well as farmer organisations. As Barkan and Holmquist (1997) argue,
members and would-be members of local district councils establish reputations for community service by raising funds for self-help projects in the private sector and by lobbying appropriate state agencies to assist projects located in their areas. Members of Parliament and aspiring members likewise seek to “deliver the goods” on self-help; by so doing, they draw local self-help organisations and grass-roots political leaders into their personal political machines, and, in turn, attach their machines to the countrywide clientelist structures that dominate Kenyan politics and control patronage at the center of the Kenyan system (p. 360).

While policy advocacy is dominated by cooperatives and farmer unions in Kenya, non-governmental organisations have increasingly emerged as vocal actors in the policy arena. These CSOs largely represent small farmers and engage in cross-cutting issues ranging from land rights, water and sanitation, food security and the provision of agricultural inputs. However, due to variations in mobilisation capacity, some CSOs have assumed more visibility in the policy arena than others.

The following sub-section describes in more detail the work of CSOs engaged in policy advocacy work on behalf of smallholders by focusing on two organisations – the Kenya Land Alliance (KLA) and Resource Conflict Institute (RECONCILE).

Kenya Land Alliance

Kenya Land Alliance, a not-for-profit and non-partisan umbrella network of 95 civil society organisations and individuals, was founded in 1999 and registered as a Trust in 2001. Its core commitments revolve around policy advocacy for the reform of outmoded land policies and laws in Kenya. Its activities are national in scope and are largely funded from foreign donor sources. Key administrative functions are currently managed by a staff of eight people headed by the national coordinator. The main activities of the organisation are geared toward representing the marginalised rural and urban poor by advocating for and supporting pro-poor land policies that further social justice and enhance the security of tenure.

The organisation was formed from the realisation that the postcolonial government land policy, legal and institutional framework created in the colonial period (beginning 1950s) was meant to meet the imperatives of political order and; enforced development of African areas. This framework had become out-dated and was no longer serving the needs for postcolonial
social transformation. Long-term internal and external political, economic and socio-cultural changes in Kenya have necessitated the overhaul of these land policies. Increased demographic and environmental pressures have led to intense resource competition, especially over land, which continues to evolve into widespread violence. One recent notable outcome of the KLA’s advocacy in the context of land reforms is the adoption and publication of the findings of a new National Land Policy. This has recently been published and critical sections dealing with the shift of radical title from the state to a proposed National Land Commission have been incorporated in the proposed new Constitution. Land is now a constitutional category in the proposed new Constitution. To be sure, a basis for these reforms had been set with the findings of a Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System of Kenya (the Njonjo Commission, 1999) and the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (also known as the Ghai Commission). The creative co-ordination of information gathering, sharing and networking among KLA’s member organisations has made the organisation a major focal point for land reform advocacy.

Efforts to pressure government to modernise its land administration and management system saw the appointment of its national coordinator as one of the commissioners in the Presidential Commission on Public Inquiry into Illegal land Irregular allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission). However, implementation of its findings has been a bone of contention, given the fact that beneficiaries of illegal allocations are powerful people in senior government positions. Recently, there have been moves by the Lands Ministry to revoke irregularly acquired title deeds, although this has mainly focused on land within the urban centers (The Standard, 27 May 2010). Similar outcomes by the KLA also include documenting cases of environmental degradation. Notable in this regard are the encroachments on the Mau Forest water towers where President Moi and his cronies acquired large tracts of land. As a consequence, illegal occupants foisted their land on unsuspecting peasants to gain political support. In the latest attempts by the government to evict peasants from the forest, debates have emerged over whether these people should be compensated or not. In the course of these debates, reports emerged of government intentions to compensate even those who illegally obtained land in the forest (The Standard, 06/05/2010; The Standard, 26/04/2010; The Standard, 07/05/2010; The Standard, 28/07/2009).
These findings by the KLA have served as a point for mobilising pressure on the government to reform the land administration system. The organisation’s advocacy objectives have been realised from a knowledgeable perspective which incorporates the use of publications such as the Land Updates, Policy papers, posters and the print and electronic media. Through networking with similar orientated CSOs such as Action Aid, RECONCILE, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Kituo cha Sheria, Shelter Forum, Kenya Human Rights Commission, Hakijamii Trust and Forest Action Network, the Alliance has also increased awareness of Land policy issues among affected communities. Through capacity building programmes, the organisation has appreciated the importance of linking community struggles with national reforms. This originates from the realisation that top-down approaches characteristic of traditional CSO practices tend to be ineffective in dealing with land and natural resource issues among the poor and marginalised. The KLA activities are therefore strongly motivated by the plight of the fisher folk, women, marginalised ethnic minorities and small farmers.

However, the activities of KLA are hampered by uneasy relations with fractions of the political elite and their sympathisers in “civil society.” Uneasy state-CSO relations have the potential of creating incentives for the government to block the organisation’s involvement in seeking information and participating in reform processes. The likelihood of the state relapsing into the traditional methods of either intimidation, threats or outright bans could hamper future advocacy programmes. The organisation also faces logistical, information acquisition and dissemination problems due to insufficient institutional capacity.

**The Resource Conflict Institute (RECONCILE)**

RECONCILE is an East African regional policy research and advocacy NGO registered in Kenya. The Institute conducts policy and legal research and education on environmental and natural resources. It also advocates for policies, laws and practices that empower resource dependent communities to influence policy processes and institutions that impact their access to natural resources and management of natural resource conflicts. On completion of training, such communities are expected to resolve environmental and resource conflicts; to effectively participate in policy, legislative and institutional processes for sustainable management of the environment and natural resources; and, to peacefully resolve other
associated conflicts. Indeed, advocacy for pastoral land rights constitutes a significant focus for the organisation’s activities.

The public has also been sensitised on critical resource issues through the stimulation of public debates through organised public fora. For instance, from 2003 to 2006, RECONCILE collaborated with the Drylands Programme of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), on a programme focused on capacity development for pastoral groups in East Africa advocating for policy frameworks that are supportive of pastoralism as a livelihood and land use system. Networking with other organisations like the KLA saw both of them pushing for a review of the provisions of the Draft National Land Policy on customary land tenure and common property resources.

The organisation is also involved in capacity building of community based organisations to engage effectively in sustained land rights advocacy by providing technical assistance in research and information acquisition. This is necessary for informed policy advocacy, thus linking local advocacy work to the wider policy environment and to organisations that have expertise and competence in relevant policy areas. Another instance is the collaborative advocacy work between RECONCILE and Waso Trust Land Project and OSILIGI – two pastoralist organisations in Isiolo and Lakipia in northern Kenya. The urgency of pastoralist rights issues should be understood in the context of recent announcements of the possibility of discovering commercial oil and gas deposits by several foreign companies in northern Kenya, home to the largest populations of pastoralists. RECONCILE and other human rights groups have embarked on advocacy work that seeks to raise awareness on the possibilities of doom or economic boom vi-a-vis pastoralist land rights and livelihoods.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Independent Kenya inherited a dual agrarian structure created during the colonial period to benefit white settlers. It was characterised by large land holdings enjoying disproportionate supplies of highly fertile land, better infrastructure, extension services and credit outlays while smallholder agricultural systems practiced largely by indigenous ethnic communities were plagued by land shortages, limited access to credit and infrastructure. The brief post-independence interlude (1963 – ca.1970) witnessed timid state-driven land tenure reforms which undergirded high economic growth rates. By the 1970s, the practical limits on the private property frontiers revealed
the limits of this mode of agricultural development. Indeed, its effects are still present. They include high land pressure, pervasive land sub-divisions, extensive landlessness and poor water utilisation practices. Others include low agricultural productivity, malnutrition, expansive urban and rural slums, and high under- and un-employment rates.

The attempts of cooperative societies and farmer unions to amplify the concerns of both large and small farmers have received differential treatment. While large farmers extracted disproportionate benefits through the control of the state bureaucracy, self-help and smallholder organisations were co-opted and re-oriented to the service of politically ambitious leaders and politicians. This is still the case to date. Farmer organisations are characterised by mismanagement and institutional weaknesses which hinder effective representation of farmers. Due to the challenges brought on by liberalisation of the sector, the current policy advocacy arena is less vibrant relative to the immediate post-independence period when farmer organisations were influential in the public policy process. There is, however, a recent resurgence of CSOs which have begun to actively articulate the concerns of smallholder farmers. In this regard, several key policy recommendations are proffered:

- The initiation of comprehensive land and land tenure reform by supporting the newly adopted National Land Policy. This should be geared toward establishing small family farms due to their relative efficiency as compared to large farms;
- Investment and repair of rural infrastructure to enable ease of transportation and storage and also to improve irrigation systems within smallholder areas;
- Development of policies and regulations that encourage local irrigation equipment manufacture and/or joint agricultural engineering arrangements;
- Government facilitation for the access to cheap credit by small farmers;
- Provision and strengthening of extension services and other technical support services, like training in soil and water conservation and animal husbandry;
- Increased financial allocations to research and innovation grants to universities and agricultural research institutes should stimulate interest in improved production and distribution technologies;
The government should embark on the modernisation and/or establishment of agricultural technology demonstration centers to facilitate the dissemination and adoption of new appropriate technologies;

The government should facilitate the access to market information through farmer networks within farmer organisations by encouraging investment in ICTs and other media.

Notes

1. In particular, Kikuyu and Luo formed the core political constituency of KANU, which fronted for a centralized system of government. The minority Coastal communities, Luhya and Kalenjin, supported the KADU, which argued for a quasi-federalist system of government.

2. The unimodal model of development is known in policy debates as a model under which smallholdings are comparatively more productive than large farms. The concomitant assumption holds that a small percentage increase in productivity from many millions of small farmers would significantly enhance food security more than large farms, which would require a larger increase in output to bridge the same gap. Channeling scarce resources to the small farm sector is likely to prove more beneficial for overall production. In addition, the model pointed out that large farms were becoming less productive, reducing the smallholders’ proportion of land and resulting in increased rural-urban migration, unemployment and lower productivity of large farms. Thus, the main thrust of this model is equitable distribution of resources to the poorest elements in the population mainly the smallholders through central government control of land and regulated distribution of agricultural inputs, infrastructure development, and farm credit provision (see Cohen, 1988).

3. This is in line with the Sessional Paper No.10 (1965) which favoured the investment of state resources in the so-called high potential areas. Broadly, these areas fell in Rift Valley and Central province. Fieldwork was carried out in selected areas within these provinces.

4. The credit facility of Ksh.3.2 billion was solely offered by Equity Bank but was guaranteed by the government. Loans were offered in kind consisting of inputs – fertiliser (top dressing) and seeds. Beneficiaries – small and large farmers obtain a quotation from any local stockist of these inputs and then forward the same to the bank for approval.

5. Interview with senior Agriculture ministry official.

6. Note that this period (70s/80s) also saw considerable donor-driven interventions such as district focus for rural development program (DFRD), akin to
the current devolved funds, established in 1983 was preceded by considerable
donor investment in Integrated Rural Development programmes. Donors also
invested substantially in rural infrastructure, like rural access roads, storage
facilities, production and marketing facilities like sugar and coffee.

7. KRDS was intended to serve as a roadmap to assist government, private sector,
religious groups, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), local communi-
ties, Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), and the development partners
in defining interventions to improve the well being of the rural people (Repub-
lic of Kenya, 2002b).

8. With the experience from the reforms period, the government saw the need to
emphasise the use of participatory methodologies in policy making and imple-
mentation. The PRSP was prepared through a consultative process involving
public and private sectors and civil society as was required by the International
Financial Institutions (IFIs). The PRSP process was another form of external
influence on the local policies. The government committed itself to priority
actions in two broad areas – creating opportunities for rural communities and
the private sector to effectively carry out their activities in an increasingly com-
petitive global environment, and accelerating policy and institutional reforms,
particularly the large backlog of legislative and regulatory reforms.

9. Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Develop-
ment (MOLFD) and Ministry of Cooperatives Development and Marketing
(MOCDM).

10. For example the Agriculture, land and Natural Resources Committee tasked to
process legislation from all six Agriculture related ministries.

11. Since 1999 MPs representing constituencies that grow coffee, tea, sugarcane and
keep livestock have increasingly sought to voice concerns raised by commodity
associations, e.g., Sugar Parliamentary Group, Coffee and Tea Parliamentary
Group.

of agricultural policies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

13. The structure of cooperative organisations in Kenya has four tiers. At the apex,
is a Union that represents all cooperative societies formed along commodity
lines at the district levels. These are known as secondary cooperatives. Then the
divisional cooperatives and others, called primary cooperatives.

14. Kenya Planters Co-operative Union Ltd (KPCU; the Co-operative Bank of
Kenya; New Kenya Co-operative Creameries Ltd (New KCC); Kenya Rural
SACCO Society Union Ltd (KERUSSU); National Housing Co-operative
Union Ltd (NACHU); Co-operative Insurance Company of Kenya (CIC);
Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Co-operatives Ltd (KUSCCO); Co-opera-
tive College of Kenya.
15. Located in Southern parts of Nyanza province, this union was Registered in 2005 and initiated soybean production to counter the effects of malnutrition and HIV/AIDS caused by environmental and health effects of tobacco and sugarcane farming in the area.

16. An interesting development in this regard is the role KUSCCO has played in enhancing the demands of the SACCOs; NACHU has also become an active representative of housing cooperatives in the country.

17. At the time of this research study KPCU was in serious financial and political doldrums that obtaining information on its current activities was difficult. It had effectively collapsed. It has been included here to illustrate the politics of agricultural institutions in Kenya. Other large farmer unions that have collapsed under the weight of liberalisation and patronage politics include Kilifi Cashew nuts factory in the Coast Province. Proposal to revive it have however been forwarded to the Ministry of Cooperatives; Kenya Farmers Association; and Kenya Grain Growers Cooperative Union.

18. Promotion of Private Sector Development in Agriculture (PSDA) is a bilateral technical assistance programme jointly implemented by the German Agency for International Development (GIZ) and the Ministry of Agriculture on behalf of the Government of Kenya through collaboration with other agricultural sector Ministries, mainly with the Ministry of Livestock Development, Ministry of Fisheries Development and Ministry of Cooperative Development and Marketing.

19. Some NGOs in the food security, inputs provision and water and sanitation programmes are included in the database for this study.

20. The donors include Actionaid, Dfid, Development Corporation of Ireland, Ford Foundation, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Freidrich Ebert Foundation, Ms-Kenya and Oxfam-GB.

21. The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission popularly known as the Ghai Commission was chaired by constitutional law scholar Prof. Yash Pal Gahi and was charged with writing a modern constitution for Kenya from 2000 to 2004.

22. This particular commission documented for the first time the extent to which the grabbing of public land had been perpetuated by politically connected people in the previous and current regimes. Some of these people are still hold powerful positions within the Kibaki regime.

23. While the cabinet adopted the document what has emerged are only pronouncements of the intent to implement the findings.

24. A notable voice against the proposed National Land Policy is the Kenya Landowners Association, an organisation representing local and foreign large land owners.

25. RECONCILE hosted the Secretariat of KLA for in 1999 until 2000 and helped set up its institutional framework. It is also a founding member of LandNet East.
Agricultural Policy-Making in Kenya

Africa, a Kampala-based regional network of land policy stakeholders from government, research institutions, and civil society organisations in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda.

26. An independent, non-profit organisation promoting sustainable patterns of world development through collaborative research, policy studies, networking and advocacy.

27. China National Offshore Oil Corporation, Africa Oil, Lion Energy, China Petroleum Corporation

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4
Advocacy for Sustainable and Equitable Agricultural Development: The Case of Malawi
Richard Kachule

Introduction

Agriculture is the most important sector of Malawi’s economy in terms of its contribution to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It accounts for 39% of GDP, contributes over 80% of foreign exchange earnings, employs about 80% of the workforce and contributes significantly to national and household food security (Malawi Government, Agriculture Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp), 2009). The agriculture sector is divided into two sub-sectors, the smallholder sub-sector which contributes more than 70% of agricultural GDP and the estate sub-sector which contributes less than 30%. In an attempt to improve agricultural productivity, the Government of Malawi has spearheaded the development of several sectoral and sub-sectoral policies and strategies aimed at addressing some of
the constraints faced within the sector especially by smallholder farmers. Despite the various initiatives, including a review of some of the policies and strategies in the agriculture sector, there has been little improvement of the plight of smallholder farmer. They continue to face a myriad of challenges (discussed below) that threaten the viability of the sector and rural livelihoods.

Malawi’s socio-economic development agenda is guided by the overarching Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) for the 2006/2007 to 2010/2011 fiscal years (Government of Malawi – 2006). Other major economic activities in Malawi include mining and quarrying, manufacturing, utilities (electricity and water), construction and distribution (Government of Malawi, Economic Report, 2009).

**Problem and Context**

Out of Malawi’s 13 million people, 87% of the population is based in the rural areas while the remaining 13% is urban (Government of Malawi, National Statistical Office [NSO], 2008). Population density is estimated at more than 139 inhabitants per square kilometre of arable land, making it one of the highest population densities in Africa. The high population density has contributed to land degradation and accelerated deterioration of natural resources (*ibid*). The majority of Malawi’s rural population is engaged in agriculture. Despite its significant contribution to the economy, the smallholder sub-sector is faced with a number of challenges that affect its performance and contribution to the country’s economy. Major constraints affecting smallholder farmers include: (i) low productivity; (ii) limited access to and low usage of modern productive technologies such as hybrid seeds, irrigation, inorganic fertilisers and farm machinery; (iii) poor access to input and output markets and agricultural credit; (iv) skewed land distribution and insecure land tenure; (v) limited access to agricultural extension services; (vi) weak farmer organisations; (vii) limited entrepreneurial skills including low value addition; and (viii) high levels of poverty among the majority of the smallholder farmers, (Government of Malawi, ASWAp 2009).

Malawi has several Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) that work within the agricultural sector. They include: the Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET), the Farmers’ Union of Malawi (FUM), National Association of Smallholder Farmers in Malawi (NASFAM) and the Training Support for Partnership (TSP). These CSOs advocate on behalf of the smallholder farmers for a more enabling environment to improve small-
holder farmers’ productivity including better policies. Despite the existence of the CSOs on agriculture, there have been limited improvements of the conditions under which the smallholder farmers operate particularly regarding access to better output markets and productive resources such as land, improved technologies and capital markets. This anomaly formed the basis of this study whose main objectives were to identify the critical factors affecting the smallholder farmers and the corresponding policies aimed at addressing the challenges. In addition, it sought to identify the representative and associational forms of agency (organisations) that exist to respond to the challenges confronting smallholders.

**Research Methods**

The research principally involved a review of literature related to the two basic research questions which were: (i) What policy factors inhibit the sustainability of smallholder agriculture systems? (ii) What forms of organisations exist in the country to respond to the challenges confronting smallholder farmers? Interviews were conducted with representatives of some CSOs on how the CSOs represent (amplify) smallholder farmers’ policy interests. The interviews were focused on getting a deeper understanding of the internal operations of CSOs and the nature and efficacy of the networks (local, regional and global) that they have established in the recent past, the nature of CSOs’ relationship with farmers, and the challenges that CSOs face in their advocacy work. The consultations also aimed at establishing any debates that the CSOs are engaged in regarding current policy issues such as the promotion of bio-fuels and the possible effects of climate change. Furthermore, the interviews aimed at assessing the capacity of the CSOs on various aspects including the manner in which they integrated policy advocacy activities within their programmes, management styles and approaches within CSOs, governance, staffing, capacity to raise/attract funding for the identified activities, communication channels, the manner in which the CSOs consult and represent the interests of their constituencies and collaboration with other stakeholders.

**Key Issues in the Agriculture Sector**

The Government of Malawi’s (MoG) ASWAp observes that there are several key issues and constraints in the agricultural sector, which affect the agriculture sector in general but more specifically the smallholder farmers.
The agriculture sector is generally characterised by low and stagnant yields, over dependence on rain-fed agriculture which increases vulnerability to weather related shocks, low level of irrigation development, and low uptake of improved farm inputs (Government of Malawi, 2009). The ASWAp further observes that low profitability of smallholder agriculture is influenced by weak links to markets, high transport costs, few and inefficient farmer organisations, poor quality control and lack of market information. These issues have long been outstanding as the Malawi Agricultural Sector Investment Program (MASIP) also identified similar issues within the agriculture sector as highlighted below (Government of Malawi, 2004).

**Low Productivity**

Productivity in the agriculture sector has generally been below potential yields. Most of the crops have shown negative rates of productivity growth during the 2000-05 period, with the exception of beans and tea, Figure 4.1 (Government of Malawi-ASWAp, 2009). This decline in productivity has been particularly evident within the smallholder sector. Low productivity in the smallholder sector is largely attributed to low usage of modern inputs. In addition to low input use, poor agricultural credit, poor access to input and output markets, unfavourable weather conditions, small landholding sizes and weak technology transfer also contribute to smallholders’ low productivity. The ASWAp estimates the gap between potential yields and actual yields of most crops in Malawi to be in the range of 38% to 53% for cereals and 40-75% for legumes.

**Poor Access to Input, Output Markets and Agricultural Credit**

The liberalisation of the agricultural sector witnessed the state’s withdrawal from direct interventions in input, output and financial markets in favour of private sector operations. Despite the shift, both input and product markets still function imperfectly. Most smallholder farmers are poorly organised and lack bargaining power over pricing of agricultural inputs and output. Transaction costs remain high due to low economic activity and low traded volumes of agricultural inputs and output. With the collapse of the Smallholder Agriculture Credit Administration (SACA), access to agricultural finance has been limited among smallholder farmers. Commercial banks and micro-finance institutions consider lending to the
agricultural sector to be a risky investment, preferring to lend to non-farm sectors, (Government of Malawi ASWAp 2009, Kherallah et.al, 2001)

**Figure 4.1: Productivity Trends in Main Agricultural Crops, 1970-2005**

(continues on next page)
Source: Government of Malawi (ASWAp, 2009)
Limited Access to and Low Usage of Modern Productive Technologies

Smallholder farmers’ limited access to and low usage of modern productive technologies such as irrigation technologies, inorganic fertilisers and hybrid seeds is a function of a number of factors. These include low income levels among the farmers, limited access to information through the agricultural extension services and poor access to the technologies due to poor road and transport infrastructure. Low income levels make it difficult and sometimes impossible for the farmers to afford modern technologies whose prices are often beyond the farmers’ means. Furthermore, the large populations within the smallholder areas make it difficult for the few extension personnel to disseminate training on new and modern farming methodologies. These communities have very limited access to alternative sources of information such as the print and electronic media.

Skewed Land Distribution and Insecure Land Tenure

Unequal land distribution has been identified as one of the major constraints on agricultural productivity in Malawi. However, as long as Malawi continues to depend on agriculture, land will remain one of the most important resources for the economy to achieve growth and sustain people’s livelihoods. Chirwa (2004) notes that land is one of the important determinants of the welfare of the people and that access to land is likely to lead to increased economic growth and reduction in poverty. Chirwa (ibid) argues that past agricultural strategies have been less successful because they ignored the land question among smallholder farmers. Chirwa observes that access to land via agricultural production is one of the important factors that can translate growth to poverty reduction. Chinsinga (2008) makes similar observations that land is a primary productive resource in Malawi and that it holds the key to poverty reduction. However, despite the fact that land remains the most significant productive asset for the majority of Malawians, it is far from being equitably distributed. Poor access to land and land tenure insecurity are notable causes of poverty and major reasons for low agricultural productivity among smallholder farmers. Problems of land in Malawi therefore revolve around issues of access, tenure security and land use.

The inequitable land distribution is attributed to a number of factors including the 1967 land reforms which mandated that land was construed as a commodity to be governed by market forces. This encouraged entrepreneurs
to acquire portions of communal land and convert them into their own private lands. Thus, the 1967 laws instituted mechanisms for converting customary land into private land and reinforced the postcolonial dual agricultural strategy that distinguished estate farming from smallholder agriculture. In essence, the land market that was created following the 1967 laws only provided for one-way transferability of land from customary to the estate sector (Chinsiga *ibid*).

Due to poor access to agricultural land, most land-constrained smallholder farmers are forced to cultivate on marginal lands such as steep slopes, river banks, protected areas thereby causing soil erosion and land degradation. Kanyongolo (2004) notes that the alienation of peasant customary lands and their conversion to private or state ownership progressively created and expanded a mass of land shortage and landless peasants. As a result, the landless peasants have continued to labour on estates; migrate to urban centres and become part of the underclass eking out a living at the periphery of the formal market; or have engaged in counter-systemic actions, such as resistance against further privatisation of communal land and occupation of private or state-owned lands.

The current pattern of land ownership still remains skewed in favour of a small minority who accumulated vast tracts of land under the auspices of the colonial and postcolonial legislative instruments. Given the colonial and postcolonial injustices that have underpinned the land tenure and ownership patterns in Malawi, it is necessary to implement a land reform programme in the country. Silungwe (2005), observed that while the law states that customary land is the property of the people of Malawi the land vests in perpetuity in the president implying that the legal title in customary land does not vest in the people of Malawi but rather in the president. The declaration that land is the property of the people of Malawi has no legal significance under the Land Act. Silungwe further argues that the Land Act does not grant the people of Malawi any enforceable right at law. Thus, the people of Malawi only have the right of occupancy and use of customary land. The state has powers to dispose of customary land as private land under leasehold, thereby rendering the possibility of the land to be converted into freehold.

Cross (2002) observed that the majority of non-state organisations do not have adequate capacity to engage in a sustained campaign to improve land policies on behalf of the majority of smallholders. In fact, there is no consensus within the existing agriculture-focused organisations in terms of the appropriate tenure mechanisms, appropriate land sizes and functions of local government authorities (including traditional authority such as chiefs) in terms of their role in land adjudication and allocation.
Despite the numerous problems associated with land, opportunities exist for land reforms particularly those that can increase access to land for the landless or near landless. This is based on the observed poor performance of estate agriculture. Some estates have been abandoned while other estate owners are offering their estates for sale (Chirwa, 2004). In addition, Chirwa observes that there is high willingness among smallholder farmers to participate in community based rural land development programmes. Chirwa (2008) also notes an increase in access to land and financial resources among smallholder farmers that participated in the community-based land development programme. These farmers were more likely to invest in improved maize seeds, tended to be more productive and their overall welfare was better than non-participants. However, Chirwa argues that the positive effects are driven more by access to financial resources than change in land tenure per se. This underscores the importance of complementary investments and assistance in order for land reform programmes to have significant impact on poor smallholder farmers. The 2002 land policy advocates for interventions which aim at providing land to the land constrained households, promoting productivity on small land holdings, promoting low cost conservation technologies, integrating gender and HIV and AIDS awareness into land management and ensuring sustainable environmental and natural resource management. However, the policy’s effectiveness requires government’s commitment, taking advantage of opportunities that exist such as availability of idle land in the estate sub-sector and smallholders’ willingness to participate in land reform programmes.

**Limited Access to Agricultural Extension Services**

The smallholder sub-sector has also witnessed an erosion of extension services due to factors such as a growing farming population, collapse of the farmer club system, deaths and retirement of extension workers, inadequate training of new and existing workers and declining resource allocated to some of the agricultural sub-sectors such as extension. A national survey by the National Statistical Office in 2005 revealed that only 13% of agricultural households got advice from an agricultural adviser on crop and input management. The inadequate extension services have implications on the extent to which developed research technologies can be disseminated, adopted and efficiently utilised by smallholder farmers. The low use of modern technologies has resulted in lower yields within the smallholder sub-sector than in the estate sub-sector (Government of Malawi -ASWAp, 2009).
WEAK AND INEFFICIENT FARMER ORGANISATIONS

According to the database compiled by a consortium of three farmer based organisations (NASFAM, FUM and MALEZA)\(^1\), there are over 2,000 farmer organisations in Malawi. The consortium defined a farmer organisation as an organised grouping of farmers other than a farmer club with necessary documents and membership of more than 15 individuals. This includes cooperatives, local commodity associations, and farmer based groups (NASFAM et.al, 2008). Although this definition excludes a farmer club, it should be noted that a farmer club is in most cases the basic farmer grouping upon which other organisations (cooperatives, associations and unions) are formed. In fact, the Ministry of agriculture principally works with farmer clubs as avenues for agricultural extension and other related services. Despite the existence of numerous farmer organisations, most of the farmer organisations are poorly organised, inefficiently operated and lack bargaining power over agricultural input and output prices and services. This renders the farmer organisations ineffective. Studies have shown that smallholder farmers benefit from properly organised farmer organisations founded on collective responsibility and democratic principles. Successful farmer organisations tend to have clearly defined roles and responsibilities amongst the members, have adequate resources for their operations and have strong linkages with service providers such as financing institutions, transporters and easy access to input and output markets (Kachule and Dorward, 2004; Kachule and Poole, 2004).

LIMITED ENTREPRENEURIAL SKILLS INCLUDING LOW VALUE ADDITION

Smallholder farmers are predominantly considered to be subsistence farmers basically producing food crops for their own consumption. Smallholder agriculture is also associated with limited value addition on food crops and on cash crops such as tobacco, groundnuts and cotton. This implies that the smallholders realise lower prices on marketed raw commodities than they would have obtained with value addition. Lack of capital and high cost of agro-processing technologies contribute to limited value adding by smallholder farmers.

SOCIAL OUTCOMES

A number of factors, including those discussed in the preceding sections, have significantly contributed toward high levels of poverty and food
insecurity amongst smallholder farmers. The Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS) shows that the main determinants of poverty are education, occupation, per capita land holding, type of crops, diversification out of maize, participation in tobacco, participation in public works programs and paid employment opportunities. In addition to poverty, shortage of labour supply is another issue faced by most smallholder farmers. According to the 2008 population and housing census, the average household size in Malawi is 4.4 persons (Government of Malawi, 2008). The age structure in most households is characterised by children of less than 12 years. These children cannot provide adequate labour for agricultural purposes. The labour shortage at household level is also worsened by the scourge of HIV and AIDS whereby some families have lost the principal family labour suppliers, or in other cases the family spends much of their time caring for the AIDS victims. The HIV and AIDS pandemic has also contributed to increased child headed households which cannot effectively undertake farming activities on their own. The increasing advocacy against child labour is also forcing families to send children to school, thus causing a shortage of labour within the smallholder households.

The majority of the smallholder households are food insecure. Over the past thirty years, Malawi has gone through different political and economic phases which have had different focus on agriculture with varying effects on smallholder maize production over time, see Figure 4.2 below.

Figure 4.2: Smallholder Maize Production Trust

Data source: Ministry of Agriculture 2007/08 Annual Agricultural Statistical Bulletin
The first of these phases spans the period from independence in 1964 to the time that Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were introduced in the early 1980s. During this period, the majority of smallholders were food secure with respect to maize, the country’s staple food crop. Surplus maize production was also recorded at national level. This was possible because of the emphasis that the then regime put on agricultural services targeting smallholders. The period was characterised by increasing emphasis on smallholder extension services through the “Block system”. Smallholder farmers were provided with agricultural inputs on credit through the Smallholder Agriculture Credit Administration (SACA). The period was also characterised by government’s massive financial support to the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) which was regarded as the buyer of last resort for smallholder produce. Through these arrangements, smallholders were assured of easy access to agricultural inputs and output markets (Ng'ong'ola et al., 1997; Kherallah, 2001).

The period of structural adjustment from the early 1980s into the mid-1990s saw declining productivity among smallholder farmers due to a number of factors including the removal of agricultural input subsidies. The removal of subsidies resulted in low usage of inorganic fertilisers and hybrid seeds amongst smallholder farmers due to high cost of the inputs. Liberalisation of agricultural markets through the SAPs paved the way for private sector participation in inputs and output markets. Unfortunately, most of the private traders had unscrupulous practices aimed at siphoning the smallholders’ produce such as offering low prices, use of uncertified weighing gadgets and sometimes even robbing the smallholders of their produce under the disguise of commodity agents. Reduced government’s subvention to ADMARC as part of SAPs rendered ADMARC uncompetitive against private traders and worsened smallholders’ access to input and output markets. The collapse of the Smallholder Agriculture Credit Administration (SACA) programme, which was replaced by a commercially oriented Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC) that offered loans at commercial interest rates, also worsened smallholder farmers’ access to financial capital.

The situation worsened between 1994 and 1996 when agricultural inputs subsidies were completely removed. The removal of subsidies resulted in skyrocketing prices of agricultural inputs which placed them beyond the reach of the majority of smallholders. Smallholders reverted to local seeds and/or recycling hybrids which drastically reduced yields and total production. This rendered most of the households food insecure and drove the nation into becoming a net importer of the staple food crop (Ng’ong’ola et al., 1997).
The year 1994 marked the beginning of a new period; there was another political transformation which saw the country shift from a one party state to a multiparty democracy. During this period, the government attempted to resolve the crisis in smallholder agricultural access to inputs by introducing the “starter pack” programme. Under this programme, smallholder farmers were given 5 kilograms of both basal and top dressing fertiliser and 1 kilogram of hybrid maize seed. This did not help much since the input package was too little and most households tended to apply the fertiliser over a larger area than scientifically recommended. The starter pack programs ran for two agricultural seasons beginning from 1998/99 to 1999/2000 and benefited about 1.5 million smallholder farmers (Government of Malawi 1998 – 1999). Realising that the starter pack programme did not yield expected results, the government introduced another programme called the Targeted Inputs Programme (TIP). Under the TIP, targeted smallholder farmers received two 50kg bags of fertiliser, one for basal dressing and the other one for top dressing. In addition to the fertiliser, each beneficiary was provided with 2kgs maize seed (Open Pollinated Variety-OPV) and 1kg of an appropriate legume seed. The TIP programme ran from 2000 to 2003 with the number of targeted beneficiaries changing from year to year as reflected in Table 4.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TARGET HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998/1999</td>
<td>2.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>2.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2002</td>
<td>1.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/2003</td>
<td>2.0 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIP Logistics Unit (2004)

The low agricultural productivity and continued food insecurity both at household and national levels continued until around 2004. This forced the government, under the leadership of President Dr. Bingu WaMutharika, to reintroduce agricultural inputs subsidies beginning from the 2005/06 agricultural season to the present day. The subsidy programme only targets the poorest households as opposed to the universal subsidies that occurred prior to SAPs. Various studies on the Agricultural Inputs Subsidy Programme (Chinsinga, 2009; Jere, 2008, SOAS, 3 2008; Kachule and Chi-
longo, 2008; Imperial College, 2006) show that the intervention resulted in increased smallholder yields from less than 1 ton/ha to an average of 2.04 tons/ha. This translated into increased production and improved household as well as national food security. For the first time in two decades, the country recorded a surplus of 0.5 million metric tonnes in 2005/06 and 1.3 million metric tonnes in 2006/07 (Jere, 2008). The country began to export maize once again and even donated some to neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe and Lesotho.

**Policy Interventions**

Over the years, government, intermediary NGOs, CSOs and other stakeholders have put in place a number of policy interventions aimed at promoting productivity in the agricultural sector, through creation of an enabling environment for both production and marketing of agricultural commodities. However, there are factors that have affected effectiveness of the policy interventions. These are discussed in the following section which starts with an overview of the policy interventions from the colonial era through to the post-colonial era, under one party rule to the multiparty and democratic governance which was ushered in the early 1990s.

Most policies in the colonial era and the immediate post-independence period to the early 1980s tended to favour the estate sub-sector and suppressed the smallholder sub-sector. During the aforementioned era, the policies restricted smallholder farmers’ participation in agricultural production and marketing. Smallholder farmers were not allowed to produce crops such as burley tobacco in their own right, but rather as tenants to estate owners. They were largely confined to production of food crops especially maize. There were also restrictions on smallholder farmers’ produce marketing whereby ADMARC was the sole buyer of smallholder produce, with no direct access to export markets. On the other hand, the estate subsector enjoyed the privilege of selling their tobacco through the auction system and directly exported tea and sugar (Ng’ong'ola et.al, 1997). Beginning from the early 1980s, the economy was gradually liberalised, paving room for private sector participation in marketing of agricultural commodities.

The period from early 1980s to mid-1990s saw the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) by the Bretton Woods institutions, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The SAPs were aimed at liberalising the economy by reducing state interventions in the marketing of agricultural inputs and output and allowing the private
sector the lead in the marketing of agricultural commodities. Several other input and output policies were introduced under the SAPs. This included a review of some of the policies that had existed prior to this period, Ng’ong’ola et al. (1997). Further policy initiatives occurred between 1997 to date. Recent policy reviews have endeavoured to harmonise inter-ministerial policies to minimise duplication and to foster inter-sectoral policy linkages. Annex 1 at the end of the chapter provides a chronology of some of the major policy initiatives dating back to colonial days.

The policy changes in the agricultural sector have been driven and guided by both national development agendas stipulated in national policy documents and also by sectoral policies. National policy documents have included the Development Policies (Devpols) which were in place from the early 1970s to mid-1980s. The Devpols were followed by the poverty reduction strategies such as the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP), launched in April 2002 in response to the widespread and deepening poverty and aimed at reducing poverty by empowering the poor. The MPRSP was built around four strategic pillars, one of which emphasised the promotion of sustainable pro-poor growth, to achieve the required and sustainable level of 6% annual economic growth rate necessary to reduce poverty by half by the year 2015. Pillar 1 provided the premise for the development of the Malawi Economic Growth Strategy (MEGS) as a tool to achieve the poverty reduction objective. MEGS was developed in close collaboration with the private sector.

The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) was formulated following the MEGS and it is the overarching operational medium term strategy (2006/07 – 2010/2011) for the attainment of the country’s Vision 2020. The main thrust of the MGDS is to create wealth through sustainable economic growth and infrastructure development as a means of achieving poverty reduction. This is expected to transform the country from a predominantly importing and consuming economy to a predominantly manufacturing and exporting economy. The MGDS, which is coordinated through the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, represents a policy shift from social consumption to sustainable economic growth and infrastructure development. It places emphasis on six priority areas: a) agriculture and food security; b) irrigation and water development; c) transport infrastructure development; d) energy generation and supply; e) integrated rural development; and f) prevention and management of nutrition disorders, and HIV and AIDS. These six priority areas are expected to
accelerate the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the areas of health, education, gender, environment, and governance. The MGDS is expected to rejuvenate the rural economies and transform them into potential engines for economic growth that translate into increased redistribution of wealth. The MGDS also identifies five thematic areas in which progress must be made if the overall strategy is to be successful. These thematic components are: (i) Sustainable Economic Growth; (ii) Social Protection; (iii) Social Development; (iv) Infrastructure; and (v) Good Governance (Government of Malawi, 2005).

The emphasis on agriculture is based on the assumption that an improved agricultural sector will potentially enhance economic growth, through production of food and cash crops and value added for domestic and export markets. The MGDS aims at increasing agricultural productivity and food varieties by: (i) increasing value addition to agricultural products by smallholder farmers and orienting smallholder farmers to greater commercialisation; (ii) strengthening the linkages of farmers to markets through infrastructure development; and (iii) enhancing irrigation and water development. Food production and income generation from agricultural activities are key in achieving food security through own production and/or incomes realised from sales of agricultural outputs. Such agricultural activities need to ensure that natural resources are used in a sustainable manner (Government of Malawi ASWAp, 2009).

The development of the MGDS involved a participatory approach, aimed at incorporating views of all stakeholders. Amongst those involved in the development of the MGDS were all the arms of government (executive, parliament and judiciary), civil society, and multi-lateral and bilateral donors. The MGDS draws from the issues defined in the MEGS, lessons from the implementation of the MPRS, the Malawi Public Sector Investment Programme (MPSIP), current government policies and other works and studies done by civil society based research institutions.

In an attempt to harmonize policies, the Government of Malawi has recently reviewed various national development strategies, agricultural strategies and agricultural-related legislation and policies and produced an Agricultural Policy Framework (APF). The APF summarizes the objectives of agricultural development, strategies and policies that will be pursued to achieve both stated and commonly perceived agricultural objectives. The purpose of the National Agricultural Policy Framework (NAPF) is
therefore to increase agricultural productivity to ensure food security and sustainable agricultural growth and development (MoAFS, 2006).

At sectoral level, the agricultural sector has designed policies that seek to convert the national goals into specific sectoral and sub-sectoral strategies and activities. Key strategies include the Agricultural and Livestock Development Strategy and Action Plan (ALDSAP) and the Agriculture Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp) which is the most recent harmonised Agricultural development agenda. The ASWAp, spearheaded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security is part of the GoM’s efforts to reduce poverty. The ASWAp is aimed at increasing agricultural productivity by contributing to 6% growth annually in the agricultural sector, improving food security, diversifying food production to improve nutrition at household level and increasing agricultural incomes of the rural people. The ASWAp is based on the priorities established in the MGDS and it is also consistent with the AU led CAADP (see introduction to this book). ASWAp has identified three focus areas which are:

1. **Food security and Risk management**: To be achieved through increasing maize productivity, reducing post-harvest losses, diversifying food production and managing risks associated with food reserves at national level. ASWAp aims to reduce malnutrition through agricultural diversification that includes the promotion of legumes, vegetables, fruits, small stock such as goat meat (milk), pigs, rabbits, chicken, guinea fowl meat, eggs, and fish.

2. **Agri-business and market development**: This will entail promoting commercial agriculture production involving smallholder farmers, agricultural diversification, agro-processing for import substitution and value addition, developing the domestic and export markets for inputs and outputs, and developing more public/private partnerships involving producers, buyers, input dealers, service providers, and policy makers in the value chain.

3. **Sustainable management of natural resources**: This will focus on sustainable land and water utilisation. Emphasis will be on conservation farming, afforestation, protection of fragile land and catchment areas, and rehabilitation of degraded agricultural land. The strategy will also focus on water use efficiency and expanding the area under irrigation.
The ASWA Ap also has two key support services which are:

- **Technology generation and dissemination**: ASWA Ap aims to improve research services with a focus on result- and market-oriented research on priority technology needs, as well as technical and regulatory services needs of the stakeholders complemented with efficient farmer-led extension and training services.

- **Institutional strengthening and capacity building**: This will focus on strengthening public institutions, building capacity on public management systems and improving resource allocation for effective implementation of agricultural programs.

Furthermore, ASWA Ap recognises the importance of two cross cutting issues of HIV and AIDS; and Gender disparities whereby issues related to HIV and AIDS will be mainstreamed in the ASWA Ap program. The aim is to minimise morbidity and mortality attrition, enhance resilience and household coping mechanisms and also reduce HIV infection risks and vulnerability. Gender issues are mainstreamed in the ASWA Ap document, in order to reduce gender disparities and enhance capacity of the youth, women and men to contribute to agricultural productivity. Figure 4.3 is a summary of the ASWA Ap focus areas and crosscutting issues.

**Figure 4.3: ASWA Ap Focus Areas, Support Services and Cross-cutting Issues**

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, ASWA Ap, 2009
In addition to sectoral policy reviews, there has also been a review of most sub-sectoral policies including the Malawi National Land Policy (2002), the National Nutrition Policy and Strategic Plan for 2007 to 2012 (Government of Malawi- undated), the Extension Policy (2000), the Irrigation Policy (2002), the Water Policy, the National Water Policy (2003) and the Livestock Policy (2005). Alongside the policy documents, strategies have also been developed for some related areas such as capacity building (Government of Malawi, 2005), HIV and AIDS specifically for the agriculture sector (Government of Malawi, 2003).

Despite the existence of several agricultural sub-sector policies, there is no specific sub-sector policy document on agricultural input and output marketing. As a result, statements regarding input and output marketing are often made by the executive wing of government, giving directives on how certain inputs and output are to be marketed and priced. A recent example of this practice occurred when the Government of Malawi reintroduced targeted agricultural input subsidies, as a result of what others have called part of the ruling regime’s political manoeuvres to entrench itself within the rural electorate. The directive’s goal is to improve the food security status of the majority of smallholder farmers; through establishing controls on maize pricing and exports and the setting of minimum prices for commodities such as tobacco and cotton.

FACTORS AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY INTERVENTIONS

The preceding section has outlined some of the policy interventions that have occurred in the agricultural sector to date. However, it should be noted that policy design, although vital, is only a part of a bigger process and is highly dependent on effective implementation of the agreed policies. The following subsections discuss some of the factors that negatively affect the successful implementation of the policies.

LACK OF COMMITMENT TO MACROECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMMES

Malawi has undergone three different political regimes which have had varying commitments to macroeconomic reforms of the economy. The immediate post-autocratic era (1994-2004) is considered to be one of the poorest in terms of fiscal discipline. The era was characterised by increasing domestic debt from MK9.1 billion in June 2001 (8% of GDP) to MK47.1
billion in 2004 (25% of GDP), high inflation and interest rates and little investment by the private sector. These factors were partly attributed to non-adherence to agreements with institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), coupled with increasing corruption (Government of Malawi, 2009).

**Political Instability**

Malawi has had a reputation for managing political disputes peacefully with no record of civil strife. However, political instability manifested itself between 2004 and 2008, while there was a minority government. The government faced significant challenges in passing certain bills. Prolonged debates before the passing of the budget and other important bills, characterised parliamentary deliberations during the 2007/08 financial year. This affected the implementation of the agricultural inputs supply programme (subsidy programme), which eventually resulted in delayed access to the inputs by smallholder farmers.

**Policy Inconsistency**

Inconsistencies surrounding policy formulation and implementation are some of the elements that negatively affected the performance of the agricultural sector, including private sector investment. Examples of policy inconsistencies which have created uncertainties in the farming and business communities include the grain market liberalisation, the maize export or import ban and liberalisation or privatisation of agricultural marketing, (Ng’ong’ola et.al, 1997, Government of Malawi, 2009). Liberalisation of agricultural markets included the grain market. However, because of the strategic importance of maize as the country’s staple food, government has tended to impose ad hoc bans on maize exports and this creates uncertainty among maize traders.

**Lack of Policy Harmonisation**

The sequence of policy implementation can demonstrate the degree to which policies are harmonised. During the structural adjustment period, liberalisation of input markets preceded liberalisation of output markets. This implied that input prices were high compared to output prices, since output markets were still under state control with no competition from the private sector. This translated into lower revenue realised by smallholder
farmers to afford the purchase of inputs (Ng’ong’ola et al., 1997). Such a scenario contributed towards reduced demand for treated seeds and inorganic fertilisers, which consequently negatively affected productivity levels. There is need to develop a consensus amongst the concerned stakeholders (government, market actors and smallholders) on priorities within the agriculture sector. Such consensus will potentially contribute towards more coherent sequencing of policy implementation and most likely contribute to achievements of the desired increased productivity within the sector.

**Inadequate Financing Mechanisms**

Adequate financing is one of the prerequisites for effective policy implementation. An analysis of Malawi’s budget allocation to the agriculture sector shows that it has surpassed the minimum 10% requirement of the overall national budget, as suggested by the Maputo Declaration of 2003 (Kachule, 2009). However, the analysis reveals that despite the increase in budget allocation to the agriculture sector, more than 51% of the agricultural budget is being allocated to recurrent expenditure compared to development/investment budget. This is partly attributed to large expenditures associated with management and logistics of the subsidy program (Kachule, 2008). The large allocation to recurrent expenditure implies less funding to development programmes that would enhance performance of the agricultural sector, particularly the smallholder sub-sector, hence the need for policy commitment in financing development-related activities. Table 4.3 below summarises Malawi’s national budget allocation to the agriculture sector between 2000/01 and 2008/09 financial years.

**Lack of Capacity and Commitment to Institutional Reforms**

Since 1996, Malawi has adopted the decentralised policy with respect to planning and financial management. This implied planning, implementation and management of programmes, including resources, being controlled by district assemblies and line ministries at district level. The decentralised policy has however been implemented before most district assemblies and ministries were not provided adequate internal capacities to manage programmes. Most district assemblies and ministries do not have the necessary personnel and institutional framework to adequately plan, implement and manage resources on various programmes. The decen-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Recurrent Agric.</th>
<th>Capital Agric.</th>
<th>Recurrent Agric. as % of Total Agric. Budget</th>
<th>Capital Agric. as % of Total Agric. Budget</th>
<th>Recurrent Agric. Expenditure</th>
<th>Capital Agric. Expenditure</th>
<th>Total Agric. Expenditure</th>
<th>Recurrent Agric. Expenditure as % of Total Agric. Expenditure</th>
<th>Capital Agric. Expenditure as % of Total Agric. Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kachule (2009)
Centralised policy also implied that CSOs and people at the grassroots take an active role in planning and implementation of various programmes at district level. In the agricultural sector, this requires existence of strong and active farmer organisations which are lacking in most districts. The Ministry of Agriculture appreciates that one of the challenges of decentralisation is lack of capacity at the local level (Ministry of Agriculture, 2000).

In order to ensure that the decentralisation policy is successful, there is need to build the capacity of personnel involved in local government and also to clarify the institutional framework in a coherent and systematic manner. Such clarification should explain, not only the role of the district assemblies and line ministries, but also that of chiefs, civil society organisations and other stakeholders. Attempts at the improved mobilisation of smallholder farmers should be supported. Organisations representing smallholders need to be accorded more opportunities in policy implementation. This can be achieved by having a clear core functional analysis and clearly defined roles of all stakeholders in policy documents and strategies. This would enhance effective implementation of policies and strategies such as the ASWAp (Government of Malawi, 2009).

**Key Actors in the Policy Making Process**

Prior to the decentralisation process in 1996, formulation and implementation of national and sectoral policies, strategies, programmes and projects largely entailed a top-down approach. With the advent of decentralisation, the responsibility of planning and implementing programmes and projects shifted from central government to state and non-state institutions as well as the general public at district level. This shift meant an increased role and responsibility of the grassroots institutions and the general public in planning and implementation of programmes and projects within a district. The recent national, sectoral and sub-sectoral policy reviews have therefore encompassed the decentralisation policy, by involving various stakeholders both state and non-state at district level. The non-state actors are expected to take an active role in the planning and implementation of programmes including agricultural programmes and delivery of related services at district level.

At national level, key institutions in agriculture policy formulation include the Ministries of Agriculture and Food Security; Irrigation and Water Development; Trade Commerce and Industry; Local Government and Rural Development; Economic Planning and Development; the Office of the President and Cabinet; and Department of Public Procurement. However, policy
implementation has been affected by overlaps and duplications. In view of the overlaps, there are currently various on-going institutional reforms within the agricultural sector. This entails changing roles, especially between central and district level institutions on one hand, and between state and non-state actors on the other. Such reforms include the Core Function Analysis (CFA) initiative by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) which aims to define the roles of state and non-state actors in the planning and delivery of programmes. This exercise will culminate into identifying the core functions that the public sector should retain, those that can sub-contracted, and those that should be privatised (Government of Malawi, 2009).

The GoM considers the smallholder farmers as the principal partners in agricultural development. However, the government recognises a number of challenges facing the smallholders which include: the highly disorganised manner in which the smallholders operate with very few cooperatives and associations in existence; high levels of illiteracy resulting in difficulties in adopting new technologies and understanding of farming as a business activity; and very little linkages between farmers and private firms that provide services to the agricultural sector. Because of these challenges, smallholder farmers tend to have little influence on policy developments and project activities that influence their environment (Government of Malawi, 2009).

State of Policy Advocacy

Despite these challenges among the smallholders, there are many institutions and groups including CSOs, faith based institutions, and academic and research institutions which have varying capacities in fostering agricultural change in Malawi through policy advocacy. In order to develop a full appreciation of the role of the various CSO and other related institutions in policy advocacy, it is important to have an understanding of the typology of organisations engaged in promoting smallholder agriculture. This section analyses in more detail the manner in which organisations are constituted and some of their strategies.

Typology of CSOs Engaged in Policy Advocacy

There are several CSOs and NGOs that are working on issues related to the welfare of the people the majority of which are smallholder producers. These institutions can be categorised by their background and areas of focus. Within the CSO community, some focus on issues related to agriculture
while others focus on human rights issues and yet others focus on gender related issues. However, the common feature among these CSOs is that their constituents are predominantly smallholder farmers, implying that despite the area of emphasis by any particular CSOs there are common issues related to agriculture that affect the plight of the CSOs constituents. Thus, CSOs are not mutually exclusive of each other in terms of the advocacy activities.

Apart from the CSOs focusing on purely agricultural policy advocacy, there are other NGOs that focus on agriculture but with a developmental perspective. Thus, they are not necessarily focused on policy advocacy but rather they devote their energy to providing services that could lead to improved agricultural productivity amongst the poor and marginalised smallholders, in turn improving the smallholders’ livelihoods. Such NGOs tend to work on a cross-section of issues including provision of agricultural inputs (seeds, fertiliser and equipment such as motorised and treadle pumps for irrigation); post-harvest technologies (modern grain banks/storage); micro-finance services; market linkages; soil and water conservation; and general agricultural advice/extension services.

**Who is engaged in Policy Advocacy?**

As discussed in the preceding section, there are a number of policy advocacy oriented CSOs in Malawi. However, just a few of the CSOs are actively involved in agricultural policy advocacy and they have different areas of interest with overlaps in some cases. Major organisations involved in agricultural policy advocacy in Malawi include the Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET), the National Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi (NASFAM), the Farmers Union of Malawi (FUM), and the Training Support for Partnership (TSP), the Centre for Social Concern (CFSC), Actionaid Malawi, Plan Malawi and World Vision Malawi. Some of these organisations are member based CSOs, for example, CISANET, NASFAM and FUM while others are intermediary NGOs (Action aid Malawi, Plan Malawi and World Vision Malawi) and others are registered as Trusts (such as TSP) but operate in a similar way to intermediary NGOs and others are faith based (such as CFSC).

**Achievements by Some CSOs**

Despite inefficiencies in most farmer organisations, achievements have been made by some of the CSOs to the benefit of the smallholder farmers.
CISANET’s advocacy work on the current input subsidy programme led to significant changes in subsequent subsidy programmes. Such changes included pan-territorial pricing for all fertiliser types, inclusion of hybrid maize seed in addition to open pollinated varieties and inclusion of private sector participation in the programme. CISANET also successfully lobbied for the development of irrigation equipment standards and also assisted the Department of Irrigation Services to develop the standards. Technical working groups are currently developing draft standards.

The Farmers Union of Malawi, alongside other players, lobbied Government to adopt a consultative process with key actors in the agricultural value chain, when setting minimum prices for agricultural commodities. As a result the GoM established the Agricultural Marketing Advisory Council to lead consultations with different stakeholders in the Agricultural Value chain. FUM has also successfully lobbied for the increase in import duty on dairy products to protect smallholder dairy farmers. This was effected by Government of Malawi in the 2009/2010 National Budget. Furthermore, in 2008 FUM and other stakeholders lobbied the Government of Malawi for the introduction of National Identification Cards to ease the challenges of farmers’ traceability and targeting for public and private programs. Currently, the Government has commence a National Identity Program. Box 1 also presents successful cases of addressing smallholder constraints by the Mzuzu Smallholder Coffee Association and NASFAM, as a result of proper organisation and efficient management.

**Conclusion**

Malawi is still an agro-based economy with the majority of the producers being smallholder farmers facing a number of constraints. These include poor access to input and output markets, limited access to agricultural credit, limited access to and low usage of modern technologies, fragmented land holdings and weak farmer organisations. Secure access to land remains one of the major factors negatively affecting agricultural productivity. There is definitely a need to consider a land redistribution and tenure reform programme to ensure equitable access. The current pattern of land ownership is skewed in favour of a small minority which accumulated vast tracts of land under the auspices of the colonial and postcolonial legislative instruments. Despite the many constraints confronting the smallholder producers, this group has the potential to improve productivity within a conducive environment characterised by well-organised and efficient farmer organisations.
Box 4.1: Examples of Successful Farmer Organisations in Malawi

1: Mzuzu Smallholder Trust
Coming from a background of poor organisation and inefficient functioning, Mzuzu smallholder coffee associations transformed legally into production cooperatives, with an umbrella organisation as a union. This transformation invested in training smallholder farmers on how to manage coffee farming as a profitable business. The Union is responsible for marketing smallholder coffee and central procurement of inputs needed by the farmers. The cooperatives employ technical advisers that train contact farmers in extension services and other business skills. The Union has also created a Savings and Credit Union as a micro-finance program servicing smallholder coffee growers, by providing savings facilities and input credit managed by the cooperatives. The Savings and Credit Union had a fund of MK58 million comprising 40% equity (shares by smallholder growers) and 60% capital grant from the European Union. This facility is managed by growers and it has contributed towards significant improved access to agricultural credit among smallholder farmers (Government of Malawi ASWAp, 2009).

2: National Association of Smallholder Farmers in Malawi (NASFAM)
Founded on the principles of collective action and democratic governance, NASFAM is currently the largest independent, smallholder-owned membership organisation in Malawi. NASFAM started as a USAID funded project to support and organise smallholder tobacco production. Over time the association has diversified into production of other cash and food crops such as groundnuts, soya and birds eye chillies. NASFAM is a legally registered institution under the Trustees Incorporation Act. The association operates nationwide and provides its members with support and guidance on how to organise themselves to farm as a business. The association also provides marketing support to its members, whereby it facilitates bulking of members’ produce to secure access to most profitable domestic and international markets. NASFAM also accords its members the opportunity to access farm inputs in a timely manner and at competitive prices, through its network of Association Farm Supply shops. NASFAM also incorporates issues of food security, HIV and AIDS and gender within its programmes. Other services offered by NASFAM include farmer training which uses a farmer to farmer concept where skilled farmers train fellow farmers in their locality in life skills; policy advocacy; and infrastructure development. Currently NASFAM has a membership of over 100,000 across the country.
as avenues for agricultural services, access to input and output markets and capacity building.

A number of policy interventions have been implemented to address the constraints faced by the smallholder farmers and there are several non-state actors that lobby and advocate for better conditions for them. However, the literature indicates that effectiveness of the policy interventions is a function of several factors including: commitment of government and other stakeholders to adhere to macroeconomic reforms, political will as well as political stability, harmonisation of policies and consistency in policy implementation. Furthermore, there is need for capacity building at various levels such as government institutions, civil society organisations and, more importantly, at farmer level through efficiently organised and managed farmer organisations that would minimize hurdles faced by the smallholder farmers. Collaboration among the various state and non-state actors is essential since they all serve the same constituency, irrespective of their areas of interest.

Notes

1. Malawi Enterprise Zones Association.
2. This is where a few neighbouring villages formed a block through which an extension advisor offered services on a regular basis.
4. 1) Colonial era; 2) one party/autocratic; and 3) democratic/multiparty era.
5. Other CSOs as members as opposed to NASFAM and FUM whose members are smallholder farmers through their individual organisations (associations and cooperatives).
6. Institute for pro-poor growth.

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### Annex 1: Chronology of Major Agricultural Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy, Strategies and Regulatory Interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Maize Control Board (MCB) established to regulate and control maize marketing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Agricultural Produce and Marketing Board (APMB) established and replaced MCB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Markets for all smallholder crops liberalised except for cotton and tobacco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Farmers Marketing Board (FMB) established and replaced APMB. State monopoly on marketing of virtually all smallholder crops re-imposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) established and replaced FMB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Special Crops Act introduced and prohibited smallholders from producing and marketing high value crops such as burley and flue cured tobaccos. Commencement of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) supported by financial and technical assistance from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and bilateral and multilateral donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Marketing of smallholder produce liberalised except for cotton and tobacco. Producer prices for the smallholders were still being set by the government. Agricultural Produce (Marketing) Regulation Act introduced and banned private exports of groundnuts, beans and pulses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Special Crops Act amended and smallholders allowed growing burley tobacco for the first time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Cotton production and marketing liberalised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Agricultural Produce (Marketing) Regulation Act revoked and ban on private exports Of all agricultural produce lifted with the exception of maize.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Tobacco marketing liberalised. Pricing for smallholder produce liberalised except for Maize. Price band for maize set for the first time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### INPUT POLICIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Smallholder Fertiliser Revolving Fund (SFRF) created and took over the procurement and distribution of smallholder fertilisers from ADMARC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Smallholder Farmers Revolving Fund of Malawi (SFRFM) established as a trust fund and took over responsibilities of SFRF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>MH17 and MH18 hybrid maize seed released as result of research policy to focus on development of high yielding flint maize varieties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/94</td>
<td>Fertiliser market liberalised. Production and marketing of maize seed liberalised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>Hybrid maize seed subsidy removed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td>Fertiliser subsidies completely removed. Drought Inputs Program (DIP) involving distribution of free hybrid and/or sorghum seed and fertiliser to over 800,000 households affected by the 1994/95 drought.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Fertiliser, Farm Feed and Seed Remedies Act amended by Parliament. Licensing, registration and reporting procedures for importing, selling, distributing fertilisers, farm feeds and seeds Streamlined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Agriculture Sector Wide Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Green Belt Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>Targeted agricultural input subsidies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Food Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>HIV and AIDS Agriculture Sector Policy and Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>A New Agricultural Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Increased budget allocation to the agricultural sector in compliance with the 2003 Maputo declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Livestock Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Extension Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Nutrition Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>National Land Use Planning and Management Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>A Strategy for Capacity Development for Decentralisation in Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>National Water Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>National Environmental Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Micro-Finance Policy and Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Malawi National Strategy for Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>National Irrigation Policy and Development Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Integrated Trade and Industry Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Competition Policy for Malawi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ng’ong’Ol et al., 1997
5

AGRICULTURAL POLICY MAKING IN MALI

Oumar Sékou Koné

INTRODUCTION

Mali is divided into 8 regions, 1 District (capital city Bamako), 49 administrative units (“Cercles”) and 703 municipalities. It has a Saharan climate in the North, Sahelian in the centre and Sudanese in the South. Annual rainfall varies from less than 200mm in the North to more than 1,100mm in the South. According to the latest census which took place in 1997, it has a population of 12 million. Its neighbouring countries are Algeria to the North, Mauritania to the West, Senegal to the South-West, Niger to the East, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso to the South. The major rivers are the Niger and Senegal.

The economy of Mali is based mainly on agriculture and almost 75% of the working population is engaged in the sector. Agriculture contributes 40% to the GDP and provides nearly 30% of export revenues. Overall agriculture performance is affected by climatic variations despite significant efforts to expand land under irrigation which has grown to 5,500ha over the last ten years.

In this sector, 95% (approximately 694,560 units) of the farms are run on the basis of smallholder family farming. The smallholders produce the majority of agricultural output in terms of both subsistence and exports. The
main subsistence crops include millet, rice, sorghum and maize. Ground-nuts, cotton and sugar cane are grown for export purposes. Apart from those in irrigated areas (mainly the Ségou area) and rice growing areas, most of the family farms are dependent on rainfall, which is very unpredictable. It is important to note that despite the efforts of the Malian State and some national and international organisations, smallholder farming remains weak and constrained in terms of cereal productivity in Mali. The smallholder sector cannot produce a cereal surplus in order to avert regular food shortages. There are various causes of this weakness. The main reason is the fact that the Government of Mali (GoMal) has in the past decades emphasised an export-led agricultural model which has prioritised cash crops such as cotton, with the objective of generating foreign currency at the expense of food crops for domestic consumption. This has resulted in a significant reduction of arable land devoted to cereal crops. As a result, most of the smallholder farms have been converted towards commercial crop production. Furthermore, the insertion of smallholder cash crop agriculture into international trade, especially commodity markets mediated by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has served to further undermine the sustainability of the sector. In recent times cotton prices have declined due to an increase in supply from bigger producers such as India. These developments have constrained the expected economic take-off in the rural areas.

The introduction of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986 saw the state gradually withdraw from the agricultural sector, as it had in other African countries. These international and national level measures combined to weaken the agricultural production potential of family farms. Indeed, family farms have often been left to their own devices. A lack of technical assistance, of inputs and of potential markets has been noted. Nevertheless, the rural world in Mali has remained very dynamic since the national conference of smallholders and other major meetings in 1992. The different factors affecting the agricultural sector in general, and family farming in particular, require the development of a database that is adapted to the new needs for planning of their development.

Research Context and Methodology

After a number of decades of neglect, a strong political will is emerging on the part of government, to introduce reforms that will enable smallholder agriculture to be more efficient and eventually become the engine for the growth and sustainable development of the country. The smallholder sector
Agricultural Policy Making in Mali

has evolved from the use of basic tools such as hoes ("daba"). It is currently in a semi-modern phase where equipment such as the plough, seed drill, tractor, harrow and the hulling machine have been introduced. Despite the recent policy attention, agriculture remains weakly organised, especially when the conditions for the attainment of food security and sovereignty are considered (see the sub-sections that follow).

This study is based on participatory methods of research which included focus group discussions and key informant interviews. This allowed us to better target actors; to further expand exchanges and debates, and to better refine the results. The actual research work included (i) information gathering and production of a guide to collecting basic data, (ii) design of a directory including civil society organisations, state departments and other actors involved in promoting agriculture in Mali, (iii) selection of areas for on-the-ground investigation. At regional level, we produced a typology of family farming areas depending on the most common agricultural practices. As a result, the focus was on 3 regions with agricultural potential, namely: (a) Ségou: Food crops (millet, rice, sorghum), (b) Sikasso: Cotton and food crops (millet, rice, sorghum, maize), (c) Koulikoro: Food crops (millet, rice, sorghum, maize) and cotton.

These areas were selected in order to have a better understanding of the challenges that smallholder systems have to contend with. Data on networks and the agricultural associations of civil society organisations was collected in and around Bamako, where most civil society organisations (CNOP, AOPP, IRPAD, APCAM) are based. Data was also collected from local CSOs such as Farafasisoo, Sexagone, regional AOPP in Sikasso, Ségou and Koulikoro, associations of seed and rice producers; and regional Chambers of Agriculture in Sikasso, Ségou and Koulikoro. This involved large scale work on the ground in the three agricultural regions targeted. Though most local CSOs have their apex bodies / head offices or networks in Bamako, they have specific local missions and visions based on local conditions and grievances.

The Smallholder Sector in Mali

Smallholder family farms are characterised by the following:

Demographic Characteristics of Smallholder Farmers

In Mali, family farms are mostly headed by men (see table below) with low levels of literacy. The majority have not gone beyond primary school
level. The lack of education is a real handicap to the development of agriculture, in terms of access and adaptation to new technologies. The table below also shows the difference between the number of male-headed and female-headed farms (780,559 versus 24,635) or 96.9% against 3.1%. It is the same in all regions in Mali.

**Table 5.1: Geographic distribution of farms per region and according to gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Male heads</th>
<th></th>
<th>Female heads</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayes</td>
<td>97,873</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>4,245</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>102,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koulikoro</td>
<td>122,495</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>2,678</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>125,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikasso</td>
<td>96,750</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>97,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Séguo</td>
<td>116,185</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>2,109</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>118,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mopti</td>
<td>153,424</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>6,645</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>160,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tombouctou</td>
<td>87,129</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>3,635</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>90,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao</td>
<td>72,469</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>2,696</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>75,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidal</td>
<td>26,647</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>27,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamako</td>
<td>7,587</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>8,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>780,559</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>24,635</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>805,194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Agricultural General Census (RGA-2004-2005)

**Social Organisation of Smallholder Systems**

A close link exists between the structure of the household activities and the deployment of capital within smallholder systems. This is an important relationship that impacts how decisions are made regarding the choice of production types, the planning and distribution of resources such as labour, capital, land management and inheritance (Belière et al., 2002).

In terms of the social organisation of labor, unpaid family labor is usually used, although there is an increasing tendency to use hired non-family labor in the cash crop growing areas. In socio-economic terms, the emerging trend suggests that cash crops such as cotton and rice are being grown on larger farms which depend on non-family hired labour whilst the food-crop growing areas depend on un-paid family labour. Table 5.2 below provides a comparison between family farming and agri business; it analyses the role of social relations in production, type of access to land and also the relationship with the market.
Table 5.2 below shows the link between economic, social and cultural dimensions, and the many objectives pursued while striking a balance between individual and collective aspirations. This as well as risk management through the diversification of income sources, determines livelihood opportunities.

**Table 5.2: Comparison between Family Farming and Commercial Agriculture**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>FAMILY FARMING</th>
<th>AGRI-BUSINESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of family-based labour</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Poor or nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-community ties</td>
<td>Close: based on solidarity and mutual help between household and other members of community</td>
<td>Weak: often lack of ties between entrepreneur and local community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Consumption, storage and sale</td>
<td>Sale, purchase and consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversification</td>
<td>High: to minimise risks</td>
<td>Low: for certain crops or activities only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Small: 5 – 10 ha</td>
<td>High: can be more than 100 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of connection to market</td>
<td>Low: but becoming important</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to land</td>
<td>Inherited and through other mechanisms</td>
<td>Bought</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Toulmin & Guèye, 2003

**Diversified Income Activities**

This research indicates that diversification into non-farm activities leads to unfair marginalisation of agricultural activities. For instance, the region of Sikasso which is known as the breadbasket of Mali is highly auriferous. To date mining activities have been prioritised at the expense of smallholder agriculture despite the potential for very high levels of agricultural production. In fact, agricultural production has been seriously compromised in the last two years. Increasing levels of labour previously engaged on the smallholder farms have been recruited into the more lucrative mining sector.
Discriminatory Land Acquisition and Allocation Methods

Currently, most of the land is held under customary tenure which only allocates land to lineage members. Although this practice ensures security of tenure for lineage members, it also excludes outsiders with a genuine need for land who may have the necessary skills to efficiently utilise the land.

Disengagement of the State from Agriculture

The introduction of the SAP led to the withdrawal of the state from development sectors such as agriculture. The programme was incoherent in its formulation and its implementation occurred in an unfavourable socio-political context, leading to significant economic and financial problems in the country. The economic performance of SAP has not been satisfactory. In fact, most indicators have been below the targeted goals and far removed from the expected development trends. Soon after the first phase of SAP, the GoMal introduced another program called the consolidated adjustment program. Its objectives were to enable Mali to attain a sustainable economic growth rate which is compatible with steady improvement of the financial situation and a viable position on the balance of payments. A series of measures were taken towards the achievement of these goals which have been repeated in the economic policy framework document for 1992-1995. The results that were achieved following the second programme did not match the initial objectives of the programme (Project performance appraisal report [REPP], August 24, 1998).

The consolidated adjustment programme has had a negative impact on the agricultural sector, especially the smallholder sector. This is due to the reduction of supervisory staff through voluntary retirement; privatisation of support structures such as extension services, state-owned banks, (BNDA), supervisory services (CMDT, ON, etc.), inputs supply services (ODR) and marketing services (OPAM, etc.).

The disengagement of the state is largely demonstrated by its abdication from agricultural financing and decentralisation of support functions without allocating sufficient resources to the decentralised institutions. Decentralised support functions include: training programmes, dissemination, research, loans and irrigation. In addition, although the design of agricultural policies remains an exclusive responsibility of the national level, most of the financing is being done by foreign partners in partnership with the state. The central government has retained the responsibility of financing the procurement of some inputs (especially cash crops) and
the determination of the overall agricultural policy, but this is highly inadequate given the challenges that the sector faces.

As already noted above, the intervention of international financial institutions such as the IMF, combined with the emerging impacts and consequences of the privatisation policy, the smallholder is bound to be negatively affected under this policy trajectory. Besides input procurement, the state is currently limited to research and dissemination. Other partners include the private sector and NGOs in terms of training. What is even more striking is the fact that the public sector does not play any significant role in the supply of loans, inputs and irrigation. Loans are provided by the private sector and the association of producers, while irrigation is in the hands of the private sector, NGOs, producers and villages. The recently introduced decentralisation policy, supposedly the solution to development challenges, remains incoherently organised and inadequately supported to respond to the myriad of challenges confronting smallholder agriculture.

**Limited access to agricultural innovations**

Smallholders’ access to agricultural innovations has been made particularly difficult, if not impossible, by the original version of structural adjustment policies. Firstly, the level of austerity required by the international financial institutions has led to the marginalization of state departments responsible for research and development (R & D). Smallholder systems have been unable to find the means to respond to the challenges associated with the removal of state support to research and development. The paradox is: at a time when the liberalisation of trade exchanges and globalisation in general are prevailing, and when producers have no access to new innovations such as low cost tools, they are required to increase levels of productivity and competitiveness and address sustainability challenges in order to develop.

**Climate Variations**

Agricultural output in Mali is affected by climatic variations and by the flooding of the Niger River and its tributaries. Only the Segou region has viable irrigation. The rest of the country depends upon rain fed agriculture. This presents a considerable challenge regarding forecasts in terms of yield, production levels and, generally, the fight against household food shortages. In addition, deforestation is increasingly affecting the fertile lands in arid or semi-arid areas such as Mopti, Ségou, Koulikoro and Kayes.
Expansion of the Urban into the Rural Areas

The phenomenon of “rural compounds” is gaining ground in Mali, as in most countries of the sub-region. It relates to the acquisition of large tracts of mainly agricultural lands by the urban based elites for eventual conversion into luxury housing plots. The vicinity of all major cities and even medium-sized ones in Mali is undergoing large scale urbanisation. Small landholdings lying within 40 km up to 70 km from the big cities such as Bamako, Ségou, Sikasso, Koutiala face the threat of conversion into urban settlements. The local populations engaged in farming have been compelled to sell their farms cheaply, either due to pressures put on them or lack of money. This phenomenon has impacted negatively on food security in rural areas that border big cities.

Household Food Security in Relation To Family Farming

Approximately 11% of households in Mali show a low level of food consumption; 17% reveal a border line position, while 72% register an acceptable level. Most of the differences follow a regional pattern; the proportion of households with a low level of food consumption is higher in Kidal and Timbuktu (41% and 19% respectively) but lower in Sikasso (8%) and Koulikoro (7%). When examined according to people’s life-style, food insecurity affects 50% of households under the recession crops stratum, 32% under the agro-onion stratum, and 29% under the Pastoralist stratum or category.

Table 5.3: Classification of small farmers in terms of food insecurity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production system</th>
<th>Type of consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level of consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton and fruit</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onions</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastoralists</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-rente</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture de décure</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastoralists</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigated rice</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Subsidized rice)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A high level of food insecurity has been noticed among smallholders in cotton and fruit growing areas. This is probably due to financial problems that negatively affect households’ access to consumption of animal proteins and milk products.

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN PROMOTING SMALLHOLDER FARMING**

The GoMal supports the smallholder sector at different levels. The sub-sections below briefly describe some of the measures recently undertaken by the GoMal to strengthen the smallholder sector.

**Economic development driven by family farming**

Over the last decades, the Malian government embarked on promoting rapid agricultural development with the aim of promoting sustainable, modern and competitive agriculture, resting mainly on identified family farms. Food security is sought by maximising the agro-ecological potential and local agricultural know-how and through the creation of an environment leading to the promotion of a structured agricultural sector.

Such a policy seeks to ensure food security and turn the agricultural sector into an engine for the national economy and a means of ensuring the population’s well-being. The policy rests on a full commitment to the modernisation of the smallholder sector and agricultural entrepreneurship. It is expected that this will contribute to an agro-industrial sector which is structured, competitive and integrated into the sub-regional and international economy. The Agricultural Orientation Act (LAO) aims at the promotion of women and men who depend on the agricultural sector, on an equitable footing, especially between the rural and urban areas.

**Land policy**

The current land policy aims to protect farms and farmers, promote public and private investment, promote equitable access to land-based resources, and facilitate sustainable management of such resources. As a result, the Malian government in cooperation with local authorities and the Chamber of Agriculture, has identified practices related to access to land, based on regions and agro-ecological or socio-cultural areas. Besides formally confirming the existence and scope of individual and collective rights on lands, the operation has been validated by the parties concerned.
Traditional rights are acknowledged in terms defined under legal provisions. A committee made up of representatives of all the stakeholders has been set up. It has been provided with a roadmap for the elaboration of land laws in keeping with the LAO. The new laws will supersede all the previous provisions concerning land.

Improved Access to inputs and agricultural supplies

In January 2008, the Government initiated a program aimed at boosting the production of a variety called “nerica rice”, all over the country. The program relates mainly to small farmers. In this context, the Government has given smallholders grants to buy fertilisers and seeds. This was decided by virtue of an order of the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, the Government has decreed that, starting from the year 2010, the subsidy will be extended to maize and cotton. Under the subsidy, smallholders pay a third of the going price for various inputs, namely NPK, DAP and Urea.

Civil Society Organisations and the Smallholder Sector

In Mali, the major civil society organisations involved in the promotion of the smallholder sector are in general apex organisations or networks. The sub-sections that follow use case study analysis to examine the manner in which civil society organisations represent the interests of smallholder organisations. Two organisations, the Assembly of Mali’s chamber of Agriculture (APCAM) and the National Coordination of Farmers’ Organisations are discussed in more detail below.

The Assembly of Mali’s Chambers of Agriculture (APCAM)

APCAM was established in 1987 after the President of Mali called for a forum to discuss issues related to agriculture through a ‘State of the Nation Address’. It was constituted under the Law N°88-56/AN-RM of 05 April 1988 and under order N°133 of 19 May 1988. It is represented at local, regional, and national level. APCAM is an apex organisation that includes professionals from the cattle-breeding, fishing and forestry sub-sectors. Each structure has legal status and financial autonomy.

APCAM contributes to the formulation of rural development policies and programs suitable for the rural populations. It works closely with the public authorities (national and local levels) and all other partners involved in rural development, to solve problems related to agriculture in
Agricultural Policy Making in Mali

general and the smallholder sector in particular. One of its objectives is to give farmers and their professional organisations the support and capacities necessary to ensure their own development.

To achieve its goals, APCAM redesigned its structures on the basis of the recommendations of the “États Généraux” held in December 1991 in response to the political changes that had occurred in Mali in March 1991. These changes entailed the introduction of a multi-party democracy, decentralisation, state withdrawal and empowerment of the civil society.

The new context allowed APCAM to adopt a strategy of intervention based on its decentralized structures and also to take advantage of a series of changes, in particular:

1. the new responsibility for capacity building and support/consulting in favor of agricultural producers,
2. the introduction of an electoral assembly representing the Agricultural Professional Organisations (APO);
3. the introduction of a sustainable resources allocation mechanism in order to allow autonomy and ensure effectiveness of the official government agency tasked with interfacing with the non-state chambers of different sectors;
4. enhancing the public character of the institution.

Since its creation, APCAM and its subordinate structures have undertaken research projects and studies on how to optimise utilisation of the income of the producers of cotton, rice and other cash crops, through productive value addition investments. Currently, it is focused on identifying strategies for increasing production and productivity of crops and is in the process of ensuring sustainable preservation of the environment.

In the meantime, APCAM has joined several sub-regional and international organisations where it is represented by its President. These are: (i) the West African Network of Chambers of Agriculture (RECAO), (ii) the Managing Committee of the Regional Interface Project between West African States Chambers of Agriculture (PRIECA AO), (iii) the African Farmers Committee affiliated to the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (FIPA), (iv) the Managing Committee of the Platform for Rural Development and Food Security in Central and West Africa (HUB), (v) the Association of African Cotton Producers (APROCA), (vi) the Standing Committee for Agriculture for Developing Countries within FIPA and, finally, (vii) the Management Committee of MITSOWA (Agri-
cultural Market Information System including ECOWAS countries) that is currently being funded by USAID.

APCAM has, through a combination of advocacy and networking, positioned itself as an important partner for the GoMal and donors. It is consulted on most of the national and regional agricultural policy issues and processes, ranging from farming lease reforms to the elaboration of rules and regulation for cooperatives. Its nine regional chambers also act as mediator of disputes between private operators (Bingen, 2003). Moreover, APCAM acts as an interface between the donors, the government and the private stakeholders, playing the role of a planning and implementation agency for projects financed by international funding agencies.

The organisation has established a hierarchy of structures, from the village to the national level. These structures enable it to get closer to the rural stakeholders and also to have representation in policy platforms. However, elected bodies exist only at regional and national levels. These bodies act as the regional consular assembly and the office for the RCA (Regional Chambers of Agriculture), as well as the national consular assembly and the APCAM office.

At national level, there is a coordinating body called the Permanent Assembly of Chambers of Agriculture of Mali (APCAM) hosting an office chaired by a president. At regional level, the Regional Chamber of Agriculture is chaired by a president and is run by a general secretariat. There is also a regional consular assembly composed of 17 to 29 elected members, among whom there are five (5) representatives of agriculture professional organisations of regional level, plus an office and working commissions.

At local level, the network of Chambers of Agriculture comprises three elected members per Administrative Unit or “Cercle” and includes farmers, herdsmen, fishermen and foresters. APCAM has produced a number of reports and studies based on field studies. It recently developed reports on activities implemented by certain organisations, especially on trade in cereals. It plans to produce a number of reports assessing the agricultural situation and also an analysis of the overall contribution of the smallholder sector to the national economy.

**National Coordination of Farmers’ Organisations (NCFO)**

The head office of NCFO is in Bamako but it is represented at local and regional levels by its various member organisations. It is a network of nine, mostly smallholder organisations. It was created in the aftermath
of the ground-breaking meeting of Farmers’ Organisations (FOs) of Mali known as “large FOs”, held in Ségou in 1996. The meeting acknowledged the need to create a framework for the integration of the FOs’ concerns into a unified strategy and the need to create a common platform for effective representation. Such a platform would contribute towards reinforcing lobbying and advocacy actions undertaken by single FOs.

Further discussions took place between the “large FOs” of Mali soon after the creation of the Network of the West African Farmers and Producers Organisations in Cotonou in July 2000. These discussions resulted in the organisation of a workshop in January 2002, during which the successes, failures, potential hindrances and prospects of FOs were discussed. The platform was also used to develop common strategies (institutional, organisational, communicational) and also to agree on priority actions towards the establishment of an aggregating superstructure.

The NCFO was eventually created during a workshop held on the 20th and 21st of December 2002. The meeting agreed on the structure of the operational bodies, resources, objectives and action plan. The process of registration was completed in 2003. The members of NCFO are the Association of Farmers Professional Organisations (AFPO), the Association of Fishermen Residing in Mali (AFRIM), the Platform for Farmers in the Sahel, the Federation of the Organisations of Banana Producers (FOBP), the National Committee of Users of Research Outcomes (CNU), the National Federation of Cattle and Meat industries (FEBEV), the National Union of the Cooperatives of Planters and Market gardeners (UNCPM), the Assembly of Farmers’ Trade Unions, the Federation of Rural Women (FFR) and the National Federation of Rural Young people (FENAJER).

The NCFO demands the inclusion of the member Farmers’ Organisations in policy processes and platforms focused on national development. It claims that smallholders deserve to be engaged in the formulation of national development policies. It has in the past years been engaged in the creation of a credible national movement ‘which should contribute towards a more sustainable smallholder sector that is adequately integrated within local regional, national and international development processes’. In order to advance its material requirements and interests, NCFO utilises diverse meetings and dialogues between farmers; studies and consults on major issues; provides capacity building sessions for leaders; organizes workshops and forums and participates in lobbying.

Some of the NCFO’s activities include the following:
Settling leadership disputes and reducing possibilities of duplication of representation of smallholder communities by farmers’ organisations (FOs) and encouraging farmer organisations to act as a single legitimate interlocutor in dealing with the Government and other development stakeholders,

Clarify the roles, responsibilities and missions of the different types of structures acting in the circles of the FOs, in particular the Chamber of Agriculture,

Make the FOs indispensable, based on their strong capacity of anticipation and contribution to the formulation, implementation and monitoring of agriculture policies, of development projects and programs,

Create a reliable channel of information between the grassroots and the top and

Set up a strong farmers’ advocacy hub in Mali and in the sub region.

As already mentioned, the NCFO includes FOs with national and/or regional powers. In order to improve effectiveness, it is structured as follows: a General Assembly, a Board of Directors, a National Executive committee of 15 members, an Inspection committee of 3 members, 3 working commissions and a technical support cell. A Coordinating committee ensures continuity of action and is composed of 10 representatives from each large FO. It is envisaged that regional coordination structures will be gradually installed.

To date, the organisation has been consulted and participated actively in the development of the Agriculture Orientation Act (LOA). It also independently developed strategy papers on (i) the implementation of the agricultural orientation act, (ii) smallholder food security and (iii) women’s access to land. It also made inputs into the Mali National Agriculture Sector Investment Program (PNSIAA). Some of its achievements include the mobilisation against the introduction of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO), crops and food in Mali, and participation in the Global Forum on Food Sovereignty. Social mobilisation around the GMOs issue (Genetically Modified Organisms) and request for a moratorium on participation in the Global forum on food sovereignty and the African forum on food security.
Conclusion

The discussion above has shown that the disengagement of the state from the agricultural sector through “the imposition” of international financial institutions has negatively impacted the development of family farms. Other factors constraining the development of the smallholder sector include low literacy levels among the heads of the family farms, diversification into farm-based income generating projects, an increase in the acquisition of land neighbouring smallholder areas and difficult access to agricultural technological innovations. More recently, an increase in climate variability has worsened the already precarious situation of family farms. Furthermore, there are challenges in the implementation of agricultural policies and it is imperative that the GoMal improves the institutional arrangements behind its decentralisation programme, to address the constraints regarding access to inputs, extension services and markets.

Although the Agriculture Orientation Act will potentially bring about positive changes there is need to consider other paths for the development of smallholder farms so that they can fit in the framework of the CAADP objectives. This is especially true of the goal to achieve a growth rate of 6%. Despite the mushrooming of different civil society-based networks and organisations, their impact on smallholder agriculture has been very limited. Most of these organisations depend on unreliable external financing whilst some also receive small grants from the state. Such dependency affects their programming autonomy and the nature of their relationship with the state. Furthermore, this study found that although many of the organisations that were analysed state their main objective as the defense of the interests of smallholder agriculture, they do not have funds budgeted towards the actual advocacy/lobbying. This partially explains why they have mostly focused on producing reference documents to be used as advocacy/lobbying handbooks. These organisations also face a capacity constraint, most of the staff are often unaware of new technologies and techniques used for advocacy/lobbying.

It is important to note that the CAADP in Mali is being introduced in a context where economic liberalisation has been under way since 1982. As such, government on its own does not have the capacity to coordinate policy planning to achieve 6% growth, without the input of the private sector and other non-state actors. Indeed, as of 2002, the GoMal had expressed its political will regarding withdrawal from interventionist policy and programme implementation. The aim then was to transfer a certain
number of powers to private partners who showed a higher level of organisation. Except for smallholder farms around the cotton zones commonly called CMDT zones (Malian Company for the Development of Textiles), the Malian State stopped regulating the prices and the marketing of cereals, fertilisers and machinery (Noray et al., 2007). As a result, private investment has been stimulated where there is potential for an increase in agricultural trade (Bingen, 2003).

The introduction of the CAADP framework has influenced the GoMal to consider diversification of agriculture beyond concentration with the cotton sub-sector. Already there have been positive developments from this policy shift. From 2005 to 2006, the Malian State allocated about 12% of the national budget to agriculture. Apart from the cotton and the rice sub-sectors, other agricultural sub-sectors such as dry cereals (millet, maize, sorghum, etc.) remain highly underdeveloped and far below the envisaged 6% growth rate. Other factors limiting the realisation of the 6% growth rate include climate variations, liberalisation of the input sector and the lack of organisation of local and sub-regional markets.

It is critical for the GoMal to develop a more coherent approach regarding agricultural diversification and the existing constraints faced by the smallholders. The Government and all the other partners to agricultural development should consider the actual needs of farmers and set up a less constraining framework for the sector. For instance, most of the interviewed smallholders interviewed during the course of this study did not know about the CAADP, despite the fact that it has already been integrated into the Program for Agricultural Competitiveness and Diversification (PCDA). This suggests lack of consultation on the part of government.

Note
1. A separate database of organisations working on smallholder agriculture issues in Mali is available at www.trustafrica.org

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Modernisation of Smallholder Agriculture and Policy Making in Uganda

Aturinde T. Emmanuel

Introduction

Agriculture is the backbone of Uganda’s economy and an important driver of economic development and poverty reduction. Approximately 73% of Ugandans depend on agriculture (MAAIF, 2009). However, the sector currently faces many multifaceted challenges which include land degradation, inadequate market access, unreliable weather and civil strife. Agricultural growth is also affected by other associated multi-sectoral considerations such as poor infrastructure, low literacy levels, health considerations (for example, HIV-AIDS), etc. In addition, most agricultural programmes in Uganda are under-funded (Mkandawire, 2002) and are actually declining. These challenges are exacerbated by the low level of commitment of the Ugandan Government to the agricultural sector, in terms of policy and physical investment in the productive sectors of the Agricultural Knowledge and Information System (AKIS).
The African Union’s (AU) CAADP initiative potentially provides an opportunity to improve the capacity of agricultural production and address a number of constraints currently impeding growth in the sector. CAADP signals a step towards a much more comprehensive approach to agricultural reforms with the potential to positively impact upon rural livelihoods. In the Uganda context, the CAADP directly integrates into the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), Peace Recovery and Development Programme (PRDP), Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NUREP), National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAADS), Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) and the Ministry of Agriculture Development Strategy and Investment Plan (DSIP 2010). These strategies seek to address agriculture development as a core to poverty reduction in Uganda (MAAIF, 2009).

Despite the above programmes, agricultural production in Uganda is in decline. Real growth in agricultural production has declined steadily from 7.9% of GDP in 2000/01 to 0.7% of GDP in 2007/2008 (MAAIF, 2009). According to the Ugandan government, the biggest constraints to agricultural production include crop pests and livestock diseases, lack of suitable inputs, lack of appropriate technologies to increase productivity, the vagaries of weather and limited access to financial and extension services (MFPED, 2009). Increasing agricultural productivity not only depends on improving existing production deficiencies through the adoption of modern or improved technologies and practices, but also depends critically on many other factors. These include the need for access to adequate productive resources, well-functioning markets, infrastructure and a conducive policy environment that is built on continuous advocacy programmes. To realise these good practices, there is a need for a well-functioning and relatively independent civil society with adequate capacities to analyse policies and engage government.

**Problem and Research Context**

Over the last three decades, the world has witnessed rapid changes in global policy environment ranging from protectionist planned economic systems to liberalised and externally driven market-led economic systems. Many developing countries, including Uganda, experienced sweeping economic crises in the late 1980s and 1990s, and as a result a number of them were forced to undertake economic policy reforms, largely supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (MAAIF, 2009). In agriculture, economic policy shifts included the lifting of price fixing by state organs, the dismantling of monopolistic state produce and
marketing boards, downsizing of government extension staff and total elimination of government provision of agricultural subsidies and/or free provision of fertiliser, seed and other agricultural inputs.

The implementation of adjustment programmes in Uganda had multiple impacts that affected various sectors of the Ugandan economy. The agricultural sector was drastically affected due to its interdependence on other sectors such as industry, the transport and communication sector, investment, public service and trade, among others. One of the major changes associated with adjustment was the introduction of the policy of decentralisation. The implementation of the decentralised administrative system was aimed at simplifying the policy making process and enhancing the bottom up approach which increases stakeholder participation. However, the process of decentralisation was not followed up by adequate resource allocation and capacity support. As a result, decentralised government agencies have limited resources and this is negatively affecting their performance.

Although the majority of Uganda’s household still eke out an existence from agriculture, the sector receives a pittance in terms of budgetary allocation. Only 3.8% and 4.4% was allocated for agriculture in the national budget for the financial year 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 respectively (GoU Budget, 2008, MFPED, 2009). Furthermore, the sector remains besieged by multiple and multidimensional challenges which have been described in the introductory section, but will also be elaborated here from a Ugandan perspective. It is important to emphasise that the underdevelopment of agriculture will not necessarily be resolved by increasing budget allocation, rather there is a need for high level coordination of the different agencies tasked with implementing the programmes targeting the smallholder farmers who dominate the sector. This study reveals that institutional issues such as capacity weakness, insufficient end user (farmers) and private sector involvement, and an ineffective farmer support system persist in most of Uganda’s agriculture productivity programmes and organisations, thus hampering progress in the sector.

The farmers, who should be stakeholders, have a limited voice to articulate and advocate for their rights. The collapse of co-operative unions in Uganda and over reliance on an already weak government programme has contributed to the emergence of unaffordable private sector led extension services. The extension services have to be hired (outsourced) at sub-county levels according to the NAADS implementation programme. Such an approach lacks institutional mechanisms for farmer protection and thus limited utilisation of the agricultural programmes.
Uganda and the CAADP

The Ugandan government signed the CAADP compact on March 31st 2010. This follows the African Heads of state meeting in Maputo in July 2003 in which African governments, including Uganda, agreed to the CAADP agenda. Within the four pillar framework, CAADP has key principles of building partnerships, dialogue, and mutual peer accountability at all levels (Uganda CAADP Brochure 2009). If properly implemented, the CAADP process has the potential to produce a robust and empowered farmer society. The CAADP in Uganda is housed under the Ministry of Agriculture Animal industry and Fisheries (MAAIF). The government of Uganda held a number of round table discussions through which the CAADP compact was developed. These discussions involved government representatives, development partners, and farmers through the National Farmers Federation (Uganda CAADP Compact 2010).3 The vision of the CAADP is in line with and supported by Uganda’s own strategies such as the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), The Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), the National Development Plan now under development and the DSIP. The ministry of Agriculture notes that there is an increasing recognition of the fundamental importance of agriculture to Uganda’s economy and of the central role it should play in development, economic growth and poverty reduction. Government strategies like Prosperity for All (PFA) which targets the poor are in line with the CAADP’s Pillar III (see introductory chapter).

However, it is important to note that the CAADP in Uganda has had limited focus, even within government departments, despite a number of round table discussions leading to the signing of the compact. Many people within the Districts Agricultural Offices who were consulted during key informant interviews expressed limited or no knowledge of the CAADP. The strategy is yet to be properly integrated into all sectors of the economy. Furthermore, as already noted the Government of Uganda (GoU) has not yet made any significant budgetary allocation towards agriculture since signing the compact.

Access to Land and Smallholder Agriculture in Uganda

In Uganda and the region as a whole, land is a volatile and political issue. Land disputes have broken out across national boundaries and spread to tribal and ethnic groups. Before January 2010 when the new land act was signed,
Uganda did not have a clearly defined and consolidated National Land Policy since the advent of colonialism in the 19th century. Land issues in Uganda have been exacerbated by contemporary phenomenon such as the discovery of extensive deposits of mineral wealth, generating overwhelming uncertainties in land rights and resulting in tenure insecurity (MLHUD 2009).

Following the 1995 constitution, the Ugandan government established the 1998 Land Act that provided for the District Land Tribunals to address land conflicts. This was further followed by the 2004 Land Amendment Act which included a clause on spousal consent in conducting land transactions. Specifically, the 2004 Land Amendment Act requires women to endorse any transaction that involves land at household level. However, many issues relating to the customary land tenure rights and ‘mailo land’ (in central Uganda) remained unaddressed. The gaps in these earlier laws necessitated the initiation of the new Land Amendment Act 2010. The areas of focus in the new national Land Act include redressing historical injustices in land rights and providing more equitable access to land, providing livelihood security through employment or access to land for more intensive use, facilitating appropriate development, delivering land-use services and protecting fragile environments (MLHUD, 2009). The law also focuses on registering formal and customary rights to land and fixed property, generating revenue from land and property tax and providing effective land administration.

Unlike the previous laws, the new land law in Uganda was developed after a highly participatory and inclusive process which took into account the varied interests of the key stakeholders. The Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment (MWLE) led the preparation of the national policy, in collaboration with other key institutions, including Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MFPED), the Uganda Land Commission (ULC), Ministry of Gender (MoG), NGOs working on land issues, the Uganda Land Alliance, the donor community and other key stakeholders particularly farmers and cultural institutions.

Following a series of land evictions based on tribal (ethnic) conflicts in the country, many people especially the smallholders expressed their hope in the new land law. However, focus groups discussions have revealed that some also fear that the law may suffer from implementation challenges, given the level of corruption and the poor state of institutions that exist to ensure its success.

The land registry in Uganda was ranked among the five most corrupt government departments. The judiciary recently revealed that an increasing number of land cases remain unaddressed due to the shortage of judges (MLHUD, 2009). The new land law can potentially reduce the recurrent
cases of land evictions and disputes between landlords and squatters. The central region of Uganda is characterised by Mailo Land under the guardianship of the Kabaka of Buganda. This means that every person buying land in Buganda is a squatter. This arrangement was instituted under the colonial policies in the 1900 Buganda Agreement (Rugadya M, 1999). Also, many people in the central region who are tenants on land owned by those who have land titles face evictions when the landlords sell the land (Rugadya, M., 2009). The Northern region of the country is dominated by customary land tenure and thus farmers’ use land as security to acquire loans from financial institutions cannot. The new land policy has not been subject to scrutiny through implementation. However, there are already a lot of contestations from different sections of Ugandan society, mostly in the central region.8

**LAND AND AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION**

Agricultural production is mainly carried out by smallholders who own an average 3.2 acres (MAAIF – PMA 2009).9 Not surprisingly, farm sizes tend to be smallest in the more densely populated highlands and largest in the sparsely populated Northern and North-Eastern parts of the country.

**Table 6.1: Farmer Categories in Uganda by Land Holding (acres)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Small-Holders</th>
<th>Medium-Holders</th>
<th>Large-Holders</th>
<th>Avg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2: North-Eastern Savannah Grasslands</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: North-Western Savannah Grasslands</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Para Savannahs</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Kyoga Plains</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Lake Victoria Crescent</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: Western Savannah Grasslands</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: Pastoral Rangelands</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: South-Western Farmlands</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10: Highland Ranges</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAAIF – PMA Secretariat, 2009

Agricultural land has not always been optimally and sustainably used. Land productivity potential, land capacity and land sustainability for agriculture is unknown. This makes it virtually impossible to allocate land to its optimal use. However the government has adopted agriculture zoning in
order to address the land use practices. The new agricultural policy allows changes in land use within protected areas, especially forests, wetlands and wildlife reserves. Management of protected areas is largely in the hands of government which has created policies that have resulted in land use changes in these areas.

The core problem in the conservation and management of these ecosystems is the unsustainable exploitation arising from conflicting land use and inadequate enforcement of natural resource management regulations. At present, land use activities not only lead to environmental degradation but also loss of biodiversity, both in protected and unprotected environments. There is a lack of an integrated and comprehensive approach to the management of land-based resources. There is a need to harmonize policies, laws and regulations dealing with land-based natural resources and to develop clear criteria for setting aside areas for conservation in the country. There is no mechanism for resolving grievances of communities arising from human conflicts, environmental conservation and sustainable management of land for agriculture production.

**Land Use Management in Uganda**

Physical development planning at regional and local levels is an important tool in the management of land under any tenure. It enables the state local authorities, communities and individuals to determine in advance the direction and rate of progression of land sector activities by region and area. However, these instruments have failed to provide adequate guidelines and a framework for planning at the national or regional levels and little guidance for the development of land use plans in rural areas. The majority of smallholder farmers have been excluded from the land use planning process. Besides, planning authorities (local councils) do not always have the resources and technical capacity to plan or implement approved plans. This explains the persistent land wrangles, evictions and the formation of the Uganda Squatters Association (locally known as ‘Abebibanja- squatters’) Landlords Association to defend the squatters and Landlords rights respectively. This has increased insecurity of land use and continued to threaten agricultural development initiatives.

Access to land in Uganda is becoming increasingly difficult, especially for poorer segments of society, while land owners continue to hold big chunks of land which lie unused. The majority of smallholders eke out an existence on small plots of land. Their situation is compounded by the lack of
security on land due to civil wars and land grabs by local and national elites. The majority poor who live in rural areas have no money to participate in land markets which are dominated by society’s elite. Through a number of discussions, many respondents argued that there is a wide gap between land availability, accessibility and utilisation. The issue of accessibility is very critical especially in areas characterised by insecurity such as Northern and North Eastern Uganda. The patriarchal tendencies embedded within the cultural norms of most tribal groupings limit the participation of women and youth from ownership and the eventual utilisation of land. Poor road networks and communication also negatively affect land utilisation and general agricultural development. In addition, there is need to address land degradation, especially through soil erosion (NEMA, 2005).

**Water and Agricultural Production**

A big proportion of Uganda’s farmers still depends on rain-fed agriculture. Although Uganda is well endowed with water resources, both surface and underground, there are limited sources of water to support the agricultural sector. Furthermore, recent rainfall patterns have been erratic and unreliable in terms of onset prediction. Large parts of Uganda, especially the North East, are partly semi-arid and they face a severe water crisis, especially during drought periods. Increasing frequent periods of drought have had adverse effects on both the quality and quantity of water resources, which has become a big challenge to the agricultural sector.

Although the importance of irrigation towards achieving food security is widely acknowledged, there has been limited corresponding investment. The country has very few irrigation schemes and dams as alternative sources of water. Less than 1% of ordinary Ugandan farmers irrigate their land. Overall, 5% of commercial farmers use irrigation channels. These include established plantations like Kakira sugar, Kinyara sugar growers, Kibimba rice scheme, Doho irrigation scheme and flower growers in Wakiso and Mukono districts.

According to a 2007 report by the Internal Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), sugarcane and rice are the most irrigated crops in Uganda and the rest of the crops are rain dependent. The majority of smallholders say they have failed to adapt to irrigation because the technology used is expensive. One smallholder in Hoima remarked that “I can grow maize all year round if I had the means of irrigating my crops.”
Inadequate water for livestock

In dry corridors of Uganda, animals depend on water from boreholes, water scooped from sandy riverbeds, pools that gather water during the rainy season and dams/valleys tanks which have partly silted. Lack of sufficient water supply for the animals is among the reasons why the Karimojong, among other groups, move to other regions and inevitably end in conflicts. The Karamoja region has extreme climatic variability which is also aggravated by the lack of any big permanent rivers area. Only a few perennial streams exist, with a low discharge of low, 1–3m³/sec. The region receives 700–900 mm of rainfall per year for a short period. Droughts have intensified competition for water and magnified social inequalities in such dry areas, thus impacting further on livestock production. In Uganda, drought forces more and more pastoralist groups and cultivators to survive on the same limited resources. Subsequently, each group becomes more protective of their land and water.

Interventions to address the water challenges in Uganda

Past efforts to mitigate drought have included the establishment of several pilot irrigation schemes and construction of about 1,250 valley dams/tanks and about 6,200 fish ponds in most of the dry lands. This, however, has not provided a solution to the water challenge in Uganda. The artificial water sources that were constructed currently require re-appraisal and rehabilitation. One way to increase agricultural production in Uganda is to increase the opportunities for subsistence farmers to take up irrigation using localized low cost water harvesting technologies. The main challenge to the PMA and other stakeholders envisioning agriculture development in Uganda and the entire region, is how to use the available water resources optimally, to increase productivity in crop, livestock fisheries and forestry sectors all year round.

This could be handled through building capacity to develop water resources to avail water for production on a sustainable basis. There is need for instituting an appropriate policy and regulatory framework, building the requisite research capacity for generating and demonstrating water harvesting and irrigation technologies, rehabilitating existing infrastructure including meteorological stations and soil laboratories to support early warning systems. These strategies will further help in meeting the PMA vision – “availability of water all year round for increased and sustainable commercial agricultural production without degrading the environment.”14
It is noteworthy that policy interventions in Uganda have failed to handle the issue of sharing the River Nile with Egypt for irrigation purposes. The existing agreements bar states from conducting any activity on the river without the consent of Egypt. Meanwhile, other water bodies like Lake Victoria have not been exploited for irrigation. Lake Victoria has been privatised for fishing, thus limiting crop irrigation possibilities.

**Labour issues in Uganda**

Agricultural labour must not only be abundant, but it should have sufficient skills. The majority of the Ugandan population engaged in agriculture at different levels lacks the requisite skills. This shortage of skills was partially caused by the low level of extension service development and information infrastructure. In addition, agricultural labour is not regulated. The country does not have a clear labour policy which specifies the minimum wage rate. Labour migration is another critical factor that has affected agricultural development in Uganda. Most rural youths have moved to towns in a form of rural urban migration. The increasing rural to urban migration of youths has left a large population of elderly and very young in the villages, which is not conducive to agricultural development. The cost of casual labour in rural areas has increased over time because of the decreasing supply of labour. For example, it is estimated to have increased from 1000/= in 2005 to 3000 in 2010 in Mbale district (FGD). These trends have negatively affected the development of the agriculture sector.

The increasing levels of literacy in Uganda offer an opportunity to enhance agricultural skills. If adequately mobilised, the educated youths have the potential to adopt the extension message quicker, do marketing and engage stakeholders regarding major agricultural issues like labour skills, inputs among others. However, if the continued decrease of returns from the agricultural sector is not arrested, there is a likelihood that skilled agricultural labour will relocate into other sectors such as the urban-based services sector.

Furthermore, labour in Uganda is affected by cultural complexes. For example, in the North-East where livestock rearing is dominant, there are fewer workers available to work in crop production farms. In central region, small and informal businesses remain dominant with very minimal agricultural activity. There is a big population of (lumpen) unemployed, urban youths who wander the streets of the urban centres throughout the country. The majority of these youths are engaged in small, income-generating activi-
ties such as “boda-boda” riding, brick making, petty trade and service sector work. The low participation of youth in agriculture is partly attributed to issues of access and control over productive resources (land and capital), as well as limited knowledge and skills in modern farming techniques.

THE MARKET AND AGRICULTURE

An efficiently functioning market has the capacity to transfer information, allowing the free flow of factors of production to profitable enterprises. A successful agricultural sector requires domestic markets which include a favourable environment, infrastructure, information and facilitating functions. On the other hand, there is need for international markets which include international trade rules and policies, comparative advantages and market opportunities for the developing countries. The agriculture sector in Uganda is severely affected by lack of market infrastructure. Improving market access is essential for the success of agriculture development initiatives like the PMA which has a mission to transform subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture. Farmers will only produce when their products are assured of a market outlet. “Market access” implies that the key players in the marketing chain, including farmers, processors, inputs suppliers and other service providers have sufficient information and the physical, financial and social means to purchase inputs and sell agricultural produce on favourable terms (MAAIF, 2009).

The question of the market in Uganda requires a multi-sectoral approach. Farmers need to be empowered to demand these services. It is important to note that 90% of Uganda’s road network consists of earth and gravel roads and about 25% of the rural feeder roads are impassable during the rainy season (PEAP, 2004). In addition, there is a myriad of community roads that are in a poor state but yet are very important to linking local communities with the market. The main means of transporting the majority of agricultural produce is through carrying of the load on the head. It is estimated to amount to about 70% of total marketed produce, undertaken mainly by women (PEAP 2004). The bicycle transports about 20% of marketed produce while motorised transport carries about 8%. Donkeys and ox-carts are used to transport the remaining 2% of marketed produce. To improve market access, the subsistence farmer has to shift in the short to medium term to Intermediate Means of Transport (IMTs) including bicycles, donkeys, ox-carts and motorcycles, through a comprehensive government programme to improve rural transport in the country. This will
help to link the rural areas to the market centres and also intensify mobility of factors of production.

**Access to International Markets**

The international trade rules and policies as provided for currently under World Trade Organisation (WTO), European Union (EU), COMESA, East African Co-operation (EAC), etc. provide both challenges and opportunities for market access for agricultural commodities from developing countries and Uganda in particular. As countries around the world lower their trade barriers, developing countries that depend mainly on agricultural exports will have increased access to international markets, at least in theory, provided they are able to produce competitive products with the quality standards desired in such markets.

After a number of years of implementing the PMA, Uganda still has challenges of aligning domestic policies with international trade, developing domestic markets and generally harnessing comparative advantages through proactive government policies. The WTO and G8 countries have failed on several occasions to address issues raised by developing countries. The government of Uganda needs to find ways to exploit the value-added agricultural products market. Some of the constraints that need urgent attention are discussed below.

**Lack of Economies of Scale to Supply Markets**

As in other developing countries, the nature of agricultural production in Uganda is predominantly subsistence oriented with less emphasis on commercial production. Therefore, the farmers are unable to produce the quantities in line with demand orders. This leads to the loss of trust in export markets as well as loss of market share, since competitors step up their supplies. For example, Uganda has failed to meet export demand for honey and fish despite getting market assurance from the EU in early 2006 (MAAIF 2009).

**Failure to Comply with Quality Assurance Standards**

Standards are becoming increasingly important in international trade of food and agricultural products. The Ugandan export sector has occasionally failed to meet these standards and where attempts towards compliance have been made, the associated costs have remained high and prohibitive for the majority of exporters (MAAIF 2009).
Inadequate Flow of Market and Production Information

Market and production information are required in the making of all business decisions. However, this information is not readily and sufficiently available to agents involved in production, processing and marketing entities in Uganda. When available, there is information asymmetry as one moves up the marketing chain. The end results have always been poor production, market planning and management among others, by agents and cheating of ill-informed farmers.

Poor Linkage Between Farmers and Agribusinesses

There has been a recent global growth in demand for specialised and high value agricultural products. These emerging markets are specialized niche markets with specific characteristics and requirements. They call for prior planning of production and value addition infrastructure so as to match farmers’ supply with market demands. Thus, there is a growing need to link producers with those value chain players involved in agro-processing and marketing. But in Uganda such linkages, are sometimes weakly organised if available or absent altogether.

Lack of Affordable and Accessible Export Finance

Lack of suitable export development financing schemes is still a big challenge for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) engaged in agricultural commodities. Although the Bank of Uganda has instituted several export finance schemes in the past, they remain inaccessible to the majority of the small and medium exporters, not only on technical grounds but also because of high interest rates. Other sources of export finance such as micro-finance are too costly. The conventional commercial banks are reluctant to finance agriculture and agro-based export business due to their unpredictability.

Inadequate Market Infrastructure

In Uganda, agricultural production takes place in rural areas where market infrastructure is inadequate or not available at all. For successful export marketing, the kind of infrastructure required includes: good feeder roads, communication facilities, electricity, pre-cooling and pack houses, cold and dry storage facilities, refrigerated trucks, air freight facilities, and so forth.
There are insufficient national export development competencies. With the politico-socio-economic complexities characterizing international trade, key competencies are needed in doing business in other countries. Exporters should be able to negotiate and execute export orders properly, as well as have reasonable knowledge in strategic export planning, management and marketing. At the moment, there is no established institution in Uganda that is responsible for training exporters on essential and basic export skills.

**Presence of Non-Tariff Barriers in Export Markets**

Throughout the globe, tariffs are now waning under the influence of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). But, non-tariff barriers continue to pose a big challenge to Uganda’s exports. For example, in markets where Uganda’s products enjoy preferential treatment such as US-AGOA market, entry into these markets remains difficult due to the challenges of meeting standards of quality, packaging, handling and so forth. Even at the regional level, nontariff barriers continue to affect Uganda’s exports in the form of delayed procedures, unwarranted excuses for rejection of entry of goods, deliberate misinterpretation of COMESA and other trade provisions. It is therefore essential that Uganda builds adequate capacity in terms of competent personnel for international trade negotiations, potentially through developing the farmer’s movement in the whole country.

**Inputs and Agriculture Development in Uganda**

The PMA has identified the need for improved productivity in terms of yield per unit area or per unit livestock as one of its main areas of focus. This is in response to the low levels of productivity discussed earlier. Comparative trends in different sectors show a big decline and poor performance in agriculture over a number of years (Table 6.2).

International experience shows that agricultural productivity has grown rapidly where modern varieties and fertilisers have been widely adopted. Ugandan agriculture is characterised by a low application of modern inputs resulting in low yields. Fertiliser use, for instance, is among the lowest in the world, at an average of 1 kg of nutrients per hectare compared to 4kg/ha for farmers in Mozambique, 6kg/ha in Tanzania, 16kg/ha in Malawi, 31.6kg/ha in Kenya and 51kg/ha in South Africa. The use of improved seeds stands at 6.3% of farmers while agro-chemical use is at a meagre 3.4%.
Modernisation of Smallholder Agriculture and Policy Making in Uganda

Input markets in Uganda have been difficult to develop for a number of reasons. Demand for agricultural inputs is highly variable in time and space. The demand for seed is strongest when farmers are growing hybrids, whose seed must be replaced regularly. Many farmers are growing varieties whose seeds can be saved from the harvest and replanted for several cropping seasons. The quality of seed in the market may be unknown as quality cannot be determined through visual inspection. The weak demand for fertiliser follows much the same reasoning: lack of knowledge, information asymmetries, liquidity constraints, risk and uncertainty, and high opportunity costs. Profitability tends to weigh heavily in farmers’ decisions because the cost of fertiliser often represents a large share of cash production costs. When cost factors and risk factors act in tandem, as they do in a rain fed environment like Uganda, the impact on fertiliser demand can be very significant.

The low productivity can be traced to a virtual absence of modern inputs such as lack of improved varieties of crops and livestock breeds, absence of the use of improved agronomic and post-harvest technologies and very low use of critical inputs including fertilisers, pesticides and irrigation water (Table 6.3).

Table 6.2: Trends in Industry, Services and Agricultural Sector Growth Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash crops</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>-10.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food crops</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Rhetoric to Policy Action

Table 6.3: Farmers using Agricultural Inputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Inputs</th>
<th>Improved seeds</th>
<th>Manure</th>
<th>Chemical Fertiliser</th>
<th>Pesticide, Herbicides Fungicides</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The input market in Uganda is not regulated and the quality standards of the inputs are at the mercy of the market players. Discussions during Focus Group (FG) meetings revealed that, in some cases the maize seeds sold in markets are only smeared with colours and put on market for sale. The input sector is managed by the private business community that sets the prices. “Many of our farmers today are conned by the middlemen who hike prices and also take advantage of their ignorance,” a Focus Group member argued. Another member argued that farmers are exploited at different levels, from purchase of inputs to the point where they sell their produce. Information on the market is still inadequate, which affects the efficiency of market and the entire agricultural sector. The FG discussions also revealed that, most of the farmers in Uganda depend on unimproved seeds which usually have low yield at the end of the day.

Another critical issue is the virtual absence of efficient distribution networks at reasonable levels. Within the PMA framework, the government through NARO and NARs is supposed to play a leading role in seed research, including production of foundation seed and developing a gene bank for the country.19 “There is still a big problem with the seeds in our area. Even the cassava cuttings provided by NARO have been affected by the cassava disease. Farmers have decided to go back to the old type cassava.”20

The research on seed varieties carried out so far has had a very limited trickledown effect to the farmers. There is limited integration of research with farmers’ knowledge of how to use the research. Contrary to pillar four of CAADP, the PMA framework envisages the state’s withdrawal from agricultural seed multiplication to allow the private sector to take over. This will potentially impact negatively on agricultural productivity because
many farmers cannot afford prices charged by the private dealers. There is still a considerable amount of work that needs to be done in the input sector and the Development Strategy and Investment Plan\textsuperscript{21} (DSIP) will potentially contribute to some of the required traction in this area.

**Technology System and Extension in Uganda**

The link between understanding market demands and needs at all levels (local, national and international) and technological developments require participatory approaches to research. When appropriate productivity-enhancing technological packages and innovations have been identified, farmers need to be part of the implementation and impact evaluation. It is one thing to produce new technologies but quite another to have them adopted by farmers. The importance of agricultural advisory services in rural development is widely appreciated. Finding the appropriate approach, coverage and performance of the system and ways to improve its quality and impact remain challenging. This debate has taken place within the evolving context of the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) programme, an innovative extension delivery approach that targeted the development and use of farmer institutions. Thus, the great question of the time in Uganda is how the agricultural technological research benefits the rural farmers, given the current low level of technology employed.

Evaluations of NAADS have been consistently favourable. In 2005, two independent studies (Scanagri 2005; OPM 2005) observed that NAADS had positively influenced the increasing use of improved technologies, marketed output, and wealth status of farmers involved in the programme. More recently, two more major independent evaluations described the programme as successful (NAADS Performance Evaluation – ITAD, 2008; and NAADS Impact Evaluation (IFPRI, 2009). The latter found “clear positive impacts on adoption of improved technologies, productivity and per capita incomes” (MAAIF 2009).

Despite these successes, a number of challenges have emerged. The key institutional issue is the limited integration of the programme into the local government systems. This is a big challenge since the success of NAADS is critically dependent on the commitment and involvement of other stakeholders at district, sub-county and community level. This has affected service delivery at sub-counties especially with frontline extension workers. At the operational level the critical bottlenecks are:
Inadequate number of service providers on the ground. In addition, the technical capacity of those available is limited relative to the demand for support beyond production, in order to embrace marketing and value chain development.

The limiting nature of the Ministry of finance budgetary ceilings and the inconsistent flow of funds that jeopardises crop agriculture activities at the peak season. If farmers are to utilise resources efficiently, funds released to sub-counties have to be according to two main production seasons and not according to government’s quarterly schedule.

Lack of accountability, poor transparency and corruption in procurement, especially at lower implementation levels. This has impacted negatively on the public perception of NAADS.

The need to embed the advisory services much better within the agricultural innovation system through strengthening the farmer-extension-research linkage.

Rigid procurement processes which slow down programme implementation and contribute significantly to the reluctance of suppliers to engage with NAADS which in turn leads to higher prices for technologies supplied under NAADS (MAAIF, 2010).

The hand hoe is still the predominant means for land tillage and other secondary operations in Uganda’s agriculture. It is used by virtually all smallholder farmers, i.e. 95% of the farming population. The lack of more efficient farm power at the household level has a substantial negative impact on agricultural production and household food security. Land preparation using a hoe is very laborious and time consuming. Weeding is a critical activity and a major determinant of final yields. Many households respond to the shortage of draught power by scaling down their activities, reducing the area under cultivation (by up to 50%) and growing a limited range of crops. There can be no doubt that the productivity of the labour-force is massively compromised by a lack of physical energy and poor quality tools. Inappropriate selection and use of improved mechanisation inputs (mainly tractors and heavy machinery) have led to heavy financial losses and lower agricultural production as well as environmental degradation in many parts of Uganda.
There still remains a critical gap in the efficient delivery of extension services to smallholders in many parts of the country. The history of extension services in Uganda follows distinct stages. The first stage is the Early Colonial Period (1898-1907), during which importation of cash crop planting materials namely coffee, cotton, rubber, and tobacco took place (NAADS, 2004). There was also establishment of research stations to carry out agriculture and forestry research in Uganda. The second stage was the Extension Service through Chiefs (1920-1956). Chiefs carried out extension work, assisted by a few expatriate field officers and African instructors. The emphasis was on distributing planting materials of major cash crops and simple messages on how to grow those crops. This was coupled with enforcing by-laws requiring households to grow certain crops in accordance with agricultural practices such as soil conservation and storage of famine food reserves. The chiefs’ status and influence made farmers use good husbandry practices, proper land use and ensured household food security. The extension approach was coercion using sanctions and punishments rather than education.

The third phase was from 1956 until 1963 and it was associated with Extension through the more successful farmers (commonly referred to as the progressive farmers). The expectation was that improved performance of progressive farmers would have a demonstration and multiplier effect for increased agricultural production and productivity (NAADS, 2004). The approach was effective in situations where the number of trained extension staff was limited. Some farmers were successful in influencing their peers and served as the catalysts of improved farming. However, the criteria used for selection of progressive farmers were questionable and produced mixed results. Many of the selected farmers abused the special support given to them in form of credit and subsidized inputs. Some progressive farmers were not cooperative and willing to serve as contact farmers for educating others. Other farmers looked at progressive farmers as a privileged. The same kind of system is currently being re-implemented with the focus on six progressive households and it is suffering from the same challenges as the first similar arrangement.

During the period from 1964 until 1972, Uganda’s extension approach changed to “helping farmers to help themselves”. This educational process was facilitated by field days which included the use of tours to farmers who were doing well. However, during the same period extension drifted into focusing on selling inputs to farmers at the neglect and detriment of deliv-
ery of services. This state of affairs together with the lack of an agricultural extension policy led to the disorganisation, dormancy of extension services and low productivity experienced during the years of political turmoil from 1970 to 1980.

The period 1980 to 1991 was regarded as the ‘Recovery Period’. In the early part of this period there was marked emphasis on rehabilitation of the infrastructure and restoration of basic services (NAADS, 2004). Until 1991, there were parallel extension services in different ministries and non-government organisations. However, there was little improvement in extension services due to duplication, conflict and confusion. Later, a new policy on agricultural extension services, supported by the World Bank, was put in place in 1990. The policy was accompanied by the Merger of Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Animal Industry and Fisheries now called Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF). This approach emphasised use of dialogue to promote participation. In this way farmers’ indigenous knowledge was generated through use of participatory approaches with research/extension facilitation.

From 1992 to 1997, the government introduced Agricultural Extension Education/Reforms. During this period many international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) came into play and were mostly backed by external funding. NGOs used different methods and approaches for extension delivery. This is also the period when neoliberal reforms such as decentralisation, liberalisation, privatisation, restructuring and retrenchment were implemented. Retrenchment led to reduction of staff in the field and districts lacked capacity to steer the extension role. As a result, staff lost morale and farmers access to extension services reduced considerably. Coupled with this, negative farmers’ perception of extension staff hindered adoption of new technologies (Kibwika and Semana, 1998). It was during this period that the formulation of the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) was launched. In the process, the World Bank withheld further support to extension and research in favour of PMA.

This was also followed by the period 1998 to 2002 which is referred to as ‘Crossroad and Possible Future Solutions Period’. During this period, the funding and delivery of services was neither efficient nor sustainable. Generally, the extension system was heavily centralised and characterised by too much bureaucracy. A number of options and approaches were considered in the reform of extension service systems in Uganda. One option was for government to continue injecting resources into the ministry-based
extension system. This however, was ruled out due to other policy reforms that had been carried out in the agricultural sector. Government had committed itself to public sector reform and downsizing of the extension system in the country.

The new policies of the day emphasised liberalisation, decentralisation, privatisation and private-sector-led economic development. However, the ministry-based approach was incompatible with the new policies. During this period, there was gradual withdrawal of international NGOs from direct service delivery to working through government, and Community Based Organisations (CBOs). Donors increased their support to Government to ensure that the reform policies including PMA worked as per the specified vision and objectives. As a way forward, it was suggested that a semi-autonomous body, with strong farmer involvement, be formed to run extension service delivery, in line with the government policies of decentralisation, liberalisation, privatisation and to spur increased participation of farmers in decision-making.

Agricultural extension services in Uganda gained strength with the establishment of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in 1997. The PEAP provided for agriculture development which resulted in the establishment of the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA). The ultimate goal of the PMA was to address the factors that undermine agricultural productivity including limited access to technical advice (Tizikara, et al 2008). The need for reforms in the national extension systems led to the establishment of National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) as the main driving element behind the implementation of the PMA. The NAADS framework provides for the shift from public to private extension service provision and giving smallholder farmers access to relevant services by outsourcing (Tizikara et al 2008: 83). The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) was therefore created to empower farmers, especially women, to demand and control agricultural advisory services in the country. The NAADS was put in place by an Act of Parliament in May 2001 (NAADS 2004). Private service providers including the NGOs and registered individual extension workers are contracted to provide agricultural extension services. It requires the formation of farmers’ organisations to register at various levels. They mobilise farmers to form farmers groups that are then facilitated to farmer’s organisations at parish, sub-county or district level. Their organisations are registered with the district under the NGO statute. By the end of 2006, the NAADS outsourcing program was operating in 532 sub-counties, located in

165
64 districts. By 2005, over 12,000 Farmers groups (FGs) in 280 sub-counties had been registered through the program, while 73% of the FGs reported receiving outsourced agricultural advisory services (Byekwaso, et al 2004). By 2005, up to 400,000 households representing 30% of the total households in Uganda are estimated to have benefited from the NAADS programmes (NAADS 2005d, Tizikara, et al 2008).

However, the impact of NAADS is still very insignificant. The programme is associated with allegations of corruption and misuse of funds and this has negatively affected the possibility of establishing sustainable demonstration farms. Farmers in most parts of the country complain of poor seeds, usually not given on time and also lack of skills to manage the inputs given. Secondly, the few extension professionals in the system are poorly motivated, unskilled and lack appropriate competencies in terms of participatory skills, knowledge, facilitator mindsets and behaviour required for working with farmers in a demand driven manner (Lindley 2000).

Furthermore, there is still need to strengthen partnerships between NAADS and other significant players in the agro-industry. These players can be a source of the needed technologies or focal points for marketing farmers’ outputs. However, this study discovered that partners look at NAADS as a source of funding and farmers still fear that these partners are not playing fairly. The local government leadership in some areas is not comfortable with these partnerships (NAADS, 2004).

Resource mobilisation within the Farmer Groups established by the NAADS is still affected by poverty that is in almost every household. It is generally believed that farmers are so poor, they can do little for themselves. Though farmers are capable of pooling some resources together to build up group capital for development, strategies are still insufficient to promote intra-group resource mobilisation to reduce capital scarcity within the farmers’ groups. In the 2009/2010 budget, the Minister of Finance argued that in the financial year, emphasis will be placed on consolidation of the agricultural extension service through the restructured NAADS, integrating it with the provision of inputs to farmers. The Government of Uganda planned to provide integrated support to six farmers per parish, with an estimated total of 30,000 farmers annually. These farms are intended to serve as demonstration sites to others and support them to graduate into commercial farmers (MFPED, 2009; 14). However this plan has been hampered by the limited budgetary allocation to agriculture.
Gender Relations and Agriculture

In Uganda, women’s main occupation is agriculture. According to the Uganda 2002 Population Census, the agricultural sector employed a higher proportion of women (83%) than men (71%). At the same time, a substantial amount of women’s time is taken up in providing care activities. The key constraints to women’s participation in commercial agriculture in Uganda are: their uncertain relations to land and the limited returns available to them as they lack the incentive to undertake long term investment. The Land Act 1998 in S.40 requires that before any transaction can be carried out on land on which a family resides or from which it derives sustenance, the spouse, dependent children of majority age and the Land Committee (in case of children under the age of majority) should be consulted. In accordance with constitutional provisions, the Land Act also mandates that any customary practices which deny women, children or any other disadvantaged groups use of any land shall be null and void. The Land Committees have the duty of ensuring that the rights of vulnerable groups are protected (Rugadya M, 1999; 7). However, all these laws remain as ‘Acts’ in books among the rural, less educated or uneducated women farmers. Patriarchal practices continue to impact decisions on land compared to formal procedures. Generally, women prefer petty trading to agriculture because of their marginalisation regarding land and because of limited benefit from the proceeds of their labour invested in agriculture.

Education for women is another intervention to improve their participation and benefit in the agricultural sector. The GoU established the Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development with the aim of engendering the development programmes. All the development plans of the agriculture sector include gender as a key crosscutting issue.

Role of Non-State Actors in Influencing Agricultural Policy

Uganda, like many other African countries, lacks a robust and competent civil society. It is also important to note that civil society based advocacy for improved agricultural policies is a fairly recent phenomenon. A national smallholders’ union; the Uganda National Farmers Federation exists. However its impact on policy is very limited and it does not currently have sufficient mobilisation mechanisms to recruit members. It still lacks the required resources to mobilise for a massive farmer movement.
in the mould, of for example, NASFAM in Malawi (see chapter four of this volume). The non-state policy advocacy space is currently dominated by international NGOs such as FAO, DANIDA, JICA, USAID and the WFP among others, and donors in general play a significant role in policy making. The role of donors and international organisations in agricultural policy and broader rural development cannot be underestimated. The Ugandan budget is still 35% donor dependent.28 The actual voice of the smallholder and participation has not been given priority. This has at times resulted in strategies that do not address the farmers needs.

The operation of most NGOs and CBOs in Uganda is not fully integrated to make direct demands for policy reforms. However, their existence provides an opportunity for mobilisation in this arena of policy advocacy. Currently their operations have been mostly “politically linked statements” made by the leaderships of these formations. The government agricultural development in line with NAADS programme depends on local government structures which, as already discussed above, do not have the adequate capacity for policy implementation29 Such a situation frustrates agricultural transformation in Uganda.

Most local organisations do not have sufficient financial and human resources to address the agricultural policy issues. Local organisations do not have stable funding; instead they depend on small grants from international NGOs and private philanthropic foundations that are mostly based in the West. The farmers groups that work with the NAADS work to implement extension services tend to breakdown often. They are very limited in their operation. They have been baptized as “NAADS Groups.”30 Otherwise, the groups can be a very important role for mobilising the farmers into stronger advocacy and union groups.

Agriculture Policy Interventions in Uganda

Uganda has been without a comprehensive agricultural policy for a long time. The PMA, NAADS and the current Agriculture Development Strategy and Investment Plan (ADSIP) for 2010 to 2015 are some of the most recent attempts at comprehensive agriculture and rural development policy making. In 2007, it was estimated that nearly 40,000 farmers groups and over 700,000 farming households were benefiting from the NAADS interventions (NAADS 2007). The ADSIP has been designed in line with the CAADP agenda framework. It is estimated that the successful imple-
Modernisation of this strategy will improve the rate of agricultural growth to 6% annually by 2015 (MAAIF, 2009).

The recent launch of the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) provides an opportunity for the integration of technology into agricultural practices. However, there is an urgent need for the GoU to formulate an agricultural research policy (or at least specify goals and targets in this area). This would help to guide utilisation and development of the agricultural technology and research. The new land policy (2010) is another vital step for Uganda in addressing the land question. The long period of land crises has been blamed for stagnation in addressing agricultural problems related to the land tenure problems.31

**Areas in Need of Strengthening**

**Institution Building**

There is need to empower the end users to ensure meaningful participation in setting priorities and work programmes for research extension and training in order to ensure their relevance. Farmer empowerment in Uganda requires targeting all smallholder groups, associations and organisations. This will potentially enable farmers to express their demands and provide access to information as well as create access to decentralised and community-based extension centres, research and advisory services among others.

Institution building through sensitisation and mobilising smallholder farmers associations and national producer’s organisations to provide more efficient services should be at the core of these initiatives. Farmer’s organisations and groups need to be assisted to participate in policy making, priority setting and administration of advisory service systems. Such a process of institutional building and strengthening the farmers’ association and organisations should lead to:

- Improved mobilisation and sensitisation and the reviving of the cooperative societies and marketing boards that earlier used to help farmers in Uganda in agricultural produce marketing.
- A more coordinated and inclusive framework for the engagement of farmers to improve the design and implementation of policies
- Improved governance processes within participating organisations and also to ensure that elite capture is avoided.
Increased Mobilisation

Farmers need to be mobilised to form large groups and strengthen existent organised farmer groups. This will enable them to engage government service providers and demand accountability in areas such as policy formulation, implementation and monitoring of infrastructure development projects. There is an urgent need among farmers to identify ways in which the inhibitive agro-taxation regimes (inputs and services) can be removed or reformed.

Advocacy and Capacity Development

The farmers need to be equipped through awareness raising workshops on policy provisions and their own entitlement. Farmers should be at the centre of agricultural innovation in agriculture. They need to be active players in improving agricultural productivity, not only in terms of increasing their yields, but also in decision making and how programmes and policies are shaped. They need to be empowered to be active players in policy making, research, extension education and partners of development agencies in joint accountability.

Strengthening Farmer Information and Communication

The information channels ‘market failures’ are caused by low levels of market activity, high transport, communication and transaction costs, weak contractual enforcement institutions, and supply chain failures (FAO, 2008). Market thresholds can be addressed by supporting market actors (e.g. with market information systems). There is limited utilisation of research due to communication deficiencies, low advocacy space and limited scientific and innovation packaged research to steer rural service delivery and engender development. Lack of EWS (early warning systems) to arrest and contain crop and animal epidemics, inhibitive land tenure systems (customary fragmentations, population pressure) and land conflicts impact negatively on the trends of agricultural development.

Conclusion

Smallholder-led policy advocacy is critical to the realisation of the intended goals of CAADP. Although there is renewed interest in agriculture due to the CAADP intervention, there are a number of issues that are
yet to be resolved. The recently signed CAADP compact does not clarify how it will address the unfavourable international agreements relating to agriculture products and marketing which usually leave farmers from the developing countries at a disadvantage in the global agricultural market. Furthermore, the envisaged growth of the agriculture sector should be used to create employment opportunities for the vast untapped labour force currently migrating into urban areas, with no hope of securing formal employment.

A robust agricultural movement will strengthen Ugandan farmers’ capacity to build human and institutional capacities to articulate and defend the smallholder sector agriculture. The other important issue relates to technology and extension services for sound agriculture evolution. The concerted farmers’ efforts to demand and influence policy will serve as an entry point towards broadening citizen participation in development policies and programmes. The Ugandan government and the people need to appreciate the potential benefits of engaging within organised and equipped civil society groups. The agricultural sector will therefore be developed with a strong foundation of empowered farmers and development nationalism within the leadership structures coupled with strong institutions.

Notes

1. Refer to table 2 for the trends in Uganda’s Agricultural performance.
2. Outsourcing of extension services in Uganda has however been affected by corruption, insufficient institutional monitoring and limited and inexperienced staff in financial management leading to the misuse of the NAADS funds.
4. The case of oil discovery in the Western and Northern parts of the country has intensified national concerns on land purchase.
5. MLHUD is the Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development
8. The new land law has been contested a lot as not offering solutions to the land problems in Uganda. It is associated with blames of government trying to grab land from Buganda.

10. Whereas the War in the North has now reduced fears among the people, Karamoja area remains insecure because of the constant Karimojong raids on the neighboring districts of Achill and Teso region.

11. It has 42,942 km² of surface water, which is 15% of the total geographical area, and much of the country receives over 750 mm of rainfall annually, although it is unevenly distributed.

12. Key informant interview the staff in the, ministry of Agriculture Crop production Department.

13. Key informant interviewed during the farmer organisation data collection exercise.

14. The PMA final draft Uganda

15. An approach aligning various government Ministries and departments working in/ or that are linked to the agricultural sector such as the ministry of works, Ministry of information, Ministry of ICT, Trade and industry and investment among other sectors.

16. The PMA – Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture

17. Although in those parts of Asia and Latin America where promoting seed and fertiliser use led to dynamic commercial input markets, there was also complementary investment in irrigation, rural roads, marketing infrastructure, financial services, and other factors that made using seed and fertiliser profitable.

18. MAAIF, Crop Production Department (2000)

19. The PMA strategy final draft op cit

20. Key informant interview with district officer in Soroti District Eastern Uganda

21. MAAIF Development Strategy and Investment Plan (2010/11 – 2014/15) is the Uganda National Agriculture Policy finalized in 2009. this plan was designed considering the CAADP pillars and it addresses most of the critical issues affecting the agricultural sector


23. The six member extension service focus in Uganda is highly politicized to the extent of considering party supported by the member household benefiting from the programme. The future of the arrangement is not predictable.

24. At the time, evaluation of the agricultural extension projects showed that the unified agricultural extension was unfocused, reached only 15% of the farmers.
and its messages and approaches were neither effective nor provided value for money.

25. At the same time the National Agricultural Research System (NARS), mainly represented by National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) was also reformed.

26. First networking symposium on innovations in agricultural advisory services in sub-Saharan Africa Proceedings Kampala, Uganda, 11th -14th October 2004

27. MOFPED—Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development


29. During the development of this paper, a scenario was encountered where two district agricultural offices were visited for information on farmers organisations operating in the areas and no record existed. This is also coupled by less function offices, limited attendance in offices and supervision of activities.

30. Being called NAADS means that farmers do not feel the ownership and transformative role the groups could play.


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Smallholder Agriculture And Advocacy Groups In Tanzania

Natasha I. Shivji

Introduction

Stepping out of the hope of freedom and into the arms of the free market, many sub-Saharan African countries, including Tanzania, took on the liberalisation and privatisation packages of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the early 1980s. Tanzania overhauled the post-independence policies of *Ujamaa* and replaced them with policies that were free-market friendly, so to speak. This chapter brings together the major legal, political and economic policies, processes and structures that have fuelled Tanzania’s short walk to the global market. The paper is devoted to an analysis of the efficacy of the policies in terms of delivering equitable socio-economic development. Furthermore, the paper examines the role of smallholder agriculture advocacy groups in responding to policy measures that attempt to address agricultural development.

Tanzania relies heavily on agriculture both to support its populace and as a backbone to the country’s economy. There are approximately 4,000,000 peasant *families* in the country in a population of 40,700,000 people (Mkulo 2009: 23). Approximately 84% of the population relies on agriculture for
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employment according to the 1993 Agriculture Sector review and recent figures remain at 80% (Msabichaka 1994: 91). Smallholder peasants with access to an average of 2-5 Ha per household dominate the sector. There are only 1,254 large-scale farms in the country (National Bureau of Statistics 2006: p. 117). Most of the food crops: rice, banana, maize, cassava, beans, millet, sorghum and sweet potatoes are grown by small-scale farmers, while some cash crops such as sugar, tobacco, tea, sisal, wheat, barley are grown in large-scale farms. More recently, there is a trend on the part of large-scale plantations to encourage small-scale outgrowers, especially in sugarcane production (Maghimbi et al. 2010: 54). Recent economic trends show that the agriculture sector has been shrinking in terms of its contribution to the GDP and both the rate of growth and productivity in this sector has either been declining or stagnant.

Availability of and accessibility to land are central to sustainable agriculture. Although there is an obvious abundance of land, the lack of necessary farm implements to clear the land has meant an increase in competition for land even for large-scale agriculture. Only 15% of 883,989 sq km of total land area is cultivated (Maghimbi et al. 2010: 40). Land that is not cultivated is delineated as “unused” land. However, there is another caveat to this “unused” land as it is vital for pastoralists who exploit natural biomass such as grass (FoodFirst.com).

The Government of Tanzania (GoT) has undertaken many rural development strategies, both at the national and at the regional level, that reflect the goals of CAADP. It is crucial to understand the context in which these strategies are developed in order to understand the work and impact of advocacy groups. In order to protect the agriculture sector of Tanzania and those who depend on it, an examination of the advocacy groups working to support smallholder agriculture is needed. This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section will provide the contextualisation of the problem by placing smallholder agriculture in the wider framework of Tanzanian political economy and the issues affecting smallholder agriculture. The economic framework will be discussed through the lens of budget analysis. The political context will be set by looking specifically at the history of policies related to land and agricultural activities. In this context, the issues facing smallholder agriculture will be discussed by looking at the major pillars of agriculture: land, labor, inputs, markets and extension services.

Section two will discuss some of the major government Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) that have been undertaken to deal with the problems facing
the agriculture sector. Following a discussion of the government programs, the policy implications will be analysed by taking into account how successful the government programs have been in relation to the political and economic framework in Tanzania. Section three will discuss the role of advocacy groups with some examples from Tanzania. The material from this section relies heavily on the interviews conducted with members of the organisations. The results extracted in this section are directly connected to the background given.

**THE CONTEXT**

**State of Agriculture in Tanzania**

Until recently, agriculture was the major sector of the Tanzanian economy. However, the contribution of the agricultural sector to the GDP has been steadily decreasing. In 2004, the sector contributed 46.3% to GDP; in 2005 it decreased slightly to 45.6%. By 2007 there was a sharp decline to 25.8% and in 2008 it was 25.7% (Economic Survey 2006: 124; Economic Survey 2009: 118). This decrease could be attributed to the decreasing production of crops for various reasons, which will be discussed in depth in the next section. According to sectoral growth, agriculture has grown at an average of 4.4% between 2000 and 2008. This trend did not meet the government target of sustained agricultural growth of 10% by 2010 (PHDR 2009: 7).

The mining sector, on the other hand, is growing at an annual average growth of 15% from 2000 to 2007. It is important to note that this growth in mining does not directly benefit the majority of the Tanzanian population that relies on agriculture for employment. Currently, 37.6% of rural households are below the poverty datum line (Household Budget Survey of 2007: 11). According to the Poverty and Human Development Report 2009, the mining sector has not been able to create new employment opportunities because the linkages between the mining sector and the local supply chains are weak (ibid: 7). Hence, while the contribution of the agricultural sector to the economy decreases and the mining sector increases, the majority (80%) of rural Tanzanians, remain unemployed and in poverty.

The government has intervened by enacting several pieces of legislation to cope with the crisis of the peasants. Most of these policies, though, as will be discussed in detail in the next section, have included seeking assistance from private investors, in particular Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). In the last three years, the number of private investors in agricultural activities...
has increased steadily from 77 in 2001 to 264 in 2007 (Economic Survey 2009: 120). While agriculture is being increasingly privatised to the large-scale investor, the smallholder sectors do not have sufficient mechanisms in place to protect them against the investors who are mostly foreign and working in alliance with state-based elites. Increasingly, most of the smallholders are unable to survive exclusively on agriculture, pushing them to seek other sources of income such as beer brewing, craft, hawking or casual labour. In 2000/2001 rural households, on average, derived 60% of their income from agricultural sources. By 2007, this declined to 50%. Observers give this a positive twist by arguing that this signifies the beginning of the end of peasantry. In reality, there is nothing of the sort. In fact, it is a survival strategy to escape poverty and not a very successful one either, because other non-farm employment opportunities are also very limited (PHDR 2009: 24).

**Issues Affecting Smallholder Agriculture**

This section discusses the issues that affect the smallholder peasants. Some of these issues, especially those dealing with land tenure and peasant organisation, have been discussed in relation to the government policies on land, environment and peasant cooperatives.

**Land Policies**

In order to correctly understand the government policies related to land, a brief look into the colonial history is essential. Tanganyika was a German colony from 1895 to World War One when it lost its territories to other imperial powers. In 1895, the Germans issued an imperial decree, which stated that all lands whether occupied or not were treated as crown land under the Empire. The German colonialists did not recognise indigenous ownership of land while settlers were given ownership of land with documented titles under the metropolitan systems of land ownership based on Individualization, Titling and Registration (ITR). Ownership was given under freehold titles, which meant that the owner could hold land in perpetuity. Indigenous lands were treated as un-owned land, which by virtue of the decree were owned by the Crown since the Germans did not see the indigenous people as having a concept of ownership (United Republic of Tanzania [URT] 1994: 9).
After the defeat of the Germans in World War One, Tanganyika was placed under the British as a trust territory. Under the League of Nations mandate the interests of the natives were supposed to be paramount. The British Land Tenure Ordinance No. 3 of 1923, which was later amended in 1928, stipulated that all lands were public lands under the control of the governor and no land could be used or disposed of without his consent. When the state wanted to give land to immigrants or colonialists, it was given under the right of occupancy which was a right to occupy and use land for up to 99 years. This was a granted right of occupancy governed by statutory laws. Land could be granted for up to 99 years and registered under the land registry. However, the statutory definition of right of occupancy included the rights of the native or native community to use and occupy land. This came to be termed deemed rights of occupancy by the courts, where the native could occupy land with the implied consent of the governor. Deemed rights of occupancy were governed by customary laws hence, in theory, land could be owned in perpetuity through the customary laws of inheritance. There was no titling of customary lands. Importantly, customary rights over land were seen to be inferior to statutory claims. This led to insecurity of land tenure of customary rights (ibid: 9-12).

Between 1953 and 1955, the East African Royal Commission (EARC) attempted to formalize the lands held under customary law through the “formalisation program”. They called for Individualisation, Titling and Registration (ITR) of all land. According to the government paper No. 4 of 1958, customary tenure was considered extra-legal. Nonetheless, this proposal for formalisation did not pass as Julius K. Nyerere intervened stating the pitfalls of formalising all land in his article “Mali yaTaifa” (National Property). In it Nyerere stated that:

All human beings, be they children brought up in poor or rich families, or belonging to sinners or saints, or even those whose parents are either slaves or free men, were born to find land in existence. They can neither add to it nor reduce its extent. It is God’s gift, given to all His creation without any discrimination (Nyerere 1974: 53).

The model of right of occupancy continued after independence. It was only in 1990s that any serious attempt was made at revising the land laws. In 1991 a Presidential Land Inquiry Commission was created which discussed the state of land tenure in Tanzania and made recommendations for a new land policy in the country. The Commission recommended that the ultimate
control of village land should be under village assemblies, while national lands should be under an independent land commission answerable to the national assembly. This measure would create a horizontal form of governance, which would avoid putting all powers in the president. The Commission also recommended that smallholder producers should have security of tenure which would protect their lands from alienation by outsiders, including the government itself. This measure would create a horizontal form of governance, which would avoid putting all powers in the president. The Commission also recommended that smallholder producers should have security of tenure which would protect their lands from alienation by outsiders, including the government itself.4 Thirdly, there should be no transfer of land within villages without the consent of the village assembly.5 This would ensure that communal ownership of land was respected. Essentially, the Commission tried to maintain a democratic approach in matters of land by diluting the top-down control of land. As Shivji, the chair of the Commission pointed out, the approach suggested by the Commission was to “modernise tradition in a democratic direction rather than impose modernisation from above by statutory compulsion” (Shivji 1997).

The commission also discussed the issue of gender inequality as one of the problems facing the system of land tenure. Since 80% of the rural community is patrilineal, women had access to land and property by virtue of their relationship to men. They had secondary rights, which are uncertain in duration, not well-defined and subject to change (Mutembei & Tumushabe 2008: 5). The Land Commission addressed this issue by suggesting that there should be an entrenched quorum of women in the village assemblies, so that women are integrated into the decision making process. Both the name of the woman and the man should appear on the village certificate of land. This would prevent the man from making decisions on the land without the consent of the woman. Finally, there should be no transfer of land within the villages without the consent of the village assembly, and if transfer of land does occur then measures should be put into place to ensure that women and children are not left destitute. The Commission sought to address the question of gender in the larger picture of land tenure reform, by placing authority in the village assembly rather than the president (URT 1994: 249-60).

Following the Land Commission’s report, the National Land Policy in 1995 addressed the issue of the discrimination of women in access to land and assets and declared land to be a constitutional right. It focused on four main areas; land tenure and administration, surveying and mapping, urban and rural land use and planning and land use management. The Land Act of 1999 and the Village Land Act of 1999 followed the Land Policy. The Land Act No. 4 1999 and the Village Land Act No. 5 1999 maintained a dual system of land tenure under statutory law and customary law. Customary
rights over land and statutory rights were put on the same footing. These changes implied that both deemed right of occupancy and granted rights of occupancy were secure under the law. Under this Act, land was divided into three main categories: village land, reserve land and general land. Moreover, two new hierarchies, Land Division of High Court and District Land and Housing Tribunals were introduced in the judicial system of land related dispute settlement which already included Court of Appeal, Ward Tribunals and Village Land Councils.

The Village Land Act of 1999 nullified the certificate of right of occupancy to the village councils and instead introduced the certificate of village land to communities. This meant that the local government had limited powers. However, the ultimate control over village land still lay in the hands of the President. The Act stated that all lands in Mainland Tanzania “shall continue to be public land and remain vested in the President as trustee for and on behalf of all citizens of Tanzania” (quoted from Maghimbi et al. 2010: 33). Furthermore, it stated that informal land titles were to be formalised and new certificates called HatiyaArdhiya Mila (certificates of customary land) would be issued for customary lands. The formalisation of land titles meant that land could be transferred or sold without the permission of the village assembly or any other local government body. However, the state still held the authority to repossess customary lands. Theoretically, the formalisation of land titles would mean that if the farmer wanted to get loans from the bank he/she could use the land as collateral (Chachage 2006).6

Many organisations saw this Act to be progressive since it added a clause to emphasise the rights of women over land (Interview with Marjorie Mbilinyi, 4 May 2010). Women are generally poorer than men in the villages. However, it cannot be construed that because of this they do not have access to the land. Certainly, women have access to land as they are the ones who take care of it the most. The problem is that they did not have direct ownership over the land. The Village Land Act of 1999 dealt with this problem by adding a gender clause which stated that family land is to be protected under co-occupancy. According to the Act, co-occupancy means the occupation of land by two or more undivided shares. Therefore, this would allow women to hold land simultaneously with their spouses. While this was an important provision, it did not add anything new to the reality of the situation. There is already an anti-discrimination clause available in the constitution. Furthermore, even if the woman is given rights to ownership, if she remains poor then she will also become a victim of all the
issues that face smallholder peasants, including having to sell her land in order to survive. Once the Act was implemented in 2001 it became clear that the main significance of the Act was not to protect women’s rights over land, but rather to allow for the transferability of land.

In 2004, the Land Act was amended. The Land Amendments Act of 2004 allowed for two main provisions which were not available in the Land Acts of 1999; (i) the sale of bare land and (ii) making it easier to foreclose mortgaged land. Whereas in the Act of 1999 sale of bare land was not permissible, the amendment of 2004 made it possible. Also, in the Act of 1999 the burden of exercising remedies against mortgage in the case of a default lay with the lender. However, the Act of 2004 made it easier for lenders to exercise remedies in the case of default by foreclosing land. Prior to the amendments of 2004, land was regarded as being for use and the security of land depended on its use (usufruct). Rights of occupancy were granted on condition that the land must be developed. Failure to do so would result in land being revoked by the state. Sale of bare land was therefore made virtually impossible since if land were bare then the state would not grant permission to sell it. However, this only applied to statutory lands since the sale of customary lands were regulated by families and communities. The amendment of 2004 changes this and explicitly allows for the sale of bare land by a citizen or non-citizen to a citizen of Tanzania (Shivji 2003: 1-3).

In reality, this meant the commercialisation of land, whereby the market value of land supersedes the agronomic value of land (Riedinger et al. 2001). In conditions of poverty the peasant would be inclined to sell his/her land for immediate gain rather than cultivate it. The titling of customary land therefore would enable a peasant to sell his/her bare land under the customary title and the buyer could choose to convert the customary title into a statutory one making the land marketable. The seemingly progressive gender clause of the 1999 Land Act was overwritten since in practice it meant that any ordinary peasant, especially women who are poorer than men in rural areas, could no longer compete for land in the market. It is important therefore to look at the issue of gender in the context of the issues facing smallholder agriculture. In order to ensure the security of women over land, measures have to be put in place to protect the land through the community. Ownership over land through titling does not guarantee security of tenure; rather it means that land can be more easily sold. Alongside the liberalisation of the Tanzanian economy, these Land Acts have left the smallholder peasant more vulnerable to market forces without state protection.


ENVIRONMENT POLICIES IN RELATION TO SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE AND LAND

The most important environment policy adopted was the National Environment Policy 1997 which aimed at addressing wider issues of social well-being. The policy linked the issues of poverty and environment for sustainable development. It argues that a healthy economy needs a healthy environment. The relationship that the policy draws between the issue of land tenure and the environment is critical to this discussion. It states:

Resources that belong to everyone easily become the care of none. The ownership of land and land resources, access to, and the right to use them are of fundamental importance, not only for a more balanced and equitable development, but also to the level of care accorded to the environment. It is only when people can satisfy their needs, have control of their resource base, and have secure tenure to land that the longer-term objectives of environmental protection can be satisfied (Kamata 2008: 20).

It demonstrates government’s attitude towards customary tenure and the fact that its introduction coincided with the Land Policy of 1995 followed by the Land Acts of 1999, suggesting that it had a bearing on the preferred land tenure system. The policy defines the rural poor as the major degraders of the environment. It identifies the problems of the environment as: land degradation, lack of accessible good quality water, environmental pollution, loss of wildlife and biodiversity and deterioration of aquatic systems and deforestation. Of importance to this paper is the concern with land degradation in the policy.

The policy resulted in the establishment of the Environmental Management Act, No. 20 of 2004. This Act clearly stipulates the need to protect flora, fauna, and biodiversity by creating reserves which would be protected by license and permits (ibid: 34-37). The Forests Act 2002, the National Parks Act 2002 and the Wildlife Conservation Act 2002 are specifically aimed at the creation and protection of reserves. The Environmental Management Act does not recognize communal methods of protecting the environment, but rather sees communities, especially those living near forest reserves, as being hazardous to the environment. This conflict between the communities and the environment is resolved by detaching the reserves from communally owned lands. An example cited by the survey

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done by the Land Rights and Resource Institute (LARRI or HAKIAR-DHI, in Kiswahili) in 2007 is the conflict in the Amani Natural reserve between the conservationists and the surrounding communities. The conservationists complained that people were simply stubborn and would start fires that were destructive to the ecology of the reserve. While the community members argued that there was discriminatory access to the same conserved resources. The survey brought to the surface the inability of the conservationists to understand the frustration of surrounding communities as a result of the land alienated from the community (ibid: 75). This case is typical of the conflict between conservationists and environmentalists on the one hand, and peasant communities on the other. For instance, the same survey cited above stated that 63% of the people around various reserves stated that the rules governing the environment were not beneficial to them (ibid: 79).

Policy on Peasant and Agriculture Cooperatives

Cooperatives act to protect the interests of the peasants in the market. As defined in the Cooperative Development Policy of 2002, a Cooperative Society is

an association of persons who have voluntarily joined together for the purpose of achieving a common need through the formation of a democratically controlled organisation and to make equitable contributions to the capital required for the formation of such an organisation, and who accept the risks and the benefits of the undertaking in which they actively participate” (Cooperative Development Policy[CDP] 2003: vii).

Cooperatives were aimed at protecting the peasant from the exploitation of the middleman who linked the producer to the buyer in the markets. Cooperatives thus acted as buffers to help regulate prices and protect the peasant from the forces of free market competition. Cooperatives helped to channel loans from credit agencies to individuals by acting as guarantors of the loans. As a result, the Cooperative Bank of Tanganyika was established in 1962. It changed its name to the Cooperative Bank of Tanzania in 1964 (Maghimbi et al. 2010: 49). Cooperatives bought produce from the peasant and sold it to the market. They also helped the producers to gain access to farming inputs such as fertilisers and seeds by buying inputs and selling them to the peasant on credit. It is important to note that credit was
not based on collateral of land; rather the collateral was the crop, a floating charge. Once the crop was sold the peasant could pay back the credit.

The impact of cooperatives has diminished at various stages in the history of Tanzania. The first cooperative legislation in the country was passed in 1932: Cooperatives Ordinance. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 recognised cooperatives as instruments for implementing socialism and self-reliance in the newly independent Tanzania. In 1976, in an attempt to impose stronger state control, cooperatives were banned and instead state crop authorities were created to buy the crops of the farmers. The bureaucracy involved in this system soon proved to be inefficient. Since there was an increase in the overhead expenses, the peasant got much less for his/her crop than what was obtained on the world market. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the government reversed its decision on the banning of cooperatives and allowed them to be reformed. This did not last long since the introduction of trade liberalisation and the free market in the late 1980s left the cooperatives non-functional while the state crop authorities were dismantled. The Cooperatives Societies Act of 1991 was followed by the Cooperative Development Act of 1997. Despite these legislations, cooperatives have struggled to operate within a liberalised economy (CDP 2003: 1-2). Cooperatives have been unable to withstand the competition from the private traders and their decline has left a gap in input supply, crop marketing and processing that the private sector cannot fulfill.

In light of this, the Cooperative Development Policy of 2002 sought to, amongst other objectives, “protect cooperative business operations against unfair competition” and “recognize and support small producer group initiatives with the view of transforming them into future economically strong cooperatives” (CDP 2003: 7). Despite these objectives, it has been difficult for cooperatives to gain funding. For instance, after the liberalisation of financial institutions government financing for cooperatives to facilitate collection and sale of members’ crops has been stopped. Commercial banks have been reluctant to give loans to cooperatives. This has left a gap which the private middle traders have tried to fill. The private traders have simply increased the cost of marketing of produce, ultimately reducing the financial returns to the smallholder producers. In response, the policy statement of 2002 recommended that the government institute measures to assist cooperatives financially. The policy statement does not explicitly outline how the government will go about alleviating the cooperatives from financial constraints and restoring them (CDP 2003: 33-34).
Recent figures from the Economic Survey of 2008 show that the number of Agriculture Marketing Cooperative Societies (AMCOS) decreased from 2,670 in 2007 to 2,614 in 2008. This may not be a major decline but the trend is clear. The survey explains that many cooperative unions had to shut down their services due to stiff competition from private buyers (Economic Survey 2009: 123). Furthermore, the budget of 2009/2010 allocates a mere 100,000,000 Tanzanian Shillings (approximately USD$72,500) to Cooperative reforms and modernisation program out of the 2,516,709,000 Tanzanian Shillings allocated to the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (all numbers are for domestic funds). This is only 3.9% of the funds allocated to the Ministry of Agriculture. As it is the budget for agriculture is only 0.26% of the total domestic funds (Development Plan 2009: 71; 124). Contrary to the Cooperative Development Policy of 2002, the government, as seen in the budget, seems to be allocating a very small amount to the building of cooperatives.

Following the decline of government intervention to assist cooperatives, the state has been focusing much more on initiating Poverty Reduction Strategies that fit with market liberalisation and privatisation policies. Yet, without state assistance to small producers in terms of implements, loans and protection from unfair market competition, the farmer will remain in poverty. As the Poverty and Human Development Report of 2009 concludes, the poorest households have to diversify into non-farm employment out of desperation and for survival. In any case, they are not able to generate sufficient income from non-farm employment. Given that the majority of Tanzanians will continue to reside in rural areas and derive their income from farming, state interventions must aim at raising agricultural productivity for the benefit of the smallholder producer (PHDR 2009: xxv-xxvi).

**Irrigation**

Agriculture in Tanzania is rain-fed. Although the country is not drought-prone, there are periods when it is difficult to harvest crops due to lack of rain. Irrigation is important for sustained and dependable production. While there have been several government policies that have dealt with the issue directly or indirectly, irrigation remains a limiting factor for the development of smallholder agriculture. Mainly because, the smallholder peasant is unable to afford irrigating his/her land independently without the assistance of the state or cooperatives. The irrigation schemes
that do exist in Tanzania are mostly based on rudimentary implements and are proving to be increasingly inadequate due to population increase and wear and tear. The main sources of water used for irrigation are rivers, canals and wells. 

Only 2.7% of the total agricultural land area with annual crops is irrigable. The figures for irrigated land have increased but not at a satisfactory pace over the last four years. In 2003 the planted land area under irrigation was 214,054 Ha; in 2005 it was 249,992 Ha; in 2007 it was 273,945 ha and in 2008 it was 289,245 Ha (National Bureau of Statistics 2007: 70-77; Economic Survey 2006: 123; Economic Survey 2009: 120).

**Technology and Extension Services**

Only 34% of the total number of crop growing households receives extension services (National Bureau of Statistics 2007: 99; Economic Survey 2009: 120). In 2008, the government employed 544 extension officers, which is a small number in relation to the 4,000,000 households that depend on agriculture. The source of extension services is predominantly governmental (95%), with NGOs filling the remaining gap. Even where crop-growing households receive extension services, the advice given is usually not followed up by implementation since the support services to adopt the advice are inadequate.

The use of technology in the agriculture sector is highly limited, the majority (97.7%) use hand held hoes. In fact, despite several PRS in support of improved technology there are only 6,000 working tractors as compared to 20,000 in 1970. Most of these tractors are used on large-scale farms and sometimes hired by small-scale peasants (National Bureau of Statistics 2007: 117; Maghimbi et al. 2010: 41).

**Availability of Credit to Smallholder Producers**

While the cooperatives used to provide loans in farming implements, this is no longer the case as cooperatives have become increasingly weak in the face of competition from private traders. The Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) have increased slightly since 2007. In 2007, there were 4,445 SACCOs and 263 new ones were established in 2008. The increase was necessitated by the lack of banking services in rural areas (Economic Survey 2009: 123).
Also, it is difficult for smallholder peasants to get loans from banks. As discussed under the issue of land titling, banks tend not to give loans to smallholders since smallholders do not have the necessary collateral. Previously cooperatives would use crops as collateral, allowing the peasant to pay the cooperative back once the crops were sold. Banks require much larger and secure collateral.

**Market Access**

The recent collapse of cooperatives and the consequent deregulation of agricultural commodity markets contributed towards an increase in the exploitation of smallholders when it comes to marketing their outputs. There has been an increase in the activities of private middlemen (commodity brokers) and they tend to exploit the smallholder (discussed above). In the 2002/03 agricultural season, 70% of all crop-growing households were said to have sold their crops. However, this statistic does not provide sufficient information regarding the fairness of the prices. In fact, according to the census, households reported the main problem of marketing to be low prices (64% households). Another problem was access to markets; either the markets are too far or there is no or costly transport to the markets. Occasionally, the producer does not find a buyer at the market. In such a case, the government does have the warehouse receipt system. In 2008 this system enabled cashew nut growers, for instance, to fetch a better price for their produce. However, the warehouse system has been slow to diversify into all crop-growing sectors (*ibid*, 124). Produce sometimes rots if it does not reach the market on time and wastes in other cases. Those who did not market their crops reported that their produce was insufficient (National Bureau of Statistics 2007: 94-95).

**Availability of Inputs**

Inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides are not produced locally and importation and delivery costs make them unaffordable to the majority of the smallholders. As a result, the majority of the smallholders do not use fertilisers in order to minimise production costs, but this has negatively affected crop yields. In fact, the total credit extended by the Agricultural Input Trust Fund to peasants in 2008 declined from 287 in 2007 to 238 in 2008. Of the total credit, the fund extended 157 credits for agricultural inputs such as fertilisers, improved seed drugs and insecticides compared to
176 in 2007 (Economic Survey 2009: 122). The increase in credits was due to a sharp increase in the price of agricultural inputs, especially fertilisers. Since fertilisers were liberalised and no subsidy was provided, the Tanzania Fertiliser Company collapsed and many foreign fertiliser companies have come in to fill in the gap. This has meant that government prices of fertilisers have been subject to the prices in the international markets.

Private companies are allowed to produce and distribute seeds, such as Cargill Hybrid Seeds and Pioneer Hybrid International. However the GoT is also involved in production and distribution of seeds. The Department of Research and Development has established five foundation seed farms. The Tanzania Seed Company also produces and certifies foundation seeds. Seeds are not subject to high prices as fertilisers since there is a system of community based seed production. However, even this becomes difficult since the communities rely on extension officers to train them in the multiplication of foundation seeds (www.tanzania.go.tz).

**Labour**

Most smallholders depend on household labour. However, due to current economic trends, members (especially males) of smallholder households have migrated either to urban areas or to look for off-farm employment to compliment on-farm activities. This practice is one of the most common bundles of coping strategies where agriculture on its own is not generating sufficient incomes. Often the off-farm employment does not provide as much income to the household as farming would have. The migration reduces the number of people in the household who can work on the farm, hence further worsening the problem of crop production (PHDR 2009: 24).10

The prevalence of HIV/AIDS has also affected availability of labour. In a study done by Tanzania Gender Networking Program (TGNP) on the costs for households caring for HIV/AIDS sufferers, it was found that farming activities had been negatively affected due to illnesses related to HIV/AIDS. Some households said that it was because those who usually engage in farming activities were either ill or were taking care of the ill. Others stated that it was because much of the family income was diverted to taking care of the HIV/AIDS sufferer and hence they had less money to spend on farming (TGNP 2005: 5-6).
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Changing land use patterns and food production

Many of the problems related to land have to do with land tenure. The Land Acts of 1999 have had a large impact on ownership of land since the commercialisation of land has led to land becoming a commodity with a market value. As a result, private investors have been interested in acquiring land for purposes of profit; to produce cash crops for export, biomass for biofuels, for speculation, even for purposes of mining. Increasingly, policy-making has de-emphasised the production of food crops given the declines of profits from agriculture vis-a-vis other land based income strategies.

Furthermore, the legal changes pertaining to holding land has made it easy for smallholders to sell their plots. Although statistics are not available, there is reason to believe that there has been an increase in the number of land sales due to desperation. There are possibilities that elite buyers (local and foreign) can accumulate large tracts of land. To date, 640,000 ha out of a total of 4 million ha requested by companies, has been allocated to biofuel production in Tanzania (Sulle & Nelson 2009).

The changes around landholding practice have taken place in a context of increased foreign investments in vast tracks of land for biofuel production. While proponents of biofuels emphasise the environmental benefits of biofuels over fossil fuels, they ignore the environmental hazards of the production of biomass. Monoculture leads to soil degradation.

SEKAB-Bio Energy Tanzania Ltd., established in 2007 seeks to implement what they call a block farming out growers’ franchise. This essentially means a continuous farming area under shared ownership. Advocates of block farming advance that it is a win-win situation since small-scale peasants can take advantage of large-scale farming by acting as out growers. In the case of SEKAB they would be sugarcane out growers (Cotula et al. 2009: 86; Centre for Sustainable Development Initiative (CSDI) 2009: 6). The problem with this is the shift from food to fuel production. In fact, a leaked document written by a senior World Bank analyst Don Mitchell revealed that 65-75% of the increase in food prices was caused by conversion of food crops to fuel (biofuels) (Chachage 2010). In addition there was already a decline in the production of sugar between 2005/06 and 2006/07. Therefore, to focus production of sugarcane on the external market while the internal market is already in a slump will not be beneficial for the country’s economy and consequently the small peasant will suffer. While sugar cane production is only one example, it can apply to all agricultural crops. Jatropha is yet another example of an energy plant being used in
Tanzania (Eijck 2007). According to a report presented to HAKIARDHI “...biofuel production is characterised by high rainfall, water resources, and rich soils and naturally are fairly densely populated. Thus, suggesting that biofuel production is going to be accompanied by human displacement and destruction of livelihood supporting activities as land is alienated” (Isack 2009: 6).

While proponents of biofuel production dismiss the potential of land alienation amongst the smallholders, claiming that Jatropha, the most common biomass, can in fact grow in very unfertile soils, studies have shown that they fare much better on prime land. Many biofuel investors enter into competition with smallholders over prime agricultural land as a result. In many instances, the state has used its power over customary land to claim the land of smallholder peasants and transfer it to the investors as general lands.11 Recent land use data shows that the net land balance exceeds the land suitable for rain fed crops, so the remaining land has been taken as “idle” land. However, this analysis ignores the existence of pastoral communities—and the manner in which they require access land (especially for grazing) on a nomadic basis. More than 80% of all land allocated for biofuel production is located in productive farmlands and forests. In April 2006, the government established the Biofuels Task Force under the Ministry of Energy and Minerals to deal with issues regarding biofuels. The task force first identified a “land bank” of 2.5 million Ha of land suitable for biofuel projects. Having identified the “land bank”, they allocated 400,000 Ha of prime rice growing land at Wami River on the coast region to a Swedish firm to grow sugar for biofuel production. A report commissioned by Evercare suggested that 5,000 small-scale peasants would be negatively impacted.

Pastoralists have also been negatively impacted by biofuel production. In July 2009, the Maasai of Loliondo game reserve in Ngorongoro district, Arusha suffered from evictions from their land. The Environmental Management Act of 2004 implicitly laid the blame for environmental degradation heavily on the small producers. Hence, the government took advantage of the precedence set in the Act of blaming the smallholder and applied it as one of the reasons to justify the evictions. A Maasai woman from Loliondo narrated that the people of Loliondo were accused of mismanaging the environment, despite the fact that they had been using measures to protect the environment and guarantee the survival of its inhabitants for centuries (African People’s Forum). According to a report produced by the Working Group of Indigenous Population communities in Africa (WGIP), 3,000
people were left homeless as a result of the evictions (FEMACT 2009). The evictions were carried out on behalf of private investors who claimed that the land belonged to them (Ortello Business). There are many examples similar to this where land is alienated and sold to a private investor leaving the smallholder producer displaced.12

**Poverty Reduction Strategies and their Implications**

This section discusses the major Poverty Reduction Strategies that have been established by the government in order to address agriculture in Tanzania. It incorporates an analysis of how various land policies have evolved within a context of broader development initiatives.

**Mkukuta-National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NGRSP)13**

The MKUKUTA program was initiated in 2005 with the major aim of increasing the GDP of the country to an annual growth rate of 6-8% per annum in the next decade, in light of the poverty levels in the country. Furthermore, it set a target of sustained agricultural growth of 10% by 2010 (PHDR 2009: 7). The program also aimed at reducing poverty by improving access to the basic means of production. MKUKUTA places particular emphasis on the poorest and most vulnerable groups, asserting equity and equality through all its three major clusters (Mutembei&Tumushabe 2008: 10). The three clusters of MKUKUTA are:

**Growth and Reduction of Income Poverty**

The 2009/10 Development plan stated that to achieve this first cluster the government would seek to increase the production of food and cash crops and availability of farming inputs, to increase irrigation schemes, to increase exports of goods and services, attract foreign and domestic private investment and to improve the trading environment, development of land and infrastructure, and to improve the economy of the country.

**Improvement of Quality of Life and Social Well-Being**

This cluster deals with education, health, water and social welfare. Under this section, the Development Plan of 2009/20 shows that some gains were made including: increase in registration of students in primary,
secondary and post-secondary education, increase in number of students going on to secondary school after primary school, increase in loans given to students, improvement in health of the mother and child at birth.

**Governance and Accountability**

This cluster aims at ensuring improvement in good governance, combating corruption and giving more powers to the local government. This cluster also sought to improve personal and material security and to fight crime. Under the goals of MKUKUTA, especially cluster one, the government has initiated various other programs that deal directly with agriculture (Development Plan 2009: 3-4; PHDR 2009: xxi-xxv).

**Property and Business Formalisation Program (PBFM)**

MKURABITA is a government project that was put into place during the third phase of the government (with the project beginning in 2004) under President Mkapa. It sought “to facilitate the transformation of real estate and business assets in the informal (extra-legal) sector to formal entities held and operated within the formal market that is governed by law” (Salema 2007). The program aimed at converting rural property that had not been registered into formal property, and most important to this paper is the formalisation of land. It further aimed to reduce poverty and increase economic growth by incorporating the poor into the formalised sectors of the economy. The program envisioned that the poor would have better access to loans by using their assets as collateral, hence able to improve their livelihoods (ibid).

The program’s basis is founded upon the principles of the Institute of Liberty and Democracy (ILD) in Lima, Peru whose chief architect is the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto. De Soto has outlined his theory of dead capital in “The Mystery of Capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else”. De Soto argues that the poor remain so because they lack access to formal property rights. Poverty is maintained because a majority of the poor are kept in the informal sector outside the legal system of Western capitalism (Benjaminsen 2004: 3). He identifies all property that is not formalised through titling and registration under statutory law as being “extra-legal”. These extra-legal assets could be worth trillions of dollars but they are not represented in the economy hence he terms them ‘dead capital’. Dead capital, according to de Soto, cannot be used to create additional value.
Using this framework and the umbrella of MKUKUTA, MKURABITA aims at formalising all the extralegal property in Tanzania. At the diagnosis stage of the project (ibid), it was gathered that 90% of Tanzanians reside and earn their livelihoods in the extralegal sector and 98% of all businesses and 89% of all real estate are extralegal in Tanzania. If formalised, the value of all these extralegal assets would be USD$ 29 billion (Salema 2007; Mutembei & Tumushabe 2008: 11).

The measure of most relevance to smallholder agriculture is the attempt to fast track land titling under the western system of law, which in the case of Tanzania is statutory rights of occupancy. The program even proposed what they called “blanket titling” of village land to expedite the process. The expected outcome of MKURABITA would include: an expanded economic formal sector, improved business environment, good governance through more reliable information on economic activity and increased income for the government through new tax payers (ibid). MKURABITA fits in well with MKUKUTA since both aim to reduce poverty and increase economic growth.

It is important to note that only 2% of rural land is formalised or “legal” under statutory rights of occupancy and these are mostly large-scale farms. The project was first implemented in 2004 and one of the outcomes was the amendment of the Land Act 1999 and Village Land Act 1999, along with several other legislation that have a bearing on property rights in the country.

**Agricultural Sector Development Program (ASDP)**

The government adopted the Agricultural Sector Development Program (ASDP) in 2003 in order to achieve a sustained agricultural growth rate of 5% per annum. One of the program goals is to transform the smallholder sector from subsistence to commercial agriculture. Part of the commercialisation of agriculture includes development led by the private sector. The private sector is encouraged to partake in this venture by creating an enabling business environment.

The ASDP seeks to improve the following:

- The policy, regulatory and institutional arrangements of the agricultural sector
- Agricultural services inclusive of research, advisory and technical services, and training Investment through District Agricultural Development Plans implementation
• Private sector development, market development, and agricultural finance.

The Development Plan of 2009/10 states that the ASDP is still in place allowing for an increase in availability of agricultural inputs, improving research and services for agriculture, availability of seeds and food security in the country (Development Plan 2009: 6).

**Agriculture First (Kilimo Kwanza)**

In June 2009, The Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, Hon. Mustafa Haidi Mkulo, declared that the catchphrase for 2009/10 would be “Agriculture First” (better known for its Kiswahili term, *Kilimo Kwanza*). He said that the Kilimo Kwanza initiative would operate alongside and with the complementing goals of the ASDP (Mkulo 2009: 15-16). Implementation of Kilimo Kwanza began in June 2009 when the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC) came together to discuss the policies and strategies of the project and its implementation in agriculture (Kilimo Kwanza Resolution).

The ten pillars of Kilimo Kwanza are as follows (*ibid*):

1. Political will to push for agricultural transformation
2. Enhanced financing for agriculture
3. Institutional reorganisation and management of agriculture
4. Paradigm shift to strategic agricultural production
5. Land availability for agriculture
6. Incentives to stimulate investments in agriculture
7. Industrialization for agricultural transformation
8. Science, technology and human resources to support agricultural transformation
9. Infrastructure Development to support agricultural transformation
10. Mobilisation of Tanzanians to support and participate in the implementation of Kilimo Kwanza

The Kilimo Kwanza project stems from the realisation that a majority of Tanzanians depend on agriculture for their livelihoods and thus improving agricultural productivity is central to combating poverty. In order to
embark on increased agricultural activity the Kilimo Kwanza project emphasises a green revolution which would entail better irrigation, higher seed quality and better technology in farming inputs. The goal of the green revolution is to transform Tanzania’s agricultural sector into a modern and commercial sector. In order to rapidly modernise the agricultural sector, private investment is encouraged and resources allocated to agriculture should be increased (Mkulo 2009: 41-42; Maghimbi et al. 2010: 60).

The initiative was first seen in practice through the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) which attempts to link foreign investors with local peasants. However, it has been interesting to note that the government has been zealously calling for local peasants with “idle, arable land of 500 Ha or above” (emphasis by author) to submit proposals in order to enter into contract with foreign investors. According to the executive director, Mr. Ole Naiko, the TIC with the Kilimo Kwanza initiative aims at increasing and consolidating the production of food and cash crops for export. Moreover, he states that the project would want to ensure that investors are able to get the land they require for agriculture (Kanyabwoya 2010: 2).

**Implications and Contradictions of Poverty Reduction Strategies and Land Policies**

This sub-section discusses the implications of PRS on the economy of the country, in particular on smallholder production. It takes into consideration the relationship between the PRS and the land policies and the results of the initiatives taken by these various agricultural initiatives. The most relevant results are those in the Poverty and Human Development Report 2009, which is produced by the MKUKUT A monitoring system.

The liberalisation of the economy in the 1980s and 90s transformed land policies and created a market conducive to foreign investment. Part of the liberalisation package sought to reduce government intervention in protecting the peasant (for example providing subsidised inputs). The economy was geared towards incorporating the peasant into the free market. Several initiatives to date have been undertaken to meet these goals. However, they do not seem to be working for the smallholder producer.

The basic aim of the MKUKUT A project is to reduce poverty and increase Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). MKUKUT A sets a goal of increasing the GDP growth by 6-8% per annum and the agricultural growth to 10% per annum by 2010. The current trends show that while the GDP
growth has been at its highest historically in Tanzania at 7% per annum; agricultural growth has averaged 4.4% per annum. Given this trend, agricultural growth may not meet the desired MKUKUTA growth rate of 10% per annum by 2010. In fact the most dynamic sector up to 2007 was mining with an average annual growth of 15% (PHDR 2009: 4-7). Therefore, the growth of the GDP is reflecting growth in sectors other than agriculture and perhaps an increased influx of FDI, which is also mainly in mining and finance. Agriculture is lagging behind. In fact, agricultural growth does not even meet the target of 5% annual growth set in the ASDP.

Moreover, income poverty has almost remained the same since 1991, without a considerable change. This would mean that it would not drop to meet the MKUKUTA targets by 2010. While 40.8% of the rural population was solely dependent on smallholder agriculture and lived below the basic needs poverty line in 1991, 37.6% continued to live in poverty in 2007. MKUKUTA aims to reduce the percentage of people in rural areas living below the basic needs poverty line to 24% (ibid, 12). The levels of poverty in rural areas have not changed much; 1% of the population (a figure unchanged since 2000/01) consumes only one meal a day (ibid, 27).

Another pillar common to the PRS of Tanzania is to increase the availability of farming inputs such as fertilisers and good quality seeds. Fertiliser in Tanzania is largely imported into the country. Tanzania had its own fertiliser factory, established in 1968; Tanzania Fertiliser Company Ltd. (TFC). However, in 1991/92 the company collapsed after one of its plants broke down in 1991 and it was never restored. Soon after, fertiliser trade was liberalised in 1992 and by 1994 the subsidies scheme was phased out under liberalisation. This left a weak company to compete with larger international fertiliser companies in the market. The result was higher fertiliser prices and lower consumption of fertilisers in the country. Fertiliser use decreased dramatically between 1994-2003, with only 8% of crop growing households using inorganic fertiliser and 20% using farmyard manure (National Bureau of Statistics 2006: 82). Lack of fertiliser use leads to low productivity. Tanzania’s current self-sufficiency in food is threatened by low crop productivity.

The figures above clearly show that the quality of life of the rural peasant and the development of the agricultural sector are not meeting the standards that have been set by the PRS. Privatisation and liberalisation are not helping the smallholder producer since they leave the producer vulnerable to market forces which they are not equipped to deal with.
MKURABITA seeks to employ a fast track approach to land titling so as to formalise all informal property. Any property that is outside the legal framework, extralegal, must be formalised. According to MKURABITA, all forms of customary rights and locally adapted arrangements are part of the extralegal sector (Benjaminsen 2004: 7). As discussed in the section on land policies in Tanzania, the Land Acts of 1999 clearly placed customary rights and statutory rights on an equal footing. The logic of MKURABITA, based on de Soto’s guidelines, is that property that is held outside the Western legal system is not protected by law. However, the Land Act clearly states that customary properties do fall under the law. They are not extra-legal. Although this contradiction was not explicitly addressed by MKURABITA, one of the reports from the President’s office on MKURABITA addressed one of the lessons learnt from the first two phases of implementing MKURABITA (since 2004): “There is indeed a need to effect some changes in the Village Land Act 5 of 1999 and the Land Act No. 4 of 1999 along with several other legislation that have a bearing on the property rights regime in the country” (Salema 2007). The Land Act of 1999 placed customary rights and statutory rights on an equal footing to provide an equal legal framework of protection for the small peasant who holds land under customary law. To change this would undermine customary law and give more importance to statutory law. This was the case from the time of the 1923 ordinance under British trusteeship.

Kilimo Kwanza seeks to encourage local peasants with idle arable land to join hands with foreign investors, in order to rapidly develop this land, presumably with the technology of the foreign investor and the expertise of the local farmer. There is need to deepen analysis of the nature of the envisaged partnership between the local smallholder and the foreign investor. Even though the resolution of Kilimo Kwanza, in theory, seems to aim at developing agriculture, in reality it is really geared towards large-scale farming. For two reasons: (i) the call to submit proposals on idle arable land to the TIC was put at a minimum of 500Ha or above while the smallholder producer has on average only 2-5 Ha; (ii) as discussed in the section of the Land Amendments Act of 2004, bare land cannot be directly transferred under customary law (which in practice applies to all smallholder agriculture). It is assumed that land must be used by the peasant who owns it, and if land is not used then it is given back to the community.

CAADP sets a bold goal of decreasing food insecurity, especially Pillar 3 by paving the way for export expansion. Tanzania’s Kilimo Kwanza is the
local vehicle towards meeting the goals established within the CAADP. However, an emphasis on export expansion will most likely lead to the vulnerability of the market. Developing countries such as Tanzania will be forced to produce “marketable goods” and slowly decline in self-sufficiency of basic food grains. Currently, Tanzania does not produce a surplus of basic food grains, allowing it to switch production to exportable goods. Hence, if food production declines and production of exportable goods increases, the export market may flourish but a large percentage of the population will be left hungry. Patnaik explains “[the decline in the basic food staples output per head of population] happens because, with the diversion of food growing land and resources to export crops, the food grains growth rate falls below the population growth rate” (Patnaik 2007: 60). It seems as though the PRS are aimed at protecting the interests of private investors and large-scale farmers. In reality, the small-scale farmer is left vulnerable and is not, integrated in a beneficial manner into the market economy.

Advocacy Organisations in Tanzania

This section combines the results of the research and interviews done with various advocacy groups for smallholder agriculture. The interviews were conducted with the executive directors and members of the organisations. Fortunately, during the course of the study the African People’s Forum took place which was a parallel alternative forum to the World Economic Forum, Africa held in Tanzania. Many reports and first hand experiences were presented concerning the issues affecting smallholder producers and the role of advocacy.

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that the liberalisation and privatisation packages have not adequately resolved some of the challenges faced by the smallholder sector. Inevitably, these policy prescriptions have resulted in food shortages, land evictions and intolerable living conditions for the small peasants but conversely, more land, larger profits and more exports for the large investors. It is important to note that government policies are directed towards protecting the producers, in a context where the majority of the livelihoods are dependent on agriculture. For this to occur a strategic, focused and honest analysis has to be done on the producers and their products. In a country that is still struggling to improve agricultural output, it would be detrimental to export even the little produce that is available, especially when it comes to food. Since the 1980s, under the guise of market liberalisation, Tanzania has joined the
global free market and behaves like it was economically and politically on the same footing as the developed capitalist countries. Nonetheless, as has been outlined in this paper, the history of colonialism, that bears its impact even today, has left Tanzania in a position of subordination. The first fundamental step would be to develop the country in a manner whereby it is no longer simply a producer for the Western market but self-reliant. The project of self-reliance began before organisations started playing the “anti-poverty” tunes. At independence, the vision of development did not exist in a vacuum but rather in the context of liberty. Today, the vision of development has only one context, that of liberalisation.

In this light, advocacy in itself has been a neo-liberal project, aimed at fragmenting the issues and dealing with them in isolation. The term advocacy implies a separation between the victim and the saviour where the saviour represents /adovcates the voice of the victim. Advocacy does not play a role when the intermediary between the people and the decision/policy makers does not exist. In the case of Tanzania, advocacy groups have come to play a large role because there is a sharp and ever growing divide between the urban and the rural. This divide has real implications in that the liberal democracy of Tanzania adopts a top-down approach, leaving political representation of the rural poor greatly diluted in the decision making process. To fill this gap, advocacy groups have mushroomed with, in almost all cases, the intent of linking the poor directly to the decision makers of the country. However, many of these organisations tend to be composed of urban elites, as they have the resources to bring the issues of the poor to the tables of the policy makers. The only resource that the poor themselves have to affect the decision making process in the context of liberal democracies is the power of the masses. This would imply a bottom-up approach, a shift in the way things are run under a liberal democracy. Hence, to maintain the broad framework of the system, issues are packaged in small parcels and distributed to well-intentioned people and groups to address the issue without contextualizing it. If the source of the problem is not discovered, it is very difficult to eradicate issues of poverty, inequality and injustice.

While these are some of the limitations of advocacy organisations in general, it would be unjust to condemn all the work that has been done by many of the advocacy groups. In Tanzania, there are several local and international organisations that work with smallholder peasants. Some have experienced great difficulties due to funding. Others are well-endowed
but they are limited by the agendas of the funders (Cameron 2004: 136-8). However, Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (LARRRI, better known for its Kiswahili term HAKIARDHI) has held a consistent and committed stance from its conception; the protection of the oppressed against the oppressor, to paraphrase the words of the organisation’s Executive Director (Interview with Yefred Myenzi, 23 Apr. 2010). LARRRI has consistently taken a clear position against the privatisation of land. Most recently, fearing that the commercialisation of land will benefit only a few, leaving the majority small producers landless, it organised an annual land forum debating the pitfalls of the Kilimo Kwanza initiative (ibid). Moreover, LARRRI tries to advocate for a bottom-up approach to democracy by pushing for greater representation and decision making powers at the village level. It has done this by engaging in various land policies such as the Village Land Act of 1999.

International organisations such as OXFAM have taken strong positions in defense of small producers on issues such as biofuels and against land grabbing. However, given that it is such a large organisation and has various branches, they have not been able to have consistent, direct contact with the rural poor in the same way as LARRRI. OXFAM’s strategy is more focused on immediate relief. LARRRI, on the other hand, believe that it is the people themselves who need to fight for their rights in regards to land. LARRRI deals more with legal elements of issues related to land while an organisation such as the Network of Tanzania Farmers’ Associations (MVIWATA) has a more wide-ranging goal. MVIWATA tries to provide farmers with immediate ways of accessing fertilisers, seed and other farming inputs. It has joined various government organs for purposes of seed-breeding. In addition to their work on the ground, they have worked directly with LARRRI in questioning the government PRS, more recently in regards to Kilimo Kwanza (interview with Steven Ruvuga [Executive Director of MVIWATA] 19 Apr 2010). MVIWATA has been able to directly impact the decision making process, since it recently was successful in gaining representation in local government.

If we are to take the bottom-up approach to social organisations, it would be beneficial to understand the impact and sustainability of advocacy groups by assessing their engagement with social movements initiated at the grass roots level. It is imperative to understand the difference between the NGO-driven social struggles and people’s movements, although NGOs can play a functional role when they are driven by the agenda of the people’s
movements. In the case of Tanzania, while there have been instances of protracted struggles, we witness what Scott calls “everyday forms of resistance” (as quoted in Moyo and Yeros 2005: 210). Hence NGOs need to be able to recognise these struggles in order to effectively engage with them.

LARRRI, and to a certain extent LHRC have been successful in intervening in the people’s movements in relation to land alienation. A brief synopsis of a landmark struggle that has been initiated by smallholder agropastoralists will provide the platform to analyse the engagement of advocacy groups, especially NGOs. The Barbaig and Iraqw people of Tanzania come from the Basuto plains of Hanang district in Manyara region. They are an agro-pastoralist people. Theirs has been a long struggle against the loss of their land. During *Ujamaa* in the 1970s, the government alienated massive tracts of land under the process of nationalisation. Nyerere’s politics in developing the rural areas was twofold; i) Large scale: where land was taken by the state for agriculture or ranching through parastatals, ii) small scale through villagization (Shivji 2002). This land was said to be taken from the peasants who tilled it for “public interest”. The Hanang district is the best example of land alienation through the nationalisation process.

With the aid of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the government of Tanzania took approximately 10,000 acres of land and transferred it to the National Agricultural and Food Corporation (NAFCO) for wheat plantations. The people of the district were evicted from the land. The evictions witnessed various forms of resistance through land occupations of the then NAFCO lands and engaging the state through petitions. By the 1970s, room for advocacy for the smallholder agro-pastoralists was limited in that the state saw itself as the sole keeper of the farmer (see section on cooperatives in Tanzania). Nonetheless, the Barbaig were successful in pressuring the government to form a commission of enquiry into the forced evacuations of the Barbaig and Iraqw people.

The nationalisation policies of the 70s were overhauled during the phase of liberalisation in Tanzania (1980s and 1990s) and this brought some hope of regaining the land. All land that had been nationalised was privatised under the liberalisation era and given to investors. In 1996, with the collapse of NAFCO, all NAFCO lands were privatised. As a result, the Barbaig people were once again left without their land. This period also saw a shift in the possibilities for advocacy. Consequently, there was a mushrooming of NGOs, brought about by relaxed sanctions on non-state organisations. The NGOs assisted the Barbaig in their continued struggle to reclaim their land.
Both LARRRI and LHRC played crucial roles in assisting the people of the Hanang district to embark on litigation to secure their land rights. The legal struggle was a protracted one but the courts did not prove favourable to the plight of the people of Hanang. However, other forms of resistance such as continued land occupation eventually pressured the government to ensure that two farms were returned to the agro-pastoralists.

The struggle of the Barbaiq people lasted almost 20 years, with a partial victory. It was a people’s movement. The Barbaiq community organised its life around the resistance to evictions from the land. Advocacy groups such as LARRRI and LHRC were able to effectively engage with these groups because they were led by the agenda of the people. Their role was limited to providing channels and technical support for the struggle, for instance in the court room and through lobbying (Bernard and Shivji 2010).

**Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (HAKIARDHI/LARRRI)**

LARRRI was formed in 1994 and registered as a non-governmental organisation with the aim of promoting and sustaining debate on issues related to land, especially land tenure. The NGO works mainly with the rural poor who essentially comprise of smallholder producers (peasants, miners, pastoralists, hunter gatherers) in rural and peri-urban areas (with consistent focus on women through their partnership with gender organisations) who have been marginalised from the decision-making processes and are negatively impacted by national policies.

As of December 2008, LARRRI had 28 members 10 of whom are women and 5 council members. LARRRI is an effective advocacy organisation because an analysis of some of its involvement reveals that the organisation has been able to successfully join social movements that have been initiated at the grass roots level. Hence, in many ways the organisation has acted as a tool to facilitate a) dissemination of knowledge on affairs related to the land, and b) engagement with social movements in rural areas. Moreover, LARRRI has been set apart from some other NGO organisations in Tanzania in that it has taken a very clear stance since its formation; in favour of the smallholder agriculturalist. The organisation has often taken positions that are critical of the status quo as adopted by government organs and investors, both local and foreign.
History of Policy Engagement

The program necessitates policy engagement. The aim is to ensure that villagers have access to and understand all policy matters dealing with land. They assist smallholder producers to pursue their cases in court through coaching, drafting and interpretation of court decisions. Workshops and seminars are held consistently to discuss Bills of relevance to land issues. For instance, the government set out guidelines for biofuel production without going through the necessary procedures. LARRRI, with the assistance of other organisations, successfully intervened in the process, so that at present the ministry of energy and minerals must prepare a policy, legislation followed by the guidelines. Furthermore, they engage with policy makers through use of petitions and publications. For instance in 2004 LARRRI launched a campaign on the implications of the Mining Bill which prioritised the interests of the mining sector and left the smallholder under the constant threat of land grabs. LARRRI presented policy makers with petitions and leaflets explaining their position.

Program Implementation

LARRRI holds monthly seminars that generate debates among various farmers’ networks. They have produced working papers on issues such as land tenure and bio-fuels and used television and radio broadcasts to publicise issues affecting smallholder producers. In April 2010, LARRRI set out a campaign to create awareness on the Loliondo evictions, using TV shows and engaging in debates via print media. They collaborated on this campaign with other organisations such as the Tanzania Gender Network (TGNP), FemAct, and the Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC). They also have a good resource center that they maintain, to ensure access to documents concerning land rights issues. Many of the interns work on organising and updating the library. Most importantly, all the papers, many publications and all communication is available in both English and Swahili, making it accessible to all rural communities who use Swahili.

While they are not trained to provide legal representation, they are able to provide legal training as many of their staff members have undergone advocacy training themselves. This puts both the trainer and the trainee in constant dialogue with each other. Their annual general meeting is held in collaboration with the representatives of the various village groups with which they work. Rather than focusing on administrative matters,
the annual general meeting is used as a platform for members to engage in
debate concerning LARRRI’s activities and the way forward.

While this organisation is fairly small in its staff, they have succeeded
in implementing their program and engaging in the critical issues affect-
ing smallholder peasants in clear favor of the oppressed groups. They have
collaborated with most farming, pastoralist and international advocacy
organisations that are specifically interested in marginalised communities.
For instance, much work has been done with TGNP, under the FemAct
umbrella, OXFAM during the biofuels campaign, MVIWATA and
PINGOS during the 1997 Land Bill. Most of their campaigns have focused
on creating awareness on the consequences of various Bills in relation to the
land and the smallholder agriculturalists.

**Conclusion**

Advocacy organisations can play an important role in education and
the development of the technical skills needed to deal with policy. However,
despite the good intentions and the impact that they may have, they must
recognise that they are working within the framework of neo-liberalism.
Within this framework, there will be persistent problems gnawing away
at the poor, especially in the absence of an ideology of self-reliance. For
instance, to permanently rid the country of hunger, there is a need to
rethink the functioning of the commodity markets to ensure that all food
is not either exported or converted into biofuel. One of the strategies
would be to expand state intervention in the market through statutorily
established state enterprises. However this approach flows against current
thinking that espouses the superiority of market protection.

Advocacy organisations are a result of neo-liberalism where issues
affecting the poor are addressed in a piecemeal approach. This does not
necessarily have to be a limitation however, since as has been noted, there
are organisations that have successfully acknowledged the context in which
they work. The more effective approach for organisations engaged in policy
advocacy is to reorient themselves as a resource to rural communities rather
than as their representatives.

Neoliberalism has not only been successful in limiting the economic
prosperity of the developing countries but also in suffocating the voice of
the rural poor. With neoliberalism the Tanzanian government has accepted
the whole package: political liberalism whereby decisions are made by a few
for the benefit of the majority, economic liberalism which entails opening
the market to become export oriented, and social liberalism where social services are cut down to focus on developing a market friendly environment. Politically, this has meant that the grassroots masses have no direct connection with the decision makers. Hence, often their collective voices are not heard. Economically, food insecurity has left a large part of the population hungry as all that is produced is meant for export. Socially, health and education have taken a backseat to the development of infrastructure for better communication and collaboration with investors.

In an attempt to appease the poor, advocacy has come to play a large role in order to amplify the voice of the poor. However, the voice of the poor can only be heard through the mediums provided to them. This cannot work for a country like Tanzania, since the conclusion to this story can only be a temporary solution. In order to address the crisis faced by small holder peasants, it is essential to address the direction in which the country is going and adopt an ideology of liberty and self-reliance rather than one of liberalisation and dependency.

Notes

1. This is the last census conducted in Tanzania so far.

2. There has been much debate around these figures and it has been contested as to how agricultural contribution to the GDP could have dropped so significantly.

3. While the transition to capitalism has meant increased commodity production, it has not done away with the agrarian question in the peripheries. The conditions set for global capital have meant that the process of primitive accumulation still characterizes the periphery. Hence the agrarian question remains at the forefront despite the changing social relations partly determined by commodity production. With the shift of “proletarianization” of the peasant increasingly marked in the neo-liberal era, arguments have been put forth that this marks the disappearance of the peasantries and a shift towards capitalist production. This would be a positive shift since it would pave the way for industrialization. (see Bryceson, 2000)

4. While customary lands are only transferable under customary laws and from one Tanzanian to another. The state can revoke customary lands.

5. The Commission recommended that mbaraza la wazee la ardhi, elders who would deal solely with land matters, be elected by each village assembly to give consent on the transferability of land.

6. However this does not always work in practice since the banks are reluctant to use customary land as collateral, unsure of what to do with customary titles. Also collateral in the form of 2-5 Ha of land is almost insignificant for banks.
7. The government budget segregates domestic funds from foreign sources.
8. It should be noted that while the Ministry of Agriculture itself receives only 0.26% of the total budget, the agriculture sector might be getting more funds from other ministries as well such as the Ministry for Water and Irrigation.
9. Warehouse Receipt System essentially means that a farmer can deposit his/her crop in a government warehouse and is issued a receipt which the farmer can use as collateral for advanced payment. Also he/she can deposit the crop until market prices are more suitable.
10. This has been discussed briefly in the section “State of Agriculture in Tanzania”.
11. By transferring the land from village land to general land and putting it under statutory law, the government can then sell it to private investors.
12. Mining is yet another threat to the smallholder farmer. According to the sector development figures mining is growing at the most rapid rate. Large tracts of cultivated village land are alienated and given to investors for mining purposes.
13. Commonly known in Kiswahili as Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini-MKUKUTA
14. Commonly known in Kiswahili as Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge Tanzania (MKURABITA)
15. The project, under the structural framework proposed by the ILD, works in four stages: Diagnosis, Reform Design, Implementation, Capital formation and good governance.
17. Pastoralists Indigenous Non-Governmental Organisation (PINGOS) is one such organisation that has fragmented due to contesting agendas in some cases pushed by donors.

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From Rhetoric to Policy Action


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Introduction

The preceding country chapters have examined in detail the different policy paths being pursued in the countries under study. This concluding chapter maps the way forward in terms of sustainable agricultural development in the continent and especially the six countries under study. The discussion is informed by the on-going efforts of agricultural policy reform and the increased attention to the sector from within and outside the continent. It examines in more detail the relevance of some of the classical objectives of agrarian reform, the manner in which African agriculture is inserted into commodity markets and how that may affect the performance of the sector. Finally, it subjects the institutional framework to more scrutiny, especially the role of the state and that of civil society organisations in agricultural development.

The rediscovery of the strategic importance of agriculture to Africa’s development has not only led to increased resources but has contributed to the formulation of a mixed bag of policy strategies (discussed in the introductory chapter). This is especially true of recommendations made by West-
ern-based think tanks, public and private foundations since the global food crisis of 2007/8. The aforementioned policies include the G8 led support to CAADP. The Rockefeller and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations are jointly pursuing a ‘Green Revolution’ strategy (as discussed in the introductory chapter) through the Alliance for the Green Revolution for Africa (AGRA). The AGRA initiative is significant in many ways but mostly due to the fact that it’s the single largest investment in African agriculture to date. The Mckinsey Institute, part of the global consulting firm bearing the same name, has also called for ‘African countries to narrow their focus and target high-impact [agricultural projects]’ (Sanghvi et al., 2011).

The recovery of Africa’s agriculture should be the first integral part of the broader shift towards economic transformation that is urgently required on the continent. Transformation entails the change over time in the sectoral composition of output (or GDP) and that of the sectoral pattern of the employment of labour as an economy develops (ECA, 2011: 5). The pattern of economic transformation, experienced in other countries, suggests that as the real per capita income of an economy increase over the long term, the shares of industry and its manufacturing subsector as well as services rise, as does the ratio of average productivity in non-agriculture to agriculture, at the same time, the share of agriculture in GDP and the employment share of agriculture in total employment decline (ibid: 5). Such a transformation is only achievable when there is a significant boost to agricultural production over a sustained period. The surplus value extracted from increased agriculture performance should be reinvested in a local industrialisation project.

However, as already discussed, African smallholder agriculture is either stagnant or in decline, has been fully inserted within global capitalism in a subordinate pattern and it is clearly not contributing towards national accumulation and industrialisation. Mafeje (2003: 20) argues that industrialisation could not possibly emerge from depressed African agricultural economies.

Besides the agricultural reform policies initiatives currently being coordinated by AU’s Nepad there is still a need to find mechanisms of either reforming or dismantling the international commodity chains that have served to unfairly subordinate African agriculture into global markets. Earlier movements towards industrialisation in regions such as Europe and the USA did not have to deal with the negative effects of globalisation-such as the free movement of goods from highly developed economies to underdeveloped
regions. International commodity markets have served to undermine local production. Agricultural development and food security can only be achieved after the adoption of interrelated policies and programmes that sustainably prioritise smallholder production (the majority in the countries under study).

Internal measures also need to be taken by individual governments in order to accomplish successful agricultural transformation (especially within the smallholder sector). The existence of political will, such as currently exists in Malawi, is a prerequisite for success. However, this process should not be at the mercy of the vote-seeking political elites. It should result from grassroots-based platforms of citizens demanding a development agenda that imposes a local production form of food security as an integral part of a political contract. Within such a perspective, the achievements of the Malawian government remain threatened if they are not embedded and purposefully integrated within a values-based political framework which emphasises the right to food, so that any other regime voted into office will be obliged to ensure that such a right is upheld. Implicit forms of such a political contract existed in Tanzania soon after independence when it was still a one party state. Members of parliament still had to contest for seats and had to ensure that there were sufficient food levels in the constituencies that they served. Failure to do that would have been equivalent to ceding power or position. A more explicit form of political contract on famine exists in India today and predates the colonial era.

Given the accountability structures created by democratic reforms, there is a need to increase demand on the state to reclaim its policy making and implementation role within the agricultural sector. The current practice in which non-state actors such as foreign funded NGOs have taken a central place in effecting an agricultural recovery strategy underpinned by welfarism, although necessary, needs to be complemented by a competent developmental and democratic state. A developmental state is one that has capacity to deploy its authority, credibility and legitimacy in a binding manner to design and implement development policies and programmes for promoting transformation and growth as well as for expanding human capabilities. The developmental state should not undermine the diverse political freedoms that are available in a democratic state, including regular free elections and freedom of speech but rather these should be seen as an integral component that allows citizens to contribute towards the development project.

However, it is also important to note that democratic reforms (especially political and civil rights) alone cannot bring about food security. States need
to break away from the neo-liberal logic of the supremacy of the market and invest in agriculture, especially within the smallholder sector, in a more systematic manner. Most likely this is where a real clash with Western-based donor countries may emerge. Africa is one of the largest markets for cereals and a local increase in the production for local consumption and accumulation may negatively affect global commodity prices and Western backed multi-nationals that have up until now enjoyed unprecedented profits in the sector may oppose such measures.

**Innovative Policy Processes towards Food Security**

Food insecurity and rural poverty in general should not be addressed separately from the broader agenda of economic transformation. Current trends in policymaking treat smallholder agriculture as part of the social policy cluster and ignore the sector’s potential to contribute towards the transformation of Africa’s economic transformation. Food insecurity and rural poverty should be addressed within a strategic framework that acknowledges the immediate need for improved food availability but also one that is focused on equitable integration into commodity markets and ensures local accumulation to eventually contribute towards increased aggregate demand for manufactured goods. Policy measures focused on improving access to factors of agricultural production such as land and other natural resources should be prioritised. These policy measures need also to ensure the allocation of support to farm input acquisition, infrastructure development in smallholder areas and improved access to local and sub-regional commodity markets, mediated by national governments and regional economic blocks such as the East African Community (EAC), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). Earlier chapters have summarised the multiple causes of food insecurity (or crisis) in the selected countries. In the same vein, the resolution of the food question requires the adoption of multiple but interrelated measures at global, sub-regional and country levels. Areas of intervention include strengthening agricultural systems and promotion of intra-sub-regional integration to mitigate the effects of the unfair trade currently promoted by global capital.

**Improving the Role of the State in Food Security**

The food crisis in Africa is a direct indictment of the neo-liberal post-colonial state. As already noted, most African countries were self-sufficient
at the time of decolonisation until around the late 1970s when Structural Adjustment programmes were introduced. Devereux (2002) points out that “the imposition of economic liberalisation policies has undermined the institutional capacity of the state to deliver food security to its citizens”. It was not only SAP prescriptions that negatively affected agriculture, but also the nature of the state that Neoliberalism engendered. The neoliberal state was organised to be more accountable to donor conditionality and also to devote less attention to socio-economic development issues as de Waal (1997) observes;

...austerity measures invoked in the name of neo-liberalism tend to encourage authoritarianism, in that it re-orient government accountability towards external financiers and weakens the mechanism that mediates state responsibility for famines.

In this context, democracy was narrowly defined to emphasise civil and political rights at the expense of social, cultural and economic rights. Significant policy attention was devoted towards institutional reforms to enable the operation of a free media, freedom of association, the establishment of multi-party democracies. These have mostly been accomplished, especially in the selected countries, but socio-economic development has lagged behind significantly. In fact, in many countries the number of food insecure people has increased (except in Malawi). There is an emerging consensus amongst scholars based in the global South that there is need for a democratic developmental state. Such a state should have autonomous policy space, based on the apparent consensus that development requires autonomy of the state and that autonomy requires a new conciliatory foundation, together with effective planning bureaucracies (Edigheji, 2010).

In the new policy dispensation, African states have to innovatively identify sustainable ways in which they can support smallholder agricultural producers. The World Bank (2007) recently coined the term ‘smart subsidies’ in an effort to differentiate the new forms of support from earlier subsidies. Malawi is one the few models of best practice in this regard. Recently, the Malawian government introduced a new set of bold agricultural subsidies which entailed the provision of free inputs to the smallholder sector. These reforms were initially opposed by the donor community but recently the World Bank endorsed the input support programme. The subsidies have led to a significant boost in production to an extent that Malawi has been exporting staple grains to countries facing a deficit within the sub-region (see chapter 4).
Strengthening Agricultural Systems

It is imperative to guard against a one size fits all approach; Africa has 54 diverse countries with different national specificities and levels of development. The efficacy of any agricultural development strategy should address the identified systemic nature and source of the agricultural problem identified. Each country needs to develop a comprehensive agricultural development programme, premised on state intervention and aimed at productive outcomes in agriculture and rural development. Current agricultural development plans are broad and diffuse. They attempt to cover multiple regions and sectors without devoting sufficient resources to the effort (Sanghvi et al, 2011: 2). Others such as the Mckinsey Institute and Japan Development Aid (JICA) seem to be pursuing an agricultural model based on comparative advantage or emphasising geographical regions perceived to have production potential, such as ‘development corridors’ in which commercial farms and facilities for storage and processing are concentrated. Japanese aid in countries such as Malawi and Tanzania is pursuing the One Village One Crop (OVOC) approach with the attendant danger of promoting unsustainable mono-cropping.

There is definitely commercial value in the agricultural development corridors, but the most obvious limitation is the selective nature of such projects within a context of resource scarcity. Agricultural policy reforms should be rooted within principles of equity and sustainability. It is imperative therefore that resources availed to agriculture be equitably distributed to the majority of smallholders, lest a new state-based agrarian elite is created at the expense of the majority smallholders. Such resources and other forms of support must be deployed in a manner that ensures the development of the sector beyond dependence on subsidies or grants. This will ensure that those who have been unable to share the benefits of growth and development, perhaps through lack of entitlements, can now operate within viable markets and secure livelihoods and opportunities for improvement. Despite the obvious attraction of commercially-oriented production, there is a need to focus on ensuring household food security through the promotion of growing staples such as maize, cassava and wheat (in wetter regions). Also, raising rural incomes by promoting a diversified portfolio of income activities including but not limited to livestock breeding is essential to household food security. A sustainable agricultural strategy should minimise financial (forex) costs and enhance local small scale farming, in order to increase local auto-consumption and trade. This will potentially create social synergies that are critical to broad based rural development.
Improving Infrastructure and Financial Services

As already observed in the introductory chapter, most smallholders rely on rudimentary technologies because they cannot afford to buy expensively imported machinery. There is need for the adaptation of technological innovation to suit smallholder production. Technologies should be promoted to enhance the sector’s less energy and capital intensive production system, and promote its labour intensive approaches (create more jobs) while rationalising its requirements for motorised traction, harvesting and food processing (Moyo, 2008). This would require concerted effort in identifying and investing in cheaper and easily accessible technologies for smallholder food production. Moyo et al (2009: 14) recommend that technological innovations be informed by the needs of the people and suitable for local context. They argue that:

...technology must be owned and controlled by the people and not driven by profit motives otherwise it will deepen the power imbalances, between smallholder farmers and TNCs represented by the local agro-dealers and regional wholesalers.

Development of a Comprehensive Early Warning System

Droughts and shorter rainfall have become common since 2000. There is a need to develop appropriate climate adaptation strategies especially for smallholder agriculture which is largely based on rain-fed agriculture. Early warning system should be reinvigorated in such a way that they can proactively anticipate rainfall decline and to find innovative ways of feeding this information to the smallholder sector. Furthermore, the early warning system should also include information on input markets, pricing and food availability. Identifying potential input shortage areas will alert governments and the private sector prior to the beginning of the agricultural season. More systematic and timeous collection of data on rainfall, inputs, prices and food availability at a sub-regional level is essential because it can be used to inform policies annual production strategies and with adequate support mechanisms can contribute towards averting potential crises.

Smart Partnerships Developing Inclusive Financial Markets

Reliable agricultural financial services for infrastructural development and inputs supply should be a fundamental basis of the envisaged turnaround
of the smallholder sector. In many cases, financing systems for smallholder agriculture are highly inadequate. Others (Sachikonye, 2004; Moyo and Yeros, 2005) have commented that although land reforms (redistribution and tenure) are crucial, they are not in themselves a sufficient condition of ensuring food production and consequently national development. These reforms need to be complemented by measures that ensure that smallholders have sustainable access to financing, inputs and extension services. However, currently financial institutions have been averse to extending credit to smallholders. The unavailability of title has literally repelled a number of financial institutions that lend on the basis of availability of identifiable forms of title on land or ownership of urban property. Hence, such credit has mostly been accessible to large scale farmers. There is need for a more innovative approach to rural financing which does not discriminate against the poorer sections of society, especially women. Research on experiences from areas such as Bangladesh (Grameen Bank) and India have shown that the rural poor pay on time and default rates are very low (Prahalad, 2004: 21). The default rate at Grameen Bank, a microfinance pioneer in Bangladesh, is less than 2% among 2,500,000 customers (ibid: 26). There is evidence in many other developing countries that banks can successfully lend small loans to rural people in the absence of physical collateral.

Rethinking forms of Local Organisation and Rural Production

Despite the seemingly technical nature of the problem surrounding smallholder agriculture, the organisation of smallholder production is embedded within social networks that are mostly based on autochthonous relations. The importance of the social relations have been used to justify the limited development of the African countryside for a considerable period and led others to claim that the region does not have a peasantry, but rather tribesmen subordinate to a despotic chief. However, there is need to rethink this model of social organisation as a potentially more viable approach to the organisation of production and institution of social controls and welfare. The forms of land ownership embedded within a lineage framework allocate a hierarchy of land rights that range from the political and territorial rights held by the lineage leadership and usufruct rights held by individual households within the lineage group. Such forms of land rights have recently come under attack from a neoliberal prescription that is attempting to universalise the concept of property (see De Soto,
Leading multi-lateral development agencies such as the World Bank have made various attempts to introduce new land titling methods aimed at encouraging investment on the land. The suggested reforms, including land titling within a DeSotoist framework, are yet to be implemented on a broader scale, except for trials in counties such as Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania (see Shivji in this book). However, it is important to note that if not appropriately implemented, these reforms might actually negate the social controls and welfare mechanisms embedded within the lineage-based forms of social organisation.

In the meantime, customary-based forms of tenure continue to dominate the social relations of production and any intervention focused on agricultural development has to contend with it. Inherent within customary-based forms of tenure are sub-systems of organising farm production, consumption and welfare in bad seasons. Members belonging within the lineage group devise means of sharing the productive assets to which they have access. Such examples of rural cooperation need further analysis in terms of how they can be strengthened—especially given the fact that individual rural households tend to be highly atomised and also face labour deficits to an extent that a development intervention that is purely focused on individual households might have little impact. Already, there are some case studies demonstrating that smallholders (Kenya, Malawi, Zimbabwe) operating within customary tenure areas have been able to respond to maize production for the market with great zeal. Beyond customary-based forms of organisation, there is a variety of types of social organisations that include cooperatives, farmer groups, savings associations and unions. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that collective farming and cooperatives have not been given a fair chance among the smallholder producers in Africa. The popularity of collective agriculture waned with the collapse of the Soviet Union despite the fact that cooperatives (albeit not embedded within the socialist ideology) are thriving in other parts of the world, especially in Scandinavian countries such as Sweden and Norway.

Strengthening Representative Advocacy Unions and Networks

As already strongly argued, rural households are engaged in a variety of associational activities and these formations have been at the forefront of questioning neo-liberal orthodoxy in agricultural development. However, their impact on national agricultural policies remains limited due to a
number of constraints that include a fragmented approach to engaging their governments. Furthermore, most of these organisations do not have adequate capacities to analyse government proposals and policies. Moyo (1992: xxi) has referred to this set of skills as ‘craft competency’ and ‘craft literacy.’ In fact, this problem also affects national governments to an extent that most of them rely on policy technocratic support from multilateral institutions.

The failure of the representative farmer organisations to mount a sustainable pro-poor campaign at national and regional levels has partially contributed to the continued deterioration of rural livelihoods and the contribution of agriculture to national GDP. There is an urgent need to rethink smallholder agriculture to emphasise the need for a stronger advocacy network representing smallholders.

**Building Active Rural Based Civil Society Formations**

An observation has been made that, ‘many of what now pass as peasant associations must be located in the larger landscape of new rural social movements that are less concerned with defending ways of life of blocking the intrusions of the state than delineating new political and cultural spaces’ Webster (2004: 2). Recently, mass social movements, especially in Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru have been at the forefront of the struggle to improve access to land and also to develop or maintain food crops as a source of livelihood in the face of market oriented policies that emphasise cash crops and importation of non-staple cheap foods (Veltmeyer, 2005: 303). They have opposed some or all of the neoliberal restructuring measures such as privatisation of land and other natural resources and strongly challenge the structure of agricultural commodity markets as defined by the World Trade Organisation. Africa has also witnessed the emergence of a very vibrant (but ideologically incoherent) civil society network(s) advocating largely for human rights that centre on electoral and governance reforms. Whilst these set of rights are crucial, they have not proven to be an adequate response to the structural challenges currently negatively affecting agricultural development. The momentum created out of the struggles for civil and political human rights provides an opportunity for broadening the struggle to emphasise the right to food, a dignified livelihood and structural transformation of African economies.

From an advocacy perspective Africa’s agricultural development needs to be integrated within a much broader rights-based framework which
includes the increasingly popular concept of the ‘right to food’\textsuperscript{3} A loose international network on land and food rights within civil society has emerged led by peasant organisations such La Via Campesina\textsuperscript{4} – a network made up almost entirely of marginalised groups: landless workers, small farmers, sharecroppers, pastoralists, fisherfolk and the peri-urban poor. The network\textsuperscript{5} has, since the turn of the century, been behind some of the mobilisations and campaigns that have brought food security and agriculture back on the global policy agenda. Africa based networks focused on food security and agricultural development (inclusive of agrarian reforms) have also begun to penetrate the policy scene, although there is still a lot of work to be done in terms of sharpening the advocacy tools, clarification of the policy needs and building synergies across Africa. Furthermore, the networks based in Africa need to take a more cautious approach to coalition building with existing networks, especially those in the West where farming systems are already highly developed and the farmers are actually benefitting from the existing commodity trade regimes. Most western farmers have managed to mechanise their production systems and are recipients of subsidies from their governments. African smallholders still rely on out-dated technologies, are neglected by their governments in terms of subsidies and face the brunt of the globalised commodity market. Forging relations of solidarity within such a context is difficult and needs careful thought, but should not necessarily lead to disengagement from the issues currently curtailing the development of agriculture globally. The networks should adopt a multi-pronged approach to policy advocacy that seeks to reform both the globally imposed structural constraints and to influence their governments to adopt a more heterodox approach to the development of smallholder agriculture–where the state takes on a more leading role in funding agriculture. The rallying cry should indeed be about, ‘one struggle and many fronts’.

**Concluding Remarks**

Discourse on agricultural development and food security should begin from a principled premise that every human being has a right to adequate food that is culturally acceptable and that smallholder agriculture should contribute towards national economic transformation. The acceptance of the inalienability of the right to food should also lead to a more rigorous identification of conditions necessary for the realisation of the goal of national self-sufficiency and household food security.
Attaining the goal of food security amongst smallholders should be a top priority within Africa. It should be based on the adoption of a broad range of interrelated policy measures that include land redistribution and tenure reforms, anticipating climate shocks, structural reforms, government policy innovation and establishment of partnerships that CAADP in its current form does not adequately address. The tendency amongst sub-regional governments has been to adopt populist and often contradictory policy stances, such as the rhetorical commitment to food security and the promotion of an export led growth agricultural model, without an appreciation of the inherent contradictions within such a framework. Export led agricultural strategies, mostly of cash crops, tend to stretch the capacities of states to an extent that they then fail to subsidise food crop production for the local market.

In many instances, a pro-poor agenda has been adopted as a ‘vote winning’ strategy but the hard decisions of structural reforms (especially land reforms) and budgetary commitments towards the sector have not been followed through. However, the growing levels of food insecurity and poverty require an urgent critical rethink amongst policy makers before rural poverty and food insecurity in particular become politically volatile issues as we have already seen during the 2007/8 food riots. Nepad’s CAADP is better placed to invest in research for the early warning system and effective dissemination strategies.

Finally, it is important to note that African states regardless of their ideological orientation urgently need to embark on smallholder focused agrarian reforms. These reforms must, through a concerted national policy framework and development strategy, redirect production to the national market and create dynamic synergies with domestic wages, while broadening domestic demand for industrial goods and services. Such a strategy should lean towards small (and in other instances) middle-sized farms, realising their employment potential and through this redirect production to the home market (Moyo, 2010: 302). More specifically, such a development strategy has the advantage of low financial (forex) costs. It should devote more attention towards enhancing self-employed small scale farming with local auto-consumption and demand for manufactured goods. However, such a path of agrarian reform would require securing sufficient policy planning and implementing autonomy, defined by Moyo (2010: 308) as the willingness and orientation to carry out comprehensive agrarian reforms that reorient agriculture towards national economic transformation. There
is also a need to ensure that the state has adequate capacity to effect the desired policies, together with the effective mobilisation of popular social forces in support of the vision of agrarian reform (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). Furthermore, we envisage a process of sustainable and fair integration into both national and international commodity markets, mediated by a more robust and equitable international framework of trade beyond the currently MNC dominated regime. Box 8-1 below captures the principles of such a policy framework.

**Box 8.1: A Template for Agricultural Recovery**

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<th>The Vision</th>
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<td>A sustainable smallholder-led agricultural sector which integrates farmers’ traditional and local experience within affordable scientific knowledge and innovation aimed at ensuring equitable access to healthy and nutritious food.</td>
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<th>Values Driving the Vision</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inclusiveness</strong> – ensure that men and women have equal access to the means of production and also the forces of production</td>
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<td><strong>Fairness</strong> – remove monopolies and open the downstream and upstream value chains to more actors</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Accountability</strong> – Build a new global governance system that takes into consideration the interests of peripheral states and smallholders in particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agency</strong> – Promote local innovations and responses to production challenges</td>
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<th>Priority Actions</th>
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<td>• Economic Integration—Ensure that macro-economic policies/programmes prioritise agricultural development and ensure coherence with other fiscal and monetary policies (such as exchange rate regimes, tariff policies etc)</td>
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<td>• Increased and sustained allocation of budgets towards investments in agriculture.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Develop norms for foreign investment in land (ensure that purchased land is used for enhancing local agricultural output and smallholder agriculture is not disrupted through land grabs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Amplify the voice of the smallholders to make demands for policy change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bilateral and multi-lateral donor partners should prioritise investment in ensuring public research, extension and credit facilities particularly for women smallholders (Action Aid 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1. Hernando de Soto’s book *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Elsewhere* has influenced thinking around land tenure to ensure that ‘dead capital’ is made alive through the issuing of tradable land titling. However the impact of these measures so far implemented in a limited extent in countries such as Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia have not led to a thriving land market or contributed towards an increase in rural credit and production.

2. According to Moyo (1992: xxi) *craft literacy* is the capacity to conceptualise a successful management process. It is the kind of capacity that leads to the construction of blueprints or models that can be applied in different situations. *Craft competency* on the other hand refers to the ability to understand and apply, with regularity, a model or blueprint that has been developed by someone other than oneself.

3. International organisations such as Action Aid have been running a program focused on popularising the concept of the right to food. However the enforceability of this right in the absence of radical restructuring of domestic and international structural relations remains an elusive goal.

4. La Via Campesina was formed in 1993 in Mons, Belgium at a meeting of farm leaders from around the world. It was formed with organisations mostly from the Americas and Europe, but has since expanded to include more than 150 rural movements, from over 79 countries including 12 countries in Africa (Holt-Gimenez, 2010: 203).

5. This network is made up mostly of international NGOs such the Oxfam family of organisations, Action Aid International, ONE, War on Want, etc.

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